-

This article argues that the shift from the bipolar structure of the Cold War international system to a more polycentric power structure at the system level has increased the significance of regional relations and has consequently enhanced the importance of the study of regionalism. It makes a case for a Mediterranean region and examines various efforts aimed at defining what constitutes a region. In so doing, it investigates whether the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) can be utilized to define a Mediterranean region and argues that the patters of amity and enmity among Mediterranean states are necessary but not sufficient to identify such a region. It suggests that economic, energy, environmental, and other factors, such as migration and refugee flows should be taken into consideration in order to define the Mediterranean region. It also claims that the Mediterranean security complex includes three sub-complexes. The first is an eastern Mediterranean sub-complex that revolves mainly - albeit not exclusively - around three conflicts: the Greek-Turkish conflict, the Syrian conflict, and the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict. The second is a central Mediterranean sub-complex that includes Italy, Libya, Albania and Malta and which revolves mainly around migration with Italy playing a dominant role due to its historical ties to both Libya and Albania. The third is a western Mediterranean security sub-complex that includes France, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Spain and Portugal. This sub-complex it centered around France, the migration question and its associated threats, such as terrorism, radicalism, and human trafficking. In conclusion, it is concluded that the Mediterranean security complex is very dynamic as there are states (i.e. Turkey) that seem eager and capable of challenging the status quo thereby contributing to the process of the complex’s internal transformation.

The relevance of the issues raised in the article is related to the active return of Russia to the Mediterranean region, as well as the international political transformations taking place in it. The purpose of the article is to identify the historical foundations, current state and strategic prospects of Russia’s presence and international influence in the Greater Mediterranean region. The article is based on the methodology of critical geopolitics, historical and comparative approaches, which critically analyze the geopolitical structures of the region, built in the interests of various regional and extra-regional political forces. The historical material of the ancient, medieval, new and modern periods in the history of the macro-region is used, including the poorly studied times of the Mongol presence on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Scientific works on the history, geography and international relations in the region, written in the 18th - 19th centuries, as well as modern scientific information on the trends of technological, infrastructural and political development of the Mediterranean region are introduced into scientific circulation. An important element of the article is the thesis about the special role of Russia in the Pacific-European (Eurasian) transit. From the author’s point of view, it includes not only the full implementation of Russia’s transport and logistics potential in the macro-region, but also the transfer of modern technologies, as well as the promotion of the formation of sustainable political regimes. As a result, a conclusion is made about the deep historical foundations of Russia’s presence and influence in the region, its strategic prospects are justified, and the main directions of our country’s international activities in the Mediterranean region are highlighted. An important conclusion of the article is the thesis about the need for a multilateral balanced approach to solving macro-regional problems.

The Eastern Mediterranean is becoming a new region of interstate confrontation and clash of national interests. This is largely due to the discovery of oil and gas reserves, the development of which is becoming possible with the existing technology. The Republic of Turkey has a special position regarding this maritime region. The paper analyzes those bases - historical, political and legal - that determine Turkey’s current policy with regard to maritime delimitation and the settlement of maritime disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Particularly, it is shown that Turkey’s policy in the region continues to be based on the approaches that were announced by Turkey during the I-III UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea (1958, 1960, 1973-1982 respectively), which have remained unchanged up to now. This position, as regards both the outer limits of the territorial sea, the legal regime of islands and the delimitation of the continental shelf, continues to define the essence of the controversy between Turkey and other countries of the region, including Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. At the same time, it is shown that there is a set of circumstances that significantly limit the prospects of solving these interstate contradictions within the framework of international judicial instances, including the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The conclusion is made that, for both Turkey and Greece, the most acceptable option would be to work out a “model” of settlement, which would not imply the obligation of its immediate implementation. Particular attention is paid to the ideological and practical framing of Turkish claims within the framework of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, developed by a number of retired Turkish officers. It shows how Ankara uses the ideas of pan-Turkism and neo-Ottomanism to justify its claims to vast maritime spaces. The distinctive feature of this doctrine most likely is its anti-American, anti-NATO and anti-European orientation. There is a paradoxical situation when certain ideas enshrined in this concept directly correlate with the interests of the Russian Federation.

The Black Sea region (BSR) is becoming a geopolitical space of clash - a frontline zone for the formation of a new system of international relations. After the Cold War, the region from the peripheral became one of the centers of competition between regional and global powers. It has mostly geopolitical rather than simple geographical character, significantly expanding its borders in at least four variations: the BS as the space of seven coastal states, the BS as the Baltic-Black Sea region, the BS as the Black Sea-Caspian Sea region, and the BS as the “nerve center” of the Greater Mediterranean. The article analyzes the geopolitical projects of great powers in relation to the Black Sea region in 1991-2019. The aim is to study the evolution and dynamics of these geopolitical projects by comparing the conceptual and doctrinal levels, as well as the level of practical policy of the key actors in relation to the Black Sea region. The scientific novelty lies in the systematic analysis of the geopolitical projects of great powers in the BSR after the Cold War, which becomes one of the critically important regions in the current period of world history. The authors conclude that the United States, the EU and Turkey follow an offensive strategy in the BSR, while Russia’s strategy is aimed at maintaining the status quo. After 2014, the USA and its allies have embarked on a third attempt to implement the Euro-Atlantic Black Sea project and the Greater Black Sea project, which involve the displacement of the Russian Federation from the Black Sea region. The geopolitical significance of the BSR is determined by its strategic location at the intersection of the interests of key actors. Their competition in the BSR is carried out both at the regional (Russia - Turkey - EU) and global (USA - Russia, Turkey, Iran; EU - Russia, Turkey, USA; China - USA, EU, Russia) levels, determining the content of conceptual approaches to the political structure of the region and specific integration (and infrastructure) projects. The complexity of the current geopolitical situation in the region is determined by a large number of competing powers and changing contours of the international system. The main axis of intra-regional competition in the BSR is focused on achieving a balance of power between Russia and Turkey.

The article is dedicated to the analysis of the tenth anniversary of the revolutionary events in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), called the Arab Spring. The relevance of the study of the consequences of political transformations in Arab countries is due to the incompleteness of the modernization processes in such areas as public administration, justice and human rights, which gave rise to the discontent of the active part of society, which had initiated the protests. The idea of the research was to compare the causes of popular uprisings, the methods of political struggle, the main actors and the results of the Arab Spring for most of the countries affected by this process. Particular attention has been paid to the growing popularity of Islamist political forces, which have given their answers and pseudo-answers to acute societal issues. With the help of comparative and typological analysis, the peculiarities of different models of political development in the Middle East and North African countries have been studied. Over the past decade, world science has accumulated a significant layer of research on the Arab Spring phenomenon. The authors have taken into account a wide range of opinions of scholars from Europe, the United States, Turkey, Israel, and the Arab states. Aiming to assess the political transformation of the MENA region over the past 10 years, this study analyzes changes in the position of external actors such as Russia and the USA. The authors conclude that the influence of the US as a whole in the region has decreased, while the influence of Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia has increased. Israel has managed to strengthen its own security by establishing normal relations with a number of Arab states in the region. The popular unrest that erupted again in Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria, and Tunisia in 2018-2021 was objectively caused by the same conditions that had given rise to the Arab Spring and with the same uncertain results so far.

The Afghan direction is rather important for German foreign policy, given the scale and duration (nearly two decades) of German military presence in this Central Asian country. It remains to continue one of the directions of Bundeswehr’s usage outside the NATO zone of responsibility. The article tries to explore the specifics of the German military and political-diplomatic tools used in the course of Resolute Support operation. The key research methods are comparative and event-analysis. The paper evaluates the characteristics and the results of the German participation in ISAF activity by the mid-2010s. In this regard it is shown that to a large extent the efforts of the Bundeswehr contingent in “Resolute Support” were aimed at completing unfinished tasks during the ISAF mission. The new (since 2015) tasks of the German military personal, their determinism, and the peculiarities of their implementation are defined. The article traces the ascending dynamics of the German military presence in Afghanistan. In comparison with Syria and Iraq, taking into account the scale of threats projected from their territory to the Euro-Atlantic community in the mid-2010s, the peculiarities of forms and amounts of the Bundeswehr’s use in Afghanistan are demonstrated. The author examines Berlin’s attempts to maintain its military presence in Afghanistan in conditions when US President Trump’s administration and the Taliban (banned in Russia) signed an agreement on the withdrawal of US troops on February 29, 2020. The range of factors that could affect the revision of the White House’s position in the second half of 2020 and early 2021 is defined. During this period, Germany has been trying to keep its military presence in Afghanistan. But after the final decision of the Biden administration on the withdrawal of troops, official Berlin was forced to accelerate the evacuation of its contingent (by July 1, 2021), which largely crossed out the previously declared results of the strategy in Afghanistan. The article concludes by presenting the consequences of the military drawdown in Afghanistan for the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany as a whole.

With the rising fear of Islamisation in Europe and increasing Islamist sentiment in Turkey, the issue of religion in the context of integration of Turkey into the European Union remains relevant. After a long-lasted wait and continuous negotiations, Turkey seems to be moving further away from getting accepted in the EU. The research focuses on the religious factor in this unrelenting friction between the two regions / entities and answers the question as to why the EU and Turkey should consider religion as one of the variables in the European integration. The analysis is done with the use of primary and secondary sources with special focus on Samuel Huntington’s realism-inspired work ‘Clash of the Civilization.’ Turkish sources were used for better understanding the dynamics of Turkey. In terms of methodological approach the research is done with using the content analysis and contemporary observation of socio-political scenario and behavioral changes that the EU and Turkey going through. The authors conclude that there is no proper mechanism to consider religion as a variable, but psychologically it is still playing a major role in both the EU and Turkey. The authors believe that the EU and Turkey should discuss the religious dimension of integration while talking other dynamics.

-

-

-