Image of Peter I in Modern Historiographical and Public Discourse

Full text / tables, figures

Introduction

Peter the Great is among the reference figures of the Russian historical narrative. The corresponding historical era bears his name – Petrine. Moreover, the history of Russia is divided by the figure of Peter the Great into pre-Petrine and post-Petrine times. Only the 1917 October Revolution which divided Russia’s past into the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary Soviet periods was a watershed event comparable to the reforms of Peter the Great. The understanding of the general direction of the course of history depends on the significance attached to the reference figures of the historical process.  The cleavage in regard to views on Peter, and through him on the entire Russian past is revealed long before the discussion between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. In public perception, there were established two images of Peter the Great: Peter the Great, a demigod – in the nobility representation,^[1] and the Antichrist, a German on the Russian Throne – in the Old Believer reflection.^[2] At present, Peter the Great can still be consi- dered as a figure through the attitude towards which there are reconstructed the socio-political positions of social groups.

The purpose of this study is to carry out a reconstruction that allows us to correlate the views on Peter the Great with a general vision of the historical process (philosophy of history) and value-semantic guidelines (ideology). At the same time, there is set the task of a two-level study of Peter the Great’s image – within the framework of historiography (historical science) and mass public perception (historical consciousness).^[3] The spheres of historical science and historical consciousness do not have rigid boundaries; they are connected within the framework of what is commonly referred to as the concept of historical discourse.^[4] Accordingly, the subject of the study determines the applied methodology which consists in combining the theory of discourse with the classical methods of historiography and historical sociology.

An additional factor in actualizing the study of the modern perception of Peter the Great’s image is the historical parallels between the features of the implementation of Peter the Great's policy with the state policy of modern Russia. Being considered as a Westernizer, Peter the Great pursued a no-nonsense internal policy and imperial foreign policy. This combination evokes certain associations with the current stage in the histo- ry of Russia’s state policy. The recognition of the success of Peter the Great's policy in the XVIII century in the logic of these parallels would mean the recognition of the corresponding potentials in the modern model of Russian statehood; on the contrary, the denial of Peter the Great's successes would mean the doubt that they are in principle possible for Russia on the Western platform.

Controversial breaks in historiographical discourse

The consideration of Peter the Great's reign in the system of pro et contra arguments became over time the principle of its historical presentation. Instead of the integrity of interpretations, the dialogical approach began to be increasingly chosen revealing the ambivalence of both the figure of Peter the Great and the reforms he implemented. In this respect, indicative is the book by E.V. Anisimov “Peter the Great: Good or Evil for Russia” originally presented as a dialogue between an apologist and a critic of  Peter the Great's policy. In this book the author gives arguments from the position of the accuser (he accuses Peter the Great, above all, based on the values of humanism, democracy and the market economy), and then he refutes himself from a position conventionally defined as conservative (he justifies Peter the Great based on the priority of the tasks of countering external threats). The notional ramification in the internal dialogue was set by the discourse on the phenomenon of a totalitarian society that was transferred back to the USSR relating to perestroika. In accordance with it, Peter the Great was considered as a figure that set the vector in the direction of the coming totalitarianism (autocracy, police state, strengthening of serfdom). The opponents of this view opposed it from the positions of classical or old Westernism proving the progressive consequences of Peter the Great's deeds. Thus, it can be stated that the main debatable dichotomy between Westernizers and Slavophiles changed with a new debatable break in relation to the figure of Peter the Great.^[5]

But the dispute between classical – anti-patriarchal (secular) and modernized – anti-totalitarian Westernism did not exhaust the discussion space. Along with it, other debatable breaks can be singled out, such as, for example, the discussion between patriotic opponents and patriotic proponents of Peter the Great. The former focused on the breakup of the Petrine elite with the national tradition, the latter – on the Petrine empire-building, the struggle against external enemies. Their differences in assessments of Peter the Great represented the case when disagreements between civilizational opponents and geopolitical proponents led to a divergence of historical assessments.

There arose paradoxical alliances between the followers of the line of Slavophiles and the new Westernizers in criticism of Petrine policy manifested, in particular, in public discussions. In turn, the patriotic supporters of the empire turned out to be just as paradoxically close in their assessment of Peter the Great with some liberal Westernizers. The reformatting of the discussion space around the reforms of Peter the Great makes it possible to raise the issue of describing the new models of interpreting the historical image of Peter the Great that are present in a wide discourse.

Historiographic modeling

Model No. 1: "Theory of Political Realism"

The explanation of Peter the Great’s activities most entrenched in modern historiography is its interpretation in accordance with the theory of political realism. The established ideas can be characterized as non-reflex political realism, since the assessments put forward are given without an appropriate theoretical and methodological justification. According to the position of political realism, the value of state sovereignty is the main one. Each state fights with others for dominance, enters in wars, concludes alliances pursuing an integral goal – the strengthening of its influence and power in the world.^[6]

By the time Peter the Great came to the throne, Russia economically lagged behind the European countries; in comparison with them, Russia had a lower educational potential of the population; its management system with specific red tape was distinguished by a low level of functionality. Peter the Great needed reforms in order to effectively struggle with external enemies, other states – directly with Sweden and the Ottoman Empire, indirectly – with the British Empire. The main success of Peter the Great's reign was considered the victory in the Great Northern War and its consequence – access to the Baltic Sea. Peter the Great's projects, such as the Persian campaigns, the initiation of a colonial expedition to Madagascar, as well as the study of the possibility of laying a northern sea route around Eurasia also deserve high praise in the light of considering history from the standpoint of realpolitik. All of them were aimed at undermining British power and directly posed a threat to British rule in India.^[7]

All the reforms were functionally subordinate to the military reform; and the latter, in turn, was aimed at ensuring the Russian state power.^[8] The transition to per capita taxation was needed to ensure the financing of the army and navy, the introduction of the Table of Ranks were necessary to militarize the civil service, the management  reforms – to increase the mobilization capacities of the state in war conditions.^[9] Even the church transformations were considered from the point of view of external rivalry, which assumed the development of science and technology, which in turn was associated with secular culture.^[10]

Model No. 2: "Theory of Modernization"

In accordance with the theory of modernization, the reforms of Peter the Great represented Russia's entry into the modernization phase of development. Peter the Great's Europeanization was, in essence, modernization. Hence the transfer of the institutions and cultural elements of European life to Russia.^[11] Under Peter the Great, Russia went through a path that took European countries more than a century. Nor did it have a preparatory stage of modernization in the form of Renaissance culture. Under Peter the Great, Russia leapt from traditional society to early modernity, whereas in Europe such a transition was evolutionary. The tasks of accelerated modernization determined the specifics of the autocratic style of the Petrine revolution from above. This style was not something specific to Russia and was generally typical for countries of a catch-up type of development (the second and third echelon of capitalism).^[12]

However, not all supporters of the theory of modernization recognize the fact of Peter the Great's modernization policy. There is a widespread opinion that on the contrary, having reinforced the feudal components, Peter the Great laid long-term obstacles to the modernization of Russia, which in this version of the theory is associated with democracy, individual freedom and market economy. There is also a view of the partiality of Peter the Great's modernization limited to the elite circle. Despite the Europeanization of the nobility, the majority of the Russian population continued to exist in the paradigm of traditional society.^[13]

Thus, there emerged three versions of the view on Peter the Great's politics from the standpoint of the theory of modernization. According to the first one, there was a catch-up model of authoritarian modernization; according to the second one, an anti-modernization course was pursued; in accordance with the third one, an eclectic system was created that combined modernization enclaves with pre-modern folk culture.

Model No. 3: "Historical track of Russia"

In recent years, the metaphor of the “historical track” which is the basis of the corresponding concept has gained popularity. According to it, the choice of the path made in the past determines the future. It is extremely difficult to get out of the rut; the deeper the rut, the less chance of changing the given historical path.^[14]

The “Russian track” was laid down even before Peter the Great’s time, at the stage of the formation of the Russian centralized state. During Peter the Great’s reign, it was considerably deepened, which established the invariance of the further development of the country.^[15] In accordance with the concept of the “historical track,” Peter the Great destroyed the potential for the emergence of democratic institutions, and thus deprived Russia of the prospects for alternative development. There was traced a line of communication between Peter the Great, on the one hand, and Lenin and Stalin, on the other hand.^[16] There gained popularity the phrase once used by Maximilian Voloshin about Peter the Great as the first Bolshevik on the throne.^[17]

Model No. 4: "Theory of Civilizations"

In his 2012 Address to the Federal Assembly, V.V. Putin defined Russia as a state-civilization which at the level of power discourse indicated a request for the development of a civilization version of Russian history.^[18] In contrast to the modernization approach, the civilization approach assumed the identification of value constants of the correspon- ding civilization. By their origin, these constants are associated with the civilization-forming religion laid in the core of civilization, in the case of Russia – with Orthodoxy.^[19]

In the version of the civilization approach, Peter the Great turned out to be one of the main anti-heroes in the history of Russia. His Europeanization was directed against the values and traditions of Russian civilization.^[20] In the context of civilization theory, particular attention was paid to Peter the Great's church reforms and his break with Orthodox socio-cultural norms. The emperor was suspected of sympathizing with Pro- testantism and of building a new synod system of governing the Church according to the Protestant model.^[21]

Model No. 5: "Theory of Elites"

In the projection of the theory of elites, history unfolds as a fight between various elitist, anti-elitist and counter-elitist groups in the struggle for power. With regard to the period of political transition after the death of Fyodor Alekseevich, attention is traditionally focused on the confrontation between the Miloslavsky and Naryshkin groups.^[22] However, not all researchers agree with such a disposition of the struggle, pointing out that completely different figures played the leading role in the streltsy uprisings.^[23]

As an alternative to the Petrine scenario of the development of Russia, historians often consider the potential of Tsarevna Sophia’s power circle. The traditional version artistically designed by Alexei Tolstoy about the old Moscow group that consolidated around Tsarevna Sophia may be considered outdated. On the contrary, there was deve- loped a point of view, according to which Vasily Golitsyn was preparing a package of broad reforms including the abolition of serfdom going much further than Peter the Great's reform.^[24] The conservative forces led by Patriarch Joachim in the political struggle supported Peter linking adherence to traditions with him, rather than with Sophia. There is also an opinion about two clashing versions of Westernism: Golitsyn's Westernism – gentry-Catholic and Peter's Westernism – Protestant. The victory of Peter the Great’s version meant a bet on the practical side of Europeanization. The relapses of Sophia-Golitsyn line manifested a little later – in the creation of a courtyard, palace luxury and wastefulness.^[25]

An obvious characteristic of Peter the Great's reign was the democratization of the elites, the inclusion of social lifting mechanisms. A blow was dealt to the former positions of the patrimonial aristocracy; the boundaries between the boyars and the nobility were completely erased. It was representatives of the provincial nobility and lower noblemen that took the highest positions of state power.^[26] A great number of Europeans were invited to serve, which would later be perceived as a threat of the authorities losing their national identity. In the church hierarchy, the leading positions were taken by representatives of the Little Russia clergy.^[27] Through the system of the Table of Ranks, a me- chanism was created to overcome the class restrictions of elite formation.^[28]

Model No. 6: "Theory of World-Systems"

Based on the methodological developments of F. Braudel and I. Wallerstein, an independent place in historiography was taken by the theory of World-Systems.^[29] In speci- fic developments, the World-System analysis corresponded to geopolitical, Marxist and civilization approaches. From the great geographical discoveries, the development of capitalism and the beginning of the process of formation of colonial empires, there is established a single world system. Separate world-systems (they are also civilizations) that previously existed in relative isolation are built into it. This entry was an objective process of historical development. Before Peter the Great, Russia had developed as a separate world-system. From the point of view of World-System analysis, Peter the Great's politics was its entry into the emerging world system. Peter the Great's cultural bor- rowings were a marker of inclusion in the world system and were important, above all, from the point of view of the symbolic policy of the system integration that was carried out. However, within a single world-system, the positions of the center, semi-periphery and periphery still were not finally distributed. Peter the Great's foreign policy struggle was a struggle for Russia's position within the world system, and it turned out to be quite successful.^[30]

Model No. 7: "Intellectual History"

The direction of intellectual history puts the concepts that guide the subjects of strategic action into the focus of consideration of the historical process. In such a formulation of the problem with regard to the time of Peter the Great, the central question is whether there was a certain conceptual plan in the activities of Peter the Great. A positive answer to it runs against P.N. Milyukov’s position on “reforms without a reformer” which is rather widespread, the situational response of the tsar to the current challenges, the ongoing transformations without a targeted vision. The context of the development of European thought in relation to the policy of Peter the Great suggests that he was influenced by the ideas of mercantilism, cameralism, the theory of the common good, the universality of rational state regulation.^[31]

Another side of the reconstruction of Peter the Great's views is the assumption of his sympathies with the Reformation (Protestant) Church^[32]. Attention is drawn to the fact that he mainly borrowed from the countries of the Protestant cultural area, rather than from Catholic Europe. There is a debate on Peter the Great’s church reform, within which positions clash on whether the new synod structure was canonical for the Orthodox tradition,^[33] or it was the result of borrowing the Protestant model of organizing religious life.^[34] It is Feofan Prokopovich, the leading apologist for Peter the Great's church reform, that was suspected of adherence to Protestantism, whereas the Locum Tenens of the Patriarchal See, Stefan Yavorsky, was suspected of closeness to Catholics.^[35] However, the fact that in 1719 Peter the Great banished from Russia the Jesuit Order which became widespread during the regency of Tsarevna Sophia clearly indicates his anti-Catholic views.^[36] Some researchers consider the blasphemy of the All-Joking Council a mockery of the papacy, rather than an anti-religious action.^[37]

The third version regarding Peter the Great's intention, along with the versions of the influence of modern European social sciences and Protestant religiosity, is the assumption that he developed national ideological reflection. In Muscovy, there became widespread the position that there would be no “fourth Rome.” In particular, the stance of the Old Believer opposition was based on it. The response to the crisis of the chiliastic views of Muscovy was Peter the Great's thesis on the fundamental possibility of modernizing the Christian kingdom. In this sense St.Petersburg was conceived as the “fourth Rome,” the capital of the renewed Roman Empire. The positioning of Peter the Great as the “new Constantine” also correlates with the version of the intention of Christian empire-building.

Model No. 8: "History of everyday life"

As opposed to the macrohistorical generalizations, the history of everyday life is focused on the microhistorical aspects of human existence. Despite the deliberate departure from the metanarrative, at the level of being of an individual, families or localities, it makes it possible to identify ongoing transformations and, above all, sociocultural ones. The study of certain aspects of socio-cultural transformations has become the subject of developments with regard to different periods of Russian history. The period of Peter the Great's reign is no exception.

The conducted studies demonstrated, above all, the emergence of a new type of person – a secular person. The Petrine stage of secularization turned out to be successive to the tendencies of the secularization of the consciousness and being of man in the XVII century. However, under Peter the Great the speed of the corresponding processes increased significantly. At the same time, of importance is the statement that the formation of a person of secular culture was limited to the nobility and did not affect common people; this statement is also confirmed within the framework of other models.^[38]

Certainly, the described approaches to understanding the historical significance of the personality of Peter the Great are "pure models". In the works of historians they are often combined with each other; their individual elements are used. Moreover, this use often gives rise to an internal contradiction of the proposed explanations and interpretations. But the “pure models” can be used as a guide for Peter the Great's historiography.

Conclusions

The analysis carried out allows us to identify the transition to a new historiogra- phical stage in understanding the personality and politics of Peter the Great. The former space of discourse was transformed as a result of a change in key dichotomies. In the long run the “pure models” of understanding Peter the Great's transformations should probably lead to changes in perceiving him within the framework of the historical consciousness of Russian society.

Changes in historical consciousness occur with a certain delay in relation to changes in historiographical and, more broadly, discursive paradigms. At present, both at the level of power representations refracted in the state historical policy, and mass public opinion, there dominates the view of Peter the Great as a brilliant reformer who brought Russia into the ranks of the world's leading powers, as well as an outstanding commander. Such a representation is a synthesis of the semantics of the former Soviet interpretation (the novel “Peter the Great” by A.K. Tolstoy and eponymous film by V.M. Petrov) and the theory of modernization (the image of Peter the Great as the forerunner of all sub- sequent Russian reformers). But the change in the vectors of Russia's development at the present stage presumably actualizes the demand for a new rethinking of the Petrine era in accordance with the transforming system of values and ideas of Russian society.

Bearing in mind the variety of historical discourse, a change in assessments of the activities of Peter the Great is conceivable in the logic of the transformation of a hero into an anti-hero. But the dominance of one or another rating system will be determined by a combination of factors, including state historical policy, public demands for associative images of the past, and current challenges.

 

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About the authors

Vardan E. Bagdasaryan

Moscow Region State University

Author for correspondence.
Email: vardanb@mail.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-4895-5108

Dr. habil. hist., Professor, Dean of History, Political Science and Law Faculty, Head of the Department of Russian History of the Middle Ages and Modern Times

10А, Radio St., Moscow, 105005, Russia

Sergey I. Resnianskiy

Moscow Region State University; Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University)

Email: s-r44@yandex.ru
Dr. habil. hist., Professor of the Department of Russian History of the Middle Ages and Modern Times, Moscow Region State University; Professor of the Russian History Department, RUDN University 10А, Radio St., Moscow, 105005, Russia; 6, Miklukho-Maklaya St., Moscow, 117198, Russia

References