Traces of Kantian Apriorism in the Views of F.A. Golubinsky and V.D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov

The topic of the influence of I. Kant’s heritage on Russian spiritual-academic philosophy has many unexplained points to date. In particular, the origins of F.A. Golubinsky’s and V.D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov's (hereinafter Kudryavtsev) views on the a priori forms of cognition have not yet been investigated. The definition of these views, on the one hand, will allow us to better understand the movement of Russian philosophical thought in the 19th century, and, on the other hand, will show the value of Kant’s Copernican turn for Russian religious thought. The aim of the research is to show the significance of Kantian apriorism for the theories of cognition of Golubinsky and Kudryavtsev. The main methods of the study are philosophical analysis of texts, historical reconstruction and comparativist analysis. The study found that Golubinsky and Kudryavtsev in their views on the a priori forms of cognition adhered to Kantian metaphysical interpretation (deduction) of the a priori forms of sensuality and categories of pure understanding, but at the same time criticised their transcendental interpretation (deduction). Both Russian philosophers attributed space, time and categories of understanding not only to subjective forms of cognition, but also to forms of being of things in themselves. It is also shown that Golubinsky’s and Kudryavtsev’s views on the a priori were formed under the influence of those critics of Kant who sought to “clarify” and “correct” him, in particular I.A. Fessler and A.F. Trendelenburg. As a result, it is concluded that Golubinsky’s and Kudryavtsev’s concepts of apriorism can be characterised as modifications of Kantian apriorism, which indicates the significant importance of Kantian theoretical philosophy for Golubinsky’s and Kudryavtsev’s epistemological attitudes.