Key Features of the International Climate Process: A Perspective from the Global South

Full Text

Introduction

The world’s climate has always been changing and evolving due to various influences whether natural or man-made. Regardless of these natural causes, the recent rising rate of temperatures and the accompanying continuing escalation in global warming resulting from the human-made greenhouse gas (GHGs) emission since the industrial revolution, have captured the attention and recognition of the international community, especially when these environmental worries were backed up and verified  by growing scientific data and validations Therefore, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 in response to the growing global awareness of the negative consequences of climate change, and the desire of the UN to obtain a leading role in addressing this pressing worldwide issue (Doussis & Dikaios, 2025, p. 154). Its main purpose is to provide policymakers with scientific assessments of the potential consequences of climate change, hence bringing the issue to the forefront of international affairs.^[1]

Throughout the period 1988–1990, the UN General Assembly also addressed climate change through various resolutions, stressing the alteration of the climate system and acknowledging the severe potential consequences of human-induced GHGs.^[2] Soon after, the IPCC First Assessment Report (FAR) was published in 1990, confirming the role of human activities, while admitting the uncertainties in the models and projections.^[3] The FAR accompanied by the high-level declaration of the Second World Climate Conference (SWCC) and UN resolution 45/212 furnished the ground to the formation of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), which led to the drafting of the UNFCCC (the Convention) (Heras & Gupta, 2025, p. 5).

The Convention was adopted in May 1992 and entered into force on March 21, 1994. The Convention is a non-enforceable mitigation agreement (Kuyper, Schroeder & Linnér, 2018, p. 345; Pattberg & Wideberg, 2017, p. 4) due to the US low ambition and its firm unwillingness to accept quantified emission reduction objectives “QELROs” (Heras & Gupta, 2025, p. 5). Apart from this limitation, the Convention comprises an ultimate objective of stabilizing GHG concentrations and key principles of great interests to DCs such as CBDR-RCs, comprehensiveness, support for their needs and sustainable development (SD). These principles were endorsed after a fundamental legal struggle between developed nations (led by the US), who were concerned about broad overarching principles, and DCs (led by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)), who believed that they represent an essential guidance that should be included in the main text. The two sides settled on a middle ground establishing Article 3, which outlines the key principles (Yamin & Depledge, 2004, p. 66).

Many developed countries resisted legally binding norms in order to protect their economic and strategic interests and to exert dominance by pushing aside Southern standpoints (Heras & Gupta, 2025, p. 10; Arslan, 2025, pp. 8–9). However, DCs maintained their agency by supporting relevant key principles to protect themselves from future emission reductions (Heras & Gupta, 2025, p. 2; Arslan, 2025, p. 7). These fundamental cornerstones were embraced by the carefully balanced compromised Convention and were applicable to the Parties of the KP and the PA. While these foundational principles were designed to ensure the integrity of the regime, the post-PA era has witnessed a move towards “northern selectivity”—a piecemeal application of obligations—with scholarship growingly treats the PA as a “standalone regime,” notwithstanding it operates under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Despite the vast literature on the UNFCCC process, our search didn’t identify any studies that systematically analyze COP outcomes within the scope of Article 3.3 regarding “comprehensiveness,” which is directly undermined by the selective approach taken by countries of the Global North regarding the fulfillment of obligations within the international climate process. The review of the literature suggests that there is a twofold scientific silence in the wake of PA climate negotiation process: first, the failure to ground within Article 3.3 the critiques of northern deliberate circumvention of the contested calls for FF phase-out since Glasgow COP26; second, the neglect of how unfair mitigation-centric policies engender “problem-shifting” and transboundary adverse effects onto DCs. A recent study (Adipudi, Kim & Biermann, 2025) provides empirical evidence for this argument by analyzing 182 national communications from 25 Global North countries (1994–2023), which identifies 718 instances of “problem-shifting” risk across 712 climate policies. In short, despite the UNFCCC’s recognition of the importance of minimizing the adverse effects of climate response measures, the magnitude and direction of such burden-shifts remain unexplored in a systematic manner.

In line with structural realist regime theory, the regime’s principles and norms exert influence on negotiations and outcomes by shaping actor expectations under the anarchic structure of world politics. These normative elements are frequently diluted and compromised, selectively enforced and interpreted, or weakened by constant causal factors such as power imbalances, economic interests, and relative advantage concerns, which in turn bring about distributional conflicts (cherry-picking), and strategic burden-shifting by the Global North (Krasner, 1982a, pp. 497–510; 1982b, pp. 185–189). According to Krasner, any modification in principles and norms is an alteration of the regime itself, while changes at the operational level of rules and decision-making procedures are deviations within the regime without affecting the regime’s fundamental identity (Krasner, 1982b, pp. 187–188). Therefore, the attempts by the developed countries to disregard core principles like equity and CBDR-RCs would redefine the climate change regime into a different topic-area. In contrast, the transformation from the “top-down” approach of the KP emission reduction targets to the bottom-up fashion under the PA can be considered a change within the regime of UNFCCC.

In light of the above, the fundamental research problem revolves around how causal factors have undermined the UNFCCC regime’s principles, reinforced North—South power asymmetries, and allowed Northern selectivity and burden-shifting to challenge the Global South’s demands for equity, historical responsibility, means of implementation (MOI), and comprehensiveness.

Hence, the study aims to achieve five primary objectives:

• to trace the UNFCCC’s historical evolution across its four historical phases (1995–2024) under  power inequalities,
• to highlight the main unique features and the position of the Group of 77 + China (G77) towards them,
• to assess the impact of the PA modifications on adherence to the Convention’s core principles,
• to investigate the pragmatism of phase out fossil fuels (FF) calls and the impacts on FF-dependent DCs,
• to deepen the understanding of the role of structural realism in environmental regimes and politics.

To achieve this, we have adopted a methodology that is dictated by the multidimensional essence of climate change, employing a multidisciplinary approach grounded in IR affairs, political science, economics, energy security, history, and international environmental law. The research was conducted from a Southern standpoint in compliance with the methodological basis of historicism, scientific objectivity, and reliability. Historicism proved essential for assessing historical critical junctures and milestones in the UNFCCC regime progression, providing a more comprehensive understanding of the regime’s structural changes, the influences of primary emitters as major powers, and the political stances of parties, with special emphasis on the G77 + China, considering all historical events carefully situated within their precise historical contexts. 

A combination of analytical methods is applied, comprising a disciplined review of primary sources, negotiation records, and official UNFCCC documents, guided by a critical reading of relevant peer-reviewed IR scholarship. These methods include qualitative content analysis and historical-comparative analysis with induction/deduction reasoning, and a statistical approach to exhibit the inconsistency between the calls for phasing out FF and the overwhelming long-term energy outlooks. These methods are supplemented by the author’s 25 years inputs of personal experience in the international climate process, as well as a series of personal interviews with senior stakeholders from the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), Saudi Arabia, and Kuwaiti delegations at the UNFCCC.

Landmarks in the International  Climate Process

Since the Convention entry into force, the Parties have been meeting annually at the Conferences of the Parties (COPs), the supreme governing establishment within the UNFCCC. These COPs serve as the main forum for international climate cooperation, whose decisions symbolize the collective international will of the international community (Almquist et al., 2026, p. 222; Obergassel et al., 2022, p. 3).This view is broadly shared, despite recent Western criticism regarding the COP’s inclusivity in affording equal vote for each Party, due to a lack of agreement on procedural rules on voting in INC meetings  (Maslin, Lang & Harvey, 2023, p. 2). The issue of “consensus” within Rule 42 was one of the key and foremost contentious topics in the preparatory negotiations for COP1, and remains unresolved to date.^[4] This style qualifies every Party with the power of rejection (veto) over the COPs’ final outcomes (Leal-Arcas, Alghamdi & Alharethi, 2026, р. 125, 131) and has become an important characteristic of global climate politics (Chasek, Downie & Allan, 2025, рр. 11–12). 

As a result, this approach has led some western authors to question the value of multilateral climate negotiations, encouraging minilateral climate mechanisms among major emitters to sidestep institutional gridlock (Keohane & Victor, 2016, р. 573; Pattberg et al., 2022, р. 298). However, such proposals have signaled the difficulties associated with their formation and the risk of sidestepping the existing multilateral climate process (Falkner, Nasiritousi & Reischl, 2022, р. 484).

These annual COPs outcomes form a “detailed rulebook” for executing the UNFCCC legal agreements. Highlighting prime steps and pivotal moments, this study covers notable COP sessions up to COP29, segmented into the following four phases.

Phase 1: The Formation of Binding Obligations (1995–1997)

In 1995 COP1 preparations Parties agreed that the Convention’s mitigation was inadequate and needed to be strengthened through targeting developed countries’ obligations but not DCs. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, alongside other OPEC members, argued that it was premature to reach such a conclusion without appropriate scientific information and underscored the need to address the socioeconomic impacts of recent and future obligations on other Parties.^[5] COP1 demonstrated a shared global awareness to confront the climate crisis (Ushadevi et al., 2024, p. 26) and created the “Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate” (AGBM) to launch an international action for the period beyond 2000. The AGBM met eight times, and negotiations concluded with the adoption of KP in December 1997 at COP3 in Kyoto. However, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force only in February 2005, as Russia’s ratification of the document made it possible to meet the requirement set forth in Article 25 of the Protocol, which stated that the ratifying states listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC account for at least 55% of their aggregate CO₂ emissions from 1990.^[6] 

The 1997 KP as the pioneering legally enforceable climate accord concerning GHGs mitigation (Ushadevi et al., 2024, p. 26) was built on the Convention’s legal underpinning (Leal-Arcas, Alghamdi & Alharethi, 2026, p. 116), particularly the principles of equity and historical accountability. It focused on Annex I developed countries, committing them to decrease 5% of their GHG outputs relative to1990 levels throughout the 2008–2012 period. This style of emission reduction is known as a top-down architecture, founding on international joint efforts directed to the achievement of a shared objective via legally binding commitments with specific quantifiable targets (Hare et al., 2010, p. 601). Pattberg & Widerberg (2017, p. 7) captured this notion, when they underline that the institutional design of KP embodied an approach to global climate governance that relied on the crafting a wide-ranging, globally adopted, and enforceable accord. This accord would be in a top-down manner grounded in established norms and prior consensus among all parties, while recognizing the division between developed and developing countries and their contending welfare priorities (Doussis & Dikaios, 2025, p. 156).

Key elements of the KP include the formation of a favorable US approach flexible market-based mechanisms for worldwide emission cuts (Doussis & Dikaios, 2025, p. 156), revolving around trading and transferring emission permits, similar to customary cap-and-trade programs (Makarov, 2020, p. 165), so as to achieve their assigned emission reduction targets cost-effectively. In other words, these mechanisms were intended to enable the rich Global North to offset domestic obligations through projects and trading schemes with the poor Global South at the lowest cost (Heras & Gupta, 2025, p. 5), sparking disputes on burden shifting amidst unresolved compliance matters. Scholars claim that beneath such collaborative arrangements lie economic agendas driven by wealth buildup, power asymmetries, and North—South disparities (Arslan, 2025, p. 8). 

The KP’s effectiveness was limited due to inadequate emission cuts (Makarov, 2020, p. 167) and the absence of major emitters such as the US, who would not have approved of the KP even before it was negotiated (Mukherjee & Mathew, 2023, p. 278), due to internal politics (Clémençon, 2023, p. 115). The Senate resolution prohibited the White House from ratifying agreements involving binding targets and timetables imposed on some countries, but not applied to others, or resulting in a serious economic harm (Ibrahim & Uke, 2013, p. 143). The sluggish ratification process, and the US withdrawal in 2001, weakened the Global North’s leadership model and deepened the North—South gap (Heras & Gupta, 2025, p. 5).

Despite the 30% coverage of global GHG emissions by KP-1, it was considered a decisive step forward, reducing industrialized parties’ emissions by more than 10% below a no-policy scenario by 2012 (Hoppe et al., 2023, p. 620) (Table 1). In contrast, the Doha amendments for the second commitment period (2013–2020) only covered 14% of global GHG emissions (Haibach & Schneider, 2013, p. 362), a setback stemming from major Annex I countries—the US, Russia, Japan, Canada, Australia—rejecting the  amendments on the basis that Equity and CBDR-RCs should be perceived within today’s global economic realities (Thakur, 2021, p. 368; Haibach & Schneider, 2013, p. 362) by not disregarding the rising emissions of emerging economies (Falkner, 2016, p. 1110). Through the lens of the Global South, the Western nations’ intention is to wipe out their historical responsibility by promoting a model that could drag the emerging economies into the same mitigation domain by knocking down the ‘top-down’ legally binding regime for industrialized countries (Thakur, 2021, p. 367).

Table 1. Countries Included in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol and Their Emissions Targets 1990 to 2012

Note. * – Countries that have announced their intention not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
Sourxe: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Caring for Climate: A Guide to the Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. Bonn : Climate Change Secretariat, 2003. Р. 25. URL: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/caring_en.pdf (accessed: 12.03.2026).

The KP’s “one-size-fits-all” structure left little room for flexibility for industrialized countries under stringent mandates without consideration to domestic politics, triggering “distributional conflicts” among them (Falkner et al., 2022, p. 48). This has ensured the failure of any future replication of the KP top-down model, particularly for nations whose economies relied heavily on FF and had excessive carbon intensity (Makarov, 2020, p. 168; Keohane & Victor, 2016, p. 573).

Phase 2: Turbulent Intersections, from Kyoto to Paris (1997–2015) 

Despite the adoption of the KP, “unfinished business” remained, demonstrating the implementing of the KP (Mitchell, 2001, p. 225). The lack of clarity on matters such as the “compliance system” and “mechanisms” led many signatories to hesitate in ratifying and enforcing the KP (Doussis & Dikaios, 2025, p. 156). A new cycle of deliberations under several COPs was initiated to expatiate the KP’s rulebook up to the time of COP7 in 2001, which finally concluded with the adoption of the “Marrakesh Accords” (Ushadevi et al., 2024, p. 27). 

To pursue the international climate negotiations, the Bali Roadmap contained two negotiating tracks: one under the Convention and one under the KP. The former was introduced to involve the US after its withdrawal from KP-1 as the only way that the international climate negotiations could continue with US participation, and explore the possibility of long-term cooperative action among all countries beyond Annex-I industrialized emissions.^[7] 

While high idealistic hopes were placed on Copenhagen COP15 in 2009 for a legal deal, the conference fell considerably short of expectations and was unable to agree on a second commitment period (Clémençon, 2023, p. 124).  The collapse of negotiations should be perceived within the broader global geoeconomic landscape, as the financial crisis of 2008 hampered the deliberations in favor of economic revival (Maslin, Lang & Harvey, 2023, p. 7). Additionally, the US geopolitical strategy  exacerbated the situation by insisting on shifting from mandates to flexibility, while including all Parties, particularly China and India (Clémençon, 2023, p. 120). The political Copenhagen Accord, negotiated mainly between the US and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and the PRC), breached the inclusiveness that was regarded as a crucial common practice within the UNFCCC rules of procedure (Bodansky, 2010, p. 235; Kuyper, Schroeder & Linnér, 2018, p. 352). COP15 flaws illustrated the move towards a fragmented climate architecture portrayed by the dominance of a few significant actors, emphasizing the growing power of established and emerging economies (Vogler, 2022, p. 35). 

The majority of Copenhagen obligations and the 2° C target were adopted at Cancun COP, which was considered a progress and a positive development (Ushadevi et al., 2024, р. 31; Maslin, Lang & Harvey, 2023, р. 5). This was followed by the Durban Platform (ADP), which served as a bargaining chip and a prerequisite for the adoption of the Doha Amendment (KP-2) at COP18,^[8] clearing the path for the PA.

The PA was adopted in Paris (COP21) in 2015, and was perceived as a passage out of the gridlock after COP15, enabling the wealthy Global North to abandon the dichotomous approach of differentiated responsibilities (Heras & Gupta, 2025, p. 5). The PA main purpose commits Parties to keeping the global warming below 2° C above pre-industrial levels and limiting it to 1.5° C. Achieving this long-term temperature target is anchored within the adherence to the Convention’s objectives and principles, in particular CBDR-RCs, the provision of MOI, and consideration to the parties’ domestic conditions.

The PA  marked a paradigm shift from the KP model (top-down uniform emission targets) to a country-driven approach (bottom-up Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) system) (Doussis & Dikaios, 2025, p. 159; Pattberg et al., 2022, p. 299). Indeed, the top-down approach confronted the implementation complications and political resistance by the Umbrella Group (including the USA, Russia, Canada, and Japan). The PA integrates this bottom-up flexibility through NDCs, enabling the participation of major emitters, particularly the US (Clemençon, 2023, p. 120), alongside the earlier mandatory top-down system (Pattberg et al, 2022, p. 299). While representing a constructive landmark evolution of the international climate change process (Clemençon, 2023, p. 120, 133; Doussis & Dikaios, 2025, p. 159), others view it as a departure from differentiation, allowing wealthy countries to escape providing necessary MOI and mitigation leadership (Pattberg et al., 2022, p. 305; Heras & Gupta, 2025, p. 5).

Phase 3: Forging the Rulebook—Post-Paris Operationalization to Glasgow Pact (2015–2021)

The expeditious entry into force of the PA was considered a “phenomenal progressive step” in international climate politics. This can be attributed to the bottom-up flexibility, the required 55% global GHG emissions benchmark, and the rapid ratification by largest emitters, including USA, China, and the EU (Heras & Gupta, 2025, p. 5), demonstrating the major powers’ abilities in deciding the future of the UNFCCC process. 

Given that the PA is distinguished by its abstract legal provisions, the Parties initiated the Paris Agreement Work Program (PAWP), conducting 4 COPs to operationalize the PA legal obligations (Abdulkadir, Abdulquadir & Nevaluz, 2025, р. 3; Ruiz Campillo, 2024, р. 2). The deliberations hovered over contentious North—South related issues on headship, accountability and MOI (Heras & Gupta, 2025, p. 5). Despite these tensions, COP24 finalized the “Katowice Package,” embracing almost all PAWP aspects.^[9] At COP25 in Madrid, the Parties agreed on many unfinished business items, including the six-year response measures work plan, extending the Paris Committee on Capacity-building until 2024, and completing the pre-2020 stocktake and emission gap.

 Phase 4: Contested Energy Transitions—Glasgow’s Fossil Fuel Calls to Baku’s Finance Compromises (2021–2024)

The 2021–2024 UNFCCC negotiation process witnessed an intensified fossil fuel phase-out rhetoric within the deliberations of COP26—COP29, reaching a point of “binary confrontation” between  climate sustainability and energy security (Doussis & Dikaios, 2025, p. 160; Leal-Arcas, Alghamdi & Alharethi, 2026, p. 136, 143), threatening the state sovereignty over its natural resources (Salimi Turkamani, 2025, p. 872). The climate regime has shifted from wide attention to GHG emissions towards a narrow emphasis on phasing out FF. According to Clemençon (2023, p. 131), closing the emissions gap by not burning FF resources and leave it under the ground was the real purpose of this (supply-side) approach. For Southern DCs with 78% of FF reserves, this presented a structural crisis as their economies and social welfare are highly dependent on them (Heras, 2024, p. 50; Salimi Turkamani, 2025, p. 862, 865), particularly rentier states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Ilyassov, Chukubayev & Morgunova, 2025, pp. 14–15) (Table 2). Eventually, this negotiation mode echoed that the PA and NDCs fell short of the required mitigation efforts  (Maslin, Lang & Harvey, 2023, p. 1, 6; Abdulkadir, Abdulquadir & Nevaluz, 2025, p. 5), leading planet towards 3° C (Jalil, 2025, p. 8; Hoppe et al., 2023, p. 634).

Since voluntary NDCs’ contributions are inadequate in meeting the net zero emission target (Minnerop, 2018, p. 135; Doussis & Dikaios, 2025, p. 159), the Global North has tactically pushed a supply-side mandate to phase out FF, thereby breaching the Convention Article 3.3 and the PA provisions. The international law under the UNFCCC regime lacks lucid direction to restrict FF extraction, focusing instead on demand-side emissions reduction policies (Salimi Turkamani, 2025, p. 864, 866; Van Asselt, 2021, pp. 1–3). Aiming at FF production confirms the failure of PA mitigation mechanisms (Thakur, 2021, p. 369; Clemençon, 2023, p. 131; Salimi Turkamani, 2025, p. 880). This, in turn, explains the Global North intention to shift the burden to the source-based DCs (Heras & Gupta, 2025, p. 6).

Table 2. Selected  Fossil Fuel-Dependent Countries, annual average in 2015–2019

Source: Global Decarbonization in Fossil Fuel Export-Dependent Economies // United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). May 15, 2023. Р. 27. URL: https://www.undp.org/publications/dfs-global-decarbonization-fossil-fuel-export-dependent-economies (accessed: 13.04.2026).

At Glasgow COP26, Parties were aware that current NDCs would lead global temperature to the range of 2.4–2.8°C; hence, requiring a 45% CO₂ emissions reduction by 2030 to be aligned with the PA temperature goals (Maslin, Lang & Harvey, 2023, p. 1, 9). The Glasgow Climate Pact revealed an indication of moving towards a more sectoral standpoint (Obergassel et al., 2022, p. 8) and the idea of phasing down/out FF was recognized for the first time in a UNFCCC process (Salimi Turkamani, 2025, p. 867; Maslin, Lang & Harvey, 2023, p. 9; Ruiz Campillo, 2024, p. 7). The lack of agreement on financial assistance for Global South countries in implementing the energy transition has further exacerbated their distrust of Global North countries (Heras & Gupta, 2025, p. 6).

The Sharm El-Sheikh (COP27) convened amid threatening international crises, particularly in energy and the transition to a multipolar world order, generating geopolitical frictions. Yet, COP27 approved the “Sharm El-Sheikh Implementation Plan,” whereby the Parties agreed on an equitable decarbonization pathway (Just Transition). Despite pushes to expand the scope of the Glasgow mandate by phasing down all FF (Salimi Turkamani, 2025, p. 867), the final agreement maintained the Glasgow jargon. However, climate action has weakened in some ways (Doussis & Dikaios, 2025, p. 160) and the idealism of Glasgow faced the reality of the energy crisis due to the situation in Ukraine. This, in turn, has brought to the forefront the multiple faces, double standards, and the huge gap between rhetoric and practice of countries proclaiming green headship, like the EU (Çelik, 2022, p. 1019).

In accordance with the UNFCCC global stocktake technical report submitted at Dubai COP28, immediate action is needed to reduce global GHG emissions by 43 and 60% by 2030 and 2035, respectively, and attain net zero by 2050 to accomplish the PA temperature objective. However, these deep cuts should be evaluated within the perspective of recent energy data and forecasts, which confirm the dominance of FF at more than 80% of primary energy demand (Salimi Turkamani, 2025, p. 861). This aligns with the International Energy Forum’s assessment of 32 multi-source long-term energy outlooks that concur with the conclusion of FF dominance in the short and medium term.^[10]

As a crucial review-mechanism for assessing the collective progress towards accomplishing the PA objectives (Maslin, Lang & Harvey, 2023, p. 6), the “First Global Stocktake” (GST) was among the highly contentious topics at Dubai COP28. The divergent views on this issue can be attributed to the DCs’ worry about the developed countries implementation gap, which may serve as a venue for shifting the burden to them.

At COP28, the US and other interested Parties once again tried and necessitated that the final outcome should state in detail for FF phase out.^[11] The Saudi Arabian delegation, as one of the leading OPEC nations, insisted that the Dubai conference focus exclusively on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, rather than just tackling the fossil fuels responsible for those emissions.^[12] The compromised language eventually approved was “transitioning away from fossil fuels” in the final COP statement.^[13] 

At Dubai COP28, Russia vetoed the EU hosting next COP, making Azerbaijan the feasible choice for representing the Eastern Europe region. By the time of Baku COP29 in November 2024, the reelection of Donald Trump clouded the atmosphere over the shift of US climate policy and the outcomes of this COP, especially the issue of “climate finance”. Nevertheless, Parties decided the “New Collective Quantified Goal” (NCQG), setting a new target of yearly USD 300 billion by 2035 for DCs. Despite tripling the previous “financial assistance” obligation (USD 100 billion annually by 2020), the new commitment was heavily criticized by the G77 countries. Objections to the NCQG decision at the closing plenary reflected the frustration of those who had proposed the original target of USD 1.3 trillion. This in turn, led to the initiation of “Baku-Belem Roadmap” so as to increase the DCs funding to that level.^[14] 

The issue of phasing out FF was largely overlooked at this COP, as the key agenda item was “climate finance” (Salimi Turkamani, 2025, р. 863). The lack of a new reinforced mandate for FF reduction showed that without clear financial arrangements, the Dubai “transitioning away” consensus is merely a political statement of good intentions.

Key Features of UNFCCC Process

The Convention and relevant legal instruments embody several general features that deeply influence the international climate legal structure and politics. Some of these key features, which signify key issues for the DCs, will be explored and examined through the Global South lens.

As for the position of DCs position on key issues, there is an enormous range of aspirations and interests among them, ranging from small and vulnerable countries to large emitters. DCs can effectively pursue their national interests when these coincide with the G77 + China coalition position. The G77 + China, the largest political grouping, is a diverse block, yet it remains the primary forum through which DCs align and formulate unified positions under the UNFCCC umbrella. Once the Group reaches a unanimous agreement on any specific matter of common concern, it is widely seen as a sign of the collective stance of the South (Almquist et al., 2026, p. 224). Thus, examining the unified G77 position as expressed in its official statements during COPs provides a practical approach to identify the broader perspective of the South.

The most unique feature is the complexity and multidimensionality of the climate change, which covers many aspects of human life-patterns and activities. This notion was acknowledged by the international community and was captured by the SWCC Ministerial Declaration. The Convention was drafted to accommodate such diversity; science is an important dimension, but not the only one. In turn, combating climate change should not be confined solely to its scope. In light of this, environmental, economic, and social dimensions of SD, including the eradication of poverty, the special conditions and specific needs of DCs, and the cost-effectiveness of climate policies, must be addressed in an integrated manner.

The G77 + China made it very clear that combating climate change stands on equal footing with the right of SD, eliminating poverty and hardship, supplying reasonable clean energy for all, safeguarding universal health coverage, and building a “better life for the six billion people” living in the South. Hence, national conditions and strategies will determine the country’s contribution to the global climate efforts.^[15]

Building on the complexity and multidimensionality that defines climate change, the UNFCCC outcomes are a product of delicate compromise among the international community members. The UNFCCC process covers several areas of climate actions; hence, comprehensiveness in dealing with these areas is a crucial matter. 

This clarifies the G77 + China’s devotion to underlining the significance of maintaining the comprehensive full scope of PA-NDCs and the importance of attaining a balanced progress on all aspects, including adaptation, mitigation, MOI, and loss and damage, as the group has repeatedly articulated in many occasions.^[16]

The international climate change politics and legislation have been deeply rooted in   “intergovernmental UN-based process” (Thompson, 2025, p. 128). The policy-making process within the UNFCCC system is based upon intergovernmental negotiations, and Parties are presumed to pursue their national interests. Despite the growing skepticism about the effectiveness of multilateral climate diplomacy (Clemençon, 2023, p. 114), this type of UN-centric intergovernmental process was explicitly embraced in the provisions of various COPs decisions, such as the “Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan” and the “First Global Stocktake,” when acknowledgment of multilateralism founded on the values and principles of the UN was recognized.

The G77 + China persistently maintains that the UNFCCC is the main intergovernmental forum for global climate deliberations. The group strongly rejected any skepticism towards multilateral state-driven process, viewing it as a worrying threat that could undermine its collective efforts and interests. The G77 + China also stresses the need to preserve the intergovernmental nature, and believes that maintaining unity and trust among Parties within such process is essential and the only path for addressing the serious challenges facing humanity future. The G77 + China also emphasizes that the multilateral climate regime is grounded in the Convention and its related legal instruments (KP and PA), and should not be revised.^[17] This reflects a fundamental tension between the South’s solid commitment to multilateralism under the UNFCCC and the North’s preference for minilateral engagements and cooperation within forums dominated by a few major emitters.

DCs perceive climate politics as a segment of historical and economic injustice. In DCs viewpoint, developed countries should not only accept the historical responsibility for combating climate change, but also support the DCs undertakings. The message from DCs on this issue is loud and clear that historical responsibility is the “moral and legal basis” of developed countries’ commitments; it is unfair to disregard the fact that these countries accomplished economic progress through out centuries of emission buildup. Therefore, developed countries must take the lead in addressing this challenge.^[18]

The Convention acknowledged climate change as “common concern of mankind,” calling for the international community cooperation.^[19] However, this should be perceived within “equity” and CBDR-RCs principles, which recognize a shared environmental objective but involve distinction among Parties. Therefore, industrialized nations must lead the efforts in combating the climate change (Art. 3.).^[20] UNFCCC negotiation rounds, even post-PA when the dichotomous approach of differentiated responsibilities was abandoned, revolve around these principles and the significance of distinction between developed countries and DCs. As a result, burden allocation, support mechanisms to DCs, types and conditions of obligations lie at the heart of UNFCCC process.

DCs have relied on the principle of CBDR-RCs to call for greater leadership from industrialized nations and to confront proposals enforcing uniform binding emission targets. The Group argues that developed countries should not only take the lead in reducing their emissions, but also modify their production and consumption patterns. The G77 + China regards CBDR-RC as an essential “guiding principle” necessary to achieve the PA global temperature goal.  

The UNFCCC process places importance on the special concerns and requirements of certain party members. Least developed countries (LDCs) and specific DCs groups will be given full consideration through technology transmission, insurance, and financial support, when Parties are fulfilling their obligations (Articles 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10).^[21] These actions of support should address not only climate change negative impacts, but also the harmful effects resulting from the policies and measures of combating climate change. Aiming to sow division within the G77 + China, the Global North repeatedly limits the eligibility for this support to only few clusters of DCs. However, the G77 generally demonstrates solidarity by insisting on the comprehensive application of relevant provisions.^[22]

As regards SD and economic growth, the UNFCCC identifies Parties’ “right to promote sustainable development.” In this context, the Convention and relevant agreements explicitly recognize that DCs are entitled to acquire and utilize their resources, and the right to increase their energy consumption. Thus, the Convention, KP, and PA provisions require consideration and minimizing the adverse effects of climate response measures on Parties whose economies are heavily dependent on FF and energy intensive industries. In this regard, the stance of FF-dependent countries after Glasgow towards hasty energy transition is comprehended, and the essence of the Saudi Minister of Energy’ reflection about the pledge towards the energy trilemma and PA climate sustainability is realized.^[23]

International Politics of Climate Change

The UNFCCC has not only designed the international legal framework for climate change, but also has laid down the foundation for a more complex landscape of climate international relations and politics. The launching of key climate legal instruments, such as the Convention, the KP and the PA, has intertwined legal mechanisms with climate politics and paved the way for increased international cooperation on GHG emissions control and advancement of other climate actions.

Actually, the effectiveness of these treaties depends on UNFCCC parties’ compliance with their legal commitments, which in turn is driven by political will and determination. Therefore, climate negotiations are not just legal practices and arrangements; they are shaped by geopolitical factors, power dynamics, economic and sustainable development priorities, diplomatic skills, and the strategic partnerships among parties. Indeed, evaluating the success of climate agreements and forecasting future diplomatic developments in international climate politics rely, to a large degree, on recognizing this interconnectedness.

International climate change politics is characterized by a wide array of nations, the main players, who strive to prioritize their particular interests within the multilateral platforms.^[24] There are almost 200 Parties to this international climate system, which is grounded in the “Westphalian” state-centric order, or what I.A. Makarov, following W. Nordhaus, termed the “Westphalian dilemma” (Makarov, 2020, p. 165).

According to Sprinz & Weiß (2001, pp. 69–70), countries’ stances in international climate negotiations can be anticipated on their interests. Countries with high climate change threats and low costs to reduce emissions are likely to be pushing for stricter regulations (pusher), while those with lower threats and higher costs resist them (dragger). Countries in between these two extremes will have mixed attitudes (intermediates), and those with no climate risks and high reduction costs (bystanders) will probably stay out of the discussions altogether. 

The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) captured this heterogeneous international portrait of the world, which would affect the behavior of Parties in the UNFCCC political process, and argued that countries differ in terms of their emissions (high or low) and climate impacts (high or low).^[25] In conjunction, Makarov argues that the PA bottom-up structure splits the global main GHGs emitters into “enthusiastic” nations, such as the US, EU, and China, aiming at carbon neutrality for green technological control and energy security. Conversely, “reluctant” nations which include emerging economies, such as India, Brazil, and South Africa, prioritizing SD necessities, poverty alleviation and energy accessibility. This latter group also comprises countries whose economies are heavily reliant on FF, such as Russia and Arab petroleum countries, who perceive swift energy transition as a major hazard to their economic interests, social wellbeing, and geopolitical status (Makarov, 2020, pp. 169–172).

Three conspicuous dynamics in the UNFCCC process that may contribute to comprehending the international climate change politics and what restrict the regime’s effectiveness:

1) the conflicting burden-sharing stances among the Global North countries,

2) the opposing priorities within the Global South,

3) enduring North—South equity disparities (Bodansky & Rajamani, 2018, p. 20).

The international politics of climate change is further complicated due to the fact that the benefits of addressing climate change do not address concerns regarding “free riding” and “relative gains.” Since the climate is a global public good, free riding worry occurs when specific states benefit from worldwide emission cuts without making a comparable involvement themselves (Falkner, 2016, p. 1110; Makarov, 2020, p. 164, 169; Clemençon, 2023, p. 115). This is aggravated by relative gains concerns, when countries worry that their stringent measures on emission reductions may place them at a drawback in comparison to others that embrace less rigid climate actions. According to Mark Purdon, these concerns arise from international redistribution patterns, the non-excludable character of mitigation, the resources magnitude, and the time lags between costs and benefits of redistribution (Purdon, 2017).

Other scholars argue that the legally binding deals seem almost impossible to achieve, as Parties view deliberations as a zero-sum game regarding who pays the cost of emission cuts (Clémençon, 2023, p. 115). Countries are increasingly concerned about mitigation ramifications on their national energy-intensive industries in international markets. Policymakers and government officials might worry that these manufacturing businesses will suffer from a declining competitive edge and market share as input costs increase relative to other foreign competitors.^[26] At the same time, empirical assessments of the actual impact of carbon pricing on growth and competitiveness are inconclusive, depending heavily on the specific policies implemented, sectoral structure of the economy, and the use of budget revenues.

The overall policy of international climate change witnessed key changes after the PA, which in turn commenced a new age in the climate change landscape:

1) the PA neither creates explicit categories of Parties nor tailors commitments to them as the Convention and the KP do,

2) the PA represents a hybrid structure (Thakur, 2021, p. 366), in which bottom-up approach to promote participation (contained in parties’ contributions) (Abdulkadir, Abdulquadir & Nevaluz, 2025, p. 5) is combined with a top-down process to promote ambition and accountability (by reviewing the collective progress known as the global stocktake),

3) the legal character of commitments that include hard and soft law provisions (Bodansky & Rajamani, 2018, p. 48).

Conclusion

The UNFCCC regime has been chiefly shaped by power imbalances, nation-state material interests, and North-South dynamics. Grounded in the anarchic “Westphalian” order realities, these factors have played a key role in determining the trajectories of the climate regime, and how its core principles have been applied over time. This structural imbalance accounts for the slow progress towards achieving the PA temperature goals. It occurs because major emitters in the Global North continue to prioritize their national economic and strategic interests, while transferring implementation pressures southward.

The findings of the study also indicate that the hybrid paradigm instituted by the PA-NDCs has not addressed the enduring North—South tensions. Instead, it has enabled additional types of northern selectivity and problem-shifting, through giving prominence to the supply-side policies and measures such as FF phase-out. These calls for a structural reconfiguration of the climate regime by shifting the mitigation policies towards the supply-side, not only fail to correspond to various energy forecasts, but also transfer the burden of mitigation responsibilities to FF-dependent Southern DCs. Thus, they overlook the historical emissions of the Global North. For these DCs, this structural change carries crucial longstanding geopolitical consequences, including threats to energy security, national development strategies, and resource sovereignty. 

Therefore, the general position of the countries of the Global South is that no state has the right to impose conditions that are unacceptable to another state, since every state is free to make its own choices.

^{1 What Is the IPCC? Fact Sheet // Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). January 2024. URL: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2024/04/IPCCFactSheet_WhatisIPCC.pdf (accessed: 04.02.2025).}

^{2 See: United Nations General Assembly. Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind. Resolution A/RES/43/53, 1988 // The United Nations. URL: https://undocs.org/A/RES/43/53 (accessed: 18.05.2025); United Nations General Assembly. Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind. Resolution A/RES/44/207, 1989 // The United Nations. URL: https://undocs.org/A/RES/44/207 (accessed: 18.05.2025); United Nations General Assembly. Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind. Resolution A/RES/45/212, 1990 // The United Nations. URL: https://undocs.org/A/RES/45/212 (accessed: 18.05.2025).}

^{3 Climate Change: The IPCC 1990 and 1992 Assessments. IPCC First Assessment Report: Overview and Policymaker Summaries and 1992 IPCC Supplement // Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). June 1992. URL: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/ipcc_90_92_assessments_far_full_report.pdf (accessed: 17.01.2026).}   

^{4 The deadlock reflected two opposing positions: OPEC members, led by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and China demanded consensus on matters of substance, while industrialized nations insisted that the financial obligations should be the subject of consensus. Thus, Western nations aimed at expanding global climate alleviation mandates while maintaining full control over the funding of those initiatives. However, Western rhetoric turns a blind eye to the other side of the issue, placing responsibility solely on OPEC. This material is based on the experience of the author as a prime negotiator of Kuwait delegation at the preparatory (INC-UNFCCC) sessions for COP1. See: Eleventh Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC/FCCC): Summary Report, 6–17 February 1995 // International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Earth Negotiations Bulletin. URL: https://enb.iisd.org/events/11th-session-intergovernmental-negotiating-committee-framework-convention-climate-change-10 (accessed: 18.05.2026).}

^{5 Based on the author’s experience. See also: Eleventh Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC/FCCC): Summary Report, 6–17 February 1995 // International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Earth Negotiations Bulletin. URL: https://enb.iisd.org/events/11th-session-intergovernmental-negotiating-committee-framework-convention-climate-change-10 (accessed: 18.05.2026).} 

^{6 The Kyoto Protocol // United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). URL: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-kyoto-protocol (accessed: 18.05.2025).}

^{7 Bottom Line on International Climate Negotiations: Fact Sheet // World Resources Institute (WRI). September 2009, 22. URL: https://www.wri.org/research/bottom-line-international-climate-negotiations (accessed: 28.12.2025).}

^{8 Based on the author’s experience as a member of the LMDC group that agreed with the EU to launch two negotiating workstreams for pre-2020 and post-2020.}

^{9 Climate Change // International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Earth Negotiations Bulletin. 1995. Vol. 12. URL: https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/ (accessed: 10.02.2026).}

^{10 IEF Outlooks Comparison Report // The International Energy Forum.  February 19, 2025. URL: https://www.ief.org/events/15th-iea-ief-opec-symposium-on-energy-outlooks#report (accessed: 14.12.2025).}

^{11 Volcovici V., Dickie G., James W. Nations Strike Deal at COP28 to Transition Away from Fossil Fuels // Reuters. December 14, 2023. URL: https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/countries-push-cop28-deal-fossil-fuels-talks-spill-into-overtime-2023-12-12/ (accessed: 14.12.2025).}

^{12 Abnett K., Volcovici V., Saba Y. COP28 Clashes over Fossil Fuel Phase-Out after OPEC Pushback // Reuters. December 10, 2023. URL: https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/opec-members-push-against-including-fossil-fuels-phase-out-cop28-deal-2023-12-09/ (accessed: 12.12.2025).}

^{13 Outcome of the First Global Stocktake: Draft Decision -/CMA.5. FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/L.17 // United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). December 13, 2023. URL: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2023_L17_adv.pdf (accessed: 14.12.2025).}

^{14 Summary of the 2024 Baku Climate Change Conference: 11–22 November 2024 // Earth Negotiations Bulletin. 2024 (26 November). Vol. 12, no. 865. URL: https://enb.iisd.org/sites/default/files/2024-11/enb12865e_0.pdf (accessed: 13.05.2025).}

^{15 Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by Ms. Elba Rosa Pérez Montoya, Minister of Science, Technology and Environment of Cuba, at the Resumed High-Level Segment of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP 28) (Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 9 December 2023) // Group of 77 and China. URL: https://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=231209 (accessed: 18.05.2025).}

^{16 See: Statement on Behalf of Group of 77 and China by Mr. Farukh Amil, Acting Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN, During the Intergovernmental Preparatory Meeting (IPM) of Fifteenth Session of Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD-15) (New York, 26 February 2007) // Group of 77 and China. URL: https://uat.g77.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IPM-of-15th-Session-of-Commission-on-Sustainable-Development-1.pdf (accessed: 18.05.2025); Statement by the Delegation of Pakistan on Behalf of the Group of 77 and China after Adoption of the Law of the Sea Resolution (A/62/L.27) During the Plenary of the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly (New York, 21 December 2007) // Group of 77 and China. URL: https://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=071221 (accessed: 18.05.2025); Statement by H.E. Mr. Evo Morales Ayma, President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Chair of the Group of 77, in the Climate Summit (New York, 23 September 2014) // Group of 77 and China. URL: https://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=140923 (accessed: 18.05.2025); Statement by H.E. Mr. Manasvi Srisodapol, Special Representative of the Chair of the Group of 77 for Climate Change, on Behalf of the Group of 77 and China, at the Joint Plenary of the 22nd Session of Conference of the Parties (COP22) and the 12th Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP12) (Marrakech, Morocco, 8 November 2016) // Group of 77 and China. URL: https://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=161108 (accessed: 18.05.2025); Statement on Behalf of the Group of 77 and China by Ambassador Ammar Hijazi of the State of Palestine, Chair of the G-77 and China for the Climate Change Process, at the COP25/CMP15/CMA2 Closing Plenary of the UN Climate Change Conference (Madrid, Spain, 13 December 2019) // Group of 77 and China. URL: https://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=191213b (accessed: 18.05.2025); Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China at the Closing Plenary of the SBSTA-58 and SBI-58 (Bonn, Germany, 15 June 2023) // Group of 77 and China. URL: https://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=230615 (accessed: 18.05.2025).}

^{17 Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China at the Closing Plenary of the SBSTA-58 and SBI-58 (Bonn, Germany, 15 June 2023) // Group of 77 and China. URL: https://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=230615 (accessed: 18.05.2025).}

^{18 See: Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by Mr. Marthinus Van Schalkwyk, Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism of the Republic of South Africa, at the Opening of the High-level Segment of COP 12 and COP/MOP2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Nairobi, 15 November 2006) // Group of 77 and China. URL: https://www.g77.org/Speeches/111506.html (accessed: 18.05.2025); Statement by H.E. Mr. Evo Morales Ayma, President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Chair of the Group of 77, in the Climate Summit (New York, 23 September 2014) // Group of 77 and China. URL: https://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=140923 (accessed: 18.05.2025); Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China at the Closing Plenary of the SBSTA-58 and SBI-58 (Bonn, Germany, 15 June 2023) // Group of 77 and China. URL: https://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=230615 (accessed: 18.05.2025).}

^{19 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change // The United Nations. 1992. URL: https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf (accessed: 20.01.2026).} 

^{20 Ibid.}

^{21 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change // The United Nations. 1992. URL: https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf (accessed: 20.01.2026).}

^{22 Based on the author’s experience as a spokesperson of the G77.}

^{23 KSA Is a ‘Global Model’ for Energy Transition // Oil & Gas News. November 1, 2023. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20241207210435/https://ognnews.com/Article/46436/KSA_is_a_’global_model’_for_energy_transition (accessed: 05.03.2026).} 

^{24 Nasiritousi N., Bäckstrand K. International Climate Politics in the post-Paris era // Nordic Economic Policy Review. 2019 (May). P. 25. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333104806_International_Climate_Politics_in_the_Post-Paris_Era (accessed: 12.12.2025).}

^{25 Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers. Third Assessment Report // Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2001. URL: https://www.ess.uci.edu/~yu/class/ess15/TARSynRep_SPM.pdf (accessed: 12.12.2025).}

^{26 Black S., Liu A. A., Parry I., Vernon N. IMF Fossil Fuel Subsidies Data: 2023 Update // International Monetary Fund. 2023 (August). IMF Working Paper No. WP/23/169. P. 17. URL: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2023/english/wpiea2023169-print-pdf.pdf (accessed: 22.12.2025).}

About the authors

Atif A. Alharbi

Author for correspondence.
Email: 1072228007@rudn.ru
PhD Student, Department of Theory and History of International Relations; Senior Advisor on International Relations, former Head of the Kuwaiti delegation to the negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 10, bldg. 2, Miklukho-Maklay St, Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation

References

Supplementary files