Vol 23, No 4 (2021): Identity in the Political Constructions of Modernity

L.A. Fadeeva is the author of numerous publications and key co-author of fundamental encyclopedias published by the Russian Academy of Sciences (Identity: The Individual, Society and Politics. An Encyclopedia, 2017) and the Russian Political Science Association (Trends and problems of the development of Russian political science in the global context: Tradition, reception and innovation, 2018), representing the leading scientific school for identity studies in Russia (see: Perm School of Political Science: Sources, Development, Content, 2019), who has served multiple times as guest editor for the thematic issues of the best Russian political science journals on this topic (Political science (RU), 2020, No. 4). In this introductory article, our guest editor L.A. Fadeeva presents the materials of the current issue of our journal, interpreting their cross-cutting themes as the politicization of the non-political through the prism of identity processes at the macro-regional, regional and national levels.

The analysis of discussions on various aspects of the evolution of the modern state, the specifics of post-communist transformations and the role that Marxism and the tradition of radical socialist thought can play in the near future in their search for a way out of the crisis generated by the agony of the neoliberal global world order. As a starting point for the analysis, theoretical articles published in the second edition of the collection “Communism, Anticommunism, Russophobia in post-Soviet Russia. 2nd ed., Add. / Auth.: P.P. Apryshko et al. - Moscow: World of Philosophy, Algorithm, 2021 (607 p.) were selected. A comparative analysis of the polemical works of domestic scientists, political theorists and philosophers with those discussions that for many decades have been conducted by their colleagues abroad clearly indicates that today none of the existing ideologies, as well as the paradigms of economic and socio-political theory, can pretend to be the only recourse. The experience of recent decades clearly excludes the very possibility of transforming the economy and society on the basis of a certain universal synthetic model. In post-communist Russia, the heat of political passions, which stimulates the extreme polarization of political programs for overcoming the crisis, also hinders the achievement of agreement and the search for a solution acceptable to all.

Libertarianism is a new ideological trend, popular among young people. We try to find out whether libertarianism rises as independent political movement or it is the reaction on the fall of popularity of traditional political parties. For that purpose, the author made the comparative analysis of the program documents of the Libertarian Party of Russia with the classical works of the American libertarians and analyzed the published interview both of the party leaders/activists and of the experts. The author used the interview which he took from some activists in order to clarify the political identification of the Russian libertarians. The political identity of libertarians is characterized by the broadest possible interpretation of personal and economic freedom. Libertarians believe that such freedom is compatible with law and legality and is opposite to anarchy. At the same time, they avoid definitions and norms that could constrain freedom by both the state and the adherents of certain, including liberal, values and slogans. This broad approach makes it difficult to politically identify libertarians, but contributes to their attractiveness among young people.

The article analyzes the ideological preferences of the residents of the Kaliningrad region through the prism of their socio-economic situation and political behavior. The study is based on the data of a formalized interview (N = 977) according to the age and sex sample, representing the population of four geodemographic districts of the Kaliningrad region. Based on the Nolan Chart, the study determines ideological types according to the respondents’ attitude to political and economic freedom. The statistical analysis of the data revealed a high degree of pluralism among the residents of the region on the issues under consideration. At the same time, it showcased the prevailing ideas of state regulation of the economy and values of personal freedom. Analyzing the socio-economic situation of the respondents and their inherent ideological attitudes, the author found that the values of economic freedom are more often shared by young people, middle-aged people, residents living in Kaliningrad, with higher income. Ideas of state regulation of the economy prevail among people of retirement and pre-retirement age, residents of the semi-periphery of the Kaliningrad region, with lower income. The study also revealed the relationship between the ideological attitudes of people in the region and their political behavior. In particular, it found that people who share the values of political and economic freedom are ready to take the most active part in protests. At the same time, the study did not identify any significant links between the ideological type of the respondents and their electoral behavior.

In the article, identity politics is understood as an intentional policy towards forcing and maintaining a macro-political identity. The authors also refer to the traditional understanding of identity politics as a political course focused on protecting the rights of oppressed (deprived) minorities. The object of the research is the European countries of the post-Soviet space. The authors emphasize the dominance of the international (European) vector of political identity, based on the position declared in official speeches and confirmed in the media and history textbooks. The authors identify several stages that determine the algorithm of identity politics in the Baltic countries, the Ukraine and Belarus. They give examples of how in modern conditions the reference to value orientations actualizes the classical understanding of identity politics, at the same time exacerbating the confrontation between the countries that have chosen the European vector and those who hesitate or do not have such a chance.

The concept of identity reflects the ongoing shifts in political theories when external parameters that did not previously fall into the optics of political research become a part of political reflection and political analysis. Emphasizing sociocultural issues captures not only the departure from the linear normativity of political theory and pragmatics but also the search for modern explanatory models that cannot be reduced merely to institutional determinism. The controversy and ambiguity of the civic identity concept are imposed on the need for interpreting the formation of civic communities in the newly emerged independent countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union (on the example of Russia and Armenia), including the possibilities of protest and project identity. Methodologically the article is based on the perception that the construction of civic identity cannot be reduced to the normative understanding only. The authors bring out the causal complexes that predetermine the construction of civic identity, while also highlighting the differences in how civic communities and their value focuses are perceived and constructed in Russia and Armenia. The authors also define the general features of civic identity, which can be described as a common basis of solidarity, the removal of particularity and a shared vision of the future.

The paper analyses the politics of memory of the World War II (WWII) in socialist Yugoslavia and compares the corresponding commemorative practices in the post-Yugoslav republics. The focus is on the design of holidays and memorial dates that reflect the symbolic and valuable attitudes of society, as well as the trajectory of nation-building. The formation of the state metanarrative in post-war Yugoslavia was closely related to the monopolisation of the leadership roles of the national liberation war by the communists, who united the six South Slavic nations in their struggle against the Nazi invaders. The state holidays and memorial days were derived from the history of resistance to foreign occupiers and internal enemies in order to legitimise and strengthen the triumph of the new socialist order. Alternative Yugoslavian non-communist movements, especially the Ustash and Chetniks who were potentially capable of competing in the symbolic field, were declared class enemies, reactionary elements, and quislings. As the processes of disintegration increased in socialist Yugoslavia, there were several attempts to revise its ideological attitudes and symbolic heritage of WWII. Nevertheless, as the study shows these attempts became, rather, a marginal phenomenon, and most post-Yugoslav states retained the commemorative, albeit de-ideologised, practices of the previous period.

In the 2010s many moderate parties in Europe began to use the agenda of the far-rights, competing with them on the same field. This article is devoted to the problem of inter-party competition in European countries amidst the rise of far-right parties. We also intended to check if the far-right profile is the same for all EU countries. To achieve the goal of the study, we used two databases on party positioning - MARPOR (Comparative Manifesto Project) and CHES (Chapel Hill Expert Survey). The study revealed that the consolidated family of the far-rights exists only in the countries of North-Western Europe, while in the countries of East-Central Europe the agenda of the far-rights is less consolidated and regionally heterogeneous. The mainstream competitors of the far-rights included mostly conservatives in North-Western Europe, and various parties, including the Social Democrats, in East-Central Europe. The study confirmed the hypothesis about the serious influence of the far-rights on mainstream politics. At the same time, it questioned the traditional approach which attributes the far-right profile only to far-right parties and ignores both regional differences and the factor of spatial competition.