Validity (Geltung) and Evaluation on Lotze’s Place in the Psychologismusstreit

Lotze’s crucial role in the dispute around psychologism was by no means limited solely to introducing the concept of validity, as is commonly assumed or simply presumed. While it is conceivable to view the opposition between psychologism and antipsychologism as a contrast between blending versus separating psychology and logic, the prevailing approach in the dispute around psychologism has led to a misconception that antipsychologism entails a disregard for questions of subjectivity. Yet, by moving away from superficial generalizations and examining the dispute closer, the opposite conclusion emerges: antipsychologism propelled a profound reevaluation of subjectivity as an indispensable correlational element for justifying the possibility of objective knowledge. From Herbart to Husserl, antipsychologism progressed by formulating a conception of subjectivity that is appropriate to its aims. Lotze represents an intermediate phase in this process, by both decisively departing from Herbart to overcome the naturalistic notion of subjectivity, which enabled the notion of spontaneous evaluation, while still retaining Herbart’s unconditional endorsement of the principle of immanence - a principle that Frege and Husserl explicitly criticize. It is in the latter thinkers that the overcoming of psychologism takes place as the definitive overcoming of naturalism.