Sociological portrait of the higher bureaucracy in Russia

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Sociology of bureaucracy has strong historical roots in the works of Karl Marx, Max Weber and Michel Crozier. In the Russian society, due to its statism, the state bureaucracy has always played a prominent role, although with a traditionally unfavorable reputation [15]. There are different research fields in sociology of bureaucracy, and one of them is the study of the highest level of bureaucracy [see, e.g.: 1; 5; 18; 22] — senior civil servants, and there are special bodies in some countries for recruiting and assessing such officials (e.g., Senior Executive Service in the USA). This stratum occupies an intermediate position between public employees and political elites [10], which is why the terms “political elite” and “administrative elite” are used [13]. Social structure and political organization determine the higher bureaucracy’ features in each country. A sociological study of the high-­level bureaucrats’ biographical characteristics allows understand the relationships between civil servants and politicians: are they homogeneous stratum or not, are they principals and agents or, on the contrary, bureaucracy rules, while politicians only “reign”? In addition, such studies shed light on the national public service system: do higher bureaucrats stand out from professionals or there is a “glass ceiling” effect, and only political appointees or representatives of patrimonial clans can make a career? The answers to these questions have both theoretical and applied meaning. I focus on the biographies of the higher civil servants of the Russian federal ministries to identify the prevailing recruitment strategies and career trajectories and compare them with the ministries’ results to find out what type of bureaucracy maximizes the managerial effect.

The concept of bureaucracy proposed by Vincent de Gournay in 1745 covers types of hierarchical management, a set of negative characteristics, and a professional group of administrative employees. Max Weber introduced the concept of rational bureaucracy, separating decision-­making (politics) from professional work (administration). The classics of management philosophy, such as Henri Fayol and Michel Crozier, analyzed both state and corporate bureaucracies as having much in common. In Russia, the term “bureaucracy” is used mainly for civil servants [see, e.g.: 15]. Neither the parliament nor judges or law enforcement agencies belong to bureaucracy, since it is usually synonymous with executive power.

Two groups of publications were analyzed: first, traditional long-­term studies of senior civil servants in European countries, which combine group surveys and expert interviews with such officials. The theoretical framework of such works is based on the concept of public service proposed by Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge [11] — relation models of senior civil servants and politicians. These models can be described as principal–agent, partnership, expert, etc. Laurenz Ennser-­Jedenastik [5] examined the party affiliation of general secretaries (deputy ministers) and suggested that the main drivers of party politicization in elite bureaucracy were a demand for ideological consensus and a representation of major parties in the higher civil service. Alexandre Belloir and Caspar van den Berg [1] wondered what skills — political-­strategic, substantive or procedural — senior civil servants consider the most important, and used the concepts of loyalty, responsiveness and responsibility to check how the party-­political background of senior civil servants influences their decision-­making [4]. Rodney Lowe and Hugh Pemberton considered the evolution of parliamentary select committees to resolve the potential contradiction between bureaucracy and parliamentary democracy [14]. Natacha Gally argues that administrative labor markets as institutions are the result of the interaction of three collective actors: professional groups, administrative organizations and politicians [8]. Katarina Staroňová and Marek Rybar study the patronage type of bureaucratic career — when political parties appoint candidates to public administration [20]. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre showed the consequences of populist politics for public administration and the role of bureaucracy in it [18].

There are many such studies in Asian countries, for instance, in Japan, the tradition promoted by the Meiji Restoration made public administration follow principles of legitimacy, consensus, and seniority [23]. A study of senior Indonesian government officials based on the principal-­agent theory showed the likelihood of a hypothetical government official accepting a bribe was lower when strong leaders monitor and impose sanction, while peers refuse bribes [19]. Among Iranian ministers, there are such predominant professional strata as bureaucrats, scientists and specialists, Shiite clergy and political activists [22].

Russian research in the field have been insufficient for a long time. One of the first was Olga Kryshtanovskaya, who proved the continuity of the Soviet management personnel (so-­called nomenklatura) in contemporary Russia [13]. Some researchers revealed these aspects in the gender and regional perspectives [12]. The higher federal bureaucracy was studied through its recruitment channels and career trajectories [21], through its biographical data and career in federal ministries [7], through neopatrimonial practices and the criteria for the promotion, including links with the boss [9]. According to the publications on the higher bureaucrats’ efficiency, the Weberian (professional) type of bureaucracy promotes economic growth [3; 6], and government programs run by professional officials are more effective than those run by political appointees [10].

Many authors emphasize the role of social environment in bureaucrats’ efficiency, which should reflect the relationships of officials with politicians, citizens, firms, and non-­governmental organizations [2]. Catherine Owen argues (based on the data from Russia and China) that participatory authoritarianism allows public sector reforms while channeling increased civil engagement into secure channels [17]. Ervin McDonnell concludes that in developing countries lacking the ethos of bureaucracy it may develop through observation, imitation and experience, including special projects to change the bureaucratic mentality [16].

Higher bureaucrats are referred to as civil service elite or administrative elite, therefore, we should check the compliance of Russian higher bureaucrats with the sociological understanding of elite (Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels), and its variety of theories can be reduced to two. The first defines the elite as self-­reproducing layer that prevents strangers from entering it (see, e.g., Mosca’s altimetry theory of elites). The second interprets the elite as a sum of the most capable and talented professionals from all walks of life (see, e.g., axiological theory of elites, dating back to Pareto). When applied to the civil service, the altimetry theory is expressed in the patrimonial (protectionist) bureaucracy (also known as the “spoils system”), i.e. appointees are nominated by political leaders and parties, and loyalty takes priority over professional qualities. The axiological theory means meritocratic recruitment and promotion by personal merits, not by origin or social connections. Thus, the first theoretical hypothesis (H.1) id that the higher bureaucracy is the elite of the Russian society. In addition, two technical hypotheses were proposed about the higher bureaucracy correspondence to the patrimonial bureaucracy (H.1.1) or meritocracy (H.1.2).

H.1.1 will be confirmed by the prevalence in the sample: natives of large cities (obviously have the best starting positions for promotion); youngsters with little professional experience (an opportunity to take a high administrative position through patronage); lack of civil service experience and/or tenure in the ministry (immediate leadership positions after the transfer with the minister’s team from another government agency or company); representatives of one university or education profile (an extractive recruiting channel, which provides disproportionate advantages). H.1.2 implies the following characteristics of higher bureaucrats: education profile and/or work in the past correspond to the ministry position (senior civil servants are experts in the professional field); a long professional tenure and/or civil service experience and/or tenure in the ministry (qualification level corresponds to the position); state awards and/or academic degrees (personal achievements confirm the leadership position; however, awards and degrees can be a part of the patrimonial model). The simultaneous presence of several signs would confirm one hypothesis. Patrimonial or meritocratic bureaucracy can have other features, but the limited set of initial data makes their identification difficult, and this limitation can probably be overcome in future research.

The data was collected from personal pages on the federal ministries’ websites as of 2018. Since the number of senior civil servants is relatively small, the sample covers the entire population or a large part of it. The following positions were considered as higher bureaucrats (senior civil servants): federal minister (government members); first deputy and deputy federal minister; department director (the largest ministerial divisions). According to the Russian law, ministers are not civil servants; they are appointed by the president with the consent of parliament and resign after the next elections. The remaining categories are civil servants of the highest group, they are appointed by the government with the minister’s recommendation or by him. They have the right to resign with the appointment of a new minister or continue service until retirement. There are many similarities in the work of these employees, which allows to consider them as a single group in the study.

When identifying the prevailing career strategy, we will test another hypothesis based on previous research [10]: H.2 — ministries led primarily by career bureaucrats (meritorious recruitment) demonstrate greater efficiency than those led by political appointees (patrimonial recruitment). We evaluate the ministries’ efficiency by the following criteria: H.2.1 — government programs implementation. In Russia, public administration is carried out through long-­term budget financed sectoral programs, which are supervised by one or more ministries (one is always the main), and there is a government methodology for the annual monitoring (the use of budget funds, the share of target indicators achieved, etc.), the results of which are published (official reports) and allows to compare all ministries’ efficiency. We used the official reports for four years before the study. If one ministry is responsible for more than one program, average indicators of effectiveness were used (arithmetic average). H.2.2 — informational openness (transparency) is a part of the New Public Management and a standard developed by the Russian government as mandatory for all ministries (publication of ministry documents and annual reports, the state of the official website, responses to citizens’ requests, etc.). H.2.3 — development of the regulated sphere: real changes in gross value added by type of economic activity and the dynamics of the each type of economic activity’s contribution to the GDP; an increase in the GDP is a sign of more efficient work given all other things being equal.

Many factors influence the ministry efficiency besides social-­demographic characteristics of senior civil servants, and any sectoral development depends not only on federal ministries but also on regional and local administrations, public and non-­profit companies. However, under the “power vertical” and the command-­style tradition in Russia we expect senior bureaucrats’ characteristics to be associated with the sectoral ministries’ performance. We collected data from official documents, ministries’ evaluations, and biographies, then applied statistical methods to calculate percentages, averages and increases in indicators, and linear OLS regressions for models consistent with our hypotheses. See Table 1 for sets of dependent (DVs) and independent variables (IVs).

Table 1
Description of the empirical model: DVs and IVs

 Note: Code names of variables that are further used in regression models are given in italics

The total number of analyzed positions was 454: personal pages on the ministerial websites lacked data for 73 department directors, thus, the sample size was 84 % of the general population, and its structure is presented in Table 2.

Table 2
Composition of the sample

To test H.1, we conducted a descriptive analysis of higher bureaucrats’ social-­demographic characteristics. We considered this group as social elite primarily by the birthplace (large cities with better education opportunities) and the university rank.

Figure 1. Higher bureaucrats’ birthplaces and education, in % (Elite University = Top Global Universities in the QS Ranking)

Figure 1. supports H.1, since most higher bureaucrats (76 %) were born in large cities. Distribution by region with the share of regions in the Russian population is shown in Figure 2. The largest groups of senior officials are from the Central (43 %) and Northwestern (13 %) regions, which significantly exceeds the share of these regions in the country’s population. Since the largest cities — Moscow and Saint Petersburg — are in these regions, their natives have disproportionately high opportunities for a career. 62 % graduated from Moscow and Saint Petersburg universities, 41 % — from the highest rank universities such as Moscow State University, Moscow State Institute of International Affairs, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Saint Petersburg State University, Higher School of Economics and Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation. 30 % have liberal arts diplomas, 24 % are economists or managers, 12 % have degrees in engineering, less than 9 % began a military career, and 8 % have degrees in natural sciences. About 5 % have more than one college degree, 33 % have university diplomas in two or more majors. 1 % studied abroad. Almost 34 % have academic degrees of candidate or doctor of sciences, and 48 % received state awards. These indicators are significantly higher than the average for civil servants

Figure 2. Higher bureaucrats’ birthplaces and the population of Russian regions (federal districts), in %

In Figure 3, there are approximately equal shares of the top bureaucrats aged 30–39, 40–49, and 50–59. There is no significant age increase in relation to the position: the share of 30–39-year-­olds among senior bureaucrats is even higher than among line managers.

Figure 3. Age groups, in %

The share of women among higher bureaucrats is only 18 % (63 % among line managers and 72 % among civil servants in general), i.e., there is a gender asymmetry explained by “sticky floor” effect — workers of a certain class (women) stay longer in lower positions.

In Figure 4, we see a high share of senior bureaucrats (24 %) with more than 30 years in civil service and 25 % of those with less than 10 years of service.

Figure 4. Higher bureaucrats’ tenure, in %

The most common tenure in this ministry (70 %) ranges from 2 to 6 years (one presidential term or the current government). Only 18 % worked at the ministry for more than 6 years, and another 18 % less than a year. Top bureaucrats tend to hold only one (current) position (33 %), 26 % held one other position, 17 % — two positions, 8 % — three, and 17 % — four and more. Educational profile and previous workplace correspond to the ministry specialty for 54 %, the highest educational and career tracks correlation is in the Foreign Affairs Ministry (91 %, including the minister, have diplomas in international affairs and a significant foreign service experience), then come ministries of finance (83 %), internal affairs and sports (75 % each), construction and housing (70 %). The minimum correspondence was found in ministries of defense (17 %), Far East development (22 %), and justice (25 %).

Higher bureaucrats’ previous jobs are presented in Figure 5: every third did not work anywhere else except the ministry, 27 % came from another federal ministry. Transfers from army or police are not common, rather there are transfers from regional authorities (11 %) or business (14 %) to the federal government.

Figure 5. Higher bureaucrats’ previous job, in %

The study of higher bureaucrats’ biographies and recruitment mode allowed two suggest two explanatory variables for the government efficiency: career bureaucrats (Weberian or meritorious) and political appointees. To conduct a regression analysis, two modes of recruitment were recoded as follows: Career — 0 and 1, and Political — 0 and 1. Two out of three DVs have normal distribution, while one DV has a set of 0s that describes the absence of efficiency for one ministry and creates a non-­normal data distribution. All dependent variables are aggregate rather than individual, and the measures were composed for ministries rather than for employees, which creates the problem of autocorrelation. To avoid erroneous interpretation, we compared the intercepts, because the size of the intercept is an expected mean value of Y when all X=0, which is the case in our model with three IVs used to explain the DVs. We used linear regression, but instead of undertaking slopes interpretation we interpret the intercepts, which provide valuable information about the values of Y at X=0. Three regression models explain 24 %, 17 % and 13 % of variation in three numerical DVs. In our model the intercept is the mean of Y for the reference group (at X₁=0) for both predictor groups. Thus, the intercept becomes meaningful and useful for testing hypotheses. Other IV values in the model indicate the difference between the reference group IV mean and the means for two compared predictor groups. The constant (intercept=110,436) in the model below is the mean value of the reference IV — Career, which was automatically excluded from the analysis as the reference category. The values of Bs for the Political group will be compared against the intercept, which reflects the Y mean value for the reference group Career.

First regression in Table 3 presents predictor IVs means as negative –11.815 for the Political group. It was compared to the intercept (constant) which was the mean value of the Career reference group. Based on the comparisons of the intercepts, we argue that the Political method of recruitment reduces the national GDP input by 11.815 % on average.

Table 3
Coefficients for the DV — GDP input

The regression results support the hypothesis that the recruitment mode makes a difference, in particular that the recruitment of Career bureaucrats leads to the higher government efficiency measured as the GDP share of the ministry input. While other modes of recruitment decrease efficiency as compared to the Career mode (the difference is statistically significant — ρ<0.0001). Table 4 presents another measure of efficiency — the ministries’ openness: Openness rate — DV, and the modes of recruitment — IVs: the results also confirm the hypothesis that Career mode of recruitment leads to more effective government, measured as the ministries’ Openness rate.

Table 4
Coefficients for the DV — Openness

Finally, the regression with the last DV, the rate of the government programs implementation (Table 5): the group of Career executives produces about 89 % of government programs success, while other group has a smaller return on efforts.

Table 5
Coefficients for the DV — Min_effect

Patrimonial and meritocratic recruitment can coexist in the national civil service [22]. Scholars have provided arguments for the civil service politicization or political neutrality. On the one hand, the mechanism of political appointments allows parties to control higher bureaucrats and include them in ruling coalition, making them follow the ideology that citizens supported in elections [5]. The party affiliation of senior civil servants is considered an effective tool for political control over the bureaucracy [4]; however, it is difficult to separate party patronage from the situation when ministers appoint employees independently [20]. On the other hand, meritorious selection increases legitimacy and public recognition, and the lifetime employment model enriches career officials with knowledge and experience [23]. Based on these arguments, we wondered whether the Russian higher bureaucracy belong to a patrimonial or meritocratic recruitment model (Table 6).

Thus, protectionist recruitment is typical for most higher bureaucrats — 76 % were born in large cities. The conclusion [12] about the gender asymmetry at this level was also confirmed. 70 % had worked at the ministry from 2 to 6 years at the time of the study, that is, less than the period between two presidential elections, and more than 18 % had served at the ministry less than a year. 33 % held only one (current) position, while 17 % — four or more. Top bureaucrats are not very young people, since the shares of those aged 30–39, 40–49 and 50–59 are about the same. There is no correlation between age and job level. Although 62 % of officials graduated from universities in Moscow or Siant Petersburg, and 41 % are graduates of elite universities, there is no educational profile or single university as “career forge”. The share of ex-­militaries is insignificant (less 10 %), which contradicts the previous argument about the “militarization” of Putin’s elite [21].

Table 6
Higher bureaucrats’ compliance with the criteria of recruitment models

Note: 2 — full compliance, 1 — partial compliance, 0 — non-­compliance

On the contrary, the following facts support meritocratic recruitment: half of higher bureaucrats (54 %) have an educational profile corresponding to the ministry specialty; 34 % have academic degrees, i.e., they are highly educated technocrats with competencies in the sphere they lead. Half of them (49 %) got state awards. 33 % had not previously worked anywhere else except the ministry, and another 27 % had previously worked in another federal ministry, i.e., they are career bureaucrats. Thus, in most cases civil servants are promoted within one professional institution — executive authorities [12], which proves the trends of internal recruitment and professionalization of senior officials [21]. In addition, they have extensive professional experience: 32 % — from 20 to 29 years, 43 % — more 30 than years.

The data does not allow us to unambiguously identify a single recruitment model as prevailing in Russia. Other studies provide contradictory arguments: education and experience provide additional advantages for candidates with personal connections with the future boss [9]; problem-­solving officials have the strongest presence [7], and so on. We are aware that some criteria are ambiguous, and the sample is insufficient for final conclusions, so qualitative survey (interviews) with current or former officials is needed in addition to an increase in the sample size in future. A long-­term survey can also improve the results’ accuracy.

Our second hypothesis suggested a relationship between the prevailing recruitment models and the ministry efficiency, based on previous research showing that programs managed by political appointees systematically receive lower scores [10]. Our regression models confirmed these findings: the state programs’ results in ministries dominated by career (meritorious) bureaucrats turned out to be better than in those led by political (protectionist) appointees. We expanded the heuristic models by adding such factors of ministerial efficiency as information openness and contribution to economic growth. The first track is based on the view that state bureaucracies have integrated into global markets, so new participatory mechanisms have become more important for governance as ruling agencies have lost their information monopoly for effective policy making, and now even authoritarian regimes apply the dual logic of openness and control [17]. By constructing the appropriate regressions, we were convinced that the Weberian bureaucracy was more effective than political appointees in openness. This confirms the finding that politicized senior civil servants do not act more responsively than their non-­politicized colleagues [4]. Another result was the comparison of the higher bureaucrats’ recruitment with the ministries’ contribution to the national GDP dynamics, based on the idea that the Weberian bureaucracy promotes economic growth [3]. The regression analysis showed a significantly more successful development in sectors where line ministries were headed by professional officials.

In general, ministries led primarily by career bureaucrats (meritorious recruitment) demonstrate greater efficiency than those led by political appointees (patrimonial recruitment). This can be explained by various reasons such as political appointees’ ignorance of civil service internal rules, or their being unfamiliar with ministry personnel and their capabilities, or their incompetence in some legal issues [10]. In any case, bureaucratic promotion criteria create powerful incentives that shape bureaucratic behavior, governance, and regime legitimacy [9].

***

The Russian civil service has a long history, and its senior servants had been involved in policies implementation. In the Imperial period, appointments to the first five classes of the Table of Ranks (1722–1917) depended on the emperor’s office. In the Soviet period, the so-­called nomenclature of the ruling Communist Party’s employees and government servants became the senior employees of all industrial, agricultural, scientific, cultural, military, and diplomatic organizations. Appointments to the nomenklatura positions were made centrally based on political and individual qualities [13].

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, employees of privatized companies fell out of the scope of state personnel policy. Appointments of managers in the public sector, with some exceptions, were made at the departmental rather than the national level. The Presidential Administration currently controls the higher bureaucracy, while the Ministry of Labor develops general regulations for the civil service. There are no specific criteria for selection, appointment, evaluation, promotion, payment and resignation of senior civil servants. This creates space for patrimonial appointments without any law violations. As a result, many top rank ministerial employees become ministers’ “teamsters” leading their policy implementation. This problem is not unique to Russia, which is why in the second half of the 20^th century, many countries legally established the Senior Executive/Civil Service (the USA in 1979, Australia in 1984, the Netherlands in 1995, and so on. These functions may be performed by such bodies as the Ministry of the Interior (Germany, the Netherlands), the Cabinet Office (UK) or the Office of Personnel Management (USA). Until 2005, 65 % of the OECD country-­members had adopted laws on the senior civil service, and in 2010 ten more countries joined the trend [14]. Senior civil service in most countries is regulated by laws, which define selection and recruitment, duties, responsibilities, remuneration and dismissals.

Higher bureaucrats take leading decision-­making positions and have lower legal protection than other civil servants. Senior civil servants work at the junction of administrative and political management and engage in strategic leadership. Their personal characteristics and management skills are evaluated at the selection stage of recruitment. Therefore, they are evaluated more frequently and are remunerated more generously. National higher bureaucrats’ models differ in the following: level of formalization — either regulation by special laws (Chili, New Zealand, USA) or ad hoc (France and Sweden); level of centralization — either regulation by the central office (Belgium, Poland and Portugal) or by several disconnected offices (Austria, Germany and Spain); (c) career-­based (in Germany or Japan, higher bureaucrats are selected from career administrative servants through exams) vs position-­based (in the USA, senior civil servants are appointed based on political affiliation).

For Russia, the main task is the create a senior civil service and provide a legal formalization for the higher bureaucracy. Citizens want officials to be accountable, and politicians want to have less ineffective managers in ministries. Our research allows to assess the situation with the Russian higher bureaucrats in terms of a more efficient recruitment model. We need specific federal regulations for the higher bureaucrats to protect them from the mood swings of political appointees and ensure stable rules of recruitment, promotion, payment, and dismissal. Since the Weberian style of meritorious bureaucracy shows the best performance, regulations should be brought closer to this model. Such measures will protect both officials and citizens from incompetent appointees and self-­interested politicians.

About the authors

G. A. Borshchevskiy

Author for correspondence.
Email: borshchevskiy-ga@ranepa.ru
Vernadskogo av., 82, Moscow, 119571, Russia

References

Supplementary files

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1. Figure 1. Higher bureaucrats’ birthplaces and education, in % (Elite University = Top Global Universities in the QS Ranking)

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2. Figure 2. Higher bureaucrats’ birthplaces and the population of Russian regions (federal districts), in %

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3. Figure 3. Age groups, in %

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4. Figure 4. Higher bureaucrats’ tenure, in %

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5. Figure 5. Higher bureaucrats’ previous job, in %

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