Vestnik RUDN. International Relations

In the context of the reconfiguration of the international relations system in the Middle East, there has been a certain stabilization of the situation. To some extent, this is due to the improvement of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In conditions of information confrontation, media often neutralize the significance of certain events, passing off what is expected as reality. In this regard, it became necessary to analyze the reaction of the leading Western media to the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation, as this makes it possible to understand how the West explains the significance of this reconciliation to its audience and the potential implications for the region. The analysis of articles was carried out on the basis of qualitative content analysis: the authors manually classified articles by topic, identified and counted frames, and analyzed in detail examples of their use. The main method used was frame analysis. This involves organizing a news story thematically, stylistically and actually in such a way as to convey a certain idea. It was found out that Western media articles focus on the increased role of Saudi Arabia, which does not look back at the United States in its actions in the Middle East. At the same time, all publications lack the idea of the possibility of stabilizing the regional situation after reconciliation, which objectively is not realistic. The recent normalization of Saudi-Iranian relations has led to a certain “conservation” of regional conflicts, but the situation was blown up by the Israeli war in the Gaza Strip, called “genocide” by the UN, and the military operations of the Israeli army against Lebanon, as well as the exchange of strikes between Israel and Iran. In addition, the weakened position of the United States following the reconciliation and the diplomatic success of China are poorly highlighted. The reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran has opened up new opportunities for the Russian Federation to build constructive relations not only with Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also with other important countries in the Middle East. However, the US-Israeli aggression against Iran in 2026 made it more difficult for Russia to develop constructive relations simultaneously with all players in the Persian Gulf, creating new risks and limitations for the implementation of Moscow’s multi-vector policy in the region.

The macro-region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has become a deeply divided region with increasingly polarized interests of states. Following the Arab Spring, some Arab countries, primarily Gulf monarchies, which had maintained internal political stability, embarked on accelerated modernization and economic diversification, ultimately needing long-lasting peace, while other states, like Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria have plunged into domestic crises on the brink of collapse. Earlier, Iraq and Libya became victims of US military interventions, leading to the destruction of their ruling regimes and civil wars. The heterogeneity of the MENA became reflected in both the 2020 Abraham Accords on the normalization of Israel’s relations with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, concluded with Washington’s diplomatic assistance and the October 2025 “peace agreement” between Israel and Hamas mediated by the USA and Qatar, ignoring the two-state formula of the Palestinian-Israeli settlement. The chaotic escalation in MENA poses a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation, therefore, requiring an adequate assessment, which explains the relevance of this study, while, the task to predict future scenarios determines its practical significance. The author aims to prove the acknowledgment that, despite the ephemeral unity, shown at Arab summits on the Palestinian issue or Syria and the existence of formats like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Arab countries remain divided into two groups, focused respectfully on sustainable development and survival. Facing irreconcilable and intractable contradictions in their ultimate priorities, they are not able to share integration. Not perceiving counterparties as equal partners, the countries of the first category are guided in politics by the paradigm of realism, if necessary, “forgetting” about sovereignty and pan-Arab problems under Western pressure. Since Russian and foreign studies devoted to conflicts and modernization of Arab countries apparently lack a review of the survival-sustainable development dichotomy, the author intends to fill this gap by using the methods of comparative and cross-event analyses. This constitutes the novelty of this research.

This article explores the various constraints, including institutional, normative and other factors, that shape the nature and limits of the Association of South East Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) engagement with the Eurasian regional order. The empirical foundation of the study is based on an analysis of ASEAN’s core foundational documents, such as the ASEAN Charter and strategic documents reflecting the organization’s long-term vision. The findings indicate that ASEAN’s limited engagement is driven by a set of four structural factors. First, there is a significant discrepancy between the institutional logics of Southeast Asia and that of Eurasia. The distributed and functionally differentiated architecture of Eurasian institutions, characterized by the separation of economic, political, and security competencies among different organizations, contrasts with ASEAN’s normatively driven and dialogue-oriented model, which is centered on consensus-building and procedural consolidation around ASEAN as the singular core of the regional order. Second, ASEAN’s strategic positioning is predominantly oriented toward the Indo-Pacific region and a hedging strategy amid major power competition, whereas the Eurasian dimension is not institutionalized as an independent strategic priority in ASEAN’s official documents. Third, the principle of ASEAN centrality and preservation of procedural autonomy constrain participation in frameworks that imply an institutional core alternative to ASEAN. This explains the organization’s cautious stance toward Russian initiatives such as the Greater Eurasian Partnership and proposals for Eurasian security architecture. Fourth, internal heterogeneity among member states on key security issues, most notably the Myanmar crisis and territorial dispute in the South China Sea, as well as differing approaches to engagement with external partners, complicates the formation of a unified position. Collectively, these factors account for the fragmented nature of interregional linkages and impede the establishment of a comprehensive framework for cooperation with Eurasian institutions.

Since the mid-2000s, the expansion of contacts with African countries in socio-economic and military-political spheres has become one of the main directions of Ankara’s foreign policy and foreign economic activity. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of Ankara’s policy towards Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, based on official documents of the Turkish government, trade and investment statistics, as well as academic literature and reports from leading international think tanks. The study examines Türkiye’s multi-vector and multi-factor cooperation with SSA, which encompasses aid to the least developed countries, trade, investment, the implementation of joint economic projects, education, healthcare, military training, and security services. The novelty of the research lies in its systemic approach, which considers economic, military-technical, political, and religious aspects as integral parts of a single strategy to strengthen Türkiye’s status as a “global center of power.” Economic interaction is illustrated by the growth of Türkiye’s trade with SSA countries from USD 742 million in 2000 to USD 12.4 billion in 2023, as well as investments by Turkish companies in infrastructure, energy, and construction. Military-technical cooperation includes the supply of arms and training of African military specialists. Although Ankara traditionally maintains the closest relations with the North African region, the partnership options it offers to countries south of the Sahara are generating increasing interest in this part of the continent, notably due to the anti-neocolonial rhetoric of the Turkish leadership. The authors of the paper emphasize that cooperation with Africa has become a key element of Türkiye’s strategy to diversify its foreign relations and enhance its global influence, which injects new dynamism into international relations on the African continent.

This article analyzes the strategic and ideological dimensions of the Iran-Venezuela partnership under conditions of sustained international sanctions as a form of counter-hegemonic alignment. It argues that the recent U.S.-led geopolitical maneuvers in the Venezuelan context, together with the newly imposed sanctions targeting the Iran-Venezuela nexus, indicate that this relationship cannot be explained as a merely conjunctural or reactive alignment. Rather, it reflects a deeper pattern of strategic convergence shaped by shared experiences of coercive pressure, political isolation, and contested sovereignty. Situated within an international order marked by increasing multipolarity and weakening normative consensus, the study employs a qualitative and comparative methodology, combining discourse analysis of official statements with empirical evidence on energy cooperation, defense-related collaboration, and diplomatic coordination. The analysis is theoretically informed by Occidentalism and the Resistance Axis framework, allowing for an examination of how material interests and ideological counter-discourses interact to maintain bilateral alignment beyond short-term instrumental incentives. The findings identify three interrelated dynamics: the conversion of shared economic vulnerability into structured energy cooperation; the development of limited asymmetric security collaboration as a deterrent to external intervention; and coordinated diplomatic engagement in multilateral forums. While institutional fragilities and external constraints limit the formalization of the partnership, its ideological depth enhances resilience during periods of relative foreign policy autonomy. Thus, the Iran-Venezuela axis thus represents a conditional and adaptive form of counter-hegemonic alignment within the evolving post-unipolar international system.

In the context of the emerging new world order, states such as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) strive to act within the framework of international law, maintaining a balance of interests based on the sovereign equality of states and the indivisibility of security. The Taliban regime’s positive attitude toward multipolarity and its struggle against Western efforts to complicate and hinder the development of Afghanistan are also important for preserving Afghanistan’s cultural and civilizational identity. In this regard, the objective was to determine how the Afghan theocratic regime and the West perceive each other, which is important for the IEA’s international recognition and its further development as a sovereign state. The study draws on historical descriptive and analytical methods such as comparative data analysis and qualitative content analysis. The results revealed several contradictory aspects of the West’s position on the IEA, particularly the United States’ violation of its previously assumed commitments under the 2020 Doha agreement. However, despite its continued distrust of Western policy and acute sensitivity to Western criticism, the Taliban has not abandoned its engagement with the West. The study argues that Western officials are generally taking a hardline stance toward the Taliban and expanding their demands (including effectively combating terrorist threats, changing social policies, forming an inclusive government, and ensuring financial transparency), making the beginning of the process of international recognition for the Kabul regime contingent on the fulfillment of these demands. At the same time, it notes the emergence of signs among some Western elites indicating a desire to establish interaction with Kabul. This is due to factors such as the Taliban’s provision of relative security and the absence of an effective armed opposition in the country, the IEA leadership’s efforts to combat corruption and drug trafficking, and the recognition that isolating the Afghan regime has failed. The author concludes that fundamental political transformation should not be expected in a country where the regime has become entrenched and enjoys the support of the majority of the population. Instead, the most optimal approach could be to focus on economic development and addressing the urgent needs of Afghan citizens.

Amid the ongoing transformation of the world economy and the eastward shift of its gravity center towards the Asian macro-region, identifying the synergistic potential of cooperation among Global South countries has become increasingly relevant. A substantial economic and political foundation already links BRICS and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) members, and mutual interest in strengthening ties is evident. This raises the question of assessing the prospects and constraints for further deepening and expanding such cooperation. The article aims to explore the synergistic potential of BRICS-ASEAN collaboration within the emerging financial architecture of the Global South. It examines de-dollarization as an economic trend, evaluates the main financing tools and mechanisms employed under de-dollarization in ASEAN and BRICS, and analyses de-dollarization as a narrative, drawing on an extensive empirical base that spans multiple discursive levels, from national strategic-planning documents to expert reports and leaders’ statements. The study concludes that there is no real convergence in the national strategic priorities of BRICS and ASEAN members, aside from a shared commitment to national sovereignty. A key narrative obstacle lies in their divergent interpretations of multipolarity: whereas ASEAN advocates an inclusive multipolarity that retains most elements of the existing international system, BRICS favours a wholesale reconstruction of the current architecture of international economic relations. Scenario modelling of future BRICS-ASEAN cooperation outlines three likely development paths: 1) a balanced system of multilateral settlements in national currencies, 2) a yuan-centered financial architecture for BRICS-ASEAN, and 3) a transition to settlements in central-bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Each scenario entails its own benefits and drawbacks. Given the constraints on the first and second scenarios and the broader trend towards the digitalisation and virtualisation of financial relations, the CBDC-based scenario currently attracts the greatest scholarly interest. Nevertheless, there is little reason for excessive optimism regarding a rapid and profound convergence of BRICS and ASEAN financial strategies. De-dollarization still requires a unified conceptual framework and a shared understanding of concrete mechanisms, both terminological and operational.

This article analyzes the energy factor in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf in the context of Beijing’s foreign policy in recent decades. Based on an integrated approach to studying China’s foreign policy towards the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and the neorealist paradigm, the authors aim to examine the dynamics of these relations. Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening-up” emphasized economic development objectives as the dominant factor in Beijing’s foreign policy, leading to a long-term focus on establishing strong ties with the oil and gas-producing Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Despite the volatility and unpredictability of the situation in the Middle East, since the late 1990s, China has consistently expanded energy cooperation with the “Arabian six”- Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman. The growing demand for energy in the Chinese economy has prompted Beijing to actively seek external energy sources. In the first decade of the 21st century, China has laid the foundation for long-term ties in the Arabian region, guaranteeing stable hydrocarbon supplies, which is essential for maintaining energy security. In the second decade, China’s interaction with the Arab Gulf states expanded beyond energy cooperation, strengthened by the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative. As a result, China developed a model of cooperation in which energy became a system-forming factor. Over time, China realized that it needed to strengthen its influence on the political processes in the region, ensuring stability and, consequently, its energy security, as oil supplies from the Middle East are indispensable in the short and medium terms. The authors conclude that China has currently become one of the most influential trading partners of the Arab Gulf states and has significantly increased its political presence in the region, contributing to the stabilization of relations between Riyadh and Tehran. Close multi-sectoral cooperation between China and the Gulf Arab states will largely determine the economic prospects and geopolitical significance of both sides as international actors in the formation of a multipolar world.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Convention) was adopted in 1992 and entered into force in 1994, providing the basis for subsequent legal instruments-Kyoto Protocol 1997 (KP) and Paris Agreement 2015 (PA)-to enhance the implementation of the convention objectives and to be guided by its principles. This paper examines the UNFCCC process from the perspective of the Global South, with a particular emphasis on the positions of the Group 77 and China (G77 + China). It traces the origins of the Convention and analyzes the climate regime evolution over three decades, highlighting the interplay between its foundational principles, such as particularly equity, “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RCs), and comprehensiveness, as well as the power dynamics in multilateral climate politics. The study illustrates how power imbalances, state material interests, and North-South dynamics shape the interpretation and application of such principles. It argues that the PA hybrid design has exacerbated Northern selectivity (the cherry-picking approach) and created new tensions, including breaching principles of the UNFCCC and burden-shifting to developing countries (DCs). Additionally, recent calls for hasty fossil fuels (FF) phase-out mirror the predetermined inclination of many developed countries so as to fill the emission gap by transferring the burden of mitigation responsibilities to FF-dependent Southern DCs, thereby breaching the core principles of the Convention Article 3.3. Underlining these structural and political limitations, the study puts forward a more grounded neorealist understanding of the climate regime and multilateral efforts to address climate change.