Kant’s Project of Practical Anthropology and the Teachings of Vl. Solovyov on the Primary Data of Morality

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Introduction

Most researchers [1–4] agree that Vl. Soloviev was an outstanding connoisseur of Kantian philosophical ideas. He evaluated some of them highly and criticized others. Thus, the Russian thinker repeatedly referred to Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and even included its outline, as well as critical analysis, in The Justification of the Good as an appendix. In this work, Kant wrote: “All philosophy insofar as it is based on grounds of experience can be called empirical; but insofar as it sets forth its teachings simply from a priori principles, it can be called pure philosophy” [5. P. 155] and suggested that the rational part of ethics should be called metaphysics of morality, or morality proper, and the empirical part — practical anthropology. According to Kant, the metaphysics of morality, thoroughly purified from everything empirical, should precede practical anthropology, and he develops it in this work, as well as in the Critique of Practical Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals. However, Kant did not have time to present practical anthropology, which would have analyzed the initial preconditions of good and inclinations to evil in human nature, in the form of a separate treatise.

Solovyov respected Kantian ethics: Kant’s “…analysis of morality into the autonomous and the heteronomous elements, and his formulation of the moral law, is one of the greatest achievements of the human mind” [6. P. 241]. In the early period of his work, he agreed with Kant regarding the correlation between morality and practical anthropology, believing that for ethics, the classification of moral facts and the indication of their material, factual bases in human nature “is part of empirical anthropology or psychology and cannot have claims to any fundamental importance” [7. P. 556]. However, in The Justification of the Good Vl. Solovyov’s position changes radically; he consciously chooses a path opposite to Kant’s and begins his main ethical work not with metaphysical reasoning but with an empirical description of the good in human nature. Hence, the historical and philosophical research task arises to trace how the Kantian project of practical anthropology is transformed in Vladimir Solovyov’s doctrine of the primary data of morality, to describe the evolution of the Russian philosopher’s attitude to Kantian practical philosophy, and to try to identify the reasons for these changes.

Kant’s Project of Practical Anthropology

Anthropological problematics occupies the most critical place in Kant’s philosophical system. In a letter to Stäudlin, Kant fleshes out the three famous questions from the Critique of Pure Reason that unite all the interests of reason: “1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What may I hope?” [8. P. 588], the fourth: “What is man? (anthropology)” [9. P. 554]. In The Jäsche Logic, “we could reckon all of this as anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last one” [10. P. 280]. However, the content of Kant’s concept of anthropology changes in different periods of his work^[1].

In the context of Solovyov’s doctrine of the primary data of morality, we will first be interested in moral or practical anthropology. Kant mentions it for the first time in the preface to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, proclaiming it an empirical part of ethics. The nature of science, according to Kant, requires “that the empirical part always be carefully separated from the rational part, and that <...> a metaphysics of morals [be put] before practical anthropology, with metaphysics carefully cleansed of everything empirical” [5. P. 156]. This is because “the ground of obligation here must not be sought in the nature of the human being or in the circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in concepts of pure reason” [5. P. 156]. Thus, practical anthropology is of secondary importance compared to the metaphysics of morals. However, as soon as the categorical imperative of morality and metaphysical beginnings of the doctrine of virtue are formulated, its turn comes. The moral law needs to pave the way to the will of man and thereby give strength to fulfill: “for the human being is affected by so many inclinations that, though capable of the idea of a practical pure reason, he is not so easily able to make it effective in concreto in the conduct of his life.” [5. P. 157]. Kant develops the same idea in the introduction to Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (in the Second Section: Transition from Popular Moral Philosophy to the Metaphysic of Morals): “a metaphysics of morals cannot be based upon anthropology but can still be applied to it”  [12. P. 238]. According to Kant, moral anthropology is based on experience and has the following structure: first, “[teaching on] the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder men or help them in fulfilling the laws of a metaphysics of morals” [12. P. 238]; secondly, “[teaching on] the development, spreading, and strengthening of moral principles (in education in schools and in popular instruction)” [12. P. 238]; thirdly, “other similar teachings and precepts based on experience [12. P. 238]. Moreover, Kant recites his thesis from The Metaphysics of Morals: “It [i.e., moral anthropology] cannot be dispensed with, but it must not precede a metaphysics of morals or be mixed with it” [12. P. 238].

Unfortunately, Kant did not write a separate work that would have developed the ideas of practical anthropology under this scheme. I share H. Klemme’s conviction that “the lectures on pragmatic anthropology, and the ‘Anthropology’ of 1798 itself, are certainly not identical with moral, or practical, anthropology” [11. P. 26], because Kant analyzes the hindering or favorable conditions for the fulfillment of the moral law, which are in human nature, not so much in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View or Lectures on Pragmatic Anthropology, as in Religion within reason alone and in Metaphysics of Morals.

In the first part of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason Kant defines the nature of man as “the subjective ground — wherever it may lie —  of the exercise of the human being’s freedom in general (under objective moral laws) antecedent to every deed that falls within the scope of the senses”  [13. P. 20]. From this, according to Kant, it follows that the basis of good or evil is exclusively in the maxim of the action. The maxim of self-love, which acts as a condition of compliance with the moral law, although it can be realized from the empirical point of view in legal (not contradicting morality) actions, from the speculative perspective, looks like moral evil. On the contrary, if the only motive for action was the moral law, which a person made his maxim, and self-love was not taken into account, then such an action is good and has moral value.

Then Kant undertakes “anthropological research” [13. P. 25] to establish whether a person (and humankind as a whole) is good or evil by nature and describes both the original givens of good and inclinations to evil. Kant divides the original predispositions of goodness into three classes: 1. The predisposition to the animality of the human being, as a living being; 2. To the humanity in him, as a living and at the same time rational being; 3. To his personality, as a rational and at the same time responsible being” [13. P. 26]. The first ones are not rooted in any reason and correspond to “physical or merely mechanical self-love” [13. P. 26]. Kant attributes to them the desire for self-preservation, for the continuation of the species (and the care of children), as well as the attraction to sociability. Human traits are related to physical comparative self-love; they motivate a person to achieve and defend his or her value in the eyes of other people (initially as equality with them). Although both types of these predispositions can be inculcated with all kinds of vices (the traits of animalism, when deviating from the goals of nature, turn into the beastly vices of gluttony, lust, and wild lawlessness, and the traits of humanity morph into the vices of culture, and Kant calls them devilish vices: envy, ingratitude, malevolence, etc.), at the highest degree, exceeding the goals of nature. etc. at the highest degree exceeding humanity), the very tasks of animalism and humanity “in the human being are not only (negatively) good (they do not resist the moral law) but they are also predispositions to the good (they demand compliance with it)” [13. P. 28]. These tasks are required for the possibility of human nature, people cannot destroy them, although they can use them against their purpose. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant once again turns to these moral qualities and considers the predisposition of animality in the context of man’s duty to himself as an animal being and the givens of humanity partly as a kind of man’s duty to himself, considered only as a moral being, but mainly when discussing the duties of virtue towards others.

Kant calls “the susceptibility to respect for the moral law as of itself a sufficient incentive to the power of choice.” [13. P. 27]. Until a moral revolution in the way of thinking has happened to a person (the transition from the maxims of self-love to the moral law as the only basis for action), they exist only in the possibility, but unlike the two previous classes, in personality predispositions “nothing evil can be grafted” [13. P. 27]. Simultaneously with the revolution in the field of thoughts, according to Kant, man begins a gradual reform of the way of feeling, allowing him to constantly move from bad to better, i.e., to engage in boundless moral self-improvement. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant’s personality tasks correspond to the preliminary aesthetic concepts of the soul’s receptivity to the concepts of duty in general, namely moral feeling, conscience, love of neighbor and respect for oneself, these are “natural predispositions of the mind (praedispositio) for being affected by concepts of duty” [12. P. 441], and every person has them from nature. Further, Kant emphasizes that all these mental experiences do not have an independent meaning for morality and arise only after the impact of the moral law on the soul. Thus, moral feeling is “the susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty” [12. P. 441] is entirely conditioned by “a susceptibility on the part of free choice to be moved by pure practical reason (and its law)” [12. P. 442]. Conscience is “practical reason holding man’s duty before him for his acquittal or condemnation in every case that comes under a law” [12. P. 442]. It acts on man’s moral sense through an act of reason and is an inevitable fact. However, man may ignore its judgments (therefore, to cultivate conscience, according to Kant, is a moral duty, albeit indirect). The duty of love for Kant is nonsense because any duty is a compulsion, and “What is done from constraint, however, is not done from love” [12. P. 443]. Yet, to do good to other people to the best of our ability is a duty. It does not depend on whether we love them or not. Finally, Kant’s sense of self-respect is synonymous with duty: the moral law in man “unavoidably forces from him respect for his own being, and this feeling (which is of a special kind) is the basis of certain duties, that is, of certain actions that are consistent with his duty to himself” [12. P. 445].

Kant also divides inclinations to evil in human nature into three degrees: frailty (moral weakness), impurity, and depravity (wickedness). By inclination he understands “the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination (habitual desire, concupiscentia), insofar as this possibility is contingent for humanity in general” [13. P. 28]. In Kant, disposition (Hang) always precedes inclination (Neigung) as a potency, in other words, inclination is “only the predisposition to desire an enjoyment” [13. P. 28], if a person has experienced it, giving rise to inclination. A strong inclination that excludes any possibility of self-control, Kant calls passion. Kant distinguishes passion in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason from affect, since it refers to the faculty of desire, and affect is related to feelings of pleasure and displeasure. Unlike predispositions, inclinations cannot be conceptualized as innate to man; they are either benignly acquired (if good) or acquired (if evil) by man himself. Evil inclinations are the subjective basis of the possibility of deviation of maxims from the moral law, “the evil heart” [13. P. 29]. The fragility (fragilitas) of human nature is expressed in the fact that the moral law subjectively turns out to be a weaker motive than inclination. Unscrupulousness (impuritas, improbitas) means the human tendency to perform “actions conforming to duty are not done purely from duty [13. P. 30]. A person mostly (and maybe always) needs other motives to act as moral duty requires. Finally, Kant’s malice (vitiositas, pravitas) is “the propensity of the power of choice to maxims that subordinate the incentives of the moral law to others (not moral ones)”. [13. P. 30]. Although malice can be combined with legal actions that do not contradict moral duty, it indicates a non-moral way of thinking. Therefore, according to Kant, such a person is correctly called evil.

Let us summarize the preliminary results of the reconstruction of Kant’s project of practical anthropology. According to Kant, a person as a noumenal being realizes the moral law and can never renounce its command, while as a phenomenal being he strives for happiness and is guided by the subjective principle of self-love. The nature of man contains both the primordial inclinations to good (contributing to the fulfillment of the moral law) and the inclinations to evil (opposing it). Human behavior is always influenced by two motives: the moral law and the law of self-love. Man is naturally inclined to make “the incentives of self-love and their inclinations the condition of compliance with the moral law” [13. P. 37], which is contrary to the moral order and at best leads only to legal actions, empirically good, but mentally evil. Therefore, according to Kant, from nature man is evil, although he has the original prerequisites of good. He can always independently make a moral revolution in his heart, which from the empirical point of view will be “an ever-continuing striving for the better, hence as a gradual reformation of the propensity to evil, of the perverted attitude of mind” [13. P. 51].

Vl. Solovyov’s Doctrine of the Primary Data of Morality

Vladimir Solovyov expounds his doctrine of the primary data of morality in The Justification of the Good. It was the result of many years of reflection on ethical issues and is marked by the great (both positive and negative) influence of Kantian philosophical heritage. Even the title of the first part of The Justification of the Good and its first sentence — “However convincing or authoritative a moral teaching may be, it will remain fruitless and devoid of power unless it finds a secure foundation in the moral nature of man [6. P. 119] — refer the reader to Kant’s project of practical anthropology. If for Kant the metaphysics of morality should precede empirical descriptions of the good in man, Vl. Soloviev, seeking to complement and improve the German philosopher, consciously chooses a diametrically opposite path. However, this was not always the case. In the early period of his work, Vl. Solovyov, by his admission, “in matters purely philosophical was under the predominant influence of Kant and partly Schopenhauer” [7. P. 549].

In the first edition of The Justification of the Good as an appendix  Vl. Solovyov publishes his work The Formal Principle of Morality (Kant) — Exposition and Evaluation with Critical Comments on Empirical Ethics, which is a reproduction (with amendments) of a part of his 1880 doctoral thesis Critique of Abstract Principle. The content of this text shows that Solovyov was brilliantly familiar with Kantian ethics. He was also aware of Kant’s idea from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals on the division of ethics into pure and empirical: “It is necessary to distinguish ethics as purely empirical cognition from ethics as a philosophical doctrine” [7. P. 556]. Vl. Solovyov agrees with Kant that the moral law having absolute necessity “can lie neither in the nature of this or that creature, for example, a human being, nor in the conditions of the external world, in which these creatures are placed; but this basis must lie in the a priori concepts of pure reason, common to all rational beings” [7. P. 558]. That is, the Russian thinker fully shares the Kantian point of view and believes that it is possible to formulate a moral law only through metaphysical research, abstracting from everything empirical, including the data of psychology, anthropology, the study of human nature. Also, like Kant, Solovyov argues that “we attribute to the moral principle, as such, unconditional binding, regardless of whether we have at this moment in our nature empirical conditions for the actual realization of this principle in ourselves or others” [7. P. 557]. Finally, Soloviev, following Kant, states that people’s will does not fully agree with practical reason, and therefore their “actions, recognized objectively as necessary, are subjectively accidental, and the determination of such will in accordance with objective laws is coercion”  [7. P. 562]. Consequently, like Kant, Vl. Solovyov believes that empirically good action “has no moral value only when it is performed solely by mere inclination, without any consciousness of duty or obligation, for then it is only an accidental psychological fact that has no universal, objective meaning” [7. P. 574].

Further, ethical divergences between Kant and Solovyov commence. According to Solovyov, when the consciousness of duty and natural inclination are combined in a person’s action, it “increases the moral value of the action”  [7. P. 574–575]. Duty is a form of moral principle, and inclination is a material psychological motive of moral activity, referring to experience. From  Vl. Solovyov’s point of view, they “cannot contradict each other, as they refer to different sides of the matter — material and formal” [7. P. 575]. Form and matter are paired categories, they are equally necessary, so “the rational principle of morality as an unconditional duty or obligation, that is, a universal and necessary law for a rational being, is quite compatible with the experiential beginning of morality as a natural inclination to sympathy in a living being” [7. P. 575].

This critical remark of Vl. Solovyov concerning Kant’s ethics is very close to the reasoning of F. Schiller in On Grace and Dignity: “the moral perfection of a person can be manifest only in the share which his inclination takes in his moral action”. [14. P. 145]. In the second edition of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant added a note with the answer to Schiller’s objections:  “I readily grant that I am unable to associate gracefulness with the concept of duty, by reason of its very dignity. For the concept of duty includes unconditional necessitation, to which gracefulness stands in direct contradiction [13. P. 23]. From Kant’s point of view, the harmony between moral duty and sensual inclination in committing actions leads to the confusion of legal and moral acts, as well as to the inevitable self-deception­—a person will mistakenly attach moral value to an act, although not contradicting the requirement of moral duty, but committed primarily out of inclination and self-love. Vl. Solovyov rightly objects to this, actually defending the position of Schiller: “according to Kant’s observation, there is no way to determine whether these actions are actually committed by virtue of one moral principle or by other, extraneous motives, that is, whether they actually have moral dignity or not; and hence it follows that we can never decide whether this acting subject has the character of righteousness or not, that is, we cannot distinguish in empirical reality righteous from unrighteous, and therefore, not” [7. P. 577]. Consequently, Kant in his ethics is limited only to the potential possession of good, and people, according to Vl. Soloviev, are defined by the Königsberg philosopher as reasonable beings, only “capable of being or becoming moral” [7. P. 577].

There needs to be more for the Russian thinker. First, he believes that if we share Kant’s theory of cognition, then since all beings without exception are unknowable things in themselves, we “cannot have any grounds, either empirical or speculative, to oppose unconditionally reasonable beings to unreasonable ones and to limit the moral domain to the first ones” [7. P. 578]. Therefore, a person is obliged to treat morally people and all other living things, including animals. From the empirical point of view, it is expressed in the principle “harm no one and help everyone as much as you can” [7. P. 578]. Secondly, for Vl. Solovyov, the good in man, as in other beings, is actual, not potential: “the good exists”  [6. P. 245]. He undertakes empirical anthropological research to find the primary principles of morality in human nature and constitute the indivisible basis  of universal morality, on which “all that is of importance in ethics must rest”  [6. P. 119]. There are three of these givens: feelings of shame, pity and reverence. According to Solovyov, shame is a uniquely human feeling, which any animal can never experience, but for pity and awe he finds correspondences in the world of living nature. This is explained by the fact that in Solovyov’s case shame defines man’s ethical attitude to his material nature: “Man is ashamed of being dominated or ruled by it (especially in its chief manifestation), and thereby asserts his inner independence and his superior dignity in relation to it, in virtue of which he must possess and not be possessed by it [6. P. 126–127]. A person feels pity to people, as well as to all other living beings, it consists in the fact that a person “is conscious in a corresponding manner of the suffering or the want of others,^[2]  i.e. responds to it more or less painfully, thus more or less exhibiting his solidarity with the others [6. P. 127]. Finally, a person shows reverence in relation to what is recognized by him as the highest. “This feeling of reverence (reverential) or of awe (piety, pietas) before the higher forms in man the moral basis of religion, and of the religious order of life” [6. P. 129].

According to Vl. Solovyov, these three feelings “exhaust the sphere of man’s possible moral relations to that which is below him, that which is on a level with him, and that which is above him” [6. P. 130], and the “highest moral doctrine can be no other than a complete and correct development of the ultimate data of human morality, for the universal demands involved in them cover the whole sphere of possible human relations [6. P. 134]. However, to justify the moral order in humanity, these feelings are not enough. Vl. Solovyov and in Justification of the Good expresses in full accordance with the Kantian thought that “All the actual manifestations of our moral nature are merely particular and accidental in character… But reason, which is as innate in man as the moral feelings, from the first puts to his moral nature its demand for universality and necessity” [6. P. 134]. As well for Kant, for Solovyov, the idea of the good is inherent in the human mind as a postulate, and the “separation between moral good and happiness is then merely conditional: the absolute good involves also the fulness of happiness”  [6. P. 240]. However, Kant’s reasoning path, from the point of view of Vl. Solovyov, “can certainly not be pronounced satisfactory” [6. P. 240].

The wrong path Kant, according to Vl. Solovyov, chooses because of “the one-sided subjective idealism which is characteristic of his philosophy as a whole” [6. P. 240]. Kant is mistaken when he “pronounces all motives other than pure reverence for the moral law to be foreign to true morality. This is unquestionably true of motives of selfish gain, which induce us to do good for our own advantage” [6. P. 241]. Although Kant’s conclusion is logically correct,  Vl. Solovyov notes that “the supreme court of appeal to which he [i.e. Kant] himself refers — conscience — does not adopt this point of view” [6. P. 242] and in confirmation of his words, cites a famous epigram by F. Schiller. According to Solovyov, “In truth, conscience simply demands that we should stand in the right relation to everything, but it says nothing as to whether this right relation should take the form of an abstract consciousness of general principles, or directly express itself as an immediate feeling, or — what is best — should unite both these aspects. This is the question as to the degrees and forms of moral development” [6. P. 242]. In other words, depending on the level of their own moral culture, people can perceive the Good as the voice of practical reason, as moral feeling, and as their unity. According to Vl. Solovyov’s standpoint is that all these three ways have equal moral value.

According to Solovyov, “Kant’s ‘idealism’ deprives the mental as well as the visible world of its reality” [6. P. 243]. Postulating the immortality of the soul and the existence of God cannot give Kantian ethics credibility: “Every sceptic or ‘critical philosopher’ has, however, a perfect right to turn this argument against Kant. Since pure morality can only be based upon the existence of God and an immortal soul, and the certainty of these ideas cannot be proved, pure morality dependent upon these ideas cannot be proved either, and must remain a mere supposition” [6. P. 244]. Therefore, if the moral law has an unconditional value (neither Kant nor Solovyov doubted that), it must be autonomous and rest on itself. Nevertheless, if we stop there, as Kant did, then, according to Vl. Solovyov, the categorical imperative will be only “an abstract formula hanging in the air” [6. P. 244]. To make the moral law binding, effective and valid, Vl. Soloviev appeals to God and the immortal soul as its sources: “God and the soul are not the postulates of the moral law, but the direct creative forces of the moral reality”  [6. P. 244–245].

God, understood as the reality of superhuman Good, according to Solovyov, nourishes the collective life of humankind, conditions its moral progress, and refers to the immortality of the soul: “If moral life, both collective and personal, be understood as the interaction between man (and humanity) and the perfect, superhuman good, it cannot belong to the sphere of the transitory material events. In other words, both the individual and the collective soul must be immortal”  [6. P. 245–246].

This interpretation of moral life indicates the importance of the property of Sobornost for the ethical doctrine of V. Soloviev. According to V.N. Bryushinkin, “it is both super-rational and sensual, which establishes a direct connection between individuals, which, as a rule, is not fully realized” [2. P. 26]. Therefore, Vl. Solovyov does not consider Kant’s exclusively rational ethics sufficient and calls it “moral chemistry” [6. P. 242], and proposes to supplement it with three non-rational moral feelings and the suprarational living God, who turns out to be the supreme undoubted knowledge that sets the meaning of human existence: “one thing we know with certainty: ‘As the Lord liveth, my soul liveth’. If we give up this fundamental truth we cease to understand and to affirm ourselves as moral beings, that is, we give up the very meaning of our life.” [6. P. 246]. However, these additions return Vl. Solovyov to the heteronomous model of ethics, criticized by Kant in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason”, where Kant directly writes that the doctrine of the postulates of practical reason does not mean that “necessary to assume the existence of God as a ground of all obligation in general” [15. P. 523].

Conclusion

Thus, Vl. Solovyov, knowing about Kant’s project of practical anthropology, which was planned but not fully realized, empirically studies human nature in The Justification of the Good and finds in it the initial prerequisites of morality. Therefore, the main ethical work of the Russian thinker can be regarded as a kind of continuation and supplement of Kant’s practical philosophy. Of course, Solovyov, while recognizing the significance of Kant’s ideas, did not share them all. For instance, suppose Kant, even though he states the presence of goodness in human nature, still tends to conclude that by nature, man is evil. In that case, Solovyov emphasizes the primary data of human morality, the feelings of shame, pity, and awe. For him, these non-rational components form the matter of goodness and are as significant as reason, which sets its form. Therefore, for  Vl. Solovyov (as for F. Schiller, but not for I. Kant) such a moral act is preferable, where the dictates of moral duty and the sensual inclination to do good are harmoniously combined. One can draw an analogy between this idea of the Russian thinker and Kant’s theory of cognition: in Kant’s case, sensual data act as a guarantor of applying categories within the limits of actual experience and are a component of empirical knowledge about phenomena. In Solovyov’s case, the abstract rational form of the categorical imperative receives its content thanks to moral feelings, which give efficacy to the moral law in people’s lives. However, to guarantee the genuine goodness of irrational moral feelings, Solovyov has to appeal to the super-rational living God, who is the force that gives validity to the morally good, and this deprives his ethical concept of the autonomy of morality, which is possible only in pure formal ethics.

_{¹ Ref., for instance, H.F. Klemme’s article The Notion of Anthropology in Kant’s Philosophy [11].}

_{² Interestingly, in Religion within the limits of reason alone, Kant calls compassion a “kindly instinct” [13. P. 31] and notes that it can induce both observance and violation of the moral law  [13. P. 31]. Therefore, the situation when an act committed out of compassion is consistent with the categorical imperative of morality is “purely accidental” [13. P. 31].}

About the authors

Sergey V. Lugovoy

Author for correspondence.
Email: SLugovoi@kantiana.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4323-2173

PhD in Philosophy, Associate Professor, Senior Research Fellow, Kantian Rationality Lab & Academia Kantiana; Associate Professor, Institute of Education and The Humanities

References