The migrant crisis in the Mediterranean: A multidimensional challenge for the European Union

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The European Union (EU) throughout its history has been the destination of diverse migratory flows. Therefore, migration has acquired special relevance by occupying a prominent position on the EU’s political, economic, cultural, and social agenda. The most recent migration crisis of 2015 represents a multidimensional challenge with severe consequences that affect, first, the institutional foundations of the EU (governance, security, solidarity of member states and institutional stability) and, second, the migratory policies of receiving states and the EU itself. This crisis is characterized, first, by the high number of illegal migrants that cross the Mediterranean, and, second, by the humanitarian tragedy and insecurity, which make the sea a grey area and an international reference in the migratory processes. The migration-security equation became a field of applied research and analysis, and at the same time a focus of political debate and public opinion. The article aims at analysing the crisis of 2015 and its consequences, which is done by means of the methodological approach based on the consequences that this phenomenon entails for the EU and for certain member states. The response of the EU is limited primarily to securitization by strengthening the external borders, turning towards internal security rather than respecting international and Community Treaties and promotion of their values, which contradicts the anticipated leadership of this global actor. The authors believe that it is necessary to implement new mechanisms in addition to ensuring greater effectiveness of the existing ones.

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The migratory processes are of special relevance for the international society in the 21st century because they affect social, political and cultural spheres of the states that are sending, receiving or transit countries for migrants. The current migration can be considered a mixed one: although its motivations are diverse (economic, political, etc.), there are the same access routes to the countries of destination, the same means of transportation and the networks of traffickers to cross borders. What can be considered different from previous migrations is that the current migration’s scope, complexity and the response of states have changed. Moreover, the irregular immigration has intensified. In this context, various migratory crises in Europe since 2015 and their consequences pose one of the greatest challenges to the policies and institutions of the EU, highlighting their fragility and inability to perform collective actions. In short, there is a profound crisis of governance, in which migration plays a catalyst role. It is an issue that has occupied for years a relevant place in the EU policies, but not in the public opinion as was the case with the migratory crises determined by the Arab uprisings in 2011. Moreover, the governments of the EU states face migration challenges differently, without a joint strategy, which is perceived by some countries as a security threat and a challenge for institutional stability. Thus, receiving states strive to keep a difficult balance between national security, national and European legislation and principles of the international human rights as applied to migrants. The massive arrival of migrants to Lampedusa and their welcome made this island a symbol of solidarity. However, the uncontrolled increase of migrants, chaotic management and lack of clear answers from the EU reveal its weakness when facing this migratory challenge. The humanitarian tragedy caused by deaths, disappearances and insecurity make the Mediterranean a grey area in the migratory processes and a reference for both migration system and international disappearances (more than 20,000 recorded deaths in the Mediterranean from 2000 to June 2018; only in 2014, 75% of all migrants in the world died at sea). The EU’s migration policy is based on security as a combination of border control and rescue measures in addition to the fight against criminal organizations, which in fact opposes social and solidarity policies, neglects historical responsibility and normative system of values for Europe is increasingly fragmented. While there is a need to protect European borders from massive migrations, it is questionable whether the EU mechanisms for the protection of borders, especially the southern ones, are effective. From the analytical point of view, there are several questions imposed by the EU-migrations equation: What are the security policies implemented by the EU? Is it possible to develop a different policy to control borders? Is migration one of the main concerns for the European public opinion? Is rejection of unregulated immigration a reaction to the potential loss of the welfare state supported by radical nationalist parties and movements? And, finally, do migratory flows constitute a challenge for the EU that cannot confront this transnational phenomenon? We focus on the position of the EU in the multidimensional crisis of 2015 determined, on the one hand, by the lack of leadership in the organization, of political will of the member states fearing the loss of sovereignty, and, on the other, by the inability to use sustainable collective mechanisms of cooperation due to prioritizing of securitization by both the EU and partner states. Therefore, the study considers how the status quo of European partners responds to protectionist policies of national interests making migration complex a challenge for the EU and its migration policies. International migration is one of the greatest phenomena of the 21st century. In recent years, the numbers of migrants have tripled, and most of the states are involved in the exit, transit or reception of migrants, while only four decades ago 25 countries were affected by the migratory dynamics. Classical theories of migration often consider it as linear and study only labour migration. The neoclassical approach influenced by Ernest Ravenstein [33] focuses on economic inequalities that affect personal motivation to emigrate in search for better living. Although these theories are questionable from the conceptual [2] and empirical [28] perspectives, they provide useful tools to analyse migration causes and effects [26]. New theories consider it as a part of global processes and social change. “New economic theories of migration continue to acknowledge the central role of (mainly economic) push and pull factors in determining the agency of individuals, but they also recognise the many intervening variables that facilitate and hinder migration. In these cases, migration research draws attention to the role played by the wider networks of family and friends who help migrants to move and to settle through financial and emotional support, and the middlemen, brokers, contractors and agencies that promote and facilitate migration”. World systems theory, on the contrary, “focuses more on wider systems than on individual agents. Here the world itself can be viewed critically as a single capitalist system in which poorer nations, the periphery, provide a constant supply of cheap labour to support the powerful and wealthy nations at the core of the system” [31]. There are several theories that can explain the migratory phenomenon in the 21st century. The most recent studies develop nonlinear concepts and frameworks, consider different types of migrants - for economic and other reasons, such as politics, religion and gender. Such an analysis focuses on globalization of migrations and uses such terms as transnationalism to explain crossing borders between nations. Migratory processes have special relevance for the international society for they affect social, political and cultural spheres of the states that are sending, receiving or transit countries for immigrants. “The volume, diversity, geographical scope and overall complexity of international migrations have increased as part of globalization” [5] or rather due to the asymmetric nature of globalization. From the theoretical perspective both globalization and internationalization are features of the international society that generate significant changes in it. Their dynamics affects domestic politics, international and social relations. Moreover, new problems transform the traditional interpretation of security - its conceptualization is no longer limited to military terms, it acquired a transpolar dimension: the threats to security or the “risk factors” became multidimensional and combined for they include traditional threats and new ones such as economic, environmental, terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational crime and mass migrations. All these threats were included into the expanded security agenda. Globalization and internationalization of migrations are classified as a security risk and a challenge for the recipient countries. In the academic field, the migration-security connection became the field of applied research and analysis, and it also entered political debates and public opinion agenda. Due to the new dimensions of migration in the Mediterranean since 2015, it is necessary address it with global and regional criteria similar to the EU. Receiving states strive to maintain a difficult balance between national security, national and EU legislation and principles of the international human rights regime that protects migrants, which causes political tensions and violations of the EU policies and values. Today migration is multifaceted and offers different levels of analysis, one of them is, certainly, direction and continuity of the migratory flows, and the neoclassical approach allows to identify how and why the EU reacts on the current migratory flows that cause an institutional-governance crisis. The close link between security and migration makes us apply the critical theory as a methodological framework for our study for security challenges are not an objective or independent reality. This theory allows to identify patterns of conduct resulting from political decisions that are “neither natural nor irrevocable or immutable” [27]. The critical theory’s normative ideological bias, i.e. the so-called ‘emancipatory pattern’, allows for changing the international system by not considering its variables or their actors as fixed. Therefore, as the perception of security is a socially constructed reality it depends on the context in which it originates and finds its legitimization. The School of Copenhagen, pioneer of the theory of securitization, claims that circumstances become issues of security not because they constitute per se a real threat to the state but because the affected actor “claims the right to manage the problem through extraordinary means” [8]. Security is beyond ordinary political games and requires exceptional measures. Considering the Mediterranean, its migration flows are considered as affecting the European security, as a threat, which fosters broad debates with a multifaceted approach to the challenge the UE faces. Under these systemic crises that affect institutions it is questionable whether they violate community, international and humanitarian law? Do they break interstate solidarity? Do they increase Euroscepticism of European citizens? Has the fracture between the north and the south of the EU increased? Does the Visegrad group (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) adopt different positions compared to the rest of the community partners? Migration profiles of the crisis - from the east to the west of the Mediterranean The EU always positioned itself as a pole of migratory attraction due to its economic and development potential. Until the Single European Act (1986), each country managed migratory flows by itself, then, after introduction of a single market and the principle of free movement, the EU had to differentiate internal and extra-community movements. For instance, the Schengen Agreement made it possible to reinforce security by controlling people at the border, facilitating domestic travel and strengthening external borders. With the migration crisis, three routes were identified [22] due to different that migrants encounter as a result of the states’ responses: the western Mediterranean route through which Moroccans and Algerians cross the Strait of Gibraltar to Cádiz and the Spanish Mediterranean coast; the central Mediterranean - from the Gulf of Guinea through Algeria, Tunisia or Libya, to Malta and Lampedusa, an island of 5,800 inhabitants 205 km from Sicily and 113 km from Tunisia; the Eastern Mediterranean route to Greece. The Mediterranean-Italy connection as the point of arrival for migrants was established after the Arab uprisings. From 11 to 14 of February 2011, 5,000 migrants from Tunisia arrived in Lampedusa, to which were added those fleeing from Libya. As a result, Italy demands from the Frontex a joint operation called Hermes (February 20, 2011) to face this massive wave. The death of 300 migrants near the coast of Lampedusa in October 2013, in addition to the arrival of 40,000 immigrants in the same year and 170,000 in 2014, exceeded all expectations and led to the activation of the Mare Nostrum device with a radius of up to 70,000 km2 in the Strait of Sicily with a monthly cost of nine million euros, which Italy cannot pay without the financial aid of the European partners. Mare Nostrum and previous joint operations will be replaced by the operation Triton (November 2014) supervised by the Frontex, and its monthly costs is about three million euros necessary to monitor the European maritime border. This operation will be replaced by Themis, whose mission is to repress the networks of traffickers and mafias in the Mediterranean. These securitization missions aimed at returning the migrants’ entries by sea to 2006 figures. From 2014 Italy and in particular the Island of Sicily has received the largest number of illegal migrants across the Mediterranean. In fact, “the route from North Africa had been providing this country with migrant labor, since at least the 1990s, but the agreement between Italy and Libya in 2010 restricted that labor supply” [6]. Illegal immigration by sea is often an alternative to the lack of other migration options, even though it is risky. For instance, only in 2015, 3,771 people died at sea [23], almost 700 migrants - at 120 miles from Lampedusa, The European Council (April 26, 2015) believes that “Europe needs a balanced approach to the phenomenon of migration, which is comprehensive from the geographical point of view and is based on solidarity and responsibility” [15], and adopted two measures to deal with the causes of this crisis: cooperation with the countries of origin and transit and struggle with the immigrant trafficking networks (90% of migrants and refugees use organized crime networks and human traffickers to reach the European area) [21]. In 2015, the networks dedicated to the traffic of migrants earned between 4,700 and 5,700 million euros [20]. At the eastern Mediterranean route, Greece is the main destination due to its geographical location. Despite the economic crisis, Greece remains a point of transit for immigrants: before “the Arab uprisings, Greece was already by far the country that endured greater migratory pressure, accumulating 86% of what the Frontex Agency denominates illegal crossings of all the EU. For example, in 2010 there were 55,700 illegal immigrants who accessed the EU through the eastern Mediterranean route, a figure that rose to 57,000 in 2011” [34]. In 2015, Greece received migrants from Syria, Eritrea, Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan through the maritime or Greek-Turkish border, and migrants aimed at accessing the route of the Western Balkans to reach Germany and the Nordic countries of the EU as final destination. Therefore, more than 853,650 migrants arrived to Greece, “56.1% of people who entered Greece that year originated from Syria, followed by Afghanistan (24.4%), Iraq (10.3%), Pakistan (2.7%) and Somalia (0.5%)” [36]. Before the massive arrival at the Balkan route, the Hungarian government unilaterally suspended the Dublin III Regulation for two reasons: the “protection of national interest” and “technical reasons”. Initially, this decision was criticized by Germany that opened its borders to welcome more refugees than it promised and suggested a new system of quotas. The negative response from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania demonstrated a community fracture putting at risk the Schengen Agreement, which forced Germany to readjust its policy and suspend the application of Dublin III. Given the risk of “renationalization” of migration policy, the European migration leads to the security crisis. Due to the closure of borders, in addition to the European Union-Turkey agreement, the route through Greece used mainly by Syrians and Afghans, is no longer a preferred option. Since 2016, there has been a decrease in the flow of migrants due to the impossibility to use the traditional route of the Western Balkans. Under the pressure of migration crises in Greece and Italy, the EU promised to relocate 22,500 refugees in 2016, settled in the camps of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, but finally resettled only 5,657, because the member countries of the former Soviet sphere agreed to receive a minimum number of refugees [11]. The European Council demands that the member countries relocate 63,000 migrants from Greece, reached only the promise to resettle 2,943, of which only 530 were finally resettled. As for those from Italy, the European Council requests the relocation of 34,953 refugees, while the member countries agreed only on 1,573 and relocated de facto only 615 [11]. The restrictive migration policy affecting the central and eastern routes of the Mediterranean reactivated the western route - its volume of migration tripled in the first half of 2018 compared to 2017 [24], with the migration profile of 75% men, 10% women and 15% of minors including a high share of unaccompanied minors [29; 30]. The summer of 2018 represents a change in the migration to Spain through the Mediterranean across the Alboran Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar, reaching record figures compared to other European countries. A smaller part of migrants reaches the borders of Ceuta and Melilla and then also the Spanish borders. The strict border policy of Algeria, whose coasts are 250 km from Almeria, makes migrants from Libya and Tunisia to seek alternative routes to reach Europe through Morocco that uses migratory flows in the foreign policy with Spain and the EU, being more or less permissive with migrants and their departure according to its own interests concerning fishing, air, association or the Western Sahara agreements that have a direct impact on the border gates. The tense relations on emigration were affected by the EU Court of Justice decision to oblige Morocco to modify agreements on agriculture and fishing so that no to let it take advantage of the natural resources of the Western Sahara. The European Commission adopts agreements with Morocco to stop migratory flows to Spain - for 140 million euros, but this is less than what was received by other migrant-sending countries such as Libya (227 million euros compared to 17 million euros given to Morocco). This money is allocated for the purchase of materials for border control and directly for the Moroccan budget. Moreover, a commitment was made to provide a channel of dialogue and permanent assistance in the coming years [13]. With this measure, the EU seeks to stop the arrival of migrants to Spain, which in 2017-2018 recorded their highest number in Europe. Under the migratory crises, Spain shifted from the policy of greater border control to the policy of short-term actions, moving from a humanitarian action intended to provide a safe harbour for 630 migrants on board the rescue ship Aquarius towards a more severe immigration control policy, especially after the attack on the Ceuta border fence in the summer of 2018. This action revealed the contradictions at two levels - at the political level the Spanish government demonstrated an incoherent line of action, and, at the level of migration management it adopts expulsion measures without respecting legal procedures and considering the risks faced by migrants. Responses of the European Union to the multilevel crisis There is a tendency to identify the migratory processes since the Arab uprisings as a migratory crisis and even the most severe one suffered by the European Union since the Second World War. However, there is a different approach based on data saying that it is only the events of 2015 that are a crisis. In fact, the EU faces a political rather migratory crisis: there is an obvious proliferation of toxic narratives against migrants that supports the negative perception of the phenomenon, encourages radical and nationalist parties to use the populist rhetoric with xenophobic and anti-immigration elements (Austria, Hungary, Poland, France, etc.). The crisis of refugees and migrants highlighted the fractures and weaknesses of the EU affecting both its institutions and member states: “this crisis put to risk essential achievements of the European integration such as the Schengen area that guarantees free movement, and the options of the EU as a credible, effective and legitimate international actor facing, in accordance with its principles and values, the scenario of conflict and instability that surrounds it” [35]. Therefore, this crisis represents a challenge to the European governance as well as to the key guiding principles, values and identity of the last half century. The scale of migration in the EU causes institutions and national governments to adopt a range of responses that combine operational-military, political-legal and economic-cooperative plans. Through these plans the EU intends to face the reality and not to neglect its responsibility as a global actor. The measures adopted aim at securitization of borders and outsourcing of migration management in the situation when it is difficult to distinguish between refugees and migratory flows. The European Commission implements the new European Agenda on Migration (May 13, 2015) [14] to boost the externalization of borders at the national, community and international levels. The Agenda [9] “emphasizes security aspects reinforcing the role of the European Border and Coast Agency, better known as Frontex, creating the European Coast Guard and enhancing all aspects related to cooperation with third countries for control purposes of immigration and the return of people. Among other issues, the Agenda proposes the creation of hotspots, defining them as emergency mechanisms to support states... The European Migration Agenda also mentions the relocation and resettlement programs for people in need of international protection, calling for solidarity between states and shared responsibility” [36]. The Agenda means a redefinition of migration policy with a security aspect and responds to emergency measures in four basic ways: reducing incentives for illegal immigration, border management, a strong common asylum policy, and a new legal immigration policy - in search for a “fair, solid and realistic” policy. For some states, the Agenda was too ambitious as they had to comply with European migration regulations, for other states rather too timid. Continuing with the securitization of borders, European countries created the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in October 2016, with the mission of managing borders and guaranteeing security in the EU through an operational strategy of intervention. Also the EU works to reinforce the Frontex [12] with a permanent body of 10,000 guards by 2027. It is becoming increasingly common for states to consider that the sea a propitious area to extend borders and prevent migrants from arriving based on the argument is that “their international legal responsibilities do not apply when they operate outside their territory or their territorial waters, creating in essence an area where the rights of migrants are not protected and where it is difficult to supervise the actions of the states” [25]. The duty of assistance is a basic principle of international conventions on the sea, but the responsibility to protect the borders makes states implement measures to intercept migrants at sea depriving them of protection in accordance with the fundamental human rights These measures have two goals - to prevent migrants’ arrivals and to avoid a negative image in the public opinion. The arrival of migrants, mainly from Syria in 2015, multiplies the geopolitical and strategic value of Turkey as a buffer state, which explains the Agreement between the EU and Turkey in March 2016, which shows the inability of the EU and its member states to manage the humanitarian crisis. The aim of the EU-Turkey Agreement, according to the European Commission, is to discourage migration flows through the mafia business model [16]. This agreement establishes: the return of migrants in an irregular situation to Turkey together with those who denied the request for asylum prior to detention in the established centres. For every Syrian returned to Turkey the EU is to resettle a Syrian who requested asylum in Turkey [17]. This agreement benefits Turkey economically and politically: Turkey received 245 million euros for 2014-2016, which was increased to 3,000 million euros and another 3,000 more in March 2016 to assist refugees. Moreover, the EU supports Turkey’s accession process to the EU, which dates back to the association agreement (1963) and more recently to the European Strategy for Turkey of 1998, which is slowed down mainly by Germany, Greece, Cyprus and France, claiming that Turkey violated the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ (civil rights, human rights and democracy) and that the Turkish regime is authoritarian. The EU also undertakes to exempt Turkish citizens from visas to enter the member states, which constitutes the most notable measure of this EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. Several institutions together with some EU governments questioned the legality of this agreement as violating International Law and International Humanitarian Law [37], and “emphasize the great contradiction that exists between the European Union that affirms in its Treaty to be a space of internal and external solidarity as well as in its migration policy but, with this Agreement and the aggravation of the humanitarian drama of this population, they show a clear inclination towards the construction of a fortress Europe that entails an authoritarian drift in the position of some community governments” [32]. Moreover, some analysts question Turkey as a safe country to receive migrants returned from the EU based on the European Union Directive 2013/32/EU, according to which a person can only be remitted to a “third safe country”. Article 38 mentions legal requirements for a country to be considered safe [18]: “people who were readmitted from Greece to Turkey under the Greece-Turkey Readmission Agreement after the 18 March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement face particular obstacles to international protection. Their access to asylum is very limited yet Turkish authorities justify limiting their access to asylum in Turkey on the basis that readmitted migrants already had an opportunity to seek asylum in Greece. This has created a vacuum for persons who are in need of international protection” [37]. Thus, with this outsourcing policy, refugees become “the bargaining chip of a negotiation, from which the Turkish side has tried to gain geopolitical and electoral advantages and the European side has prioritized needs of short-term security rather than the requirements of protection and rights” [35]. This agreement had a direct effect on the number of arrivals of migrants to Greece, which have decreased along the traditional routes, but at the same it has reinforced the use of more dangerous routes to the central and western Mediterranean [38]. Since the beginning of the 21st century, different instruments have been adopted for third countries “grouped under the rubric of the EU Global Approach on Mobility. These included the creation of mobility alliances with more favoured third countries; the maintenance of a long-term (albeit rather stagnant) dialogue with the Euro-Mediterranean region (the Rabat Process); and a considerable spending of political capital on the development of EU readmission agreements with the main transit and sending countries for migrants” [4]. These initiatives have not achieved the expected scope yet for the agreements focused more on reactive measures rather than preventive ones. Under the current migration crisis various efforts were revitalized through regional and sub-regional initiatives, although the issue of migration in the relationship with third parties was not a priority at first. In the framework of the Rabat agreements, the Valletta Summit was held in November 2015, at which the action plan was adopted with the following objectives: “to address the real root causes of underdevelopment and poverty which are the matrix of irregular migration and forced displacement; strengthen cooperation on legal migration and mobility to prevent irregular movements; strengthen the protection of migrants and asylum seekers; prevent and combat irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings; collaborate more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration” [10]. The EU also made economic commitments through foreign aid to prevent migrants and refugees from accessing the EU: a minimum agreement was adopted to strengthen the EU’s relations with countries of origin and transit, especially with Libya, by increasing financial support and reinforcing the agreement with Turkey. A crisis of the EU governance? The lack of leadership, both internal and external, does not contribute to the EU policies, which is proved by its “inability to be equipped with instruments to carry out effectively and coherently the principle of internal and external solidarity that embodies the preamble of the Treaty on European Union wherein the crisis of the displaced and refugees is just another test - the most significant one - of the ‘downward’ situation in which the integration process is found” [32]. The crisis shows that the EU system of border control, asylum and immigration does not respond effectively to these massive, unforeseen, heterogeneous and complex movements. The EU is not able to adopt a common policy on migration. The national interests as prior to the community interests created an institutional gap that affects the governance, institutions and citizens and questions the solidary base of the EU and its achievements. The EU migration management covers three areas: “the mobility of people from member countries in the EU, migrations from third countries and, finally, reception of refugees and asylum seekers. These are three branches that have evolved as autonomous political areas within the EU and respond to differentiated political logics” [1]. The migration crisis creates tensions in the EU functioning due to the variety of its causes, diversity of ideological positions and disparity of national interests that complicate decision making. The short-term policies adopted by the EU did not help, nor the “check-book policy” that implies economic investments so that third countries act as a barrier to prevent migrants from reaching Europe. These measures led to the reorganization of the routes and more business for migrant mafias. Although in 2011 European citizens were more concerned about the economic situation and unemployment, the data of the Eurobarometers in 2015 indicate that the migratory issue is a serious and growing concern - 72% of Europeans want the EU to intervene more in migratory management [19]. Illegal immigration and the Mediterranean crisis became sensitive topics for national public polls. European citizens became aware of what the massive arrival of migrants entails through the media that show impressive images of the humanitarian crisis that affects the EU institutions, member countries and population. Therefore, the question is: what should Europe do with the uncontrolled flows of migration? Moreover, migration acts as a common denominator in the nationalist and xenophobic discourse of populist parties that try “to capitalize on the triple fear of immigration that nests in some segments of societies: fear of erosion of national identity and traditional values, fear of deterioration of the social-economic position and thinning of the welfare state; and security fears aggravated by the attacks of international terrorism that are associated with immigration” [3]. Nationalist parties and political movements developed a conservative extremist rhetoric, in which the migratory phenomenon is responsible for all bad things. In addition, the Eurosceptic facet is reinforced by the opposition to the measures implemented by the EU. Although the populist term leads to a terminological confusion as meaning heterogeneous parties and movements, in the European context it is always linked to anti-immigration and anti-EU parties. The ideological weakness of populisms allows to use it by both left and right parties. The crisis of governance that Lampedusa triggered and that remains open and unresolved, spreads to other countries on the southern shore of the EU and contributes to the fear of the massive arrival of migrants, which, in turn, supports xenophobic movements and extremist parties in the EU countries such as Golden Dawn in Greece, Alternative for Germany (AfD), UK Independence Party (UKIP), FPO in Austria, Danish People’s Party, Party for Freedom (PVV) in Holland, Flemish Interest in Belgium; Finns Party (formerly True Finns) in Finland, Law and Justice in Poland, Five Star Movement and Northern League in Italy. Although the EU is considered a normative power based on values, the migratory crisis shows that national interests are prior to the common European project, which questions the integration process. In part, this is due to the crisis of governance and leadership, in part - to the diluted identity and internal fracture. Among the challenges that the EU faces is reconfiguration and effective harmonization of various policies that affect the migratory phenomenon. One of the priorities should be adequate responses to migratory flows, which combine securitization of borders and aid to the European recipient countries with economic endowment and operational support to third countries. All this would mean a sustainable paradigmatic shift in migration management - a move from a reactive police to the proactive one, which will test the effectiveness and unity of the European Union as a global player.

About the authors

C Anguita Olmedo

Complutense University of Madrid

Author for correspondence.
28223, Pozuelo de Alarcón, Madrid, Spain

профессор публичного международного права и международных отношений факультета политологии и социологии и научный сотрудник Института международных исследований

P González Gómez del Miño

Complutense University of Madrid

28223, Pozuelo de Alarcón, Madrid, Spain

профессор публичного международного права и международных отношений факультета политологии и социологии и научный сотрудник Института международных исследований


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