Vol 24, No 3 (2024): China’s Global Strategy

The article examines the conceptual foundations of China’s geoeconomic strategy and the features of its implementation in the context of the “awakening” of the Global South. The author employs a geoeconomic approach, which is used to examine various spatial economic-political phenomena, such as global economic projects, regional integration structures, economic and technological partnerships at various levels. The article identifies the key goals and objectives of China’s geoeconomic strategy in the context of the development of US-Chinese rivalry and increased international competition. It also provides an analysis of various aspects of China’s geoeconomic strategy, including diplomatic, trade and economic, financial, energy, resource, transport and logistics, scientific and technological, and digital. The study examines the Chinese interpretation of the concept of the “Global South,” with a particular focus on the positions of key states of the Global South in China’s geoeconomic strategy. It also analyzes China’s foreign policy approaches to developing interaction with key states of the Global South, including Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Türkiye, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Brazil. The topical issues of connecting Chinese economic projects with the national interests and international initiatives of key states of the Global South are considered. The article analyzes China’s strategic approaches to the development of non-Western-centric multilateral international associations, in which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) plays one of the leading roles (for example, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). At the same time, China’s initiatives to enhance engagement with regional and global international associations of states of the Global South and groups of countries are being explored. As a result of the study opportunities and limitations for China’s implementation of its geoeconomic strategy at the present stage are identified. The author concludes that the People’s Republic of China is seeking to intensify a new phase of globalization to address the long-term challenges facing its national development. As part of this phase of globalization, the economic potential of states in the Global South should be unlocked through their involvement in sustainable supply chains oriented towards China.

The sharp deterioration between Russia and the West that began in February 2022 has posed a serious challenge to the advancement of Arctic cooperation, which has become increasingly intense, fruitful, and, to a large extent, mutually beneficial for its participants over the past several decades. China, which has demonstrated to the world that it has ambitions in the region, is facing difficult challenges. In this regard, some research questions about Beijing’s Arctic strategy need to be addressed. Will the strengthening of cooperation with Russia harm the building of interaction with the other Arctic states? To what extent will the security crisis and the gradual transformation of the established system of international cooperation in the Arctic affect China’s plans to integrate the region into its global strategic projects? What role can China play in the future Arctic governance system? The objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the changes currently taking place in China’s Arctic policy. The methodological foundation of the study is the theory of regional security complexes by B. Buzan and O. Wæver. It has been determined that the policy of building an Arctic identity, one of the key components of which is the securitization of the climate discourse, is meeting increasing resistance from Western countries. In the context of the current crisis, Beijing is also forced to balance its bilateral relations with Russia and the states of Northern Europe. The erosion of the existing international Arctic cooperation framework is highly undesirable for China, as it allowed Beijing to legitimately take a limited role in the governance of the region, as opposed to the regulatory regimes of total domination of the Arctic states (sectoral approach). However, at the doctrinal level, there has been a shift in the focus in China’s Arctic policy toward a more global vision of the region’s development. The foreign policy shift has been driven by a number of external factors, including the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic and the intensifying Sino-American strategic confrontation.

The study dedicates to the genetic problems of geopolitical doctrines associated with the attribution of institutional attributes to space. It analyses the ontological foundations of geopolitics and the possibilities of its effective use. The work demonstrates that the apparent instrumentality of the geopolitical method of research is based on myths taken on faith, that is, it lies outside the boundaries of scientific knowledge. Panideas, thalassocracy and tellurocracy, the concepts of Heartland and Rimland, etc., are used as basic mythologemes. The use of geopolitical argumentation in practical politics only serves as a cover for specific foreign policy actions. And that is why the study of geopolitics is of special interest to science. The article examines the category of additional space, which sometimes complements the concept of imaginary space and subsequently forms an important part of geopolitical theories. Examples of geopolitical constructs that have emerged in the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific and the South Atlantic are used to explore both their connection to classical geopolitics and the specificity of their own concepts. From this perspective, the Sinocentric concept of the world “Community of Common Destiny,” the geopolitical aspect of the Indian concept of Hindutva, Iranian and Turkish constructs based on panideas, the South African concept of the “Island of Africa,” the Japanese geopolitical projects of the “Great Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” and the “Security Diamond,” axial constructs of Brazilian and Indonesian geopoliticians. The methodological basis of the study is critical analysis, which means correlating the methodological basis of geopolitics with specific concepts and doctrines. As a result, the author concludes that the spread of geopolitical ideas formed in Western countries outside the Old World has only expanded and diversified the scope of their application, without bringing something new to them. In general, geopolitical constructs based on imaginary spaces, despite a certain demand in the world of science and politics, do not give an acceptable effect in both areas.

Zhao Tingyang is Professor of Philosophy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Senior Research Fellow at the Berggruen Institute (USA). The research interests of Professor Zhao Tingyang include ontology, political philosophy, and the philosophy of history. His works on Tianxia theory have been translated into many languages, including German (Alles Unter dem Himmel, Suhrkamp, Germany), English (All-under-Heaven: The Tianxia System for a Possible World Order, University of California, USA; Redefining a Philosophy for World Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, UK), French (Tianxia tout sous un Meme Ciel, Cerf, France), Spanish (Tianxia: una filosofia para la gobernanza global, Herder, Spain), Italian (Tutto Sotto il Cielo, Ubalddini, Italy), and Polish (Nowa Filozofia ladu Swiatowego, Time Marszalek, Poland). In his interview, Zhao Tingyang reveals the details of his “Tianxia” concept, the essence of which is to establish a system of coexistence of peoples and states based on a renewed understanding of politics as “the art of transition from hostility to hospitality.” In such a system, as Professor Zhao Tingyang notes, the hegemony of one power over others is excluded, the risks of conflicts and large-scale crises are minimized, but opportunities are created for the development of all states on the principles of equality, rationality and improvement.

In this study, the author examines the foreign policy of Y.V. Andropov and assesses the impact of his personal position on the Soviet-US and Sino-Soviet relations during his tenure as the leader of the Soviet Union. The author was guided by the principles of historicism, scientific objectivity, and reliance on sources. It is proved that Y.V. Andropov adopted the foreign policy of the USSR from the position of the “hawks” in the Soviet leadership, which were represented by D.F. Ustinov. According to such a position, foreign policy should be absolutely subordinated to the interests of national security, which can only be guaranteed by the superiority of both nuclear and conventional forces over potential adversaries. Military power should be at the forefront of foreign policy decisions. Therefore, no matter on the issue of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe, or on the issue of the armed forces on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders, regardless of the objective changes in the situation, Y.V. Andropov always maintained a tough position. Author proves that the Soviet leader persistently rejected the reasonable proposals of diplomats and was unwilling to make any concessions that contradicted the ideas of military supremacy. This primarily concerned the issue of the INF deployment on the territory of Eastern Europe, which was a key topic of discussion at the Geneva negotiations. As a result, the Soviet Union could not avoid being drawn into the new round of the arms race provoked by the U.S. President Ronald Reagan, one of the results of which was the deployment of the American INF in Western Europe. In the East, he missed the opportunity to improve relations with China, which had begun to reorient itself away from confrontation with the USSR to building a balance in relations with the United States and the Soviet Union and continued a pointless confrontation with it. The foreign policy heritage that Y.V. Andropov left to his successors was an isolated and tense external environment in which there was few freedom of action. In addition, the growth of military expenditures caused by his tough line on foreign affairs aggravated the stagnation and crisis in the social-economic development of the USSR.

Using the example of the Far Eastern Federal District, the article examines the role of Confucius Institutes, educational institutions that China has established in various countries since 2004 to teach Chinese language and culture. The relevance of the research is linked to the growing criticism of the dual function of these organizations. On the one hand, these Institutes are considered as a soft power instrument capable of creating China’s positive image and increasing its global influence through cultural and educational contacts. On the other hand, there are cases of Confucius Institutes acquiring hard power functions, allowing China to implement its strategic goals in other areas unrelated to education and culture. This has prompted reproaches from partner countries. These moments are especially relevant in the Russian Far East, given its close proximity to China, the considerable length of the Russian-Chinese border, and the critical demographic situation in the Russian Far East. The goal of the research is to identify whether regional factors support the criticism leveled at the Confucius Institutes and, subsequently, to propose measures to mitigate China’s hard power influence in the region. By analyzing the Institutes’ activities in the Russian Far East, the authors reveal three main aspects confirming their hard power functioning. The Confucius Institutes promote China’s ‘peaceful’ expansion; they increase the internationalization of Chinese education and contribute to the development of national culture. The authors conclude that when analyzing the pros and cons of Confucius Institutes, it is important to take into account the economic and political situation in the region where they operate. Otherwise, they risk being accused of serving as a Trojan horse. The article is based on recent Russian and Chinese sources, including academic writings and mass media publications, as well as the authors’ empirical research.

This study examines the importance of Myanmar for the formation of a Sino-centric macro-region through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The authors rely on the transit of power theory that helps to analyze systemic imperatives and internal characteristics of China’s foreign policy. The authors applied the principles of historicism, scientific objectivity and reliability. In the first part of the work, the Chinese Belt and Road initiative is studied as a geostrategic tool of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The authors consider the features of its development and the strategic results of its implementation. In particular, the article emphasizes that this initiative is aimed at the formation of a Sino-centric macro-regional space. Based on this, the role of Myanmar is characterized as essential. The geographical location of this state allows China to gain access to the Indian Ocean, a transit region for energy resources, as well as to overcome one of the strategic vulnerabilities of its geopolitical position - the ‘Malacca dilemma.’ Moreover, as a border state, Myanmar is an indispensable link in the implementation of land and gas energy transport corridors of macro-regional importance. Finally, in the context of strategic competition between the United States and China, the importance of ensuring stability in critical proximity to the PRC’s state borders is growing, especially in the absence of a stable internal state situation in Myanmar. Among the additional factors, the authors highlight the importance of the mood of state and local elites for the development of this initiative. In this regard, the analysis of China’s reaction to the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021 was particularly indicative that Myanmar is of key importance because of its strategic location between China and the Indian Ocean, as well as its resource potential.

For several decades, the issue of human rights has been an instrument of Western pressure on China, and also serves as a pretext for foreign policy decisions (such as the imposition of sanctions). As part of its discursive policy, China has recently shifted from a defensive to an offensive position, including on the issue of human rights. This dynamic is considered in this study using the example of three issues that have been most actively discussed in Western discourse in recent years - Hong Kong, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and methods of combating COVID-19. The relevant discourse of China not only defended the right to its own development model, but also highlighted the shortcomings of Western systems. This discursive practice corresponds to the fundamental differences in the understanding of human rights in China and Europe, which are shown in the analysis of the provisions of the second chapter of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Constitution, the Charter of the European Union on Human Rights, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Despite the fact that European politicians see themselves as the main proponents of democratic rights and freedoms in the world, sociological surveys show a low level of satisfaction of respondents in the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, France and Italy with how the principles of democracy are respected in their own countries, against the backdrop of deep dissatisfaction with their economic situation. Moreover, in many ways, Europe’s position does not seem to be principled, but opportunistic, since China’s position on the topics mentioned above has not changed, but now European criticism has practically switched to the “Taiwan issue.”

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