Vol 28, No 3 (2024): POST-NEO-KANTIANISM

With a view to the question of a possible revival of systematic transcendental philosophy, the article follows the problem developments from outgoing neo-Kantianism to post-neo-Kantianism to the present day. Neo-Kantianism decisively determined this development, since, following the ‘analytical method’ of the prolegomena, it based its principletheoretical claim on the ‘factum of science’ and other facta of culture. Since the fact of science and culture at the beginning of the 20th century has changed. However, this ‘validity objectivism’ rapidly lost credibility. Although he was also criticized within neo-Kantianism (Emil Lask, Paul Natorp), these isolated approaches and calls for a renewal and deepening of the reflection of principles remained ineffective, since one sought salvation rather in the forced orientation to individual sciences or in new Orthodoxies and academic ‘research’. For a continuity of transcendental philosophical questions, but by no means for a revival of the systematic transcendental philosophy, the works of vom Verf. under the title Kritische Dialektik und Transcendentalontologie , post-neo-Kantian approaches of the interwar and post-war period by Richard Hönigswald and Wolfgang Cramer, Bruno Bauch and Hans Wagner, as well as Robert Reininger and Erich Heintel, documented a systematically oriented succession in the works of Werner Flach and Harald Holz to the present day, and - under conditions of philosophy of consciousness - in the works of Dieter Henrich and Karl-Otto Apel, an at least there was a thematic continuation. However, a “revival of systematic transcendental philosophy” would require more radical approaches than have been delivered in the last 100 years: it would simply require a return to the ‘synthetic method' of critique of reason , which “bases nothing as a given, except reason itself”.

This article deals with the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and its epistemological discussion by Ernst Cassirer and Richard Hönigswald. The starting point is Cassirer's treatise Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics, published in Stockholm. Both philosophers and several physicists were involved in the subsequent exchange of letters. From a physical point of view, the Copenhagen interpretation was particularly criticised by v. Laue and Einstein. Both demanded a revision of the foundations of quantum mechanics or a critical examination of essential physical concepts. The epistemological implications of the Copenhagen interpretation were rejected, in particular that the interactions between observation, the observed and the observer in quantum physics experiments should lead to a renunciation of the concept of causality or an objectively unambiguous description of natural processes. Cassirer argues here that quantum mechanics fulfils the epistemological requirement of transforming ontological “concepts of things” into epistemological concepts of relations and is therefore compatible with the neo-critical approach he advocates. At the same time, Hönigswald was working on two major treatises on the structure of physics and the concept of causality. Here he undertakes an epistemological foundation of physics as a whole. A transcendental foundation of the concept of experience and its specifications in principles such as contemplation, observation or experiment appears to be called for. Hönigswald therefore essentially rejects the Copenhagen interpretation, as it draws epistemological consequences by physical means and thus inadmissibly reverses the transcendentally necessary relations of justification. These arguments are examined and could be used for a current discussion on the epistemological foundations of quantum mechanics and physics as a whole. A post-Neo-Kantian, transcendental philosophical foundation of scientific knowledge, especially of modern physics, seems possible and necessary.

This article aims to make a contribution to the problematic history of the transcendental philosophical tradition up to the present day. At the centre is the question of the continuity of transcendental philosophical research in the 20th century with regard to the situation before and after the Second World War. The decisive point of reference here  is Neo-Kantianism. Canonical Neo-Kantianism research defines it on the basis of its core phase between 1895 and 1912, which it precedes with an emergence and ends with a dissolution. There is no consensus among researchers when it comes to determining and dating the emergence and end of Neo-Kantianism. However, the majority of researchers agree that the end of Neo-Kantianism was between 1918 and 1945, marking a break in this philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, there is also a research perspective that allows a post-history to follow the core phase of Neo-Kantianism. However, the term Neo-Neo-Kantianism proposed for this is rejected by the majority of research in Neo-Kantianism. Kurt Walter Zeidler and Andrej Noras have taken up research into the post-history of Neo-Kantianism in different ways. On the one hand, Zeidler makes “Post-Neo-Kantian systematics” the guiding principle of his analysis with a view to continuity within the Neo-Kantian school of realist criticism. Andrej Noras, on the other hand, interprets the ontological interpretation of Kant in the 1920s and its critique of epistemologically orientated classical Neo-Kantianism as Post-Neo-Kantianism, which he follows with Neo-Neo-Kantianism as a critique of the critique of Post-Neo-Kantianism. The two authors thus argue in favour of a continuity of the transcendental philosophical tradition in the 20th century, whereby they make the supposed end of neo-Kantianism the starting point of their investigations. In this article, the terms Neo-Kantianism, Neo-Neo-Kantianism and  Post-Neo-Kantianism will be clarified and contextualised within Neo-Kantian research.  On the basis of this presentation, a perspective for the transcendental philosophical systematics of the 21st century will then be developed, which productively appropriates the 20th century  as its problem-historical foundation.

The research examines the logical and epistemological studies of Leonid Evgenievich Gabrilovich (1878-1953), a Russian philosopher, logic and engineer, and subsequently a Russian-American thinker. The works of L.E. Gabrilovich still remain practically unknown or little known in Russian philosophy. In the study of the philosophical concept of one of the main works of L.E. Gabrilovich “On Mathematical Thinking and the Concept of the Actual Form” (1914), the study of the theory of “actual forms”, which clarifies the foundations of human thinking, is central to the attention of readers. It is proved that the topics of mathematical formalism, the system of experience, the actual form and the problems of number touched upon by Gabrilovich were logical and epistemological aspects of his philosophy. The research covers the content of a review of this essay by Gabrilovich of the famous German mathematician and logic Leopold Löwenheim, published in 1915. The similarity of the theory of actual forms Gabrilovich’s and the meaning of the Löwenheim theorem is revealed. The analysis of Gabrilovich’s work conducted here covers little-known pages of Russian philosophical thought and should serve to enrich and fill existing lacunae in the study of Russian philosophy of the 20th century. In the process of studying the central work of Gabrilovich, results were obtained, on the basis of which they came to the conclusion that the Russian thinker sought to build a complete system of the science of philosophy. In his emigration, Gabrilovich turned to the legacy of such Russian philosophers as Vladimir Solovyov and Nikolai Berdyaev, which was surprisingly combined with mathematical thinking and the concept of actual forms. The study outlines the prospects for studying this and other works of Gabrilovich in the context of neo-Kantianism and the philosophy of mathematics. The original theory of “actual forms” proposed by Gabrilovich can be considered the result of a philosophical understanding of the foundations of mathematics, which was characteristic precisely for logical and epistemological philosophical searches.

The recognition of metaphilosophy as a separate independent philosophical discipline forces us to pay attention not only to the various variants of its understanding and its own status, but also to the history of its origin and development. It is believed that the beginning of metaphilosophy as a study of the nature of philosophy was laid by several articles by M. Lazerowitz, although some other philosophers are mentioned in passing. The study characterizes Lazerowitz’s desire to understand metaphilosophy as a view of philosophy “from the outside” and demonstrates the failure of this attempt: in fact, his metaphilosophy represents a position “inside” philosophy itself. The author of the research argues that the beginning of philosophy of philosophy should be associated with the works of the Russian and Polish philosopher Heinrich Struve and suggests a broader reconstruction of his approach. A comparison of the works of these philosophers makes it possible to identify their common starting point, which is the statement of the presence of many disagreements in philosophy, that is, what Kant called a “scandal” in philosophy. The differences between the two approaches are also revealed, in particular, Struve’s philosophy of philosophy is a precursor to any philosophy in general, aimed, while maintaining the different points of view of individual philosophers, at developing a “common worldview”. As the subject of his philosophy of philosophy, Struve calls a historical and critical analysis of the current state of philosophy, an explanation of the subject, tasks, goals, aspirations and method of philosophy; among the “principles” of philosophy is the study of the relationship of philosophy to other “phenomena of mental life.” In addition to Lazerowitz and Struve, the author points to other philosophers (for example, J. Maritain, V. Ern, E. Kalinowsky, T. Oizerman), whose interests include metaphilosophical problems, and a detailed study of their works can help to see a certain historical tradition of metaphilosophy.

A logical formalization of the supervenience relation is proposed, allowing it to be presented as a logical, theoretical or factual relation between an individual property and another property, between an individual property and a set of properties, between two sets of properties. The main logical properties of these relations are characterized, an assessment of the known definitions of weak individual supervenience, strong individual supervenience and global supervenience associated with the concept of possible worlds is given from the standpoint of the proposed formalization. The difference between the understanding of the term "property" in classical predicate logic and the understanding of this term beyond it is emphasized. Possible interpretations of D. Davidson's thesis on the supervenience of mental characteristics on physical characteristics are considered. It is demonstrated that Davidson’s thesis does not correspond to any of the supervenience relations, the formalization of which was presented. An example of a scheme of an ideal hypothetically possible experiment is given, the results of which could refute the thesis on the supervenience of mental characteristics on physical ones. Arguments are put forward in favor of a skeptical position regarding the possibility of solving the problem of supervenience of the mental on the physical. Two types of possible situations are described in which supervenience of some properties on other properties can be discovered. It is shown that in situations of each of these types the supervenience relation is discovered as a consequence of some stronger type of connection, thereby revealing its secondary nature relative to the correlation dependencies between the properties (sets of properties) of the objects under study that are actually recorded in experience or theoretically substantiated. It is concluded that the significance of the idea of supervenience in analytical philosophy is overestimated.

The main problem that speculative realism, represented by Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman and Ray Brassier, is trying to solve is overcoming correlationism. Two important figures who played a key role in the development of correlationism are Immanuel Kant and Martin Heidegger. Correlationism is a type of philosophizing that postulates that a person has access only to the connection (correlation) between the subject and the thing in itself, but not to these instances separately. The correlation is often anthropic in nature, i.e. it is language, social practices, culture, consciousness, history, meaning, and so on. Speculative realism seeks to overcome correlationism and show how one can approach the thing in itself. Heidegger played a significant role in the development of correlationism - speculative realists are in active dialogue with him. It is shown that the interpretation and criticism of Heidegger's ideas by speculative realists is untenable. Speculative realists are often even greater correlationists than Heidegger, since they replace the concept of the thing in itself with the thing for us. It is concluded that correlationism cannot be overcome, but it is necessary to reduce its influence through a number of techniques. Such practices include the restoration of the idea of the Kantian thing in itself. It is also necessary to introduce the idea of a passive subject who reduces his cognitive claims and switches attention to the affect of the thing in itself. In addition, we must remember that the human race is not the center of the world drama, and its fate depends on how carefully it learns to handle natural forces that exist independently of it in order to avoid climate catastrophe.

The proposed research analyzes for the first time the text of the ancient Chinese treatise “The Art of War” (兵法 bing fa ) from the point of view of the presence in it of archetypal constructions designed to tame chaos in such a phenomenon of human society as war. This written work of the Chinese strategist and thinker Sun-zi has been thoroughly analyzed into phrases and words by specialists of various disciplines, but all in one key - in the key of war. In this paper, other research goals of this treatise are formulated, consisting in tracking the process of embedding elements of military affairs into the cosmological archetype of Tao. It is particularly noted that, in essence, by creating the “Bing Fa”, Sun-zi accomplished what no theorist of the art of war could do. He presented the cosmological archetype of war in the form of a sequential set of five archetypal elements, relying in its construction on the Taoist model of the cosmological archetype of Tao. In the world triad of Heaven - Man - Earth, the central place of Sun-zi is occupied by a military subject: a Warlord - Commander-in-Chief, a Warrior. From now on, a commander who knows the military craft must be responsible for the fate of his people, ensure the security of the state, its power and invulnerability. It can be traced that, in essence, civilization acts as a breeding ground for warriors and war, and Taoism together with Confucianism can be incorporated into the civilizational space only with their support of the prevailing state ideology.

The study analyzes one of the main works of Hindu philosophy, the Bhagavad Gita, which tremendously influenced the development of the Eastern image of the world in general and the Hindu in particular. The concept of paths leading to liberation and cognition of “Self”, God, being and non-being is considered. The authors conclude that the path of knowledge (Djnâna Marga), although it should contain both intellectual principles and rational tools, contains the subordination of intellect to intuition, which contradicts the European philosophical thought. Another path of liberation is the path of action (service) - Karma Marga, the most difficult task of which is to overcome the interest in performing an action. Service should be free from selfish considerations. Here Kant expressed views very close to Karma Marga, focusing on the philosophical analysis of the moral and legal. As proof, the authors analyze examples of human actions that cannot be evaluated unambiguously. The third path of the Gita is the path of love (devotion), gaining unity with God. There is no clear commentary in the work on which of the paths is most important, but the path of love itself is a result that the other two paths only strive for. The authors conclude that there is a difference between Western and Eastern culture. In Eastern philosophy, the truth is revealed not on the path to rational knowledge, but on the path of the aesthetics of love. However, the authors note that Western religion includes the concept of love, but it has a fundamentally different character. In Western Christianity, a person places God in their heart, and in Indian systems, a person must find a way to the heart of God.

The research is devoted to the status and role of utopian consciousness in society and culture. The author believes that the utopian component is inherent in any human goal-setting and design. A project is the result of dissatisfaction with the current reality; it carries within itself a desire for change, radical restructuring, but at first a person is dominated by desire and an as yet unformed image - both the goal and the path to its implementation. Therefore, the first phase of design is always utopian. In sociocultural design, this is the “image of paradise”, which only later develops into realistic plans and selection of funds, taking into account circumstances. However, the utopian component as an ideal remains an inspiring moment with a clear distinction between ideal and reality. Utopian consciousness acquires the features of an illusion when the ideal is transferred to specific actual space and time. Then people try to either “move” to Eden, or transport it to themselves, or quickly realize it, in a hurry and getting tired. In the first case, one’s own “project for the best” is abandoned; in the second, one tries to implement one’s own project without taking into account real possibilities. In both cases, disappointment follows due to the lack of realism. The study also analyzes utopian consciousness as a social construct created by influential social groups to realize their interests. This construct is spread through the media. The author believes that ideologies, including those produced by existing power, are always at the same time utopias for the masses. Two powerful modern utopias are briefly examined - globalist-technocratic and conservative-archaic, noting their unrealistic nature, leading to subsequent disappointments.

This paper aims to examine Confucian thesis of moral politics. By comparing three types of administration, Confucius’ thoughts on the problematics of moral politics are analyzed in more detail, highlighting the inner tension between the moral and the political. The difficulty of the concept is shown by discussing its development so that the validity question can be brought to the fore. In order to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the moral politics, it is necessary to first address three distinct approaches to its development. We call the consanguinity-based system of administration of the Western Zhou feudal system Lĭ-Chìh (禮治). This implies using the rites (禮) as the primary means of state governance. Comparatively speaking, the morality-governed administrative method is known as Dé-Chìh (德治). The third, Fă-Chìh (法治), denotes that laws are the basis for state governance. The interdependence of rites, morals, and law makes it impossible to simply divide the three modes of administration. The theory of moral politics offers new avenues for development since China adopted the democratic system. A group of Chinese academics known as the New Confucians attempted to integrate this theory with the democratic system in the early 20th century in an attempt to find a fresh approach to the theory’s application issue. This theory still revolves around Dé-Chìh. Fă-Chìh’s authenticity is amply verified. The New Confucians regard the conflict between Dé-Chíh and Dé-Chìh as a dialectical evolution.

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