Vol 26, No 4 (2022): PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

The introductory article by V.V. Vasilyev, the guest editor of the thematic section on “Philosophy of Mind”, offers a general vision on the researches of mind and consciousness today, gives a brief overview of the articles presented in the issue, and outlines the horizon for the development of both interdisciplinary and philosophical studies of consciousness.

This article will focus on the mechanistic origins of the computer metaphor, which forms the conceptual framework for the methodology of the cognitive sciences, some areas of artificial intelligence and the philosophy of mind. The connection between the history of computing technology, epistemology and the philosophy of mind is expressed through the metaphorical dictionaries of the philosophical discourse of a particular era. The conceptual clarification of this connection and the substantiation of the mechanistic components of the computer metaphor is the main goal of this article. The statement is substantiated that the invention of mechanical computing devices, having a long history in the European engineering tradition, formed the prerequisites for the emergence of machine functionalism in the modern philosophy of mind. The idea of multiple implementation stems from the principle that a formal symbol system prescribes rules for the use of rational abstractions through the physical architecture of a computational engine. The article considers the reasons for the conceptual shift and reveals the semantic foundations for the metaphorical transfer of the properties of abstract objects from the theory of automata to the field of modern philosophy of mind. The criticism and ways of protecting the philosophical program of machine functionalism are analyzed by changing the content of the metaphor “Mind as machine”. The reasons for the stability of the information-computer approach in cognitive sciences are also disclosed and explained.

When trying to give a universal definition to the term “neurophilosophy,” difficulties arise, since each researcher who identifies himself as a member of this field sets his own definition. The common thing for the work of “neurophilosophers” can be described as an interdisciplinary approach, which takes into account the achievements in the field of consciousness research of both philosophical thought and neuroscience. How this approach is implemented and what it represents depends on the particular researcher. This article focuses on Georg Northoff's neurophilosophical approach. For a long time Northoff has been developing a project of neurophilosophy, the distinguishing feature of which is its nonreductive nature: Northoff does not reduce consciousness to the brain but develops a special method that allows philosophy of consciousness and neuroscience to investigate the problems of consciousness and the brain in an integrated way. The article discusses the philosophical foundations of brain research that Nortoff provides, as well as the role of process ontology for the study of consciousness and the brain. In addition, the empirical studies of brain activity with which Northoff illustrates his philosophical claims are presented. The paper also identifies the philosophical significance of the brain-body-environment connection for the emergence of the processual self in Northoff's theory. At the same time, Northoff does not engage in a search for a solution to the consciousness-brain problem and, in particular, the hard problem of consciousness. Instead, he seeks to question and dissolve the problem while questioning its premises. Northoff argues that philosophers of consciousness refer to studies of particular areas and aspects of the brain to construct their theories, whereas to solve the problems of consciousness it is necessary to consider the brain holistically, as represented in neuroscientific research.

Traces the continuity of the ideas of Neoplatonism in Greek-Byzantine Patristics in the process of developing the orthodox doctrine of the Holy Trinity by the Church Fathers. The author emphasizes commonalities and distinctions in Neoplatonism and Christianity. Plotinus’ concept of the triad, the One - the Intellect - the Soul, is considered with a focus on the analysis of Plotinus’ ideas regarding the One as Deity and the Origin of the world. The process of emanation of the Neo-platonic trinity hypostasis and its connection through the World Soul with the material world is highlighted. The formation of the dogma of the Holy Trinity in classical Eastern (Greek-Byzantine) Patristics is presented in comparison with Neoplatonism. The ideas of Arius and Arianism, which also absorbed Neoplatonism, but created a theology of a different, unorthodox persuasion, are considered. The provisions of Athanasius of Alexandria, a representative of classical Patristics, on the Holy Trinity and Arius are compared. The creative perception of Plotinus’ conceptual positions in the works of St. Athanasius is presented and their difference is analyzed. In particular, the concepts of the One, the Intellect, and the Soul of Plotinus and St. Athanasius’ understanding of God the Father, the Son of God and the Holy Spirit are considered. The peculiarity of the emergence and existence of the hypostases in Plotinus’ triad in the dialectical process of successive emanation is highlighted. The existence of the hypostases in the triadic dogma of Christianity is shown as the same in being (homoousion) of the three Persons of the Trinity united by a single divine essence. The theological interpretation of the intra-divine life of the Trinity and its philosophical-religious expression in the categories “unborn” (Father), “begotten” (Son of God), “proceeding from the Father” (Holy Spirit) are revealed. The concepts of emanation (Neoplatonism) and proceeding (Patristics) are compared.

The treatise of the German philosopher Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob (1759-1827), Examination of Mendelssohn’s Morning Hours, or All Speculative Proofs for the Existence of God provides researchers with a good excuse to address captivating subjects related to issues of biographical and historical-philosophical dimension. Of particular interest in this context is the introductory article by I. Kant, which he sent to L.H. von Jakob before the publication of the treatise. The central idea of Jacob’s treatise was to defend Kant’s critical philosophy against the also critical M. Mendelssohn’s position. In the treatise, von Jakob sought to defend Kant’s concept against Mendelssohn’s similar methodological attitude of criticality in his treatment of philosophy. On this basis, Jacob’s treatise contains a serious critique of Mendelssohn’s concept. The treatise indicates an interesting picture of a certain competition between the authors of philosophical concepts of the German Enlightenment. The sides of the “Russian” period in L.H. von Jakob’s biography are also revealed. The treatise scrutinizes Mendelssohn’s methodological positions, as well as an analytical examination of his axioms. To reproduce this analysis accurately, an attempt is made to compare von Jakob’s philosophical ideas with some of Kant’s ideas. L.H. von Jakob’s philosophy can be defined as critical, with some reservations, in the general history of the German Enlightenment. It contributes substantially to comprehending the essence of the philosophical positions of both Kant and Mendelssohn and also clarifies the nature of the difference between the critiques of these two German thinkers.

Оffers a historical-philosophical reconstruction of Frank’s collaboration with the Swiss newspaper “Neue Züricher Zeitung” in the late 1920s and 1930s. The circumstances of Frank’s contacts with the newspaper’s editor Hans Barth are analysed on the basis of archival material and the correspondence ran between the philosophers. It is established that the beginning of their intensive collaboration was laid at the 8th International Philosophical Congress, held in Prague in 1934. Following this event, Barth not only began to publish regularly Frank’s texts in the Swiss newspaper, but was also involved in organising his lecture tours to Switzerland and assisted in finding publishers for the first German edition of Frank’s work, Das Unergründliche ( The Unknowable ). Particular attention is paid to the context of Frank’s publications in the “Neue Züricher Zeitung”, and in particular to his reviews of works by French thinkers René Le Senn ( Obstacle and Value ) and Eugene Augustovich Minkowski ( Towards a Cosmology. Philosophical Fragments ). The circumstances of the Russian philosopher’s acquaintance and communication with the French authors are discussed. Their responses to Frank’s reviews, which are preserved in their personal correspondence, are described. Frank’s critical approach toward M. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, which appear in the review, is also presented.

The latest progress of empirical studies of consciousness and spectacular advances in AI technologies kick philosophy out of the familiar comfort of uncontrolled proliferation of concepts and scholastic disputes. In the overview of the current state of empirical theories of consciousness, I reveal that those theories still find themselves at the pre-paradigmatic stage, therefore not yet comprising an immediate existential threat to philosophy of consciousness, though making it watch out. I make an attempt to deal with the familiar polysemy of the term 'consciousness' stripping its meaning from parts already susceptible to science and technology and from parts still highly unlikely to be explained away. Besides, I specify the relation between philosophy and science in general by analyzing them to their inner dynamics of theories and ontologies, showing that for science the distinction of the two is substantially more important than for philosophy. From this perspective, I argue that philosophical schemas of consciousness claiming to be ‘experiential’ must have met recently formulated criteria for empirical theories of consciousness, otherwise failing to explain anything in the domain. On the way, I touch on the issues of intentionality and representation. Finally, I add my own pragmatic criterion that addresses technological perspectives a theory provides. In the end of the day, a winning competitive theory will have to let us produce and control artificial conscious devices.

Raises the problem of ethics in interpersonal relations on the Internet. The ontological difference between digital cyberspace from the real world is emphasized and the corresponding conceptual constructions of modern thinkers are derived. Relevant questions of modern philosophy are substantiated - whether there are some specific ethical relations in cyberspace, which arise directly on the Internet, how they are possible, and how they can be regulated. As a theoretical and methodological basis for answering these questions, presents Levinas’ ideas regarding ethical thinking and the principles of “real” meetings on the Internet: for-the-other , face-to-face , and existent-beyond-Being . In this context, Levinas’ conception of interpersonal and ethical relations in digital reality and the role of the Other in these relations are examined. The idea of the Other as a subject being outside, but for whom the user of the Internet is responsible, is disclosed. This type of responsibility, according to Levinas, is an ethical norm. The article shows the phenomenon of augmented reality as a type of hybrid reality, which is formed with the help of digital technology. Augmented reality superimposes virtual images on the real world so that both parties interact with each other. It is emphasized that in modern social science augmented reality technology is seen as blurring the boundaries of virtual and real, as well as true and false. The concepts of Bill Persky, Nicholas Negroponte, and Marc Prensky on digital communication and the impact of cyberspace on humans are considered. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the construction of so-called primordial ethical relationships on the Internet. An important place here is occupied by D. Barney’s theory, aimed at studying the impact of the technical characteristics of network technologies on the social interaction of people. His idea of building qualitatively new interpersonal relationships in the digital environment is emphasized. The characteristic of the virtual environment as a space without response and one-way communication is noted. In this regard, the concept of N. Luhmann about the construction employing mass media of a special illusory, symbolic space, which modern man perceives as objective reality, is substantiated. The problem of obtaining truth and objective knowledge-information is derived.

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