A Conditional Axis of Resistance: Strategic Convergence between Iran and Venezuela in the Context of Occidentalism

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Introduction

The post-Cold War era consolidated a unipolar international order, dominated by the West and particularly the United States, whose political, economic, and cultural influence became globally pervasive. This one-directional and Western-centric form of globalization, however, simultaneously generated new political and strategic spaces for alternative actors to challenge the normative foundations of the liberal international system. Within this context, Iran and Venezuela emerged as two states that, despite lacking geographical proximity and cultural affinity, gradually articulated converging ideological, strategic, and economic trajectories in opposition to U.S. hegemony. Their shared experience of extensive sanctions, political isolation, and perceived external interventionism fostered a multidimensional partnership that evolved into a distinct “axis of resistance” from the early 2000s onward.

Although Iran and Venezuela differ in regime type, civilizational background, and historical orientation, both possess structurally similar energy-centered economies. This similarity simultaneously positions them as influential actors within the global energy market and renders them highly vulnerable to coercive external pressures. Consequently, their bilateral cooperation has expanded from pragmatic, material collaboration to a symbolic political project that embodies a critique of Western modernity, interventionism, and epistemic dominance. In this sense, Occidentalism, understood as an ideological framework that challenges Western claims to universality, rationality, and authority, provides a meaningful analytical lens through which to interpret the deeper logic of Iran—Venezuela relations.

Departing from conventional analyses that emphasize solely geopolitical pragmatism, economic interdependence, or anti-imperialist rhetoric, this study situates the Iran—Venezuela partnership within a broader ideational and discursive framework. It investigates the material dimensions of cooperation as well as the ways in which both states construct, disseminate, and operationalize anti-Western narratives to legitimize their foreign policy choices and to position themselves as normative challengers within the evolving multipolar order.

Building on this premise, the study proposes the following central hypothesis: the Iran— Venezuela partnership is maintained through more than shared geopolitical interests or sanctions-induced necessity; it is anchored in a mutually reinforcing ideological project rooted in Occidentalist counter-discourses and the Resistance Axis, as long as both states retain the ability to pursue relatively autonomous foreign policies. This ideological alignment operates as a historically contingent mechanism, gaining coherence and durability during periods of heightened strategic autonomy, while its explanatory power declines when external intervention significantly constrains state agency.

To analyze this hypothesis, the research addresses the following key questions:

– In what ways has the Resistance Axis functioned as an operational and discursive framework reinforcing bilateral alignment between Iran and Venezuela during periods in which both states maintained relative foreign policy autonomy?

– To what extent have shared sanctions pressures and geopolitical objectives reinforced the continuity of Iran—Venezuela ties, and under what conditions do these pressures translate into ideologically framed cooperation rather than purely instrumental alignment?

– How have different Iranian administrations (Khatami, Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, Raisi) deployed discursive and material strategies to sustain and institutionalize the partnership with Venezuela, and how have these strategies varied in response to shifting regional and international constraints?

– How does the interaction between Occidentalist narratives and the Resistance Axis produce a counter-hegemonic mechanism that remains resilient only under specific historical and political conditions, rather than constituting a permanent or static challenge to Western influence?

At the same time to ensure analytical reliability, the study employs data triangulation, drawing on an extensive range of primary sources including official statements, leaders’ speeches, bilateral agreements, and institutional records-alongside secondary sources such as scholarly literature, think-tank analyses, media reports, and economic datasets. In addition, unlike existing works that largely treat the Iran—Venezuela relations as either a tactical alliance driven by sanctions or a rhetorical manifestation of anti-imperialism, this research offers:

– a systematic application of Occidentalism as a theoretical framework,

– a discursive analysis of official statements, energy cooperation, defense collaboration, and diplomatic exchanges.

Nevertheless, this study is subject to several limitations. Access to primary data, particularly regarding confidential military or intelligence-related cooperation, remains limited. In addition, official statements and public discourse do not always fully capture internal decision-making processes, while the ideological orientations of both states may shift across different leadership periods, making long-term comparisons more complex. The analysis is also confined to developments up to 2025; therefore, events occurring after this timeframe, including possible changes in external intervention strategies, sanctions regimes, or domestic political dynamics, fall outside the core scope of the study.

That said, developments in January 2026^[1] offer early indications that the patterns identified in this research remain relevant. These events suggest that the Iran—Venezuela partnership, grounded in Occidentalist counter-discourses and linked to the broader framework of the Resistance Axis, continues to demonstrate resilience under conditions of relative strategic autonomy. Despite these constraints, the study offers a comprehensive and theoretically informed analysis of a partnership that remains central to ongoing debates on resistance, multipolarity, and alternative visions of the global order.

Methodology

Methodologically, this research adopts a qualitative design that integrates descriptive, analytical, and discourse-oriented approaches. The descriptive dimension reconstructs the historical evolution of Iran—Venezuela relations by mapping key political turning points—from Hugo Chávez’s 1999 election and the formation of an ideological “axis of resistance,” to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s intensification of anti-Western cooperation, the relative cooling during Hassan Rouhani’s moderate diplomacy, and the subsequent reinstitutionalization of ties under Ebrahim Raisi and Masoud Pezeshkian. This historical reconstruction identifies how episodes such as the U.S. designation of Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil,” the imposition of successive sanctions regimes, and the consolidation of anti-imperialist agendas in Caracas shaped the tempo, form, and symbolism of bilateral engagement.

The analytical component interprets these developments through the conceptual lenses of Occidentalism and anti-Western discourse. By embedding the bilateral trajectory within the structural dynamics of U.S. hegemony, sanctions politics, and the global drift toward multipolarity, the study highlights how Iran and Venezuela articulate sovereignty, resistance, and civilizational authenticity as counter-hegemonic principles. This is reflected in a range of symbolic practices and narratives—for instance, Chávez awarding Khatami the Simón Bolívar Order in 2005, the proclamation of an “Axis of Unity” under Ahmadinejad and Chávez in 2007, or the recurring invocation of figures such as Bolívar and Qasem Soleimani to reinforce ideological solidarity. These discursive gestures are treated not merely as diplomatic rituals but as meaningful data points that reveal how anti-Western imaginaries are produced, circulated, and institutionalized.

To capture these dynamics, the research employs discourse analysis to examine how leaders construct, mobilize, and legitimize anti-Western narratives across speeches, joint declarations, ceremonial symbolism, and state media. This method illuminates how terms such as “resistance,” “sovereignty,” “civilizational independence,” and “multipolarity” operate as recurrent rhetorical anchors across different Iranian administrations-from Khatami’s symbolic diplomacy to Ahmadinejad’s ideological assertiveness, Rouhani’s pragmatic recalibrations under renewed sanctions, and Raisi’s efforts to institutionalize a long-term Occidentalist alliance. Pezeshkian’s recent reaffirmation of “deepening and strategic” ties with Caracas, particularly in the aftermath of regional crises, further exemplifies the continuity of these discursive patterns.

In addition to this, contextual analysis places the evolving Iran—Venezuela partnership within broader geopolitical and ideological currents, particularly the global contestation of Western-centered international norms. The study traces how each Iranian administration deploys different instruments-symbolic gestures, economic agreements, and multilateral coordination, to position Venezuela as both a practical collaborator and an ideological mirror in constructing an anti-Western bloc.

Literature Review

The academic literature on Iran—Venezuela relations examines this partnership through multiple analytical frameworks, ranging from geopolitical alignment to sanctions-evasion strategies. In this context, a review of studies by Western, Iranian, and Venezuelan scholars in this area yields the following observations.

Sean Goforth (2012) argues that Venezuela, Iran, and Russia have formed an anti-U.S. geopolitical alignment supported by high energy revenues and mutual strategic interests. Central to this “axis of unity” is mutual support for regional ambitions and informal networks, including the FARC, Hezbollah, and the Quds Force. Russia strengthens the axis by providing diplomatic protection and advanced arms. Goforth contends that this trilateral alignment threatens regional security in Latin America and the Middle East and reflects broader efforts by authoritarian petro-states to challenge U.S. influence. He recommends a flexible U.S. policy combining firm action toward Russia with measures to limit Iranian and Venezuelan leverage.

Josh Chang emphasizes that the Iran—Venezuela partnership persists beyond ideological alignment, evidenced by multiple high-level meetings. He argues that Iran uses Venezuela as a strategic partner to secure political, economic, and diplomatic support in its competition with the U.S. Given Iran’s regional military disadvantages and surrounding U.S. bases, Tehran increasingly relies on distant allies like Venezuela. Chang suggests continued U.S. monitoring to better understand Iran’s long-term ambitions in Latin America and evolving counter-sanctions strategies.^[2]

Eric Lob (2025) notes continuity under President Raisi, with sustained coordination and expanded bilateral engagement in energy, defense (notably drones), transport, and agriculture. The partnership has been institutionalized with a 20-year cooperation roadmap. However, Lob highlights structural limits: economic fragility, sanctions, and resource constraints restrict large-scale trade and investment. Venezuela’s pursuit of U.S. sanctions relief may reduce alignment with Tehran, and both countries remain mid-level powers constrained by major geopolitical actors.

J. Bosworth (2021) analyzes how Iran, drawing on its own experience under heavy sanctions, provided Venezuela with two main forms of assistance: the insight that surviving sanctions requires supportive international partners, and technical guidance on maritime evasion tactics, such as disabling transponders, repainting vessels, using decommissioned ship identities, and conducting ship-to-ship transfers. Bosworth further contends that the Trump administration’s escalated sanctions imposed strategic costs on the United States and strained relations with partners in Latin America, Canada, and Europe, who opposed broad sectoral sanctions targeting the Venezuelan economy. This divergence, according to Bosworth, weakened U.S. regional credibility. Finally, while acknowledging that allegations of state capture by Nicolás Maduro help justify sectoral sanctions, Bosworth warns that such measures risk reinforcing corruption networks and worsening humanitarian conditions.

From the perspective of Iranian scholar Ali Akbar (2022), Iran’s engagement in Venezuela demonstrates a deliberate and expanding ‘soft power’ strategy aimed at securing long-term influence and deploying educational, cultural, ideological, and humanitarian initiatives. While educational exchanges are limited and religious outreach marginal, cultural diplomacy and anti-American narratives have proven effective. Social services, especially during fuel shortages and the pandemic, enhanced Iran’s attractiveness. Overall, these measures are intended to secure and extend Iran’s influence despite structural and geographic limitations.

Hakimzadeh characterizes the Iran-Venezuela partnership as an “axis of annoyance,” arguing that it is largely symbolic and ideologically incoherent, driven more by Ahmadinejad’s and Chávez’s shared anti-Americanism than by any genuine strategic convergence. He contends that deep political, ideological, and economic incompatibilities constrain substantive cooperation, rendering most bilateral initiatives performative and of limited strategic or economic significance.^[3]

Seyyed Abdollah Razavi and Shohreh Pirani (Razavi & Pirani, 2021) compare the strategies developed by Venezuela and Iran to counter imposed sanctions, highlighting measures such as strategic oil stockpiling, swap agreements, and the privatization of state-owned oil companies. The study also emphasizes that long-term contracts and multilateral cooperation could play a significant role in partially mitigating the adverse effects of sanctions for both countries.

Cardozo and Niño (Cardozo & Niño, 2023) argue that Iran and Venezuela, as petro-states shaped by similar historical ruptures, oil discovery, Western corporate dominance, nationalist petroleum policies, and revolutionary transformations, developed convergent foreign policy trajectories. These parallels fostered a shared anti-imperialist stance toward the U.S.-led liberal international order, particularly after 1999. The authors conceptualize this cooperation as a shift from “rebel diplomacy” to “resilient diplomacy,” institutionalized through energy, military, technological, and diplomatic ties that together constitute a distinct axis of resistance.

María Faiellai and Prof. Javier Luchettiii^[4] analyze Venezuela—Iran relations across economic, political, and geopolitical dimensions. The authors emphasize that, as OPEC-member oil producers with structural similarities and increasing political convergence after 1999, the two countries have developed a shared anti-hegemonic stance against U.S.-led global hegemony. Iran seeks to break its international isolation stemming from its nuclear program, while Venezuela positions Iran as a strategic partner to balance U.S. influence in Latin America. This cooperation has become institutionalized through energy, industrial, and social development projects, forming a geopolitical axis of resistance that goes beyond the framework of “South—South cooperation.”

Elodie Brun (2008) argues that the Iran—Venezuela partnership is shaped less by ideology than by the international context. The anti-imperialist rhetoric of Chávez and Ahmadinejad fluctuates with U.S. political dynamics, and both states’ diplomacies remain fundamentally conditioned by their relations with Washington. He highlights that the Iran—Venezuela partnership is shaped by international context than ideology, with U.S. relations as a major more determinant. Reliance on oil as an economic and political tool is a structural vulnerability. The partnership is an emerging strategic relationship, partly conjunctural, but embedded in broader South—South dynamics.

E.L. Molina (2024) contends that Venezuela—Iran relations (1999–2013) developed into a strategic partnership driven by shared anti-hegemonic goals and a commitment to a multipolar order. Deepening under Chávez and Ahmadinejad, cooperation expanded across key sectors and was institutionalized through extensive agreements grounded in anti-imperialist and Third Worldist narratives. U.S. sanctions and Chávez’s death, however, constrained implementation, making the alliance’s durability dependent on both states’ capacity to adapt while sustaining their strategic resistance.

In summary, the academic literature presents distinct perspectives on the Iran—Venezuela partnership. Western scholars, generally without engaging with Occidentalist frameworks, emphasize its geopolitical and strategic dimensions, highlighting evasion and structural vulnerabilities. From this perspective, Western authors adopt a “cold and critical” view, seeing the relationship as largely strategic, pragmatic, and limited in scope. Iranian researchers, however, show a closer alignment with Occidentalist perspectives, focusing on soft power and ideological projection, portraying Iran’s engagement as a long-term, ideologically driven effort to challenge Western hegemony and secure influence. Venezuelan scholars emphasize historical, economic, and anti-hegemonic factors, framing the partnership around shared revolutionary legacies and pragmatic multipolar strategies; although they do not explicitly adopt Occidentalist discourse, their actions and policy practices reflect an implicit Occidentalist orientation. Taken together, these perspectives indicate that the Iran—Venezuela relationship is simultaneously ideological, strategic, and pragmatic, with its significance shaped by the analytical lens applied. The originality of this study lies in its systematic application of the Occidentalism framework to analyze the ideological mechanisms and counter-hegemonic dimensions of the partnership, thereby moving beyond merely confirming a strategic alliance to revealing the normative impact of the Iran—Venezuela axis and its vision of an alternative global order.

Theoretical Framework

To comprehend the strategic rapprochement between Iran and Venezuela, it is crucial to scrutinize the theoretical perspectives that have shaped this relationship. In this context, the Occidentalism paradigm and the Resistance Axis are key reference points. Occidentalism is a term that emerged in reaction to Edward Said’s work on Orientalism. It offers an alternative perspective to the epistemological, cultural and political dominance of the West. While Orientalism focuses on Western representations of the East, Occidentalism examines how non-Western societies perceive and conceive of the West. This approach seeks to understand how the West is perceived within the contexts of colonialism, imperialism and globalization, and the responses that have been developed considering these perceptions (Bayoumi & Rubin, 2000, p. 59). It is also possible to apply this approach in the political sphere by interpreting it through Lacan’s notion of Self and the Other. Under this notion, according to Occidentalism, the Self (the West) constructs itself in relation to the Other (non-Westerners), positioning itself as superior by separating itself from others. And this leads to the alienation of the Other (Lacan, 1949).

The most important aspect of Occidentalism in this context is to balance Westernization trends in the Third World. Because in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the West has been seen as a model of modernization, with Western lifestyles becoming widespread, particularly among the ruling classes. And this has paved the way for anti-Western attitudes such as religious conservatism and fundamentalism to develop (Al-Azm, 2019, p. 77). Thus, Occidentalism serves to protect national identity and culture from alienation and to provide an alternative to elite-oriented Orientalism (Ahmad, 1984). In this context, Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit emphasize that entrenched and caricatured perceptions of the West, combined with experiences of imperialism and colonialism in non-Western societies, form an ideological basis of Occidentalism (Buruma & Margalit, 2004). This, in turn, lends weight to the theory that the strategic rapprochement between Iran and Venezuela is part of a larger agenda of Occidentalism. Both countries portray the West, particularly the US, as a symbol of military, economic and cultural oppression, and exploit this perception to justify their own political regimes and ideological identities. In this context, Occidentalism is a strategic tool as well as a discourse. Furthermore, the mutual adversary of the West strengthens the solidarity between the two countries, creating an alternative axis to the global balance of power. These two states, which have found common ground in Occidentalism, are also pursuing cooperation around the axis of resistance.

The victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 not only transformed the country’s state structure but also fundamentally redefined the ideological foundations of Iran’s foreign policy. Revolutionary principles such as “support for the oppressed” and “resistance to imperialism” became central pillars of Tehran’s strategic outlook. Throughout the post-revolutionary period-especially during the Iran—Iraq War (1980–1988) and the subsequent era of regional isolation-Iran developed a multilayered security doctrine that blended ideological conviction with asymmetric military and political instruments.^[5] This historical trajectory formed the doctrinal basis of what would later be conceptualized as the “Resistance Axis” (mehvar-e moqavemat). The term gradually entered Iran’s official lexicon in the early 2000s through the statements of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and became further entrenched in regional discourse after the 2006 Lebanon War via speeches by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. In academic studies, scholars such as Schulze (2008), Goodarzi (2013), and Alfoneh (2018) interpret the Resistance Axis as the institutionalized expression of Iran’s post-revolution security doctrine, encompassing its forward-defense strategy, proxy-based deterrence, and counter-hegemonic geopolitical posture.

Simultaneously, the Resistance Axis emerged as a unifying political, military, and ideological bloc opposing Western, particularly U.S.-Israeli hegemony (Tabatabai, 2020). It continues to function as both a strategic framework for Iran’s deterrence policy and a vehicle of ideological solidarity, positioning itself as an anti-Western pole in international politics (Soage, 2020, p. 97). Its deterrent potential is based on three interrelated components.

First, Iran’s military and technological capabilities, including its reliance on large military personnel and cost-effective drones and missiles, underpin its ability to project power and seek cooperation both within and beyond the Resistance Axis (Gracheva & Margoev, 2025, pp. 203–205).

Second, the “resistance economy” paradigm articulated by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei emphasizes economic resilience under sanctions and the mobilization of internal resources for national development (Shabani & Nakhli, 2013, p. 55). This approach encourages Tehran to cultivate strategic partnerships-particularly with states in the Global South—to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis the West.

Third, Iran’s foreign trade networks and strategic partnerships align with broader trends in South—South cooperation, wherein Global South countries seek alternative models of solidarity outside the Western-centered international order.^[6] Within this context, Iran maintains relations not only with members of the Resistance Axis but also with extra-regional ideological partners, among which Venezuela stands out as Tehran’s principal strategic ally in Latin America within the framework of South—South cooperation.

Evaluated within this theoretical framework, Iran—Venezuela relations take on two dimensions: defining the West and the US as the source of domination and dependency and forming a common anti-Western front like the axis of resistance. In this vein, it can be said that Venezuela and Iran, located in Latin America and the Middle East respectively, are inclined to establish a global “South—South resistance line.” Concrete elements of this line include cooperation in energy policies, common positions in international organizations, and solidarity against US sanctions. Together, these approaches conceptualize the Iran—Venezuela rapprochement as a multidimensional strategic partnership shaped not only by pragmatic interests, but also by ideological solidarity and normative resistance. In this context, Occidentalism provides the ideological basis for the strategic rapprochement between Iran and Venezuela; the resistance axis provides the tools for its strategic implementation, and this South—South resistance line provides the framework for the formation of an alternative bloc at an international level.

Historical and Diplomatic Foundations of the Iran—Venezuela Partnership

The diplomatic foundations of Iran—Venezuela relations, both founding members of OPEC (1960), date back to the 1950s, when the two countries began developing political and economic ties. Venezuela opened an embassy in Tehran in 1967, while Iran opened an embassy in Caracas in 1972, thereby establishing full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level between the two countries.^[7] Nevertheless, until the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran’s pro-Western orientation significantly constrained meaningful engagement with Latin America, including Venezuela (Lob, 2025, p. 685). The Revolution marked a turning point: its anti-imperialist stance and rupture with Washington prompted a reconfiguration of Tehran’s foreign policy toward the Global South, prioritizing alliances with states resisting Western hegemony.^[8] Venezuela gradually emerged as a natural partner in this regard. The election of Hugo Chávez in 1999 provided a strong ideological and strategic platform for rapprochement, consolidating bilateral relations within the framework of an “axis of resistance” to the Western-centered international order. Although Mohammad Khatami’s relatively moderate and West-leaning approach temporarily slowed this momentum (Perletta, 2025, p. 32), Washington’s designation of Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil” in 2002 (Shay, 2017) reinvigorated Tehran’s outreach to Latin America. This reorientation reflected not only geopolitical pragmatism but also an Occidentalist narrative emphasizing sovereignty, independence, and indigenous values in defiance of Western definitions of “civilization” and “democracy.” Symbolic gestures—such as Chávez bestowing the Simón Bolívar Order of the Liberator upon Khatami in 2005 (Lob, 2025, p. 684), or the parallel invocation of figures like Bolívar and Soleimani—reinforced the ideological depth of this partnership, presenting it as something more than conventional diplomacy.

Iran—Venezuela ties reached their zenith with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. Guided by the “Look to the East” (Negah beh Sharq) (Fathollah-Nejad, 2021, p. 272) strategy, Iran sought to expand trade, technological, and political relations beyond the Western sphere, embedding Third Worldist and anti-imperialist rhetoric into its foreign policy (Perletta, 2025, pp. 33–34). Within this framework, relations with Latin America increased markedly, and Venezuela in particular emerged as a prominent partner for Tehran. Ahmadinejad’s statement that “In every region where peoples and nations push the United States and Great Britain away from their positions, the model of the Islamic Revolution will advance with satisfaction—from Lebanon and Palestine to the farthest corners of Latin America” (Moreno, 2010, p. 62) clearly reflects the ideological orientation of this period.

Ahmadinejad’s seven visits to Venezuela during his tenure, coupled with Hugo Chávez’s numerous meetings with both Ahmadinejad and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, indicate that the bilateral relationship had acquired a strategic dimension. During his 2006 visit, Chávez emphasized this closeness by stating, “Here are two brotherly countries, united like a single fist,”^[9] and on the same occasion, he was awarded the ‘Order of the Islamic Republic,’ Iran’s highest state honor (Lob, 2025, p. 685).

In response, Ahmadinejad stated, “We are two powerful countries. Iran is a power, and Venezuela is becoming one as well. We aim to create a bipolar world. We do not accept the dominance of a single power (the U.S.) … Despite the will of the arrogance of the world, we will stand alongside the oppressed and deprived nations of the world,”^[10] thereby reinforcing the shared ideological and geopolitical positioning of the two countries. In 2007, the two leaders, during their meeting in the Iranian port city of Asaluyeh, declared the “Axis of Unity” and made a public commitment to “jointly overcome North American imperialism.” Posters depicting the leaders embracing were displayed throughout the port city, emphasizing their solidarity during this period (Lob, 2025, p. 685) and pledging open resistance to U.S. imperialism (Goforth, 2012, p. 31; Colmenares, 2025, p. 257). These developments reflected the deepening of political coordination and the construction of a broader Occidentalist alliance that contested the legitimacy of Western global dominance.

A shift occurred under Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021). His administration’s moderate and conciliatory foreign policy toward the West, particularly in its early years (Perletta, 2025, p. 34), introduced a relative cooling in Iran—Venezuela relations. Unlike Ahmadinejad, Rouhani never visited Caracas and avoided direct confrontation with the United States, preferring to maintain limited political and economic ties with Venezuela. The ideological differences with Nicolás Maduro who consistently denounced the capitalist order also shaped this distancing. Yet the structural impact of U.S. policy was decisive. The election of Donald Trump in 2016, followed by the imposition of sweeping sanctions on both Iran and Venezuela in 2018, created renewed incentives for cooperation. By Rouhani’s second term, his rhetoric once again adopted a more explicit anti-imperialist tone, reviving common ground with Caracas (Akbar, 2023, p. 252).

Under Ebrahim Raisi (2021–2024), Iran—Venezuela relations entered a new phase of institutionalization. Raisi prioritized strengthening ties with the Global South, aligning closely with Maduro’s anti-imperialist agenda. In June 2022, Maduro’s visit to Tehran reaffirmed two decades of “excellent political, diplomatic, moral, and ethical relations” since Chávez’s first trip in 2001 (Akbar, 2023, p. 252). A comprehensive 20-year cooperation agreement signed during this visit marked a milestone, embedding bilateral relations within a strategic framework explicitly designed to challenge the Western-centered global structures (Lob, 2025, pp. 693–694). Raisi and Maduro further reinforced their partnership through frequent meetings at the United Nations General Assembly, OPEC, and other multilateral platforms. Raisi’s state visit to Caracas in June 2023, where he was awarded the Venezuelan National Order of Merit, epitomized the consolidation of an Occidentalist alliance that merged pragmatic economic cooperation with ideological solidarity (Lob, 2025, pp. 693–694).

The presidency of Masoud Pezeshkian (till 2024) has so far underscored continuity with this established trajectory. In the aftermath of Israel’s attacks on Iran in 2025, Pezeshkian held a call with Maduro, who unequivocally condemned Israel’s actions. During this exchange, Pezeshkian emphasized that bilateral relations would “continue in all fields and become deeper, more strategic, and more extensive.”^[11] This statement highlighted Tehran’s enduring commitment to Latin American partnerships and Caracas’s role as a discursive ally amplifying Iran’s Occidentalist narrative against Israel and its Western backers.

Viewed across the longue durée, Venezuela occupies a consistent place in Iran’s foreign policy toward Latin America. Each administration has employed different instruments: Khatami stressed symbolic diplomacy; Ahmadinejad expanded ideological projection and economic ventures; Rouhani oscillated between pragmatism and renewed resistance; Raisi institutionalized the partnership through long-term agreements; and Pezeshkian continues the trajectory within a volatile geopolitical context. Yet the underlying rationale remains constant: Venezuela serves as both a symbolic and practical partner in constructing an anti-Western bloc. By valorising sovereignty, civilizational distinctiveness, and resistance to external domination, Iranian leaders have consistently framed Venezuela not merely as an ally but as an ideological mirror. In this sense, Pezeshkian’s remarks represent more than diplomatic rhetoric—they embody the continuity of a broader Occidentalist strategy that positions Venezuela as an indispensable partner in Iran’s pursuit of strategic autonomy in a post-Western international order.

Economic Relations: Oil-Based Economies and Strategic Cooperation

The economies of Iran and Venezuela, heavily dependent on oil production, position the energy sector as a strategic tool within alternative solidarity models that challenge the Western-centered global economic system. Oil exports account for approximately 15% of Venezuela’s GDP, making the country extremely vulnerable to even small fluctuations in this sector (Arslanian, 2025, p. 713). Similarly, oil remains one of Iran’s principal sources of revenue, despite long-standing sanctions. Their shared OPEC membership and mutual dependence on energy production have created a platform for joint policymaking, particularly in the face of U.S. sanctions. This cooperation extends beyond economic pragmatism; it constitutes an anti-hegemonic strategy aimed at resisting Western dominance. Thus, energy relations between Iran and Venezuela represent an economic dimension of an Occidentalist stance. Since 2005, Iran has expanded its economic and industrial presence in Latin America, with investments estimated at around USD 20 billion, reflecting both a pursuit of material gain and an attempt to project ideological influence into what has traditionally been perceived as the U.S.’s strategic sphere of influence.^[12]

During the presidencies of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hugo Chávez, the Iran—Venezuela alliance reached its peak (Calderon & Holman, 2014). Both leaders aligned politically in their anti-US rhetoric and further deepened economic cooperation by signing over 200 agreements in the fields of energy, finance, agriculture, technology, and infrastructure. Although US sanctions limited the implementation of many projects, some important initiatives were realized. Iran committed USD 200 million to build 10,000 affordable homes in Venezuela, established tractor production facilities in Caracas, and facilitated SAIPA’s automotive production (Moradi & Hamzeh, 2021, p. 146). As of 2007, the volume of bilateral economic relations between Venezuela and Iran reached USD 17 billion, and approximately 5,000 Iranian experts and workers were employed in Venezuela.^[13] By 2008, Iran’s industrial projects in Venezuela had reached a total value of nearly USD 4 billion (Lob, 2025, pp. 684–685).

To institutionalize these efforts, the Bilateral Bank was founded in 2009 to strengthen financial cooperation and establish independence from the U.S.-dominated global financial system, especially in relations with ALBA countries.^[14] Yet, due to U.S. restrictions, the bank continuously faced operational barriers. Venezuela also provided material support to Iran, sending oil tankers in 2011 to mitigate the effects of sanctions on Iranian fuel supplies (Lob, 2025, p. 686). The U.S. responded by enacting the “Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act” in 2012, significantly curbing Tehran’s exports to Caracas, which declined by nearly 70% the following year.^[15]

The deaths of Chávez and Ahmadinejad’s departure in 2013 did not disrupt bilateral ties. Their successors maintained the alliance, demonstrating its resilience beyond personal leadership dynamics. By 2014, the two states had signed 265 agreements across diverse sectors, from trade and ecology to culture and industry.^[16] This trajectory continued into the 2020s: in April 2020, Iran secured a USD 500 million contract to repair Venezuela’s oil refineries^[17] while the opening of the Iranian supermarket “Megasis” in Caracas symbolized deeper commercial integration.^[18] In addition, in line with Venezuela’s goal of strengthening its military and technological independence in 2021, a new institution called the ‘Military Science and Technology Council’ was established with the advice of experts from China, Russia, Cuba, and Iran.^[19]

Under Ibrahim Raisi, the relationship intensified further. In 2022–2023, Venezuela became Iran’s largest export market in Latin America, with Iranian exports reaching USD 118 million compared to just USD 816,000 in imports. This represented a 200% increase from the previous year (Mokhtar, 2024, p. 69). In 2022, Raisi signed a Strategic Cooperation Agreement establishing a 20-year cooperation framework between the two countries, containing various commitments in the oil, defense, agriculture, tourism, and service sectors. In this context, he sent an oil tanker to Venezuela, which was going through a difficult period due to US sanctions, sending a message of solidarity.^[20] It was also noted that during Raisi’s visit to Venezuela, bilateral trade volume reached USD 600 million in 2021 and USD 3 billion in 2023; the goal of increasing this figure to USD 10 to USD 20 billion in the medium to long term was expressed (Lob, 2025, p. 694).

Ahmad Firouzi, Director General of the Europe and Americas Office at the Trade Promotion Organization (TPO) of Iran, added that during the 2024–2025 period, Iran actively pursued the signing of trade agreements and that most of the groundwork for a free trade agreement with Venezuela had already been completed. He noted that only one step remains for the Iran—Venezuela free trade agreement to come into force in the 2025–2026 period, marking the first such deal between the two countries in 20 years.^[21]

Altogether, Iran—Venezuela economic relations demonstrate the dual logic of pragmatism and ideology. While oil and trade agreements serve immediate financial needs, they also embody a strategic challenge to U.S. hegemony in Latin America. By combining material cooperation with ideological alignment, both states frame their partnership not merely as survival under sanctions, but as a model of alternative globalization rooted in Occidentalist resistance.

Military and Security Dimensions of the Iran—Venezuela Partnership

Military and security cooperation between Iran and Venezuela reflects their shared determination to counter U.S. “imperialist” policies and unilateral sanctions. Beyond bilateral defense relations, this partnership is framed within South—South cooperation, aiming to construct an alternative balance of power. Both states seek to form joint resistance front by providing strategic support in military technology transfer, defense capacity building, and enhancing resilience against sanctions.^[22] In this sense, the relationship moves beyond traditional defense ties and constitutes a multilayered security architecture shaped by ideological affinity, geopolitical calculations, and the pursuit of an alternative order.

In 2008, the two countries signed a pact pledging full military support in the event of U.S. attacks. Yet the absence of joint military exercises has led many analysts to argue that cooperation is conducted through indirect and asymmetrical means. Iran’s expertise in intelligence and irregular warfare has been central, with Quds Force operatives training Venezuelan forces since 2006 and Iranian officers integrated into Venezuela’s security institutions. These activities illustrate an Occidentalist security model rejecting the Western-centric system, which the U.S. perceives as both a security and ideological challenge (de Azevedo, 2018, pp. 50–51; Goforth, 2012, pp. 35–36). U.S. concerns were evident when Robert Gates in 2009 accused the Quds Force of destabilizing Latin America, and Pentagon reports in 2010 highlighted Iran’s expanding presence. Further, Iran’s role in cyber defense—particularly Soleimani’s support against U.S. cyberattacks in 2019—emphasized resistance to Western technological dominance. Maduro’s 2022 praise of Khamenei and Soleimani as symbols of resistance reflects this ideological discourse.^[23]

The partnership has also involved the transfer of technology and arms sales. Following the U.S. embargo on Venezuela, Chavez even suggested selling F-16 jets to Iran. Between 2001 and 2012, Iran transferred unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology under a 2006 agreement (Lob, 2025, p. 685). The Iran-based Qods Aviation Industries supplied UAV kits, Venezuelan engineers trained in Iran, and Iranian experts operated at the El Libertador Air Base in Maracay.^[24] This facility became a hub for assembling Mohajer-6 and Shahed-131 drones, institutionalized in 2020 through Empresa Aeronáutica Nacional S.A.^[25] Cooperation also expanded to the naval forces, with the Iranian Zolfikar-class missile boats being equipped with Nasr-1 missiles showcased in Venezuela in July 2023.^[26]

Security ties have also raised global concerns. Between 2010 and 2019, reports claimed Venezuela issued more than 10,000 passports to individuals from Syria and Lebanon, raising alarms about infiltration into the U.S. (Goforth, 2012, pp. 43–44). Allegations of uranium transfers further linked Venezuela to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. At the United Nations Human Rights Council and International Atomic Energy Agency, Venezuela repeatedly defended Iran’s nuclear program under Chávez and Maduro (Lob, 2025, p. 683; Goforth, 2012, p. 31). This political support deepened during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, when Western opposition to Iran’s nuclear program was at its strongest.

The 2020 U.S. sanctions on both countries highlighted the international implications of their cooperation.^[27] In 2024, a high-level Iranian delegation led by Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzade, Minister of Defense, took a significant step toward further strengthening ties between the two countries during the 10th meeting of the Iran—Venezuela Joint Economic Cooperation Commission held in Caracas. In this context, two important memoranda of understanding were signed during the talks: one establishing visa exemptions between the two countries, and another focusing on technology transfer and training in the field of artificial intelligence (AI).^[28] Moreover, Maduro’s call after Israel’s 2025 attacks on Iran for Global South countries to defend Iran’s “legitimate pursuit of peace” further confirmed the continuity of this alliance.^[29]

Altogether, Iran—Venezuela relations represent not only a tactical defense collaboration, but also a broader, ideologically driven strategy to challenge Western-led security structures. By combining asymmetric warfare, technological transfers, political solidarity, and South—South cooperation, both states aim to construct a counter-hegemonic model that resonates beyond their bilateral ties.

In Lieu of Conclusion: Bilateral Cooperation Amid Strategic Uncertainty

Recent geopolitical maneuvers led by the United States in relation to Venezuela, together with newly imposed sanctions on the Iran—Venezuela nexus, reinforce the assumption that this relationship cannot be reduced to a merely conjunctural alignment. Rather, it reflects a deeper and more persistent counter-hegemonic impulse. The latest U.S. sanctions on entities and individuals based in Iran and Venezuela, particularly those linked to the commercialization of Iranian-designed combat UAVs through Venezuela and to procurement networks supporting Iran’s ballistic missile programs, demonstrate that this axis is no longer perceived as a purely symbolic or discursive partnership. Instead, it is increasingly understood as involving tangible military and technological cooperation. This shift indicates that Iran—Venezuela relations have been reclassified within U.S. and Western security frameworks as an emerging threat category.

These developments, occurring alongside an intensification of external interventions aimed at redefining sovereign domains, confirm that Caracas’s strategic and ideological partnership with Tehran has evolved beyond a rational or pragmatic policy choice. Over time, it has been transformed into a collective practice of resistance against U.S., and Western-centered power imposition. Across the past 25 years, the Iran—Venezuela axis has thus emerged not only as a defensive response to sanctions and diplomatic pressure, but also as a concrete political manifestation of an Occidentalist counter-discourse that challenges Western claims to security governance, legitimacy, and normative authority.

From the perspective of this study’s central hypothesis, the sustainability of the Iran—Venezuela partnership is contingent upon the preservation of political and strategic autonomy by both parties. This assumption has become increasingly visible in light of recent geopolitical developments. The United States’ references to United Nations Security Council resolutions and National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) in targeting Iran’s ballistic missile program, asymmetric military capabilities, and the global activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) clarify why this cooperation,^[30] extending to Venezuela, is framed in Washington as a strategic risk. Paradoxically, these external efforts to shape domestic political and security processes have served to draw Iran and Venezuela closer together, reinforcing their mutual alignment.

At the same time, persistent political and economic uncertainty within Venezuela reveals that this partnership does not rest on an automatic or unconditional form of solidarity. By defining Iran’s conventional arms transfers and technological diffusion as a regional security threats, the United States has rendered the Iran—Venezuela axis increasingly costly and structurally fragile. Consequently, the future viability of this strategic and ideological convergence depends on the simultaneous fulfillment of several conditions: the maintenance of foreign policy autonomy by both states; the avoidance of direct external determination of regime security; the continued functionality of alternative economic, military, and logistical networks under sanctions; and the ability of Occidentalist narratives to sustain domestic political legitimacy.

In conclusion, the Iran—Venezuela partnership developed up to 2025 represents a hybrid form of cooperation that diverges from classical alliance models. Grounded in political independence, ideologically informed, and oriented toward survival under sanctions and external intervention, this relationship illustrates an adaptive mode of strategic alignment. Recent U.S. sanctions, security discourse, and direct intervention in Venezuela further confirm that the Iran—Venezuela axis should be analyzed not only within a regional framework, but also as part of a broader global counter-hegemonic configuration. Accordingly, this axis constitutes a distinctive and analytically significant example in the international relations literature of a solidarity-based alignment that remains viable insofar as state autonomy is preserved and external pressure continues to intensify.

 

^{1 The United States’ attack on Venezuela on January 3, 2026 should be interpreted not merely as an unlawful use of force, but as part of a broader nihilistic geopolitical trajectory in which international law is increasingly subordinated to the security management practices of major powers. Beyond constituting a violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty, this intervention has significantly eroded confidence in the United Nations system, particularly in the capacity of the permanent members of the UN Security Council to restrain aggression, prevent mass violence, and uphold the very legal norms they purport to defend. In this respect, Venezuela represents not a case of the intrinsic failure of international law, but rather a concrete illustration of its deliberate marginalization by actors claiming authority over global security, thereby serving as a cautionary case for the contemporary international order. See:  Falk R. The US Attack on Venezuela and the Collapse of International Law // Aljazeera. January 21, 2026. URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/1/21/the-us-attack-on-venezuela-and-the-collapse-of-international-law (accessed: 21.01.2026).}

^{2 Chang J. Rogue Relations under Max-Pressure: Iran—Venezuela Bilateral Engagement 2013–2020 // E-International Relations. March 8, 2021. URL: https://www.e-ir.info/2021/03/08/rogue-relations-under-max-pressure-iran-venezuela-bilateral-engagement-2013-2020/ (accessed: 04.09.2025).}

^{3 Hakimzadeh K. Iran and Venezuela: The Axis of Annoyance // Army.mil. May 28, 2009. URL: https://www.army.mil/article/21750/iran_and_venezuela_the_axis_of_annoyance (accessed: 03.09.2025).}

^{4 Faiellai M., Luchettiii J. Los Crecientes Lazos de Irán y Sudamérica: el Caso Venezolano. Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales, 2007. P. 1–12. URL: https://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/bitstream/handle/10915/41094/Documento_completo.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed: 12.01.2026).}

^{5 Steinberg G. The “Axis of Resistance”: Iran’s Expansion in the Middle East Is Hitting a Wall. Berlin: SWP Research Paper, 2021. No. 6. P. 7. URL: https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2021RP06_Axis_of_Resistance.pdf (accessed: 01.02.2026).}

^{6 The concept of South—South cooperation conjures up an image of solidarity among developing countries, achieved through the exchange of resources, technology and knowledge. According to this narrative, South—South cooperation seeks to exploit the principle of “complementarity” in production, consumption, trade, investment, technology and development cooperation. These processes have the potential to generate positive synergies among Southern economies by creating linkages in subsequent stages. See: (Stuenkel, 2013, p. 4).}

^{7 Ball C. P. The Legacy of Chavismo’s Ties to Iran // Caracas Chronicles. June 27, 2025. URL:  https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2025/06/27/the-legacy-of-chavismos-ties-to-iran/ (accessed: 21.03.2026).}

^{8 Posch W. The Third World, Global Islam and Pragmatism: The Making of Iranian Foreign Policy. Berlin : SWP Research Paper, 2013. Р. 14. URL: https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2013_RP03_poc.pdf (accessed: 12.02.2026). See also: (Fathollah-Nejad, 2021, рр. 8, 69).}

^{9 Karmon E. Iran and Its Proxy Hezbollah: Strategic Penetration in Latin America // Real Instituto Elcano. April 8, 2009. URL: https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/work-document/iran-and-its-proxy-hezbollah-strategic-penetration-in-latin-america-wp/ (accessed: 12.10.2025).}

^{10 Ibid.}

^{11 Pezeshkian Hails Venezuela’s Courageous Stance on Israeli Aggression against Iran // IRNA. July 30, 2025. URL: https://en.irna.ir/news/85901550/Pezeshkian-hails-Venezuela-s-courageous-stance-on-Israeli-aggression (accessed: 13.09.2025).}

^{12 Bailey N. Iran’s Venezuelan Gateway // The American Foreign Policy Council. 2012. Vol. 5. P. 1.}

^{13 Ottolenghi E. Iran and Venezuela Deepen Their Strategic Alliance // Foundation for Defense of Democracies. June 16, 2023. URL: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/06/16/iran-and-venezuela-deepen-their-strategic-alliance/ (accessed: 14.10.2025).}

^{14 Pearson T. Venezuela and Iran to Form Joint Companies and Bank // Venezuelanalysis. April 3, 2009. URL: https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/4348/ (accessed: 31.08.2025).}

^{15 Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012. Public Law 112–220 // U.S. Government. December 28, 2012. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-112publ220/pdf/PLAW-112publ220.pdf (accessed: 02.09.2025).}

^{16 Šerić M. The Tehran—Caracas Axis: An Important Factor in Geopolitical Balance // Eurosiareview. July 26, 2024. URL: https://www.eurasiareview.com/26072024-the-tehran-caracas-axis-an-important-factor-in-geopolitical-balance-analysis/ (accessed: 28.08.2025).}

^{17 Laya P., Bartenstein B. Iran Is Hauling Gold Bars Out of Venezuela’s Almost-Empty Vaults // Bloomberg. April 30, 2020. URL: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-30/iran-is-hauling-gold-bars-out-of-venezuela-s-almost-empty-vaults (accessed: 11.09.2025).}

^{18  Iran and Venezuela: Axis of Anti-Americanism // UANI. March 2024. URL: https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/UANI_Resource_Venezuela_3.14.24_JC.pdf (accessed: 02.09.2025).}

^{19 Ottolenghi E. Iran and Venezuela Deepen Their Strategic Alliance // Foundation for Defense of Democracies. June 16, 2023. URL: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/06/16/iran-and-venezuela-deepen-their-strategic-alliance/ (accessed: 14.10.2025).}

^{20 Zegarra G. Irán y Venezuela: hasta dónde llega la sociedad militar de dos países acorralados // CNN Venezuela. October 13, 2025. URL: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/10/13/venezuela/iran-aliado-militar-venezuela-eeuu-maduro-orix (accessed: 11.11.2025).}

^{21 Iran’s Exports to the Americas Quadruple in a Year // Tehran Times. April 8, 2025. URL: https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/511554/Iran-s-exports-to-the-Americas-quadruple-in-a-year? (accessed: 19.11.2025).}

^{22 Iran ba Vanzoela, Koba Nikaragoeh peyvand menafe dard/moghableh ba amrika vahmayat az nezam chandghatbi [Iran Shares Common Interests with Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua: Opposing the US and Supporting a Multipolar World Order] // IRNA. June 2023. (In Persian). URL: https://www.irna.ir/news/85139631 (accessed: 02.09.2025).}

^{23 Iran and Venezuela: Axis of Anti-Americanism // UANI. March 2024. P. 15. URL: https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/UANI_Resource_Venezuela_3.14.24_JC.pdf (accessed: 02.09.2025).}

^{24 Iranians Control Venezuelan Drone Facilities as US Warships Deploy // Iran International. September 4, 2025. URL: https://www.iranintl.com/en/202509044107 (accessed: 05.09.2025).}

^{25 Morales H.R. Iran Played Key Role in the Development of Venezuela’s Armed Drone Program, Report Dinds // The Latin Times. August 31, 2025. URL: https://www.latintimes.com/iran-played-key-role-development-venezuelas-armed-drone-program-report-finds-589024 (accessed: 18.09.2025).}

^{26 Egozi A. Iran Delivers Weapon Systems to Venezuela // Defence Industry Europe. July 27, 2023. URL: https://defence-industry.eu/iran-delivers-weapon-systems-to-venezuela/ (accessed: 15.09.2025).}

^{27 Amrika Vezarat-e Defa‘ Iran, Maduro va mortabetan ba barnameh-haye haste’i va moshaki-ye Iran ra tahrim kard [The United States Imposed Sanctions against the Iranian Ministry of Defense, Maduro, and Individuals/Entities Associated with Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs] // Iran International. September 21, 2020.  (In Persian). URL: https://old.iranintl.com/%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86/%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%8C-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88-%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF (accessed: 03.09.2025).}

^{28 Tehran, Caracas Deepen Strategic Ties with New Cooperation Agreements // Tehran Times. November 22, 2024. URL: https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/506610/Tehran-Caracas-deepen-strategic-ties-with-new-cooperation-agreements (accessed: 19.11.2025).}

^{29 Maduro khastar-e hemayat-e keshvarhaye jahan az Iran shod; “Netanyahu, Hitler-e qarn-e 21” [Maduro Called on Countries to Support Iran: “Netanyahu is the Hitler of the 21st century”] // Mehr News. June 18, 2025. (In Persian). URL: https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6503648/%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%88-%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%B1 (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{30 Disrupting Iran’s UAV Proliferation to Venezuela and Iran’s Weapons Programs // U.S. Department of State. December 30, 2025. URL: https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/12/disrupting-irans-uav-proliferation-to-venezuela-and-irans-weapons-programs (accessed: 22.01.2026).}

About the authors

Damla Kocatepe

Kafkas University

Author for correspondence.
Email: dml.sahinn@gmail.com
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-1564-3995

PhD, Dr.Sc. (International Relations), Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations

Şehitler Street, 36000, Kars, Türkiye

Nazrin Alizada

Hatay Mustafa Kemal University

Email: nazrin.alizada@mku.edu.tr
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-6874-7712

PhD (International Relations), Associate Professor, Department of International Relations

Tayfur Sökmen Campus, 31060, Hatay, Türkiye

References

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