The Struggle with Correlationism: Speculative Realism against Heidegger

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Abstract

The main problem that speculative realism, represented by Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman and Ray Brassier, is trying to solve is overcoming correlationism. Two important figures who played a key role in the development of correlationism are Immanuel Kant and Martin Heidegger. Correlationism is a type of philosophizing that postulates that a person has access only to the connection (correlation) between the subject and the thing in itself, but not to these instances separately. The correlation is often anthropic in nature, i.e. it is language, social practices, culture, consciousness, history, meaning, and so on. Speculative realism seeks to overcome correlationism and show how one can approach the thing in itself. Heidegger played a significant role in the development of correlationism - speculative realists are in active dialogue with him. It is shown that the interpretation and criticism of Heidegger's ideas by speculative realists is untenable. Speculative realists are often even greater correlationists than Heidegger, since they replace the concept of the thing in itself with the thing for us. It is concluded that correlationism cannot be overcome, but it is necessary to reduce its influence through a number of techniques. Such practices include the restoration of the idea of the Kantian thing in itself. It is also necessary to introduce the idea of a passive subject who reduces his cognitive claims and switches attention to the affect of the thing in itself. In addition, we must remember that the human race is not the center of the world drama, and its fate depends on how carefully it learns to handle natural forces that exist independently of it in order to avoid climate catastrophe.

About the authors

Igor A. Devaykin

Lomonosov Moscow State University; Moscow State Pedagogical University

Author for correspondence.
Email: igor.devaykin@mail.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0001-8938-9566
SPIN-code: 6465-7051

CSc in Philosophy, Lecturer, Department of Philosophy of Natural Faculties, Philosophical Faculty, Lomonosov Moscow State University; Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Moscow State Pedagogical University

27-4 Lomonosovsky Ave., Moscow, GSP-1, 119991, Russian Federation; 1/1 Malaya Pirogovskaya St., Moscow, 119435, Russian Federation

References

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Copyright (c) 2024 Devaykin I.A.

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