Pan-Slavism of F.I. Tyutchev and F.M. Dostoevsky: Historical and Political Analysis

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Introduction. What is pan-Slavism? Pan-Slavism, as the idea of the historical unity of the Slavic peoples, based on the kinship of languages, ancient literature and common destinies, arose not in Russia, but on the European continent. More precisely, the origins of the idea of Slavic reciprocity date back to the 17th century, when the Croat Yuri Krizhanich invented the grammar and lexical composition of the common Slavic language, which he declared a means of uniting all Slavs. However, this idea acquired conceptual forms only in the 19th century. At the beginning of the genesis, having an exclusively literary character, then it was supplemented by political and religious arguments, acquiring a political and ideological character, expanded, becoming the basis of various types and varieties of Slavic nationalist ideology. Paradoxically, the first “theorist” of Slavic liberation and rethinking their worldhistorical role was a German. Johann Gottfried Herder, the head of the Protestant Church in Weimar and one of the founders of the philosophy of history, in his main work “Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind” (1784-1891, Russian translation in 1829) sympathetically characterized the Slavs and predicted a great historical future for them. In Czechia and Slovakia at the beginning of the 19th century thanks to the works of J. Kollar, “father of pan-Slavism” [Levine 1914: 668; Maxwell 2011: 83], F. Palacky, P. Shafarik and other figures of the so-called “Slavic renaissance”, the Slavs realized their national identity and ethno-linguistic kinship [Shirinyants, Myrikova 2010: 85-110]. In Russia, interest in the Slavic world appeared, in fact, as a protest of intellectuals against the unhealthy fascination with Westernism in government circles and the country’s noble elite. Another kind of the concept of Slavic reciprocity arose and took shape in Russia in the 40-50s of the 19th century within the framework of Slavophilism. Two major ideas determined the specifics of the Slavophile concept - the idea of Orthodoxy and civilizational differences. Slavophil historiosophy, like the Western idea of all-Slavism, proceeded from the Hegelian doctrine that every nation has a priori a certain “beginning”, the disclosure of the content of which constitutes its history. In relation to the Slavs, Slavophiles saw such a “beginning” in Orthodoxy, which they often identified with early Christianity. They divided the entire European history and culture into two independent “worlds” - Western Latin, Catholic, Romano-Germanic and Eastern Greek-Slavic, Orthodox. The Slavophiles saw a deep, fundamental difference between these worlds. It was on the Slavophile basis that the Russian pan-Slavist concepts and theories of the unification of the Slavs - both literary and political in nature - were formed [Egorov 2003: 23-32]. In their understanding of pan-Slavism, Russian thinkers were immediately divided into those who called for the rapprochement of the Slavic peoples, primarily in the field of culture, and those who assumed their state unification. Within the framework of Russian pan-Slavism, in which “cultural” and “political” directions are clearly distinguished, ideas were developed about the usefulness for all Slavs of introducing the Slavic alphabet (Cyrillic) into their writing, about the need for all Slavs to adopt a single literary language, which should have become Russian; projects for the political unification of the Slavs, in which Russia was assigned the role of not only a unifier, but also a hegemon. In turn, “political” pan-Slavism existed in several variants, some of which can be described as “revolutionary” or “radical” pan-Slavism, others as “conservative” or “imperial”. Of course, this classification cannot be considered faultless because those supporters of Slavic reciprocity who never put forward a program of political unification of Slavic countries, but advocated only cultural rapprochement, in the long run still assumed the possibility of uniting Slavic peoples into one state. The criteria for distinguishing these various ideological constructions should be sought in the difference of ideas about the foundations, scales, methods and ways of achieving Slavic unification. In addition to the generally accepted distinction between liberal, radical and conservative ideologies that determined the socio-political nature of certain trends and social movements in support of the unification of the Slavs in the 19th century, whose representatives interpreted the idea of Slavic reciprocity in different ways, using it to promote their views and goals not only in political, but also in the scientific and creative spheres, other divisions can be proposed. So, for example, emphasizing the importance of literary activity (the goal is to create a common Slavic language as a means of communication and the basis of unification); political aspects (liberation from national oppression and the creation of federal or unitary unions of liberated peoples); civilizational, spiritual and moral foundations (Orthodoxy as a system-forming phenomenon of a new Slavic civilization opposed to Western) - all this it also caused the peculiarities and specifics of various currents and movements of Slavic unity. Another important criterion for distinguishing them was the attitude towards Russia declared within the framework of certain concepts and theories, the interpretation of the role of the only independent Slavic power at that time in the process of national liberation of the Slavic peoples and their future unification. According to this criterion, all theories and concepts of Slavic reciprocity can be divided into Russophobic ones, proceeding from fear of the expansive power of autocratic Russia and therefore excluding its participation in the proposed political unification of individual Slavic peoples, and Russophile concepts of all-Slavism under the auspices and under the hegemony of Russia. F.I. Tyutchev’s “political” pan-Slavism It is to the Slavophile, Russophile variety of political conservative pan-Slavism that the Tyutchev’s ideal of the all-Slavic empire can be attributed, which occupies a central place in Tyutchev’s justification of the idea of Slavic unity. For the first time, the idea of the unity of the Slavs was expressed by Tyutchev in the poem “The Alps” (1830). Here the Slavic and Orthodox peoples are treated as one family, and the idea of creating an Eastern Empire led by Russia is expressed, albeit in an allegorical form. Then Tyutchev spoke about Slavic unity in a poem dedicated to the capture of Warsaw in 1831. The struggle against rebellious Poland was perceived by Tyutchev as a struggle for the preservation of the integrity of the Slavic state, which was to fulfill the great historical task predetermined to the Russian people. According to his worldview, Tyutchev appears to us as a Christian, Orthodox thinker, whose historical and political arguments are the experience of rationalizing his Orthodox faith [Shirinyants, Myrikova 2020: 7-30]. The true subject of the historical process, according to Tyutchev, is God as a completely incomprehensible force of Providence, which has its own historical regularity. The real historical life of mankind, the political processes taking place in it, have relative independence, which is especially noticeable in peaceful, crisis-free periods of development. Based on the Orthodox faith and historical intuition, a person is able to partially guess the will of Providence and build on this basis an analysis of historical political reality, which is especially important during periods of crisis of civilizations, revolutions and wars. From Tyutchev’s point of view, the foundation of any civilization, its main socioforming and cultural factor is religion, acting as a legitimate way of uniting the divine and human will. A similar foundation for the entire European region is the Christian Universal Church, the tragic split in which gave rise to two civilizational varieties - the West and the East. It is precisely the inadequate reflection of the divine will in Western European Christianity that, according to Tyutchev, is the deepest cause of the political, cultural, historical, civilizational crisis of the West.[28] First in the Russian and European intellectual tradition, Tyutchev identifies Catholicism, Protestantism, secular humanism, atheism and revolution as stages of a single process of degradation of Western European civilization. Political events of his contemporary history: the struggle for the unification of Germany, the formation of the new status of the Vatican, the revolutions in France in 1830 and 1848, other European revolutions of this period; emerging issues and problems of a theoretical plan: about democracy and the state, the relationship of state institutions and the Church, the role of public opinion and the press, etc. - all this is considered by Tyutchev in the light of the idea of a natural crisis of such a civilization, the basis of which implicitly contains the priority of the human over the divine. Tyutchev considers the struggle of the Revolution and Russia as expressing the false and true manifestations of Christianity in the historical life of mankind to be the main content of the epoch of his time. In Tyutchev’s interpretation, the idea of Slavic reciprocity and Slavic unity was based on faith in the historical mission of Russia as a liberator and unifier of the Slavic world, opposing “revolutionary” Europe. At the same time, Russia’s state priorities are clearly visible: the preservation of territorial integrity, the strengthening of political influence, etc. For Tyutchev, one thing did not contradict the other: the interests of Russia objectively coincided with the interests of the Slavic peoples. The conservatism of the idea consisted in the assumption that the Slavic world would be based on the principles of Orthodoxy and monarchical principles. Tyutchev’s ideas about the Slavic peoples and the degree of their closeness had a romantic tinge. Hundreds of years of numbing and perfecting the Slavic peoples have done their job. There was a differentiation of their confessional characteristics, cultural and everyday characteristics, the level of socio-economic development and political consciousness. Realizing all this, Tyutchev, however, considered the similarities to prevail over the differences, believing and hoping for the all-Slavic unity. His idea of Slavic unity was more historiosophical than political and pragmatic. This idea, concentrated in the ideal of an Ecumenical Orthodox Monarchy, was not supported by specific political programs and plans for the establishment of the state of the Slavs [Jong 1997: 58], a detailed justification of the ways and means of its implementation, and therefore may well be classified as never achievable utopias. The process of institutionalization of the pan-Slavist movement played an important role in the development of Russian pan-Slavism. Having appeared in 1858 and 1868, the Moscow and St. Petersburg Slavic Charitable Committees became centers of intellectual and social activity that spread the ideas of the Slavic brotherhood, formed public opinion on the so-called “Eastern question”. The development of the theory of pan-Slavism is closely connected with the events on the Balkan peninsula in the second half of the 19th century and Russia’s policy towards the Slavic peoples. There are three main stages in the formation of panSlavism. The first one was after the end of the Crimean War (1856) to the so-called “Eastern crisis” (1875), the second - from the Eastern crisis and the Russian-Turkish War to the Berlin Peace (1878), and the third - after the Berlin Peace. In the first period, after the defeat in the Crimean War, serious changes took place in Russia’s foreign policy. Russia was forced to exist in conditions of international isolation. The conditions of the Paris Peace were humiliating (the cession of part of Bessarabia and the ban on the restoration of the essentially destroyed Black Sea Fleet), but in the 1860s. Russia was not ready to wage a major war with the Ottoman Empire. Conventionally, this period can be called the period of cultural pan-Slavism. In those years Slavic charitable committees were formed, the ties of Russian scientists and publicists with Slavic figures were strengthened, the situation of the Balkan peoples was actively discussed in the press. At the same time, there could be no question of a political solution to the Slavic question. One of the main figures that vividly characterize the mindset of this period can be called V.I. Lamansky [Prokudin 2016: 70-82; Boldin, Prokudin 2019: 160-162]. During the Eastern crisis, Russia found itself in a difficult political situation. Gorchakov’s office tried by all means to find a peaceful solution to the Balkan problems (Russia was still not ready for big wars). But after the failure of diplomacy and the entry of Serbia and Montenegro into the war with Turkey, the Russian government, which did not want to lose its traditional influence in the Balkans, was forced to declare war on the Ottoman Empire. Slavic charitable committees and pan-Slavist publicists played an important role in the final decision of the government, fueling the outburst of public solidarity with the Southern Slavs. The period of the Eastern crisis can also be called with a certain degree of conditionality a period of political pan-Slavism in Russia. For the first time there was an opportunity to realize the pan-Slavic dreams of expelling the Turks from the Balkans. Now the overwhelming majority of the theorists of Slavic unity openly called for the political unification of the Slavs. General R.A. Fadeev [Gilyazov 2002: 97-111] and N.Ya. Danilevsky, A.I. Vasilchikov were also characteristic representatives of this trend in Russian pan-Slavism. The Berlin Congress put an end to the plans and dreams of the pan-Slavists regarding the complete liberation of the Southern Slavs. The time after the congress can be called a period of stagnation of the pan-Slavist movement [Boldin 2018: 109-128]. In the intellectual environment connected with the activities of Slavic committees, the Messianic and religious-moral ideas of F.M. Dostoevsky prevailed. Dostoevsky’s “cultural” pan-Slavism “In the Slavic world, Dostoevsky is the greatest prophet and the most zealous apostle of the Slavs. The Slavic idea is one of his main prophecies and one of his main messages” [Pr. Justin (Popovich) 2002: 224], the Serbian theologian Justin Popovich wrote in 1931 in the book “Dostoevsky on Europe and the Slavs”. But Dostoevsky does not have a single work in which any pan-Slavic doctrine is presented or a complete system of views on the Slavic question is set out. What allows the Serbian thinker to call him the “apostle of Slavs”, and what kind of “gospel” are we talking about? The basis of Dostoevsky’s views on the all-Slavism can be found in two works written by him on behalf of the Slavic Charitable Society.[29] These two works are a congratulatory “address” to Alexander II, compiled by him for February 19, 1880 - the 25th anniversary of the emperor’s reign, and Dostoevsky’s famous speech at the opening of the monument to Pushkin in June 1880 in Moscow. Dostoevsky also expressed his views on the Slavic question in the issues of the Writer’s Diary. “We, the Slavic society,” Dostoevsky writes in his address to Alexander II, “<…> firmly believe that the question of Slavic unity, as well as the entire East, for its ultimate purposes is also a question of the highest spiritual unification, there is a question of Orthodoxy and its great destinies already in all mankind. For we, together with our great people, also believe that Orthodoxy, united in the nations that profess it, will reveal and will be able to finally reveal the true and already undistorted face of Christ even to the rest of humanity, tormented by unbelief and its spiritual disintegration”.[30] Dostoevsky, who attached much more importance to Orthodoxy as the basis of Russian and common Slavic culture than other theorists of Slavic reciprocity, offers an original interpretation of the goals and objectives of pan-Slavism. With the help of the Orthodox idea, he wants to save not only the Slavs, but also Europe and the rest of the world. That is, the unification of Slavs for Dostoevsky is not an end in itself. This is only an intermediate stage on the way to fraternal unity of the peoples of the whole world. According to Dostoevsky, Slavdom “sanctified by Christ” become a kind of “bridge” to “all-mankind”. The all-Slavism gain their significance in world history only through Christ with his “sacrificial service to all people”, without any national preferences, for the sake of all mankind. Moreover, the unity of the Slavs (pan-Slavism), according to Dostoevsky, is possible and necessary only for “all-service to humanity”. For people of a pragmatic mindset, that is, for the Roman Catholic civilization, such a program, according to Dostoevsky, may look like a utopia, but for an Orthodox person it is a direct conclusion from the Gospel. Dostoevsky assigned the main role in the unification of the Slavic world, as well as in the further service to humanity, to the Russian people. “Russia carries within itself a treasure,” he wrote, “which does not exist anywhere else - Orthodoxy, it is the guardian of Christ’s truth, but already the true truth, the true image of Christ, obscured in all other faiths and in all other peoples”.[31] In fact, Dostoevsky believed that the basic idea of the Russian people, or the “Russian idea”, is Orthodoxy. And “the true essence of Orthodoxy is in the all-service to humanity, to which it is intended”.[32] “To become a real Russian, to become completely Russian”, says Dostoevsky in his “Pushkin” speech, “perhaps, it means only (finally, emphasize this) to become a brother of all people, an all-man, if you like”.[33] “To become a real Russian will precisely mean: to strive to bring reconciliation to the European contradictions already definitively, to indicate the outcome of the European longing in the Russian soul, all-human and allconnecting, to accommodate it with brotherly love of all our brothers, and in the end, maybe, and utter the final word of great, common harmony, fraternal final consent all tribes according to Christ’s gospel law!”.[34] Why did Dostoevsky pin all his hopes on Orthodoxy? In the “Diary of a writer” for 1877, in the article “Three Ideas”, he wrote that three global ideas are competing in the world. This is the idea of Catholicism, which, in his opinion, needs not so much Christ as world domination. The second idea is Protestant pan-Germanism, which believes that “there is no other word in the world higher than the German spirit,” and it is thanks to Germany that European humanity can embark on the path of renewal. And the third idea is “a Slavic idea, an emerging idea containing the ability to resolve human destinies in Europe”.[35] That is, for Dostoevsky, the future of the Eastern question was determined by the Orthodox-Messianic idea, because this Eastern question “is essentially the resolution of the destinies of Orthodoxy. The destinies of Orthodoxy are merged with the appointment of Russia”.[36] Dostoevsky was aware that the roots of Catholicism are deep in the Slavic countries, but he deeply believed in the historical purpose of Orthodoxy for the fate of the Slavic peoples. Orthodoxy, according to Dostoevsky, is the force that at the global level can resist “anti-Christian” Catholicism and expansionist Protestantism, “the two mortal diseases of Europe”, deeper ailments than the historical oppression of the Slavs. The goal of Orthodox civilization, according to the writer (“Orthodox cause” or “Slavic idea”), is “sacrifice, the need to sacrifice even oneself for brothers, and a sense of voluntary duty to the strongest of the Slavic tribes to intercede for the weak… great all-Slavic unity in the name of Christ’s truth, that is, for the benefit of the weak and oppressed in the world… That’s why the Russian people themselves were oppressed and endured the centuries-old burden of the cross - that’s why they did not forget their “Orthodox cause” and their suffering brothers, rose in spirit and heart with perfect readiness to help the oppressed in every way”.[37] Dostoevsky’s pan-Slavist concept, in fact, had no applied character. Russian Russian writer did not call for the expansion of Russian cultural influence in the Slavic countries, as V.I. Lamansky did, and did not inspire Russian society to finally expel the Turks from the Slavic lands, as N.Ya. Danilevsky, R.A. Fadeev and A.I. Vasilchikov did. The question of Slavic unity in the 1880s ceases to be political, becomes a “question of the highest spiritual unification” and is no longer for the protection of Russia or the “Russian-Slavic civilization”, but for the protection of all mankind from the Catholic and Protestant threat. Dostoevsky’s views are still ambiguously evaluated in Slavic countries. Unlike Justin Popovich, a Serb by birth, a connoisseur and admirer of Dostoevsky’s work, the Polish Slavist Andrzej de Lazari spoke very critically about them. In his book on Russian soil science, he writes that giving Dostoevsky’s pan-Slavism an Orthodox appearance, in fact, did not contradict the main provisions of Danilevsky’s “Russia and Europe”, in which “great power chauvinism of the 19th century manifested itself in the crudest form” [Lazari 2004: 95]. According to Lazari, Dostoevsky only changed the names: the “Slavic idea” was replaced by the “Orthodox idea”, identical for him to the “Russian idea”. “The great power and monarchism characteristic of Danilevsky, who wrote that autocracy is organic and therefore necessary for Russia, also characterize Dostoevsky’s worldview. Only one thing distinguishes the two thinkers: if Danilevsky is just a sober, and sometimes cynical politician who weighs what is most politically advantageous to Russia and what is not, then Dostoevsky’s pan-Slavist position is complemented by a utopian ethical-eschatological concept, in which there is a place for Slavophile fantasies about a kind, just, loving people Russian Russian tsar, about the Russian people-the God-bearer, etc.” [Lazari 2004: 100]. Conclusion. Pan-Slavism at the end of the 19th century The further history of the development of the ideology of Slavic reciprocity in Russia in the 19th century is not eventful. The slow decline of the St. Petersburg Slavic Committee since the Berlin Congress continued for almost two more decades. At the same time, at the end of the 1880s, an attempt was made to revive his activities, the idea of organizing a major inter-Slavic action arose. As Z.S. Nenasheva points out, in 1889 the society “provided funds, approved a program” of a trip to the Slavic lands, the purpose of which “was to convene a general Slavic congress”. They were referring to the celebrations on the occasion of the 900th anniversary of the adoption of Christianity in Russia. But “numerous meetings and negotiations with Slavic leaders showed disinterest in convening any Slavic congress, because they were not sure of the expediency of such events. The tour of the Slavic lands once again demonstrated the weakness of integration processes among the Slavs” [Nenasheva 1992: 34-35]. Moreover, many Slavic “political realists” were forced to deny any “common Slavic policy” when everyone had “Russian Poland” in front of their eyes. And Bulgaria, Serbia and Czechia did not hide that “to go along with Russia politically means to risk in one bad minute turning into a “Priveltava” or “Danube Region” or the Balkan governorshipgeneral, ruin their national independence and enter the field of administrative exploits of the Russian bureaucracy”.[38] It is clear that such sentiments did not contribute to the development of the Slavic reciprocity movement in Russia either. Disagreements within the St. Petersburg Slavic Charitable Committee led to its split in 1899. However, this event led to the emergence of several projects for the establishment of new organizations. For example, the project of A.A. Bogolyubov on the foundation of the “Common Slavic Matitsa”, which provided for “the creation of a Slavic library, a museum of fine arts, art crafts and handicrafts of the Slavic peoples, as well as departments of ethnography, archeology, numismatics, special halls for celebrations, and, most notably, a Slavic gymnasium and “Slavic Compound” [Nenasheva 1992: 37]. It should be stated that the ideologists of the “Common Slavic matitsa” in the last decade of the 19th century returned to what the Slavists of the first half of the century began with - to the call to strengthen the cultural ties of “all Slavic peoples.” But even the organizational activities of the special commission, which was tasked with developing the procedure for the upcoming work, did not bring real results. The idea of the “Common Slavic Mother” was destined to remain only on paper. In principle, the ideas of F.I. Tyutchev and propagandists of cultural panSlavism, in particular, F.M. Dostoevsky, in the context of the “Slavic question” that escalated at the end of the twentieth century and has not yet been resolved, sound modern. In particular, the idea of “Slavic reciprocity” can be realized today, as Tyutchev predicted, only through strengthening mutual trust and various ties between Slavic peoples.

About the authors

Anna V. Myrikova

Lomonosov Moscow State University

Author for correspondence.
Email: an_my@mail.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-2028-1770

PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor, Department of the History of Public and Political Doctrines, Faculty of Political Science

Moscow, Russian Federation

Boris A. Prokudin

Lomonosov Moscow State University

Email: probor@bk.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-6590-6706

PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor, Department of the History of Public and Political Doctrines, Faculty of Political Science

Moscow, Russian Federation

References