No 3 (2011)

This work aims at analyzing the principle of observability (PO) from the formal point of view, making use of its explicit (ontological and epistemological) definitions. It will be made clear that our contemporary interpretation of PO is directly associated with the so called stage of empirical weightlessness of a theory (SEWT). It will be made clear, too, that it is SEWT exactly that offers ample opportunities in both substantiation of PO and substantiation of van Fraassen's thesis: Emp Ad (L) → (Real (X) → ¬Obs (X)).

Object of research in the article are the basic concepts of the sense which has developed in analytical philosophy. Recognizing that the bases of an analytical paradigm of sense are put by G. Frege, the author gives primary attention to the analysis of a problem of sense in G. Frege's interpretation. It is underlined in the article the value of ideas of G. Frege not only for artificial, but also for a natural language. It's not casually that G. Frege is carry to number of founders of modern philosophy of language. In the article it is also shown that the analytical philosophy doesn't represent a homogeneous current. In this connection are allocated concepts frege-russel's type and concepts of sense of S. Kripke, K. Donnelan, H. Patnem as alternative to them.

In this paper opportunities of overcoming of limitation of both constructivism and realism are discussed. For this purpose I consider interpretation and expression as complementary forms of activity of a subject of knowledge.

The article is dedicated to ontological foundations (or their elements) in cosmology. A detailed analysis of one of the modern cosmology main problems, the problem of dark energy is represented. It's demonstrated that in spite of a sufficient quantity of the empirical facts which may be interpreted as an accelerated expanding of the Universe and also the dark energy as a cause of this expanding the nature of the latter may be understood differently. It's impossible to choose a mode of understanding empirically but necessary to consider according methodology tied with ontological principles.

Combined logics of sentences and events consist of two parts: the external logic depending on epistemological assumptions and the internal logic depending on ontological ones. They were introduced by V.A. Smirnov following some G. Frege's and N. Vasiliev's ideas. An analysis of the structure of combined logics shows that, in fact, they employs the links between two logical systems postulating in the role of ontological part algebras which serve as the models of respective logics. It prompts us to consider systems which describe the direct interplay of two logics on syntactic level where we have an access to these logics without mediation of their models. In the role of those systems might be used the so-called coexponential and exponential ones which were introduced in [15]. In the paper the case of two paraconsistent combined logics (having paraconsistent algebras as their ontological part) is considered.

A phenomenon of science is considered from a logical-semiotic angle. Existing research methods and definitions of science are analyzed too. Furthermore a place of science in the universe of sign systems is determined. Finally, science is put as a an evidential or inference knowledge. Different imitative means of pseudo-scientific reasoning is exposed and specific examples of such included.