Vol 26, No 2 (2024): The Value-Worldview Foundations of Politics

From the point of view of political science, the formation of a worldview is associated with a person’s awareness of himself in the surrounding socio-political reality, the development of a certain value attitude towards the objects present in it and the building of his own model of interaction with them. The semantic basis of a worldview is values, including political ones, which exist in the form of social ideals, shared by members of social groups or society, ideas about excellence in politics, or personal life orientations of an individual. Axiological guidelines for the development of a country are determined by national or traditional values. Having defined the content and semantic content of the concepts of «worldview», «ideology» and «identity», denoting interrelated socio-cultural and political-psychological phenomena based on values, the author offers a model of their conceptual coupling, reveals the semantic and instrumental aspects of the process of their formation. The formation of the value and worldview system of society is a long-term process, the nature and course of which is determined by the political and cultural traditions of the nation, the actual context of people’s life and the strategic objectives of the country’s development. The processes of formation of value and worldview systems of an individual and society are interconnected and interdependent.

Based on a systematic review of 192 scientific articles published from 2019 to 2023. In journals included in the list of peer-reviewed publications of the Higher Attestation Commission of the Russian Federation, two main strategies for studying the political orientations of Russians are distinguished: dominant and critical. Within the first, a consensus was reached that the basis of the political orientations of Russian citizens are ideas that can be united under the leadership of traditionalism and analytically examined in the conceptual prism of moderate conservatism. The authors adhering to the second strategy problematize the accepted interpretation of tradition and aim at revealing the contradictions present in the worldview of Russians, showing the significance of the chronic fragmentation of Russian society. A comparison is also made of the areas of research on political orientations in Russia and in other countries. It is indicated that foreign scientists pay very little attention to Russian political culture itself; the available works are focused on its protest aspects and on the historical context of the formation of its specificity. Unlike their foreign colleagues, Russian scientists are most interested in studying the current political orientations of young people. The author concludes that solutions to some of the most pressing research problems are revealed in the civilizational and other approaches developed by Russian researchers, which contribute to the convergence of both strategies, the unification of their positive potential and at the same time can shed light on what seems to be a long-standing and truly most important and the current problem of the political orientations of Russian society - inconsistency, polarization, fragmentation, which may have taken shape in the civilizational specifics of Russia.

Within the framework of the presented research, the question of the manipulative potential of mass culture as a tool of political influence is raised. The methodology of the work is built based on a combination of elements of comparative, structural and descriptive analysis. The author concludes that popular culture products, even if their creators have purely commercial motives, play the role of a tool for promoting meanings and values and, due to this, are a resource for regulating the behavior and perception of the target audience. The latter turns mass culture into a product of the functioning of the orientational level of the political system. The potential of works of popular culture to develop the effect of emotional contagion contributes to the fact that the impact of broadcast content becomes as wide as possible. The high degree of dependence of the content of cultural narratives on the context and the possibility of free commentary contributes to an increase in the options for their interpretation. The result is the loss by authors and customers of works of full control over the dissemination of transmitted meanings and their interpretation.

The relevance of the study is related to the unfinished nature of the formation of the Russian national-state identity. The model of national-state identity that exists in modern Russia is fragmented and somewhat amorphous, largely inheriting the semantic and structural features that crystallized earlier - at the crisis (1992-2000) and post-crisis (2001-2008) stages of its formation. The new geopolitical challenges addressed to the Russian state and society in the early 2020th also testify to the need to reassess the recent, largely contradictory experience in the formation of national identification landmarks in post-Soviet Russia. The purpose of the article is to provide a scientific and political understanding of the factors and specifics of the formation of the national-state identity of Russia in the crisis and post-crisis stages (1992-2008). Theoretical and methodological foundations of the study are based on a combination of a political and psychological approach and modern social constructivist theories. The empirical base of the study is the results of sociological surveys conducted by leading Russian academic, research and analytical organizations, as well as data obtained during the implementation of a number of research projects of a political and psychological nature. It is recorded that the crisis of nationalstate identity in 1992-2000 was determined not only by institutional and value-ideological, but also by psycho-emotional factors, among which a special place is occupied by mass frustration and atomization of the social space of Russia. It is noted that the basic factor in the gradual overcoming of the crisis of the Russian national-state identity was the building of a personalist model of power, supported by a decrease in the severity of ideological and political conflicts. The two defining trends of the post-crisis stage in the development of the Russian national-state identity were the restoration in the political consciousness of society of stable ideas about Russia as a great power and the political consolidation of most of society based on «Putin’s consensuses».

This article presents the outcomes of a study that investigates the perceptions among residents of Russia regarding their membership in the Russian nation or society. The study employs interviews (100) and focus groups (40), carried out across five regions of Russia, as its primary data collection methods. The key methodological approach was to pose questions about societal membership and the integration of various migrant types into Russian society, thus revealing underlying beliefs about the criteria for belonging to the Russian nation or society. This approach was especially insightful for understanding perceptions about groups that are typically not questioned about their societal membership. The study identifies two distinct types of societal membership: “organic” and “acquired”. Organic membership is socially ascribed to individuals born in Russia or those with ancestors born in Russia. This category often overlaps with national identity, rendering ethnic Russians born in Russia the quintessential members of Russian society. However, organic membership is not exclusively reserved for ethnic Russians; it extends to other ethnic groups considered part of “the peoples of Russia”, though they are seen as less typical members. Interestingly, the perception of these membership categories varies between regions with distinct national identities and those without such distinctions. Acquired membership, on the other hand, is contingent upon fulfilling specific criteria, such as familiarity with Russian (or regional) culture and a desire to be part of Russian society. Exceptionally, notable achievements can override these criteria. Unlike organic members, individuals with acquired membership can lose their societal status, except in cases of betrayal, which is nearly impossible for organic members. The findings are contextualized within citizenship studies, positing that the described constructs serve as a foundation for the institution of citizenship rather than the converse. Additionally, the study contributes to the ongoing cognitive turn in ethnicity research, offering new insights into the conceptualization of national and societal belonging.

Today, the question of the relationship between the collective and the individual in their consciousness and worldview occupies a special place in the study of modern Russian youth. Young people tend to want to separate themselves from society in order to understand their personality and belonging to various social groups, to accept or not accept the values, norms, ideals of the society in which they are located, in general, to understand their place in it. At the same time, our political culture is considered collectivist, oriented towards the ideas and values of conciliarity and solidarity. In this regard, the study was aimed at identifying attitudes and orientations towards the collective and individual in the minds of modern Russian youth. The empirical base of the study was made up of data from the All-Russian representative survey of citizens aged 14-30 years ( n = 2,500) conducted in the fall of 2022. The qualitative part of the study is presented by the materials of 8 focus groups conducted in the fall of 2023, the participants of which were young people aged 14 to 30 years living in all federal districts of Russia. The general conclusion of the study was the results of the study allow us to say that the so-called We-worldview is characteristic of modern Russian youth, which is a complex set of contradictory but interrelated values, ideas, orientations and attitudes towards inclusion in public relations and relationships. Its peculiarity lies in the fact that it simultaneously manifests elements of the collective (solidary, conciliar, communal) and partly individualistic principles that are traditional for the domestic political tradition. Young people retain attitudes towards unification and solidary social relations. At the same time, social groups, society, the state and interaction with them are perceived by young people only through the prism of the “I” as defining the context, conditions and circumstances of their life and creating opportunities for their self-development, self-expression and self-realization.

In the context of the changes taking place in Russian society, research on the value and ideological foundations of politics is necessary to develop a strategy and identify technologies for working with different categories of citizens, especially in new regions. An important part of the processes of social consolidation is the image of the future shared by citizens. The article conceptualizes the concept of “image of the future” as part of the subjective space of politics, the purpose of the study was to approve a conceptual model based on empirical research of the youth in new subjects of the Russian Federation, fulfilled based on focus group interviews with schoolchildren and students of Russian new regions. It is determined that the youth image of the future in the new territories of Russia are simultaneously defined and limited by the content of the political world view. Three life trajectories have been identified in which the youth of the new subjects of the Russian Federation sees their future: returning to their small homeland; moving to another subject of the Russian Federation; emigration. It is shown that these trajectories correlate with models of new Russian citizens’ civil identity. The originality of the results is determined by the interdisciplinarity approach used in the study, the new research focus and the novelty of the empirical data being introduced into scientific turnover.

In the context of global technological transformations and active penetration of artificial intelligence technologies and neural network algorithms into the digital space of socio-political communications, a new format of socio-political interactions is being formed today, defined by the widespread use of “smart” tools and mechanics of content generation and broadcasting in communication processes. In this regard, there is a demand for scientific research into the processes of the influence of artificial intelligence and neural networks on the content and functional parameters of modern socio-political communication interactions. The purpose of this study was to determine the relationship between “smart” technologies and the transformation of the contemporary space of sociopolitical communications in terms of the formation of risks, threats and challenges of a new type associated with the introduction of digital solutions based on the application of artificial intelligence technologies and neural network algorithms in the current practice of sociopolitical communications. The main research question is the extent and nature of the impact of the introduction of artificial intelligence technologies and neural network algorithms in the contemporary space of socio-political communications. To achieve the research goal and answer the research question, the authors applied the method of discourse analysis of scientific sources on the research topic, as well as conducted an international expert study, which allowed to identify key expert positions on the research topic and, based on the compilation of expert assessments, to identify the main risks, threats and challenges of socio-political nature formed in the processes of modern digital communications. The main conclusion of the paper is the thesis, substantiated and confirmed by the results of the research, that there is a wide range of socio-political risks, threats and challenges associated with the introduction of artificial intelligence technologies and neural network algorithms into the processes of contemporary digital communication. The paper provides a meaningful analysis of these risks, threats and challenges of a new type that can significantly affect the nature, dynamics and scenarios of the contemporary technological development of key spheres of life of the contemporary state and society.

The pattern reveals the way of thinking of the national leader and transmits a certain semantic code to the audience. One of the patterns that has been repeated over the years in the rhetoric of Russian President Vladimir Putin is the pattern of the existence of a “threat to national security.” The purpose of the paper is to analyze the content of the “threat to national security” pattern in the President Putin’s rhetoric, his relationship with the public sentiments of Russians and the role of the pattern in the Russian political system. The following methods were used: rhetorical analysis (identification of rhetorical techniques and strategies as means of effective communication and persuasion); conceptological analysis (analysis of linguistic means that objectify the concept, the basis of which is the pattern); correlation analysis (establishing the nature of the relationship between variables, used in the analysis of public opinion polls, correlating them with the propensity to support Putin). The empirical basis of the study consisted of eight texts of Vladimir Putin’s speeches in the period 2000-2022, analysis of the results of public opinion polls by WCIOM, Department of Sociology and Psychology of Politics, Faculty of Political Science, Moscow State University. The selection of texts was carried out on the basis of the presence in the speech (presidential periods only) of the most complete presented pattern of “threats to national security”, as well as on the basis of observing a chronological step between texts of an average of 3 years, in order to be able to conduct research in dynamics. As a result, it was established: 1. The existence of a threat to national security is a recurring theme in Vladimir Putin’s discourse throughout all terms of his presidency. 2. The pattern of “threats to national security” has undergone changes from a threat of an internal nature to a predominantly external one. 3. The significance of the threat in the discourse increases every year. 4. A persistent feature of Russian public sentiment is the need for security. An analysis of Putin’s place in the political and communication space of Russia allows us to designate him as an actor-network person, whose political discourse is the most accessible source of isolating value codes capable of consolidating Russian society, which until 2022 is in a state of anomie, a value mismatch between different levels of existing political values. The scientific novelty of this work lies in the fact that Putin’s rhetoric has not previously been analyzed from the standpoint of identifying in it the pattern of “threat to national security” and its political-semiotic significance, relationship with trends in changes in the public mood of Russians, despite a number of works devoted to the formation the image of the enemy, affective rhetoric, the “us/them” dichotomy and the problematic level of the language code, which are essentially partial manifestations of this pattern.