Vol 27, No 3 (2023): KANT’S “CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON” AND WAYS OF ITS READING BY PHILOSOPHERS

The study offers an overview of philosophical currents formed under the influence of Kant’s critical philosophy. Such directions of Kantianism as German Idealism represented by F. Jacobi, Neo-Kantianism represented by E. Cassirer and A. Riehl, ontological interpretation of Kant’s theory by M. Heidegger and analytical tradition of Neo-Kantianism represented by J. McDowell are considered in detail. These examples demonstrate different approaches to understanding Kant which have been developed throughout history. Among them, one can identify the epistemological approach that views Kant’s theoretical philosophy as a theory of knowledge and, above all, as a theory of experience. It can be contrasted with various metaphysical approaches developed against the background of an idealistic reading of the Critique of Pure Reason . From time to time, realistic interpretations of Kant’s theory of experience that try to avoid ontological dualism concerning the relation between “appearance” and “thing in itself” have arisen, which seem adequate to its spirit and letter. Within the analytic Kantian paradigm, a whole spectrum of interpretations of Kant’s concept of experience has emerged, for which the stumbling blocks are, above all, Kant’s theory on the cognitive faculties - sensibility and understanding, the deduction of categories and the transcendental unity of apperception. In the first case, the main issue is the question of the cooperation of cognitive faculties in the process of experience formation, which still causes difficulties for researchers; in the second case, the question of the role of non-discursive and discursive concepts in this process; in the third case, the question of the relationship of apperception, consciousness and self-consciousness and their functions in cognition. The study shows that all these questions still await their final resolution. The study is in fact an introduction to the block devoted to the reception of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in connection with the approaching anniversary of the philosopher.

W. Dilthey’s program of “criticism of historical reason” was formed in a polemic with the legacy of I. Kant on the basis of transcendental reflection of the data of descriptive psychology. It was focused on understanding the radical difference between the sciences of the spirit and the sciences of nature. Starting from a critical rethinking of Kant's legacy within the boundaries of his own version of the academic philosophy of life, Dilthey began to talk about the fact that the reason, directing the cognitive activity of the subject, is characterized, first of all, not by the theoretical “purity”, but by its involvement in the “open” flow of history, which it gives meaning and sense through language. It interacts with historical experience, which arises through the synthesis of actual events perception in the time flow and memory images with real categories and concepts constructed by the intellect of the human subject. The ability to judge what is happening in history, its assessment in a humanistic perspective, is also considered by Dilthey as inseparable from the work of historical reason. The reason involved in the flow of time and life cannot be a carrier of theoretical “purity” and acts as inherently hermeneutic in its nature. Dilthey presented an interesting analysis of the main levels of hermeneutical procedure - emotional perception, expression and understanding, aimed at comprehension of the diversity of spiritual and cultural worlds in synchrony and diachrony of their existence. Denying the possibility of comprehending the meaning and sense of history by constructing substantialist schemes, he asserted the importance of narrative representation of the past in the light of the present. Dilthey's project of “criticism of historical reason” was based on the idea of the “openness” of the meaning of the past, due to its rootedness in the very way of human existence in time. This idea was inherited and further developed in the horizon of the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger and other contemporary thinkers of hermeneutical orientation.

Kant’s theory of cognition aimed to explain the possibility of scientific knowledge. Aesthetics and life science were not considered by Kant in the context of cognition. By contrast, Cassirer set himself a philosophical task to extend Kant’s theory of cognition to all forms of culture, including pre-scientific knowledge and aesthetics. The present study demonstrates how Cassirer explained the possibility of different objective forms, named symbolic, by employing and transforming Kant’s theory of cognition. For this goal, Cassirer took the following steps: modified the definitions of a priori synthesis (the act of understanding) and pure intuition (the forms of space and time) - main building blocks of Kant’s cognition; indicated the necessary correlation of intuition and synthesis; characterized a priori synthesis and the intuition as notions which include contradicted meanings. Cassirer called this contradiction “twofold oppositions” as characteristic of a priori synthesis. The first argument of the article is that the possibility of various synthetic acts is rooted in the nature of a priori synthesis which carries together two different meanings: the act of uniting elements and the initial unity. One synthetic act forms the world of nature and is connected to scientific space and time, and the other is the product of immediate perceptional space and time, from which the world of myth and aesthetics appears. Thus, Cassirer expanded the scope of “pure” synthesis. The second argument is that Cassirer specified a priori synthesis and pure intuition as a functional concept. The functional concept belongs to the model of concept as-relation that Cassirer has elaborated. It includes moments that are separated and united simultaneously. This definition of concept breaks the rules of consistency. The concept of as-relation justifies the contradictory characteristics of a priori synthesis and pure intuition, which include both the combination of moments in a synthesizing act and the initial unity of intuition.

The article analyzes the influence of Kantian philosophy on the problems and development of Russian empiriocriticism. It is shown that the critical pathos of Kant’s philosophy, as well as his call for intellectual honesty in philosophy, was appreciated first of all. Relying on Kant, Russian empiriocritics proved the inconsistency of metaphysics in both its religious and materialistic forms. In addition, the teachings of the founders of empiriocriticism, E. Mach and R. Avenarius, were also criticized because some dogmatic assumptions were found in them. Attempts to eliminate these assumptions resulted in a dynamic concept of experience, based on which the concepts of empiriomonism (A. Bogdanov), empiriosymbolism (P. Yushkevich), scientific philosophy (V. Lesevich), positive philosophy of life (S. Suvorov), positive aesthetics (A. Lunacharsky), ethics of mutual joy (A. Bogdanov) and many others were developed. Special attention was paid to the analysis of the “thing-in-itself” since this very concept of Kantian philosophy was used by G. Plekhanov to justify “orthodox” Marxism. Russian empiriocritics opposed Plekhanov’s identification of the “thing in itself” and the material object, arguing that the concept of matter is a metaphysical assumption and, for this reason, cannot contribute to refuting dualism and Kantian “agnosticism.” From the monistic point of view, the “thing-in-itself” should be understood on the basis of experience as a necessary form of its organization. According to Bogdanov, there is nothing a priori in the “thing-in-itself”; this idea appeared as a result of substituting the known for the unknown and expressed a process rather than essence. Kant’s aesthetics and moral philosophy were also actively discussed in Russian empiriocriticism. The interpretation of beauty as “expediency without purpose” was extended to the fundamental principle of the “aesthetic worldview,” which gave credibility to the doctrine of the ideal, the practice of social construction, etc. As a result of the polemic with the ethics of compassion, of which Kant was considered the most authoritative defender, an alternative ethic of mutual joy was created. Thus, the influence of Kantian philosophy on Russian empiriocritics was complex and contributed to the development of new ideas.

H. Arendt developed largely her hermeneutical interpretation of understanding in line with the rethinking of I. Kant’s philosophical heritage. Although she was able to offer a rather original interpretation of the theoretical views of the great German philosopher, her hermeneutic strategy was also influenced by the approaches to their understanding that were proposed by her teachers M. Heidegger and K. Jaspers. Arendt’s hermeneutical teaching proceeds from the need to realize the close unity of practical action and spiritual activity of the human subject - Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa. Accepting the initial position of Heidegger’s metaphysics of finiteness about the “abandonment” of man in the flow of time, Arendt simultaneously follows Jaspers’ call for the need for an existential-hermeneutic interpretation of practical action and the abilities of the spirit by their understanding on the basis of Kant’s legacy. Singling out thinking, will and judgement among the main vectors of self-realization of the spirit, she demonstrates their close relationship with the main types of practical human activity - work, work and action. Analyzing the abilities of the spirit, Arendt emphasizes the major role of thinking, which brings together the processes of knowledge acquisition and meaning creation. It highlights the primacy of the meaning-producing function of the reason in relation to the ability of the intellect to generate true knowledge on the basis of generalization of the data of contemplation. Describing thinking after Kant as a “thing in itself”, Arendt speaks of its involvement in eternity and time in the moment of the present, the ability to generalize the past and design the future. Thinking forms the core of practical reason, which Kant identified with the will, and opens a new horizon of meaning generation in its aspiration to the future. The ability to judge also turns out to be a product of thinking, referring to the past while relying on common sense and imagination. Arendt rightly argues that the “paralysis” of the faculty of judgement, indicating the significance of Kant’s categorical imperative, threatens not only to produce a distorted vision of history, but also the triumph of the “banality of evil” in the sphere of politics.

P.F. Strawson is one of the most famous Kantian philosophers and interpretators of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”. This study is dedicated to reconstruction of this interpretation. It is also dedicated to the analysis of the story and place of Strawson’s interpretation in the history of his own philosophical career. I show how Strawson reads Kant’s text, what strategies of interpretation he adopts and what problems he faces. In “Individuals” and “The Bounds of Sense” Strawson explicitly associates himself with Kant and considers himself as Kantian philosopher. Kantian philosophy for Strawson is the descriptive, anti-sceptical metaphysics that seeks to explicate our basic conceptual sсheme. However, due to various criticism, Strawson had to abandon descriptive metaphysics and to change his intellectual figures. On of the main heroes of “Skepticism and Naturalism” - his late book - becomes Hume. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the explanation of the transition from Kant to Hume. In this work, Strawson argues for some kind of soft Hume-like naturalism instead of previously held descriptive metaphysics. This kind of naturalism is more modest than metaphysics. It does not pretend to be the main and the most fundamental of all the philosophical studies. It is simply an analysis of one of the possible philosophical perspective. The stand point of ordinary believes.

This study explores the phenomenon of the so-called “third reading” of propositional attitude reports. This reading, which was originally explored in the dissertation of J. Fodor (1973) and has since become one of the significant problems in the formal semantics of natural languages, differs from the more well-known de re and de dicto readings by being an intermediate case. If the de re interpretation can be referred to as transparent specific, and the de dicto interpretation as opaque non-specific, then the third reading is transparent non-specific. Fodor's standard solution has been the subject of much discussion in the literature and has given rise to a series of widely accepted counterexamples that are thought to demonstrate the limitations of Fodor's solution. At the same time, alternative approaches to the explication of these readings also suffer from formal shortcomings (for example, some of them did not satisfy the requirement of meaning compositionality, which is a basic requirement in formal semantic literature). This study points out that the analysis of all complex cases of the third reading did not fully take into account their syntactic structure. This remained unnoticed due to the ellipsis in many of these cases. It is shown that a restoration of the ellided syntactic structure makes it possible to analyze all hard cases as basic ones using the classical standard analysis proposed by Fodor supplemented by the principles of admissibility of substitution of L-equivalent expressions in intensional contexts (known since G. Frege and R. Carnap). In the final part of the work, it is demonstrated how exactly the main complex cases of the “third reading” are explicated in terms of the standard approach.

In diesem Beitrag wird die philosophische Konzeption des Anfangs der Philosophie als Beziehung zum Verhältnis von Subjekt und Objekt untersucht, die der Neukantianer Heinrich Rickert entwickelt hat. Die Untersuchung rekonstruiert erstens den problematischen Hintergrund, der Rickert zum Problem des Anfangs und zu seiner Unterscheidung zwischen drei Bedeutungen des Begriffs ‘Anfang’ führte. Dieser Hintergrund steht im Zusammenhang mit der Wiederbelebung der dialektischen Philosophie zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts. Zweitens wird eine Konzeption des korrelativen Anfangs der Philosophie als Antwort auf das von Hegel zu Beginn der Wissenschaft der Logik formulierte Paradoxon vorgeschlagen. Auf diese Weise wird Rickerts Argumentation als Antwort auf die drei wichtigsten Kritikpunkte Hegels am Anfang der Philosophie durch den Begriff des Ich analysiert. Um die Argumente zu verdeutlichen, die Rickert in seinem Aufsatz über den Begriff des Anfangs der Philosophie entwickelt, werden wir die wesentlichen Hinweise auf Rickerts Konzeption des heterologischen Denkens geben. Schließlich wird der Ansatz eines korrelativen Anfangs im Hinblick auf das allgemeine Projekt einer Transzendentalphilosophie bewertet. Wir werden aufzeigen, wie das, was Rickert die Wendung zum Objekt nennt, Rickert zu einer paradoxen Position verpflichtet, die er selbst als ‘transzendentalen Empirismus’ charakterisiert. Jenseits dieser Schwierigkeit will die vorliegende Untersuchung zeigen, dass Rickerts Position eine der originellsten Positionen der Transzendentalphilosophie darstellt, die sich mit der Hegelschen Frage nach dem wahren Anfang der philosophischen Wissenschaft auseinandersetzt.

The study addresses some aspects of Suprematist theory of perception, allowing to investigate the structure of Suprematist phenomenon in the context of ontology, socio-political and religious-mystical works of K. Malevich. The aim of the paper is to present Malevich’s theory of perception in the framework of enactivism. Namely, the article focuses on the theory of social affordances, which today is widely used in design, game development and other everyday practices. The author refers to Malevich’s theoretical and sociopolitical essays, as well as to the commentary literature. Although Suprematism represents a well-researched tradition in art theory, the author stress the need for a follow-up study of Malevich’s theoretical essays in the contemporary context of philosophy of consciousness. The author also emphasizes the relevance of Suprematist philosophy for today’s way of thinking. For the most authentic presentation of Malevich’s ideas I use the phenomenological and hermeneutical method on a par with elements of the ecological approach in psychology and enactivism in the philosophy of consciousness. Consequently, the theory of affordances an effective and natural unification of all the aspects discussed above. The study shows the affinity of Malevich’s ideas to this theory. The author focused on the thesis of feeling as the goal of the expressive act of art. As one could see, Kazemir Malevich always emphasized the bodily-affective dimension of art, and in this sense he participated in a global cultural-historical shift in our conception of the essence of art. Since then, art has ceased to be elitist, but has instead inherited everyday practices. Thus, Malevich speaks of a new art that suits the man of the new world, the Soviet citizen. In this context, I relate the idea of affordance, which means the creation of a feeling-opportunity for subjective action (agency), to the artistic act whose goal, according to Malevich, is the creation of an emotional body-affective feeling. I defend the theory of social affordances, explaining the mechanism of social interaction, as the most adequate model for explaining Suprematism. As a result, based on the already developed concept of bodily-affective dynamics, I show how visionary and creative Malevich was, and how his ideas contribute to the development of a theory of social, emotional affordances.

The increased attention of the Orthodox Church to issues of medical education in our country was the result of the fact that in the 1990s it once again became one of the most active forces in our society. The connection between the church and the medical community, which goes back to a time when the doctoring of the mind and bodily health was in fact the work of the same people, cannot leave the church indifferent to the professional formation of healthcare workers. The Soviet era saw the forced de-Christianization of the medical profession and measures taken to abolish medical ethics rooted in the Hippocratic Oath and the Gospel commandments. The restoration of dialogue between church and medicine began after the collapse of the Soviet state, but it is still insufficiently regular. Currently, factors complicating this dialogue are liberal medical legislation and capitalist economies in health care. The former, by legalizing abortion, artificial insemination, and sterilization, absolves the doctor of moral responsibility in matters concerning the management of human life; the latter encourages him to view his profession not as a service, but as a means of making money from other people’s suffering. If the dialogue between church and medicine were to be carried on permanently within the walls of medical schools, it would strengthen the spiritual and moral foundations of the medical profession, upon which it has always existed. One of the most significant forms of this dialogue should undoubtedly be the teaching of biomedical ethics, which should be grounded in modern theology and the values of traditional spiritual cultures of Russia.

Manifestations of school shooting or ‘columbine’, constituted by armed mass attacks and murders in educational institutions perpetrated by adolescents, have proliferated in recent years. They are marked by their unpredictability, spontaneity and cruelty. This phenomenon has been subject to scholarly examination from various perspectives, enabling the elucidation of its multifarious traits and characteristics as a means of diagnosis and prevention. This study surveys established academic approaches to the study of school shootings (psychological, legal, sociological, semiotic, existential) and delineates their specificity and scope. Drawing on analysis of incidents of school shootings in Russia from 2014-2022, key signs and tendencies in the occurrence of mass attacks on educational institutions are delineated. Adopting existential approaches in philosophy and psychology, notably the works of A. Camus, E. Fromm, M. Boss, V. Frankl and L. Berkowitz, the semantic stages and constituents of school shootings as existential crimes and subsequent suicides are elucidated. The present study aims to identify and characterise the roots and essence of school shootings ('columbine') as an existential crime type, in order to comprehend the semantic motivational origins of school shootings and analyse the ‘boundary situation’ engendering individual destructive rebellion against the world. The nexus between unresolved existential needs and quandaries of the individual and the factors triggering self-destructive personality mechanisms is expounded, whereby the individual enacts an ‘escape’ from reality against the backdrop of media-disseminated aggressiveness and legitimation of violence as a means of overcoming problems and self-presentation. The existential analysis and modelling of school shooters’ actions offered here has enabled conclusions to be drawn regarding potential countermeasures to such crimes.

Religious fundamentalism continues to be an enormous concern in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy since the atrocity involved numerous extremist groups, including religious fundamentalist ones. This horrible tragedy has brought in all citizens of the globe mindful of the existential threat of these organizations. Their existence sparks an immense discourse in various fields, including in the academic field that centres around the query of ‘what drives them to act mercilessly and inhumanely.’ Aside from political matters, their extremism is shaped by their method of approach to the doctrines or dogmas, teachings, ideologies, and religious traditions of faith they espouse. The methodology used by fundamentalists in approaching their religious texts and traditions is one of the major issues confronting religious fundamentalism. That methodology refers to the authoritative method, which entails two notable inquiries. Why do fundamentalists consider their religious doctrines or dogmas to be infallible or unquestionable? Why do they presume that all other knowledge and values are subordinate to their religious texts? This philosophical analysis seeks to investigate and evaluate the flaws of the authoritative method within fundamentalism by contrasting it with the Deweyan experimental or scientific method and bridging the two methods with the ‘reflective method’ the author postulates.

The study is devoted to the study of actual state of the archival materials of V.S. Solovyov which are held in different funds of Russia. During the working process was carried out the analysis of Solovyov’s related materials in a number of archives of Moscow and St. Petersburg. In the context of this topic, documents from such archive funds as: RGALI, GARF, TsAGM, OR RSL (Moscow), OR RNL, IRLI RAS, RGIA (St. Petersburg) were reviewed. Particular attention was paid to the 1880s as the least researched period of philosopher’s work in his biography due to the insufficient availability of sources and to the restrictions of spiritual censorship in connection with the church-political content of Solovyov’s works of this period (“The Great Debate and Christian Politics”, 1883; “The History and Future of Theocracy”, 1887, etc.). In this regard, special attention was paid to the Solovyov funds in such archives as RGALI (F. 446) and OR RNB (F. 718). In the course of the study, many storage units were identified containing unsorted, draft materials, notebooks and notes of the philosopher, which need to be systematized and studied. The work carried out allows us to establish the scale and determine the priority areas of current research on the creative biography and philosophy of V.S. Solovyov based on the study of primary sources in the archives of Russia.