Vol 26, No 3 (2026): Regional Aspects of Contemporary International Relations

In the context of the reconfiguration of the international relations system in the Middle East, there has been a certain stabilization of the situation. To some extent, this is due to the improvement of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In conditions of information confrontation, media often neutralize the significance of certain events, passing off what is expected as reality. In this regard, it became necessary to analyze the reaction of the leading Western media to the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation, as this makes it possible to understand how the West explains the significance of this reconciliation to its audience and the potential implications for the region. The analysis of articles was carried out on the basis of qualitative content analysis: the authors manually classified articles by topic, identified and counted frames, and analyzed in detail examples of their use. The main method used was frame analysis. This involves organizing a news story thematically, stylistically and actually in such a way as to convey a certain idea. It was found out that Western media articles focus on the increased role of Saudi Arabia, which does not look back at the United States in its actions in the Middle East. At the same time, all publications lack the idea of the possibility of stabilizing the regional situation after reconciliation, which objectively is not realistic. The recent normalization of Saudi-Iranian relations has led to a certain “conservation” of regional conflicts, but the situation was blown up by the Israeli war in the Gaza Strip, called “genocide” by the UN, and the military operations of the Israeli army against Lebanon, as well as the exchange of strikes between Israel and Iran. In addition, the weakened position of the United States following the reconciliation and the diplomatic success of China are poorly highlighted. The reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran has opened up new opportunities for the Russian Federation to build constructive relations not only with Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also with other important countries in the Middle East. However, the US-Israeli aggression against Iran in 2026 made it more difficult for Russia to develop constructive relations simultaneously with all players in the Persian Gulf, creating new risks and limitations for the implementation of Moscow’s multi-vector policy in the region.

The macro-region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has become a deeply divided region with increasingly polarized interests of states. Following the Arab Spring, some Arab countries, primarily Gulf monarchies, which had maintained internal political stability, embarked on accelerated modernization and economic diversification, ultimately needing long-lasting peace, while other states, like Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria have plunged into domestic crises on the brink of collapse. Earlier, Iraq and Libya became victims of US military interventions, leading to the destruction of their ruling regimes and civil wars. The heterogeneity of the MENA became reflected in both the 2020 Abraham Accords on the normalization of Israel’s relations with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, concluded with Washington’s diplomatic assistance and the October 2025 “peace agreement” between Israel and Hamas mediated by the USA and Qatar, ignoring the two-state formula of the Palestinian-Israeli settlement. The chaotic escalation in MENA poses a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation, therefore, requiring an adequate assessment, which explains the relevance of this study, while, the task to predict future scenarios determines its practical significance. The author aims to prove the acknowledgment that, despite the ephemeral unity, shown at Arab summits on the Palestinian issue or Syria and the existence of formats like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Arab countries remain divided into two groups, focused respectfully on sustainable development and survival. Facing irreconcilable and intractable contradictions in their ultimate priorities, they are not able to share integration. Not perceiving counterparties as equal partners, the countries of the first category are guided in politics by the paradigm of realism, if necessary, “forgetting” about sovereignty and pan-Arab problems under Western pressure. Since Russian and foreign studies devoted to conflicts and modernization of Arab countries apparently lack a review of the survival-sustainable development dichotomy, the author intends to fill this gap by using the methods of comparative and cross-event analyses. This constitutes the novelty of this research.

This article explores the various constraints, including institutional, normative and other factors, that shape the nature and limits of the Association of South East Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) engagement with the Eurasian regional order. The empirical foundation of the study is based on an analysis of ASEAN’s core foundational documents, such as the ASEAN Charter and strategic documents reflecting the organization’s long-term vision. The findings indicate that ASEAN’s limited engagement is driven by a set of four structural factors. First, there is a significant discrepancy between the institutional logics of Southeast Asia and that of Eurasia. The distributed and functionally differentiated architecture of Eurasian institutions, characterized by the separation of economic, political, and security competencies among different organizations, contrasts with ASEAN’s normatively driven and dialogue-oriented model, which is centered on consensus-building and procedural consolidation around ASEAN as the singular core of the regional order. Second, ASEAN’s strategic positioning is predominantly oriented toward the Indo-Pacific region and a hedging strategy amid major power competition, whereas the Eurasian dimension is not institutionalized as an independent strategic priority in ASEAN’s official documents. Third, the principle of ASEAN centrality and preservation of procedural autonomy constrain participation in frameworks that imply an institutional core alternative to ASEAN. This explains the organization’s cautious stance toward Russian initiatives such as the Greater Eurasian Partnership and proposals for Eurasian security architecture. Fourth, internal heterogeneity among member states on key security issues, most notably the Myanmar crisis and territorial dispute in the South China Sea, as well as differing approaches to engagement with external partners, complicates the formation of a unified position. Collectively, these factors account for the fragmented nature of interregional linkages and impede the establishment of a comprehensive framework for cooperation with Eurasian institutions.

Since the mid-2000s, the expansion of contacts with African countries in socio-economic and military-political spheres has become one of the main directions of Ankara’s foreign policy and foreign economic activity. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of Ankara’s policy towards Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, based on official documents of the Turkish government, trade and investment statistics, as well as academic literature and reports from leading international think tanks. The study examines Türkiye’s multi-vector and multi-factor cooperation with SSA, which encompasses aid to the least developed countries, trade, investment, the implementation of joint economic projects, education, healthcare, military training, and security services. The novelty of the research lies in its systemic approach, which considers economic, military-technical, political, and religious aspects as integral parts of a single strategy to strengthen Türkiye’s status as a “global center of power.” Economic interaction is illustrated by the growth of Türkiye’s trade with SSA countries from USD 742 million in 2000 to USD 12.4 billion in 2023, as well as investments by Turkish companies in infrastructure, energy, and construction. Military-technical cooperation includes the supply of arms and training of African military specialists. Although Ankara traditionally maintains the closest relations with the North African region, the partnership options it offers to countries south of the Sahara are generating increasing interest in this part of the continent, notably due to the anti-neocolonial rhetoric of the Turkish leadership. The authors of the paper emphasize that cooperation with Africa has become a key element of Türkiye’s strategy to diversify its foreign relations and enhance its global influence, which injects new dynamism into international relations on the African continent.