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Sudan survived different external rules, at least starting from 1821, when it became a part of the Egyptian Ottomans. Egypt played an important role in the colonial expansion as an agent of the Otto-mans. The rulers of Egypt were Turkish-speaking governing bodies that dominated Egypt since the medieval period. The Arab-Islamic movement known as Mahdist Movement at first was considered a liberator, but turned out to be a political machine of Arabization, Islamization and slavery during its brutal rule in 1881-1889. The Mahdist government of this Islamic theocratic rule was defeated by the Anglo-Egyptian army in 1889. The Anglo-Egyptians rule in Sudan lasted from 1898 to 1956, and was known as a condominium. The colonial rulers, without any consultations with the Southern Sudan peoples, handover power to the Northern Sudanese political elite, which kindled an atrocious conflict between the Southerners and the new rulers from the north. The refusal of the Southerners to be ruled by their Northern neighbors unleashed the first Sudan war (1955-1972). This violent conflict ended with the signing of the agreement, according to which South Sudan gained autonomy to administer its own affairs within the Sudan state. The autonomy was abrogated unilaterally by the central government in 1983 due to the discovery of the oil deposits in the south of the country in 1978 by a Canadian company, and the central government of Sudan did not wish to share profits with the South. The second Sudan war (1983-2005) ended with the independence of South Sudan (2011), which opened doors for changing the colonial borders of Africa. Thus, the article consid-ers regional and international role of the South Sudanese struggle for independence and its implications for the liberation of other countries of the continent.

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN SOUTH SUDAN “The origins of the Sudan’s current problems predate the unequal legacy of the colonial system in the XX century. They can be found in the ideas of legitimate power and governance developed in the Sudan states of XVIII and XIX centuries, which were incorporated into the structures of the Turco-Egyptian empire, achieved new force in the Jihad state of the Mahdiya, and were never fully replaced, but rather... occasionally adapted by the XX century colonial state” [9. P. 7]. The longest bloody conflict in the Sudan was between the Southern Sudan people and the government and started a year before the independence of the country waa declared in 1956. The conflict erupted at the end of the British colonial era and was deeply rooted in the history of the region and in the Arabization of North Africa. The North and Central part of Sudan were among the first states Christianised in the V century and the oldest states in the history of humankind. The state building started here after 3,000 B.C., and the largest states of the region were Kerma kingdom with its capital in city of Kerma along the Nile delta, and the smaller state with its capital at Sai between Kerma and Egypt. In about 1,800 B.C., Kerma conquered Sai kingdom, central and northern parts of contemporary Sudan, and become the largest state to the south of Egypt [10. P. 149]. Christianity came in 543 to Dongola, the last kingdom of the region, and contributed to the cultural development of the area by building new churches and monasteries. The Christian states existed until the Arab conquest that started in Egypt between 639 and 642 and slowly expanded to North Africa and then to the south. The peoples of northern Sudan resisted the invasion of Bedouin Arabs that overrun most of North Africa in 1054. The gradual conversion to Islam and infiltration of the Arabs into the territory ended the era of Christian kings (the last Christian king was succeeded by a Moslem in1315). In the south, the Christian kingdom of Alwa resisted the Arab invasion until 1504, when it surrender to the Muslim Funj state of Sennar. “This removed the last barrier to Bedouin expansion in this part of Africa, and Baggara (cattle Arabs), poured south and west into Eastern and Central Sudan” [18. P. 160], which continued until today especially in Darfur due to the war of Arabs against indigenous African peoples in order to settle Arabs from northern Sudan [24]. Sudan is the largest country of the African continent with an area of more than 2,5 mln km 2 covering a territory of about Western Europe with the population of 36 million people [15. P. 3]. Arabic is the major language in the north whereas in the south Dinka language and nation dominate. The Sudan population consists of 70% African and 30% Arab peoples [17. P. 5]. Over 70% of Sudanese are Muslim, the largest share is of African descent; while the rest follow traditional religions, and 5-10% are Christians. South Sudan consists of three provinces of Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal and Equatorial. The area is about one-fourth of the total area of the Sudan Republic, and the population of South Sudan is a third of the population. South Sudan has bounders with neighbouring Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire and the Central African Republic, which were arbitrarily drawn by the imperial powers that colonised the region, that is why some peoples of the South Sudan live in the neighbouring countries [26. P. 7]. The expansion of Arabo-Islamic power to Sudan was followed by the Turk-Egyptian conquest of Sudan in 1820 by Muhammad Ali, the ruler of the Ottoman of Egypt. The Egyptian rule was the last serious venture in the colonial expansion of the Ottoman Empire. The Turk-Egyptian colonial rule ended after sixty years when the Mahdist Muslim Movement overthrew it in 1885 [13. P. v]. It was in the XIX century under the Tuks-Egyptians when the North-South division became obvious in Sudan. This period is known for the dramatic expansion of slave-raiding and slavery in South Sudan. The slaves were targets only for non-Muslims of South Sudan for Islam forbids enslaving Muslims. The colonial government collaborated in slave-raiding with non-Muslim Arab territories involved in official raids with the army or organising their own raids [5]. “Excess slaves were kept by the raiders for their own use or for sale. Not only did the number of slaves increase during the Turk-Egyptian, but the use of slaves too expanded and for the first time domestic slavery became widespread throughout all segments of society in North Sudan” [9. P. 5]. There was a convergence of military and commercial networks in the exploitation of the south for the government and commercial companies had their own armies as a mixture of free men and slaves. Both established many fortified trade centres and caravan routes to export young slaves from the south to the markets in the north and Middle East. Traders and officials established their own fiefdoms in the south as a source of slaves and wealth. Under the Turk-Egyptian rule the slave population in the north was drawn mainly from the south, and for the people of North Sudan slaves and ‘blacks’ were synonymous. Even southern Sudanese who became Muslims or worked for the colonial administration or in the army were stigmatised by their slave status or origin. The Turk-Egyptian colonialism desintegrated South and North Sudan by setting the south peoples of the lowest status against the peoples of the north. The Turk-Egyptian colonial rule was overthrown by the Islamic movement called ‘Mahdist’ ans led by the charismatic religious leader Muhammad Ahmad (Mahdi-expected saviour) that established the Mahdist state (1883-1898). After the death of the Mahdi, his successor Khalifa Abdallahi (1846-1899) formed an autocratic state based on the army of slaves mainly from the south and west. The Mahdist state expanded to the south for slaves and agricultural products. The great famine of East Africa in 1888- 1892 increased plunder for food and slaves due to the dwindling supply for domestic labour and military recruitment. The Mahdist state divided the peoples of the area between Dar al-Islam (house of peace) and Dar al-Harb (house of war) more than any previous Muslim states of the region. This division is between people of Islam and followers of African indigenous religions. The Mahdist state developed its own form of internal colonialism in South Sudan [9. P. 7]. The Mahdist movement used religion to unify the Muslims of Sudan to overthrow the Turk-Egyptian colonial rule, but latter the core Arab militant group of the movement turned against the indigenous Africans: “It is estimated that the population of Sudan fell from around 7 million before the Mahdist revolt to somewhere between 2 and 3 million after the fall of the Mahdist state” [6. P. 133]. This movement had two consequences for the future of the country: first, the attitudes of the north people to the people of the south did not change; the Mahdist state eliminated the traditional ruling system by direct appointment of administrators or agents to rural areas in the south, west and east - this is one of the reasons why the Anglo-Egyptians overthrew the Mahdist state in 1898 with the help of the groups opposing the Islamic government. Secondly, the injustices against the non-Muslims of the south determined Sudan’s current problems as inherited in the colonial system legacy. In the Mahdist state, the northern Sudan Muslim communities were divided between the followers of the Mahdi (called Ansar ) and the eastern part of the country with the followers of the religious family Mirghani, founder of the Islamic sect Khatmiyya that opposed the Mahdist state and was supported by the Egyptian government. Various opposition groups joined forces with the Anglo-Egyptians to overthrow the Mahdist state at the battle of Omdurman on September 2, 1898. The new Anglo-Egyptian rule was called Condominium (joint control of the state by two or more other states) and administered the south and north of Sudan differently. The Anglo-Egyptian colomial rule (1898-1956) was similar to the Turk-Egytian (1820-1883) and Mahdist (1883-1898) states for South Sudan for the majority of colonial administration personnel served all governments, and the same is true for the army. The brutality of the administration was very similar except for the name, i.e. it was the same wine in a different bottle. In the first two decades, the south was considered by the colonial administration as a reservoir of conscript for the colonial battalions in Sudan. These soldiers from the south remained socially separated from the northern people due to their ‘slave origins’. The people form the south were not enthusiastic about becoming the soldiers of the colonial government, and the conscription was forced - prisoners and war captives were regularly made soldiers [9. P. 11]. The policy of the colonial administration from 1930 was to administer South Sudan independently from the north and in the similar way as the black African British colonial territories [1. P. 115]. The basic principle of this ‘Southern policy’ declared in 1930 by the colonial administration in Khartoum was that the local administration should use the indigenous structures of authority, employ indigenous laws and customs as long as they supported the British idea of good government and justice [9. P. 11]. The colonial administration aimed to develop South Sudan education in English and to help the Christian missionaries to stop the expansion of Islam to Central Africa by creating “a large Christian population which would eventually link up with Uganda and form a substantial buffer or check to the spread of the faith, such as the Muslim” [1. P. 39]. The attitude of the British colonial government to South Sudan changed after the World War II due to the Egyptian and northern Sudanese nationalists attempts to fight for independent and united Sudan. To start the liberation the legislative council was established in the north as a first step to create a national parliament. The question of how to incorporate the south into independent Sudan was raised by the colonial administration at the unrepresentative conference in Juba on June 12-13, 1947. The delegates were not chosen not by the people of the south but by the administration. The participants of the conference were three provincial governments including a head of the police, few chiefs, and some administrators. The conference was chaired by the civil secretary not mandated by the people of the south to decide such crucial questions. The participants of the conference did not know each other and were not educated as the northern nationalists. The chairman of the conference did not allow debates on a separate administrative future of the south. “No decisions could be made at the conference since members had received no mandate from their people...” [22. P. 107]. From the historical point of view (relations of northern nationalists and southern leaders), there was not grounds to form a common state for the northern leaders were to replace the British colonizers in the perception of the southern people. The southern leaders formed a new political party - Liberal Party - and participated in the elections to the first self-governing parliament in June 1953. In the new parliament, the representatives of the Liberal Party tried to raise the issue of a separate administrative status of the south proposing federalism as constitutional solution. The demand was ignored by the northern nationalists, and all key positions in the south were given to the northern officials; the politically active southerners considered it the beginning of northern colonization of the south [9. P. 27]. In October 1954, the political groups of the southern people including members of the Liberal Party, leaders of three southern provinces and representatives of southern Sudanese in Khartoum, held their own conference in Juba to discuss the political future of Sudan and the south within Sudan. They decided to vote for the independence of Sudan from Egypt, but as a federal system with an autonomous state in the south with an option of becoming completely independent from the north. The demand of the southern political leaders for a federalist state was rejected by the northern political leaders, and Sudan was declared an independent unitary state on January 1, 1956. THE FIRST SOUTH SUDAN WAR The first general elections of the parliament in Sudan was in November 1953: the National Union Party (NUP) got 51 seats out of 97 in the lower chamber, another northern party Umma got 22 seats, the southern Liberal Party - 9 votes, the Socialist Republican Party and the Anti-Imperialist Front (AIF) - 1 each. The northern political majority declared a unitary state and started replacing British state officials by Sudan employees (Sudanization): “With the unrelenting development towards independent united Sudan, one incident after another intensified southern fear of domination by the north. The attitude of northern officials to southerns, the discrediting propaganda of northern political parties against one another in their scramble for southern votes, the alienating strategies by which the government sought to intimidate southerns into passive, and above all, the announcement of the results of the Sudanization of 800 posts previously held by the colonial powers, out of which the south received only four minor posts, fanned southern opposition into the violent revolt of August 1955” [7. P. 37]. The replacement of British officials with northern Sudanese in the civil and military administration upset the soldiers from the south in the area and mutinied against this political subjugation by a regiment in the Torit district of Equatorial Province in August 1955 [1. P. 73]. The southern Sudanese considered the mutiny a beginning of the struggle against the northern oppression. The British colonial government did not help the southerns to build their future but urged the northern politicians to replace it. The violent tragedies of the second part of XX century in South Sudan were the result of the unjust transfer of power from the British colonial rule to the Northern Sudan politicians. “On January 1, 1956, at a hastily improvised ceremony, Isma’il al-Azhari, ‘father of new Sudan’, lowered the flag of Egypt and the United Kingdom and gracefully raised three horizontal stripes of red, white and black of the flag of the new Republic of Sudan” [3. P. 68]. The Condominium was over and the new state was developing with violent conflicts. After the independence, the southern politicians did not lose hope to create a federal democratic state. They organised a more effective political movement for the post-independent elections in 1957, formed the Federal Party, and it won almost all south’s seats in the parliament. The southern politicians involved young generation and church leaders in political activities, used common strategies with underdeveloped areas of the east and west to form a strong coalition. The pressure for federalization from South Sudan was not accepted by the ruling party Umma, which is the main reason for handing power over to the army in 1958. The conflict ended by the replacement of the civilian government of Sudan by the longest military rule in Sudan’s history that started on November 17, 1958, and the military rule took on to speed up Arabization and Islamization of Sudan. The military junta prohibited all discussions about South Sudan. The military government led by General Abdu implemented a policy of Arabization and Islamization in the south: Arabic language replaced English in schools; Christian missionaries were expelled; conversion to Islam was encouraged, especially among students. The military rule used Arabization and Islamization to achieve national unity, but the southern people formed the South Sudan Liberation Front (SSLM) with Anya-Nya as its military branch. The movement fought for the independent state in the south. The military government refused to recognise that there was southern problem and “continued to denounce the imperialist and missionaries as the source of the problem. The military junta degraded southern politicians in exile as stooges and agents of foreign powers and missionaries, believing in that the only way of bringing about integration and unity was through military power” [1. P. 86]. The military government was overthrown by the people’s revolt called October revolution in 1964; the next civil government stayed in power until 1969, when the military group ‘Free Officers Movement’ overthrew the parliamentary regime and seized power in the military coup [5. P. 202]. The coup leaders formed a ‘Revolutionary Command Council’ (RCC) of ten officers headed by the coup leader colonel Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiri. The Nimeiri military government first eliminated the right political wing, and in July 1971 attempted a military coup supported by left politicians mainly Communist Party of Sudan (CPS), in which their leaders were executed. The military leader became the top politician and started secret talks with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) that led to the Addis Ababa Agreement in February 1972 [9. P. 39]. It created a power consisting of central government and a unitary southern region with its capital in Juba and its own elected assembly and council of ministers; Arab language remained the national language and English became a main language in the south; additional agreements were signed to cease fire and integrate guerrilla forces into the national army. This agreement ended the first Sudan Government war against the southern people (1955-1972). The Addis Ababa Agreement was ratified by the Regional-Government Act in March 1972, and incorporated in the permanent Constitution of 1973. This agreement was gradually weakened by the central government and eliminated on June 5, 1982, when Nimeiri divided the south into three regions. The Constitution of 1973 declared Sudan a secular state with freedom of worship not only for Christians and Jews but also for the followers of indigenous religions. A secular law governed relations between citizens in civil and criminal matters, while personal or family matters were under the Shari’a for Muslims and customary law for rural people in the north and south. Nimeiri imposed Shari’a law on the whole country in September 1983, which was followed soon by the dissolution of the southern regional government. The abolishment of the autonomy of the southern and the imposition of the Islamic Law on the whole country became possible due to the the favourable international situation for Sudan military government (the overthrow of Haile Selassie absolute monarch in September 1974, the new military government in Ethiopia closing the USA military base in 1977 and signing a military pact with the Soviet Union). Sudan became an important ally of the US as a regional counterweight to the USSR supported by Ethiopia. The discovery of oil in South Sudan attracted American oil companies, and the Reagan administration’s hostility to Libya determined the US and Sudan military alliance. Sudan became a part of ‘Rapid Development Force’ allowing the US forces to carry out joint manoeuvres with the Sudan’s army. “Nimeiri played the Libyan and Ethiopian cards to secure his military supplies from the US. The US, too, found that the ‘defence of Sudan’ was a useful propaganda tool against Libya” [9. P. 57]. Nimeiri came to power in 1969 and accepted that the war in the south could not be solved militarily. By 1983, he was convinced that he had enough military weapons from the US to deal with any revolts in the country. The Reagan administration supplied various military weapons to the Sudan government to protect it from external enemies and not caring about how Nimeiri would use them in the country. The Nimeiri government cancelled the Addis Ababa Agreement in January 1983 and ordered the battalions in the south to move to the north though they were headed by guerrilla fighters and had to stay in the south. The abolition of the southern region and the attack on the battalion that refused to move to the north prompted further mutinies and desertions from the military base at the border of Ethiopia. THE SECOND SUDAN WAR In July 1983, these groups formed the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) as a political organization and its military wing - the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) under the command of John Garang. First the aim of the SPLM was to solve the problem of the south that “can only be solved within the context of united Sudan under a socialist system that affords democratic and human rights to all nationalities and guarantees freedom for all religions, beliefs and outlooks” [25. P. 23]. The SPLM wanted to create a democratic society, grant equal rights to all religions and nationalities in the country, which implied that Islam would not have a special status. The SPLM rejected attempts of various Sudanese governments to establish a Sudan national identity on the basis of Arabic language, Arab culture and Islam [9. P. 63]. There were two views on the future of South Sudan: one was expressed by the leader of the movement and the second - by the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) which preferred a full independence for South Sudan but was suppressed by the new leadership. The military confrontation between SPLA and Sudanese military forces started in May 1983. The people’s uprising removed Nimeiri from power in April 1985, his defence minister replaced him and organised parliamentary elections in 1986 that formed a civilian parliamentary administration led by the Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi as a prime minister. The civilian government leader met with the SPLM leader in Addis Ababa to solve the South Sudan conflict in a peaceful way. Sadiq al-Mahdi before the elections promised not to use the Shar’ia law for the whole country, but as a prime minster he refused to repeal the law, that is why in 1989 a military coup led by brigadier Umar al-Bashir eliminated the civilian government through the terrible bloodshed. The Bashir military government became an Arab and fundamental Islam movement increasingly referring to the pan-Arab and Islamist values when talking about the war supported by the Arab countries. The government used its propaganda machine to declare the South Sudan war a conflict between the Arabs and Africans. The army vowed “not to give up one inch of the soil of this homeland”, and government officials rushed abroad to request funds to win back “Arab towns captured by ‘Africans’ and ‘infidels’” [15. P. 15]. The Sudan government supported oppositional liberation fronts in Ethiopia under Haile Sellassie government and military government of Mengistu Haile Mariam. The Ethiopian government was overthrown in May 1991 by the Coalition of Liberation Fronts, and the new Ethiopian government led by the Tigrian People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) expelled the SPLM leaders from the country and closed refugee camps. The Sudan military government used this opportunity to weakened and liquidate the SPLM by military means. “Iran’s President Rafsanjani visited Khartoum in December 1991, declared the war in South Sudan a jihad and signed military protocols with Sudan’s government, including to pay US $300 million for the Chinese military material” [15. P. 16]. In the 1990s, the political atmosphere gradually changed against the military government of Sudan due to various reasons such as its support for the Iraq Government during the Gulf War, its extreme Islamist agenda, the policy of harbouring terrorists, including Osama bin Laden who lived in Sudan from 1992 to 1996, and its support to extreme Islamic groups. The turning point for the Sudan government was in June 1995 - an assassination attempt of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, in which the Ethiopian government accused Sudan providing logistical support and sanctuary to the perpetrators. In May 1996, the UN Security Council imposed on Sudan non-economic sanctions. The American government placed Sudan on its list of state sponsors of terrorism, and imposed unilateral sanctions. STEPS TO THE REFERENDUM IN SOUTH SUDAN The first step to accept the right for self-determination of South Sudan was made by the Sudan National Democratic Alliance (NDA) founded in 1989 and consisting of armed and unarmed northern and southern organizations, professional associations, trade unions and SPLA. In 1995, the NDA issued its Asmara Declaration, which stressed the necessity of a future political system based on a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-racial society, and endorsed the right of self-determination for the south. The Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) led Sudan’s longest peace initiative launched in 1993 and chaired by Kenya. In 1994, IGAD issued the Declaration of Principles, a set of brief propositions for subsequent negotiations. It declares a peace agreement for democratic and secular Sudan, calls for sharing national wealth and resources and for negotiations on the modalities of an interim period followed by a self-determination referendum for the south. After many years of hesitation, the Sudan government accepted the Declaration in 1997. Horn of Africa is a region of many violent conflicts; in 1998, three main SPLM supporting countries - Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda - entered devastating wars. Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war (1998-2000) for borders, and Uganda was caught in the conflict with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that weakened the IGAD. The US peace initiative coordinated with IGAD produced greater clarity in 2002, when a protocol was signed between SPLM and the government of Sudan to resolve the issue of self-determination, state and religion. The protocol confirmed the independence for the south was confirmed, and after three years of long discussions the Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed by the government and SPLM in January 2005 ending a war between South Sudan and government of Sudan. The key principles of this agreement are as follows: acceptance of the right for self-determination for South Sudan, and separation of the state and religion by variations in the legal systems embracing both Islam/Shari’a and Christian/secular traditions [12. P. 29]. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) led to the internationally monitored referendum in 2011, when the people of South Sudan were offered two choices: unity with the north or full independence. The CPA endorsed in the interim period between July 2005 and 2011 sharing arrangements at the national level and an autonomous government for South Sudan with its armed forces. Wealth sharing agreements provided the southern government with an access to valuable oil revenues in the region. According to the CPA power sharing arrangements between the ruling party - National Congress Party (NCP) - and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) a government of national unity was formed, in which NCP holds 52% and the SPLM - 28%. A similar reallocation of seats in the National Assembly was arranged for the period up to the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2009 and latter rescheduled to April 2010. The agreement provided that the president Omar Bashir would remain in office and a chairman of the SPLM. The CPA also created an autonomous Government of South Sudan (GOSS) with an independent executive, legislative and judicial powers. Juba became the capital of South Sudan, and the GOSS dominated by the SPLM is based in this city. The GOSS has wide-ranging powers in many areas except those usually associated with national sovereignty such as national security, foreign policy and currency, etc. During the interim period, the SPLM forces remained separate from the Sudan armed forces. “An estimated two million people have died as a result of the fighting over the past eighteen years, victims of direct violence or related starvation and disease. Half a million refugees have spilled into neighbouring countries, and roughly four million people have been displaced and driven from their homes within Sudan - the largest such dislocation in the world today. Indeed one out of every eight people rendered homeless by war around the world is from Sudan” [15. P. 3]. After such sufferings due to the refusal to incorporate into the Sudan state [2. P. 99], finally the southerns are asked if they want to be a part of the Sudan state. Let us quote Makwec Kuol Makwec, one of the Dinka nation’s chief, who expressed the oppression of the south Sudan people by the political leaders from the north: “When you visited the north, you must have noticed the difference between the Arabs in the north and us here in the south... they are red-skinned and we are black... their names were Ali, Muhamed, Osman, etc., and our names are Deng, Akol, Lual, etc. We have no shared ancestry, they pray differently but they want to force us to believe in their gods, they try to impose their language upon us and they have killed our people over the years. They... have taken our people and forced them into slavery. Their climate is arid and hot and ours is cooler and vegetated, and they want our land. Their economy is more advanced and we have nothing here because they have extracted our resources for their own use. Their entire way of life is different from ours... I assure you, the Arabs are not the people we want to share anything with, and history speaks for us. We have never been one, we will never be one... they have done terrible things to us” [17. P. 1-2]. The CPA, which was signed by the Sudan government and SPLM in January 2005, gave the right of autonomous self-rule to the people of South Sudan for five years. According to the CPA, then the people will have a chance of self-determination if they want to stay in Sudan or prefer their own state. After this period the referendum was organized with the presence of UN, EU and other international governmental and nongovernmental organizations in January 2011. The result of the referendum was not surprising for the observers of the political situation in South Sudan: 98.8% voted for the independent state. The South Sudan people of different national groups, religions and ages celebrated their long struggle result of liberation from the Arab-Islamic dictatorship. On July 9, 2011, the new state of South Sudan was officially declared as an independent state and it was admitted as a new member of the United Nations General Assembly on July 14.

About the authors

A Kumsa

Charles University in Prague

U Kříže 8, 15800 Praha 5, Czech Republic


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