Energy Factor in China’s Relations with the Gulf Arab States

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Introduction

In the early stages of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) history, its policy in the Middle East and other regions was largely shaped by Cold War realities and the role of great powers in global politics. Later, with the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening-up” policy in 1979, Beijing adjusted its foreign policy strategy, prioritizing economic development over rigid ideological stances. China began focusing on expanding ties with Middle Eastern states, particularly oil-producing ones. In the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing’s growing concern over US hegemony in the Middle East prompted it to engage in a highly pragmatic dialogue with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, even as the PRC’s demand for hydrocarbons steadily increased (Figure 1).

These circumstances precipitated a major shift in Beijing’s Middle East policy. Notably, China accounted for more than two-thirds of the growth in global oil demand and one-third of the growth in global natural gas demand between 2013 and 2023;^[1] furthermore, in 2024, imports met approximately 74% of its oil consumption needs, according to statistics from the General Administration of Customs of the PRC and data from the Chinese publication Caijing.^[2] Consequently, China has a vital interest in securing additional energy sources to sustain its economic growth without interruption.

It is from the Gulf region that China sources approximately half of its imported oil.^[3] Currently, the proven oil reserves of the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf account for about 30% of the global total,^[4] and four countries in the region—the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Iraq, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait—rank among the world’s top ten oil producers. Furthermore, Qatar holds some of the world’s largest proven natural gas reserves; in 2024, it ranked 6th in natural gas production volume, as well as being the third-largest natural gas exporter and the second-largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG).^[5]

Russian scholarship has shown growing interest in China’s foreign policy, including its engagement in the Middle East. In this context, notable works include those by I.R. Tomberg (2012), E.N. Grachikov (2015; 2019), T.L. Deych (2018), Yu.V. Petrunina (2016), E.M. Savicheva, A. Brebdanе, and I.V. Ryzhov (Savicheva, Brebdanе & Ryzhov, 2022), and E.S. Melkumyan (2020).

Figure 1. Production and consumption of oil and petroleum products in China, 1993–2024, million barrels per day
Source: China Overview // U.S. Energy Information Administration. May 19, 2025. URL: https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/CHN (accessed: 02.08.2025).

This study is grounded in the neorealist paradigm, which views a state’s national interests as the primary driver of its foreign policy actions. The authors believe this approach methodologically sound for analyzing the PRC’s external energy policy, which is shaped by national interests and security concerns. As it engages in global geopolitical competition, Beijing must weigh risks and benefits while simultaneously bolstering its military and economic power to ensure its energy security. An interdisciplinary approach enabled a comprehensive analysis of China’s relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, covering key areas of cooperation in the energy sector.

On the Path to Long-Term Energy Cooperation with Gulf Countries

Chinese experts do not always agree on the development and utilization of Middle Eastern oil and gas resources. Given the region’s volatility and unpredictability, some experts advocate for the rapid diversification of energy sources to avoid over-reliance on Middle Eastern fields; they argue that China’s dependence on imported oil should be capped at one-third of total consumption and that sources should be diversified by importing oil from Russia, Central Asian states, and the Middle East (Qian, 2010).

Such reasoning appears to be somewhat simplistic, given that while hydrocarbon production is expanding worldwide, Middle Eastern still dominates the global energy market. For instance, the volume of international crude oil trade in 2023 stood at 2.1 billion tonnes, matching the 2022 level. The Middle East leads in exports, accounting for 41% of the total volume.^[6] Meanwhile, the resource capacities of Central Asian nations, for example, fall far short of meeting even a third of China’s external demand for hydrocarbons. Thus, given current realities, China cannot do without oil from the Arabian region. Clearly, the PRC’s diplomatic activity in the Middle East aims to secure preferential conditions for its relevant corporations to ensure stable energy supplies from the region, particularly in light of the country’s rapid economic growth and the vigorous expansion of knowledge-intensive industries that require substantial energy resources.

Until 1990, the only Persian Gulf countries supplying crude oil to China were Oman and Iran (Leung, Li & Low, 2011). In 1979, China signed a ten-year trade agreement with the former which was subsequently renewed multiple times. The Sultanate remained one of China’s key Arab partners (Melkumyan, 2020). For instance, in 1995, an agreement was signed to increase oil supplies from Oman to China fivefold, from 20,000 to 100,000 barrels per day. In 1996, Oman supplied China with oil and petroleum products (primarily fuels and lubricants) valued at USD 140 million. Chinese exports to the Sultanate increased correspondingly (Han & Chen, 2018, p. 5). In 2005, the parties signed agreements to step up cooperation in the economic, oil, and gas sectors,^[7] and the countries have maintained a regular high-level dialogue since then.

In 1996, China reached an agreement with Yemen on cooperation in the oil sector, signing a contract to purchase 30,000 barrels per day for the Zhenhai refinery.^[8] By 1999, Yemen had become the second-largest supplier of crude oil to China, exporting 4.1 million tonnes annually, trailing Oman (5 million tonnes), but surpassing Iran (3.9 million tonnes) and Saudi Arabia (2.5 million tonnes) (Leung, Li & Low, 2011).

From the beginning of the 21st century, Saudi Arabia and several other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or the “Arab Six,” comprising Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman, met China’s growing demand for crude oil, while Yemen, with its limited resource potential, was relegated to the background.^[9] This rapprochement started with a trip to the region by Chinese Vice Premier Li Lanqing in 1993 (Ahmed, 2016, p. 193). Later, in 1999, then-Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Riyadh, resulting in a bilateral agreement to expand energy cooperation.^[10] Chinese corporations entered the Saudi domestic market, while Arab backers engaged in oil refining within China itself (Fulton, 2020, p. 518).

The trajectory for future development was set by a series of high-level bilateral visits between 2006 and 2009. Notable among these was King Abdullah II’s first overseas trip to Beijing (January 2006), during which five sectoral agreements were signed and a number of promising projects were discussed. Earlier, in 2004, during a visit to the region by Chinese President Hu Jintao, the parties announced the establishment of the China—Arab Cooperation Forum, which led to the start of work on the Energy Forum (Yao, 2014). On February 11, 2009, GCC Secretary-General Abdul Rahman bin Hamad Al-Attiyah met in Riyadh with Chinese President Hu Jintao, who put forward several proposals, including the launch of a China—GCC strategic dialogue mechanism and the creation of a free trade zone between them.^[11]

China has sought to expand cooperation with Iraq as well. In July 2004, Beijing opened an embassy in Baghdad and began supporting the restoration of the public administration system after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. Kurdish and Iraqi politician Jalal Talabani visited Beijing before and after taking office as president of the country in 2005. As a result, several agreements were reached, including one regarding the implementation of oil contracts concluded under the previous regime in Baghdad. 80% of Iraq’s debt (USD 8.5 billion) was written off,^[12] and Chinese companies China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), CNOOC and Sinopec began working in local oil-bearing areas (Al-Shafiy, 2015). In 2008, the contract from 1997 with CNPC was renegotiated, and this state corporation received the rights to develop the Al-Hadab oil field. In 2009, it acquired a 29-year subcontract for the development of the largest Rumaila field (where it owns 37%, with the other shares going to British BP and the Iraqi national Basra Oil Company (BOC)). In December 2009, again, CNPC won a second round of licensing for an equity interest (37.5%) in the Halfavia field in partnership with France’s Total (18.75%), Malaysia’s Petronas (18.75%) and Iraq’s BOC (25%). In May 2010, China National Offshore Oil Company CNOOC, in partnership with Turkey’s TPAO, won the tender to develop the Maysan field. The share of the Chinese company reached 63.75%, and it became the main operator (for Iraqi drillers it was 25%, Turkish — 11.25%) (Al-Shafiy, 2015).   

During the visit of Sheikh S. al-Sabah as Prime Minister of Kuwait to Beijing in July 2004, the parties signed a framework agreement on cooperation in the oil and gas sector.^[13] In 2005, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) opened an office in the capital of China.^[14] By the end of the same year, the Kuwait Petroleum International (KPI, a subsidiary of KPC) signed a memorandum of understanding with China’s Sinopec regarding the construction of an oil refining complex in the city of Zhanjiang.^[15] The project included an oil refinery with a capacity of 15 million tonnes per year (300,000 barrels per day)^[16] and an ethylene cracking unit with an annual capacity of 1 million tonnes. Additionally, in 2009, Sinopec secured a USD 400 million contract to construct five oil and gas facilities designed, according to projections at the time, to increase Kuwait’s oil production by more than 4 million barrels per day by 2020.^[17] The project was completed, yet Kuwait’s oil production in 2020 amounted to only 2.439 million barrels per day.^[18]

As for Qatar, China purchased LNG from it.^[19] CNOOC opened an office in Doha in 2009, coinciding with the implementation of long-term agreements between Qatargas and both CNOOC and PetroChina: CNOOC was to receive 2 million tonnes of LNG annually for 25 years, while PetroChina was to receive 3 million tonnes annually for the same period. The total volume of contracted supplies amounted to 5 million tonnes of LNG per year.^[20] The emirate has become a major exporter of LNG to China. While the value of shipments was estimated at USD 100 million in 1999, it had reached USD 1 billion by 2010 (Davidson, 2010, p. 30). In 2023, Qatar exported 16.7 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas to China, valued at approximately USD 13 billion, ranking second only to Australia in this regard.^[21]

In November 2008, the China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation (CPECC) was selected as the contractor for the Abu Dhabi (Habshan-Fujairah) oil pipeline project in the United Arab Emirates.^[22] The value of the signed contract was USD 3.29 billion. The project was executed by CPECC with the participation of CNPC and the China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau. In just the last few years, crude oil imports from the UAE to China have increased by 40%, rising from 480,000 barrels per day in 2021 to 674,000 barrels per day in 2022.^[23]

Thus, China has laid the foundation for long-term ties in the Gulf subregion, securing the energy supplies necessary for its continued economic development. This approach was implemented through numerous agreements signed between China and the Arabian monarchies. Beijing’s active energy diplomacy demonstrated the interest of Chinese corporations in investing in Arab energy resources and participating in field development and other industry-related projects (Grachikov, 2015, p. 213). China requires a continuous influx of oil into its economy. In turn, Middle Eastern exporters of “black gold” rely on the vast Chinese market; this interdependence has elevated the partnership to a new level that extends far beyond hydrocarbon cooperation, encompassing the military-industrial complex, financial and economic collaboration, and artificial intelligence (AI). Clearly, relations between China and the GCC states are not and will not be defined solely by the energy factor.

The Energy Factor in Partnership Strategies and the Belt and Road Initiative

Following Beijing’s announcement of the renowned “Belt and Road Initiative” (2013), the trajectory of energy cooperation between this major Far Eastern power and Arab nations took on a new substance. Among other things, the initiative served as China’s response to the “encirclement strategy” employed by the United States in East Asia (He & Feng, 2018)—specifically, as an antithesis to President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy (2012), which Beijing interpreted as an American attempt to contain China (Clarke, 2020).

On June 5, 2014, at the 6th Ministerial Meeting of the China—Arab States Cooperation Forum, Chinese President Xi Jinping outlined the key principles of Beijing’s policy regarding the aforementioned initiative in a speech titled “Promoting the Silk Road Spirit and Deepening China—Arab Cooperation.” In particular, he stated: “Both sides should adopt a broader vision and a practical approach to developing the ‘1+2+3’ cooperation model.” In this model, energy cooperation was positioned as the core, with infrastructure construction and trade-investment engagement serving as two additional pillars, complemented by three high-tech sectors: nuclear energy, space exploration, and breakthrough energy technologies.^[24] Thus, engagement with the Arab world has become an integral component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Sun, 2015).

In 2015, China officially became the world’s leading importer of crude oil,^[25] with nearly half of its imports originating in the Middle East. In January 2016, Xi Jinping visited the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Arab Republic of Egypt. Speaking at the headquarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo, he outlined an updated vision of Beijing’s concept: “We must promote a new ‘oil and gas plus’ cooperation model and strive for new horizons in the China—Arab strategic energy partnership—one characterized by mutual benefit, security, reliability, and long-term friendship.”^[26] Many Chinese experts believe that China’s energy interests in the Middle East should be regarded as fundamental, given that “Middle Eastern energy significantly impacts the sustainable growth” of the PRC (Zeng, Xiao & Breslin, 2015, p. 260).

On July 10, 2018, the 8th ministerial meeting of the China—Arab States Cooperation Forum took place in Beijing, chaired by Wang Yi, State Councillor and Foreign Minister of the PRC. In his address, he called on the parties to establish a strategic partnership, strengthen trust, and provide reliable support for mutual interests. According to the minister, the outcome of Beijing’s policy in the Arab region has been the establishment of partnerships (at various levels) with the following countries: a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Saudi Arabia (2016), Egypt (2014), the UAE (2018), and Algeria (2014), as well as a “strategic partnership” with Oman (2018), Kuwait (2018), Qatar (2014), Iraq (2015), Jordan (2015), Djibouti (2017), Sudan (2015), and Morocco (2016). The event culminated with the Declaration of Action on China—Arab Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, which reflects the importance of the Arab region in the implementation of this large-scale initiative.^[27] As Wang Yi put it, “the overall configuration of the joint construction of the Belt and Road in the Middle East is rapidly taking shape.”^[28]

New Approaches to China’s Strategic Partnership with Gulf Countries  in the Energy Sector

Ensuring energy security has become a crucial factor in the interaction between China and the “Arabian Six.” As previously mentioned, the relationship between the parties evolved into a comprehensive partnership, driven largely by the rapidly expanding trade, dominated by energy supplies. By 2010, Beijing had already supplanted Washington as the largest trading partner of Middle Eastern nations.^[29] The aforementioned trend continued its rapid development, a fact confirmed, among other things, by the PRC—GCC summit held in December 2022, which resulted in the release of a joint statement and an action plan for strategic dialogue covering the 2023–2027 period.

A report on China’s energy cooperation with Arab nations, prepared by the CNPC Economics and Technology Research Institute (September 2023), also reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to further enhancing energy and trade cooperation with these countries. For instance, the volume of energy exports from Saudi Arabia to China grew significantly, rising from USD 1.5 billion in 2000^[30] to nearly USD 54 billion in 2023 (Çevik, 2025, p. 199). In 2019, Saudi Arabia exported a record 1.67 million barrels of oil per day to China, increasing supplies by 47% and becoming China’s largest oil supplier; in doing so, it overtook Russia, which had previously held the top spot, for the first time in four years.^[31]

In 2020, amidst the global pandemic, Saudi Arabia remained the leading supplier of energy to China, accounting for approximately 16% of China’s total oil imports, valued at USD 28.1 billion. Saudi Arabia and Russia were the two primary suppliers of crude oil to China in 2022, each accounting for 18% of total imports^[32] (Figure 2). However, sanctions and the price cap imposed on Russian crude oil in early 2023 led to significant discounts on supplies of the commodity from Russia. Driven by these lower prices, Moscow overtook Riyadh in 2023 to become the primary source of crude oil imports for China.^[33]

Figure 2. Share of the Middle East in China’s crude oil and condensate imports in 2022, %: the total may differ from 100% due to rounding
Source: China Country Analysis Brief // U.S. Energy Information Administration. November 2023. P. 13. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20250427090913/https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/China/pdf/china-2023.pdf (accessed: 12.09.2025).

China is the most lucrative market for Saudi Arabia, especially given the sharp decrease in US oil imports resulting from the shift towards unconventional sources. In recent years, the economic dimension of Sino-Saudi relations has continued to expand. For instance, in late 2018, Saudi Aramco secured a number of major contracts, making it the largest oil supplier to China. The year 2019 saw the signing of 35 agreements worth over USD 28 billion, covering bilateral cooperation across various sectors, starting with energy.^[34] Several memoranda of understanding regarding investment in downstream operations were signed, including an agreement between Saudi Aramco and Norinco to build a USD 10 billion oil refinery in Liaoning Province (construction began in March 2023). Saudi Aramco has acquired a 9% stake in an oil refinery in Zhoushan, as well as oil storage facilities serving other Asian markets.^[35] Thus, Riyadh’s investment in China’s oil refining industry has paved the way for a mutually beneficial bilateral investment exchange in the energy sector.

During his state visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that Beijing was ready to invest in the ambitious Saudi Vision 2030 project (Frolov, 2023), which aims to reduce dependence on oil exports, diversify the economy, and develop green energy, infrastructure, healthcare, education, and other sectors. Furthermore, the possibility of settling a portion of oil export transactions in Chinese yuan is being considered in the Saudi capital.^[36] Currently, the energy dialogue between Saudi Arabia and China is exerting a significant influence on the global economy and geopolitics.

In recent years, Iraq has become one of the top five suppliers of raw materials for China’s oil refining industry (see Figure 2). Chinese oil companies, such as CNPC, Sinopec, CNOOC, PetroChina, and Zhenhua Oil, maintain a substantial presence in the country’s upstream sector. Iraqi oil exports to China increased from 28,000 barrels per day in 2007 to 573,000 barrels per day in 2014, reaching 1.19 million barrels per day in 2024.^[37] Iraq is the third-largest global supplier of oil to China and the second-largest among Arab nations. In September 2019, China signed an “Oil for Reconstruction” agreement, under which the local Basra Oil Company awarded a contract to China’s Hilong Oil Service & Engineering Co. (a subsidiary of the Chinese state-owned China National Machinery Industry Corporation, or SINOMACH) to carry out work on 80 oil wells at the giant Majnoon oil field in the southern province of Basra.^[38]

The practical implementation of the Iraq—China cooperation mechanism, linked to 2019 agreements to finance infrastructure projects using proceeds from a portion of Iraqi oil exports, began in 2021. Subsequently, in January 2024, China’s CNPC (via PetroChina) became the lead contractor for the development of the West Qurna-1 field following ExxonMobil’s withdrawal from the project. In early 2024, the parties planned to ramp up production to 600,000 barrels per day by the end of the year.^[39] According to the AEI China Global Investment Tracker, 24 out of 41 construction contracts awarded by Iraq to Chinese companies between 2007 and 2022 were related to energy projects, 15 of which were carried out by CNPC.^[40] In 2021, Iraq became the largest recipient of investments in energy projects under the Belt and Road Initiative.^[41] China has recently announced its readiness to integrate the Belt and Road Initiative with Iraq’s “Development Road” project, which aims to improve transport and energy networks and facilitate Iraq’s connectivity with major trade hubs in Asia and Europe.^[42]

China’s share of Oman’s crude oil exports has significantly increased in recent years. In 2023, China received 92% of Oman’s crude oil and condensate exports, amounting to approximately 286 million barrels. The value of Omani crude oil exports to China is estimated at around USD 25 billion.^[43] The Sultanate is the third-largest Arab oil supplier to China and the fourth-largest globally, accounting for 7% of China’s total oil imports (see Figure 2). Omani exports include crude oil, methanol, paraxylene, and polypropylene. However, some experts believe that Chinese investment in the Sultanate’s oil sector is insufficient, and this imbalance in the relationship weakens Oman’s position in the face of current economic challenges.^[44] Despite years of attempts to diversify the national economy, Oman’s oil and gas sector accounts for more than 70% of its government revenue.^[45]

Cooperation between China and the UAE has reached a new level. In 2017–2018, relevant companies from both countries signed a series of agreements. Notably, CNPC took the initiative to acquire a stake in onshore and offshore development concessions for USD 3 billion^[46] and concluded a major package of contracts worth USD 1.6 billion with the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) for onshore and offshore seismic surveys in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.^[47] In July 2019, ADNOC and China’s CNOOC agreed to explore opportunities and share expertise in the upstream and downstream sectors, as well as in the liquefied natural gas industry.^[48] The significance of the deal is underscored by the fact that the signing took place in the presence of the then-Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and Chinese President Xi Jinping. In October 2021, the UAE announced its “Net Zero by 2050” strategic initiative.^[49] Since then, China and the UAE have been gradually expanding cooperation in the fields of low-carbon and renewable energy (Sim & Griffiths, 2024). In a joint statement dated June 2, 2024, the parties emphasized the importance of ensuring energy security and resilience.^[50]

Energy cooperation has become a cornerstone of relations between China and Kuwait. This is reflected in a number of agreements. For instance, in August 2014, Kuwait signed a new 10-year contract with Sinopec Corporation that provided for a doubling of energy supplies and more favorable cost and freight terms. In recent years, China has emerged as a major contractor for oil well drilling in the country. Chinese enterprises have secured contracts for 64 projects spanning various sectors of the Kuwaiti economy, including oilfield services and exploration, infrastructure, and telecommunications, with a total value of USD 13.7 billion. These projects have become landmarks in Sino-Kuwaiti cooperation. Furthermore, in 2017 alone, Kuwait purchased Chinese-made oilfield equipment worth over USD 635 million, while Sinopec operated 53 drilling rigs in the country, commanding more than 45% of the Kuwaiti onshore drilling market.^[51] In July 2018, another Chinese company—KERUI Petroleum—signed a USD 100 million contract with Kuwait’s Action Real Estate Company (AREC) to supply two smart ultra-deep drilling rigs. Earlier, in May 2018, KERUI had won a contract worth approximately USD 50 million from the Kuwait National Drilling Company (KDC) to supply one similar rig.^[52]

In October 2018, Kuwait signed a partnership memorandum with Sinopec for the construction of a new oil refinery in southern China. That same year, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) and China’s ShanDong Refining and Chemical Group agreed to cooperate on the marketing, transportation, and storage of Kuwaiti crude oil. The deal aimed to expand joint investment platforms in the oil and logistics sectors. In 2022, the Chinese company Honghua Group and Kuwait Drilling Company signed a new contract worth 435 million yuan (approximately USD 60.03 million) for the supply of high-quality land drilling rigs and other equipment.^[53]  In 2023, China imported 179.9 million barrels of crude oil from Kuwait, valued at over USD 15 billion.^[54] Kuwait ranks among the top six Middle Eastern oil suppliers to China (see Figure 2).

China has by now surpassed many countries in terms of the volume of harmful atmospheric emissions. This is largely due to the fact that coal still meets approximately 70% of the country’s domestic energy needs. Natural gas is more environmentally friendly, and it is only natural that China seeks to replace coal with natural gas imports. The fact that Qatar held 11.28% of global natural gas reserves as of 2024^[55] serves as a key driver of the mutual interest shared by Doha and Beijing in maintaining and expanding their bilateral cooperation.

Today, Qatar is one of the six largest LNG suppliers to China. Qatari LNG accounted for 7% of all liquefied gas supplied to the PRC in 2021,^[56] 15% in 2022,^[57] and 23% in 2023.^[58] On March 22, 2021, Qatar Petroleum reached an agreement with Sinopec to supply 2 million tonnes of LNG to China annually over a ten-year period.^[59]  In 2021, the same Qatari company signed a 15-year contract with the Chinese corporation CNOOC for the supply of 3.5 million tonnes of LNG, starting in January 2022.^[60] This gas deal is of particular importance to China, which aims to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Additionally, in 2022, CNPC and QatarEnergy signed a 27-year agreement under which China will purchase 4 million metric tons of LNG annually.^[61]

Although China is striving to transition to green and “clean” energy, particularly through a major campaign to promote electric vehicles (involving high taxes on internal combustion engine vehicles, free parking for electric cars, and restrictions on non-electric vehicles entering major city centers), forecasts indicate that the country’s dependence on oil and gas imports could rise to 80% by 2030 (Wang, Li & Li, 2018). According to projections by the International Energy Agency and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the energy interdependence between Asia and the Middle East is set to persist and intensify in the coming years. By 2050, the oil import dependency of developing Asian nations could approach 90%, while the Middle East will retain its status as a key export region, directing an increasing share of its seaborne shipments to Asian economies.^[62]

China is engaging in massive equity acquisitions to gain greater control over energy flows, shield itself from price volatility, and mitigate the risk of supply disruptions. However, the potential for conflict in the Middle East and North Africa periodically threatens to disrupt logistics routes. Consequently, experts believe that Beijing must pay greater attention to stabilizing the region to avert such threats (Besada & Salam, 2017). It is worth noting that the U.S. strategy for containing China involves this energy factor as a key consideration.

Should the United States adopt an expansive interpretation of its self-appointed mission to safeguard waterways in the Persian Gulf, extending it to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the entire maritime route supplying China with hydrocarbons could come under U.S. control. Beijing views this prospect unfavorably and may take measures that could involve direct participation in ensuring regional security (Savicheva, Brebdane, & Ryzhov, 2022). A likely first step in this direction was the 2017 decision to build China’s first overseas naval base in the small state of Djibouti. This move establishes a Chinese military presence in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, placing it in close proximity to oil trade routes and the Suez Canal. This aligns fully with China’s 2015 military doctrine, which explicitly states that “the security of overseas interests—including energy and resource supplies, strategic maritime lines of communication, and overseas institutions, personnel, and assets—has become an issue of vital importance.”^[63] The importance of protecting China’s overseas interests and maritime rights was also emphasized in the 2019 White Paper on National Defense in the New Era.^[64]

Thus, the state of instability in the Middle East directly impacts Beijing’s regional policy. China is clearly uncomfortable with the fact that the US Navy controls oil transport routes from the Persian Gulf, including those leading to the South China Sea. Indeed, should events take an unfavorable turn, such as an armed conflict involving the US, the imposition of a strict economic blockade, or Washington pressuring its regional allies, China could be cut off from Middle Eastern hydrocarbons. Such a negative turn of events would also affect the implementation of projects under the Belt and Road Initiative beyond the Middle East, thereby intensifying global competition between the US and China. Clearly, one of the reasons behind Beijing’s mediation in normalizing Iran—Saudi relations in 2023 was precisely its concern for the security of oil transport routes from the Persian Gulf to China, in the event of an open military confrontation between Riyadh and Tehran, or the latter potentially blocking the Strait of Hormuz, which is a vital artery for many oil-importing nations.

Conclusion

China has currently become one of the most important trading partners of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Their close, multifaceted cooperation, driven by pragmatic considerations, will largely shape the economic prospects and international political significance of both sides as a multipolar world is taking shape. The need for energy resources and the imperative of ensuring its own energy security have become key drivers of Beijing’s policy in the region. A series of high-level official visits to Gulf oil-producing nations led to the conclusion and implementation of numerous long-term energy contracts and facilitated the establishment of a multilateral framework: the China—Arab States Cooperation Forum. This has laid the groundwork for a subsequent strategic partnership, including within the scope of the Belt and Road Initiative. Energy cooperation has served as a foundation for deepening and expanding partnerships in other areas as well, such as infrastructure, finance, high technology, culture, education, healthcare, and tourism. China’s foreign policy initiatives align closely with the ambitious economic diversification programs of the Arabian monarchies, elevating cooperation between China and the region’s nations to a qualitatively new level. Significantly, this cooperation is not and will not be limited to the hydrocarbons sector; it extends far beyond that to encompass diverse fields such as renewable and green energy, cultural exchange, and the development of new artificial intelligence models.

The accession of several Gulf states—seeking to balance their traditional ties with the West, particularly the United States—to BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as full members or dialogue partners is undoubtedly fostering expanded engagement with China across a wide range of areas. However, these groupings serve as platforms for dialogue on global and regional security, energy, trade, and investment cooperation not only with Beijing but also with other key international actors, including Russia.

As the turbulence in the Middle East poses economic and energy-related risks to China, the country is seeking to stabilize the regional situation through dialogue and cooperation. In recent years, Beijing has also significantly expanded its political presence in the region; a prime example is the success of Chinese diplomacy in normalizing relations between two political heavyweights—Tehran and Riyadh. A key driver behind this mediation was Beijing’s desire to secure its energy imports from the Gulf, given that a military escalation between Iran and Saudi Arabia could lead Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, thereby cutting off hydrocarbon supplies from GCC countries.

It appears that China will remain dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies in the short to medium term, despite its efforts to diversify its energy sources, particularly its push towards green energy and active promotion of electric vehicle production and mass adoption. Against this backdrop, the mutually beneficial partnership between Beijing and the Arab Gulf states advances their respective national interests while simultaneously balancing the ambitions of competing powers.

 

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^{10 Memorandum of Understanding on Petroleum Cooperation between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia // Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. October 31, 1999. URL: https://sa.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zsgx/zzwl/201005/t20100528_2040548.htm (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{11 President Hu Jintao Meets with GCC Secretary General Al-Attiya // Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco. February 12, 2009. URL: https://sanfrancisco.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/xw/200902/t20090213_4390148.htm  (accessed: 02.02.2025).}

^{12 China Cancels 80% of Iraq’s Debt // The Sydney Morning Herald. February 3, 2010. URL: https://www.smh.com.au/business/china-cancels-80-of-iraqs-debt-20100203-nbc9.html (accessed: 02.02.2025).}

^{13 Niazi K. Kuwait Looks Towards the East: Relations with China // Middle East Institute Policy Brief. 2009 (September). No. 26. P. 4. URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/106361/No_26_Kuwait_looks_towards_the_east.pdf (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{14 Ibid. P. 6.}

^{15 Ibid.}

^{16 Ibid.}

^{17 Kuwait Oil Company Awards Deal to Sinopec // Middle East Business Intelligence. April 7, 2009. URL: https://www.meed.com/kuwait-oil-company-awards-deal-to-sinopec/ (accessed: 02.02.2025).}

^{18 Kuwait’s Oil Revenues Drop Last Year by About 42.5 Percent // Times Kuwait. May 21, 2021. URL:  https://timeskuwait.com/news/kuwaits-oil-revenues-drop-last-year-by-about-42-5-percent (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{19 U.S. Energy Information Administration Country: Analysis Executive Summary:  China. Full report, September 30, 2020. URL: https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/CHN (accessed: 15.08.2025).}

^{20 Qatar in LNG Deal with PetroChina, CNOOC // Reuters. July 18, 2008. URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/world/china/qatar-in-lng-deal-with-petrochina-cnooc-idUSPEK184556/ (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{21 Downs E. China’s Oil Demand, Imports and Supply Security: Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on “China’s Domestic Energy Challenges and Growing Influence over International Energy Markets”. Washington, DC : U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 24, 2025. P. 4. URL: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/Erica_Downs_Testimony.pdf (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{22 Abu Dhabi Crude Oil (Habshan-Fujairah) Pipeline Project // Hydrocarbons Technology. URL: https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/abu-dhabi-pipeline/ (accessed: 22.06.2025).}

^{23 China Country Analysis Brief // U.S. Energy Information Administration. November 2023. Р. 12. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20250427090913/https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/China/pdf/china-2023.pdf (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{24 Xi Jinping Attends Opening Ceremony of Sixth Ministerial Conference of China—Arab States Cooperation Forum and Delivers Important Speech Stressing to Promote Silk Road Spirit and Deepen China—Arab Cooperation // Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Iraq. June 5, 2014. URL: https://iq.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zygx/zxxx/201406/t20140612_2517525.htm (accessed: 02.02.2025).}

^{25 McSpadden K. China Has Become the World’s Biggest Crude Oil Importer for the First Time // Time. May 11, 2015. URL: https://time.com/3853451/china-crude-oil-top-importer/ (accessed: 15.08.2025).}

^{26 Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech at Headquarters of the League of Arab States, Stressing to Jointly Create a Bright Future for Development of China—Arab Relations and Promote National Rejuvenation of China and Arab States to Form More Convergence // Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. January 22, 2016. URL: https://sa.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zt/2/201601/t20160127_2040707.htm (accessed: 22.06.2025).}

^{27 Declaration of Action on China—Arab States Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative // China—Arab States Cooperation Forum. July 10, 2018. URL:   http://www.chinaarabcf.org/chn/lthyjwx/bzjhywj/dbjbzjhy/201807/P020210828263718115188.pdf (accessed: 02.02.2025).}

^{28 Wang Yi: The Joint Building of the Belt and Road between China and Arab States in the Middle East is Rapidly Taking Shape // Ministry of Foreign Affairs. People’s Republic of China. July 10, 2018. URL:   https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/dqzzywt_663826/202406/t20240606_11384726.html (accessed: 15.08.2025).}

^{29 Hornschild S. China in the Middle East: Not Just About Oil // Alert / European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). 2016 (July). No. 31. P. 1. URL: https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/EUISS-China%20in%20the%20Middle%20East-not%20just%20about%20oil.pdf (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{30 Alhamawi L. How China Became Saudi Arabia’s Top Trading Partner, Revived Ancient Silk Road // Arab News. December 8, 2022. URL: https://backup.arabnews.com/node/2213231/business-economy (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{31 Paraskova T. Saudis Boost Crude Oil Exports to China By 47% In 2019 // Oil Price. January 31, 2020. URL: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Saudis-Boost-Crude-Oil-Exports-To-China-By-47-In-2019.html (accessed: 22.06.2025).}

^{32 China Country Analysis Brief // U.S. Energy Information Administration. November 2023. P. 12. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20250427090913/https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/China/pdf/china-2023.pdf (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{33 Ibid.}

^{34 Saudi Signs 35 Agreements with China Worth $28bn // Gulf Business. February 22, 2019. URL: https://gulfbusiness.com/saudi-aramco-sign-china-refinery-deals-crown-prince-visit-sources/ (accessed: 22.06.2025).}

^{35 El Gamal R., Aizhu C., Zhang M. Saudi Aramco Shifts Strategy in China to Boost Oil Sales // Reuters. March 14, 2019. URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco-china-oil-idUSKCN1QV1JC (accessed: 22.06.2025).}

^{36 Said S., Kalin S. Saudi Arabia Considers Accepting Yuan Instead of Dollars for Chinese Oil Sales // The Wall Street Journal. 15 March 2022. URL: https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-considers-accepting-yuan-instead-of-dollars-for-chinese-oil-sales-11647351541 (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{37 Salem A. China, India Acquire 60% of Iraq’s Oil Exports in 2024 // Iraqi News. January 22, 2025. URL: https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq/china-india-acquire-60-of-iraqs-oil-exports-in-2024/ (accessed: 02.02.2025).}

^{38 Iraq Signs Contract with Chinese Oil Company to Complete 80 Wells in Iraq //  Xinhua. September 7, 2019. URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/07/c_138371964.htm (accessed: 15.08.2025).}

^{39 Mohammed A. ExxonMobil Hands Over Operations at West Qurna 1 Oilfield to PetroChina // Reuters. January 1, 2024. URL: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/exxonmobil-hands-over-operations-west-qurna-1-oilfield-petrochina-2024-01-01/ (accessed: 12.09.2026).}

^{40 China’s Growing Role in Iraq’s Energy Sector (Report) // Iran Oil & Gas Network. June 8, 2023. URL: https://www.iranoilgas.com/news/details.aspx?id=25334&title=China%E2%80%99s+growing+role+in+Iraq%E2%80%99s+energy+sector+(Report (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{41 Wang C. N. Brief: China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2021 // Green Finance & Development Center. February 2, 2022. URL: https://greenfdc.org/brief-china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2021/ (accessed: 22.06.2025).}

^{42 Faraj M. China Willing to Link with Iraq’s Development Road: Ministry // Rudaw. February 5, 2025. URL: https://www.rudaw.net/english/world/05022025 (accessed: 22.06.2025).}

^{43 Crude Petroleum in Oman: Bilateral Trade Profile // The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC). 2023. URL: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/crude-petroleum/reporter/omn (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{44 Mogielnicki R. Oman’s Bittersweet Economic Relations with China // The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. July 21, 2020. URL: https://agsiw.org/omans-bittersweet-economic-relations-with-china/ (accessed: 15.01.2025).}

^{45 2025 Investment Climate Statements: Oman // U.S. Department of State. URL: https://www.state.gov/reports/2025-investment-climate-statements/oman (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{46 ADNOC Sales to Chinese Companies in 2018 Reach $7.9 Billion // Gulf News. July 23, 2019. URL: https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/adnoc-sales-to-chinese-companies-in-2018-reach-79-billion-1.65389122 (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{47 China’s CNPC Wins $1.6 Billion Seismic Survey Deals from ADNOC // Reuters. July 19, 2018. URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/currencies/chinas-cnpc-wins-16-billion-seismic-survey-deals-from-adnoc-idUSKBN1K91KT/ (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{48 Godinho V.  UAE and China Sign Strategic Oil and Gas Agreement // Gulf Business. July 22, 2019. URL: https://gulfbusiness.com/uae-china-sign-strategic-oil-agreement/ (accessed: 12.02.2025).}

^{49 The UAE’s Net Zero 2050 Strategy. URL: https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/strategies-initiatives-and-awards/strategies-plans-and-visions/environment-and-energy/the-uae-net-zero-2050-strategy (accessed: 22.06.2025).}

^{50 United Arab Emirates, People’s Republic of China Issue Joint Statement // Emirates News Agency (WAM). June 2, 2024. URL: https://www.wam.ae/en/article/b3goict-united-arab-emirates-peoples-republic-china-issue (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{51 China Becomes One of the Biggest Oil Drilling Contractors in Kuwait: Report // Global Times. July 16, 2017. URL: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201707/1056580.shtml (accessed: 12.09.2026).}

^{52 KERUI Petroleum Obtained Over USD 100 Million Bid for Kuwait 3000HP Ultra-Deep Drilling Rig Project // Energy Industry Review. August 1, 2018. URL: https://energyindustryreview.com/oil-gas/kerui-petroleum-obtained-over-usd-100-million-bid-for-kuwait-3000hp-ultra-deep-drilling-rig-project/ (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{53 China’s Honghua Group, Kuwait Drilling Company Pen New Deal Worth 435 Million Yuan // Belt and Road Portal. October 22, 2022. URL: https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/284820.html (accessed: 22.06.2025).}

^{54 Top Suppliers of Crude Oil to China (2023) // Voronoi.  July 21, 2024. URL: https://www.voronoiapp.com/energy/Top-Suppliers-of-Crude-Oil-to-China-2023-1857 (accessed: 20.09.2025).}

^{55 Annual Statistical Report 2024 // Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). 2025. P. 18. URL: https://oapecorg.org/media/2b5842d2-7148-49cb-81ad-54f2b11d6bdb/-465237118/Annual%20Statistical%20Report/2025/Statistical%20Report%202024%20final%20E.pdf (accessed: 12.08.2026).}

^{56 Country Analysis Executive Summary:  China // U.S. Energy Information Administration. August 8, 2022. Р. 9. URL: https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/China/archive/pdf/china_2022.pdf (accessed: 20.08.2025).}

^{57 China Country Analysis Brief // U.S. Energy Information Administration. November 2023. P. 14. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20250427090913/https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/China/pdf/china-2023.pdf (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{58 China’s Natural Gas Consumption, Production, and Imports All Increased in 2023 // U.S. Energy Information Administration. August 14, 2024. URL: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=62804 (accessed: 22.08.2025).}

^{59 Cocklin J. Qatar Petroleum Signs LNG Supply Deal with China’s Sinopec // Natural Gas Intelligence. March 22, 2021. URL: https://naturalgasintel.com/news/qatar-petroleum-signs-lng-supply-deal-with-chinas-sinopec/ (accessed: 22.08.2025).}

^{60 Qatar Petroleum Signs 15-year SPA to Supply 3.5 MTPA of LNG to China’s CNOOC // EuroPetrole. September 29, 2021.  URL: https://www.euro-petrole.com/qatar-petroleum-signs-15-year-spa-to-supply-3-5-mtpa-of-lng-to-china-s-cnooc-n-i-22796 (accessed: 22.03.2025).}

^{61 Xin Z. CNPC Secures 27-year Agreement with Qatar Energy // China Daily. June 21, 2023. URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202306/21/WS6492580ba310bf8a75d6b13a.html (accessed: 22.08.2025).}

^{62 See: World Oil Outlook 2024: Global Interregional Crude Oil and Condensate Trade // Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 2024. URL: https://publications.opec.org/woo/archive/chapter/129/2359 (accessed: 10.06.2026); International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook 2024. Paris : International Energy Agency, 2024. Р. 19. URL: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/20058/1/WorldEnergyOutlook2024.pdf (accessed: 12.09.2025).}

^{63 China’s Military Strategy (Full Text) // The State Council Information Office. The People’s Republic of China. May 27, 2015. URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm (accessed: 22.08.2025).}

^{64 Full Text: China’s National Defense Policy in the New Era // The State Council. The People’s Republic of China. July 24, 2019. URL: https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html  (accessed: 22.08.2025).}

About the authors

Elena M. Savicheva

RUDN University

Author for correspondence.
Email: savicheva-em@rudn.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0001-8617-3508
SPIN-code: 6331-0848

PhD (History), Associate Professor, Department of Oriental and African Studies

10, bldg. 2, Miklukho-Maklay St, Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation

Ammar M. Brebdane

RUDN University

Email: ammarbre1@gmail.com
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-0808-7521

PhD (History), Assistant, Department of Oriental and African Studies

10, bldg. 2, Miklukho-Maklay St, Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation

Alexey K. Malakhovsky

RUDN University

Email: malakhovskiy-ak@rudn.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-6372-3455
SPIN-code: 5499-4579

PhD (History), Associate Professor, Department of Theory and History of Journalism

10, bldg. 2, Miklukho-Maklay St, Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation

Andrei A. Vasin

RUDN University

Email: vasin-aa@rudn.ru
ORCID iD: 0009-0005-1607-8958
SPIN-code: 5280-7180

Post-graduate Student, Department of Oriental and African Studies

10, bldg. 2, Miklukho-Maklay St, Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation

References

Supplementary files