RUDN Journal of Political Science

The “cancel culture” becomes a mechanism for forming civilizational identity. Within the framework of the constructivist approach, civilizational communities are viewed as ways of responding to the formation of national narratives that attempt to combine cultural diversity and relative political unity in the context of competition between modernist projects. Key axes of conflict have been identified: postcolonialism versus realism, global versus particular, secular versus religious. A shift towards moderately isolationist positions in modernity projects is noted, given the lack of resources to impose their civilizational projections as universal. The process of using the mechanisms of “cancel culture” is described, not only to securitize one’s civilizational identity, but also to construct an alternative project of modernity. The mechanism of “double construction” of civilizational identity through “cancel culture” is observed: the creation not only of the image of the “Other”, but also of its historical projection, which acts as the antithesis of the civilizational past. However, by creating the “Other”, the subject initiating the “cancellation” also transforms its own identity under the influence of the image it has created. Due to the lack of communication between competing projects, internal tensions intensify, and the conflict becomes symbolically significant as it begins to touch upon the historical foundations of a particular civilizational community.

The image of the defender of the Fatherland is a key symbolic mediator that connects abstract categories of values and identity with specific behavioral practices. He is a cultural model, a figure embodying traditional values. The article reconstructs and analyzes the value-normative content of the defender of the Fatherland image, which dominates public perceptions and official political discourse. The methodological basis on which this distinction is based is the approach of A. Assman, which highlights the culture of memory, the bearer of which is society, and the historical policy implemented by the state. Thus, the image of the defender of the Fatherland is interpreted in the context of the historical policy of the Russian state. The key attention is paid to considering the image in the context of political and legal mechanisms and models for ensuring commemorative practices aimed not only at fixing and preserving it for future generations, but also protecting it from desecration and belittling the exploits of defenders who form the basis of the image. The “tension” between public perceptions and official discourse is a key issue of the study, which draws conclusions about potential risks in the form of image instrumentalization, simplification of historical memory and the formation of unstable ideas.

In contemporary political studies, there is growing interest in understanding the values and worldviews of young people in the context of historical memory as a mechanism for the formation of national identity. The Russian political and cultural tradition is characterised by the existence of stable value-based and worldview foundations linked to notions of faith and spirituality, truth and justice, the will as positive freedom, patriotism and collectivism, and their reflection in historical events and contemporary socio-political practices. In this regard, the study aims to identify which historical events and images are perceived by young people as illustrations of these value imperatives. The work is based on data from a nationwide survey of young people aged 14-35, conducted in the autumn of 2025. The study employs a multi-stage proportional stratified sample with a total volume of 2,700 respondent. The results of the study show that the value and worldview orientations traditional to the Russian people are represented in the perceptions of young people, first and foremost, in the heroic episodes of our country’s history, among which the Great Patriotic War is the most significant.

An important role in the study of the processes of transformation of collective memory is played by the study of founding myths as fundamental events of national history that encode collective ideas about the past and related identities. In Russia, conflicts around the myth of the founding of the state can be considered using the example of three key military events - the Battle of Kulikovo, the Stand on the Ugra River and the Battle of Molodi. The study of memorial conflicts in the public space demonstrates the clash of the traditional Russian myth of opposing the Horde and the competing Turkic-centric myth of the Horde as the matrix of Russian statehood. An analysis of the array of comments on videos dedicated to the military events of the Russian founding myth allows us to identify eight main discursive strategies of “demythologization” aimed at challenging the traditional founding myth. At the same time, the dominant strategies of “demythologization” form a single “Eurasian-Horde” narrative complex corresponding to the memorial conflict of the founding myths.

The instrumentalization of the Islamic factor during the ideological and geopolitical confrontation between the USSR and Nazi Germany in World War II acquires new resonance amid the ongoing reconfiguration of the traditional political architecture of the world. History becomes not merely a political instrument but lays claim to the legitimizing status of political reality. Under conditions in which religion emerges as a defining variable of contemporary politics, the construction of a coherent past for a multinational country possessing civilizational status constitutes a task of national security. The theoretical and methodological foundation of this study draws upon both classical conceptions of the politics of memory (P. Nora and A. Assmann), wherein the latter is understood as a means of identity formation and the management of complex historical experience, and contemporary methodological approaches that conceptualize religious organizations as political actors aligned with the state and transmitting the state agenda. Accordingly, the construction of Soviet political reality as divided along confessional lines contradicts the image of the past currently elaborated by Russia’s official Muslim institutions. The article identifies mechanisms whereby contradictory historical experience is transformed into a consolidating state narrative, while drawing a principled analytical distinction between the properly confessional (Islamic) and ethnonational dimensions of identity-dimensions frequently conflated in the existing literature. The contemporary discourse of institutionalized Islamic organizations in Russia is predicated on a strategy of selective memory, wherein the heroization of participation in the Great Patriotic War serves as an instrument for the legitimation of confessional structures within the system of state-c onfessional relations.

Changes in toponymy became a significant aspect of symbolic confrontation during the political crisis in Ukraine (2014-2022) and the special military operation (2022-2024). During the period under review, the toponymic policy of the Kiev regime, built along the ideological lines of “decommunization” and, since 2022, “de-russification,” remained primarily “offensive,” focused on the symbolic recoding of the space of the south-east of the former Ukrainian SSR. In turn, the DPR and LPR limited themselves to criticizing Kiev’s toponymic initiatives. At the same time, the very rejection of the prospect of “decommunization” of Donbass played an important role in strengthening the new identities of both republics and mobilizing the population in their support. The start of the Special military operation opened up the prospect of the return of the territories of Donbass occupied by the Kiev regime, which allowed the leadership of the DPR and LPR to switch to their own toponymic policy, which was based on the idea of returning to the names used in Ukraine before the 2014 coup. At the same time, the toponymic landscape of Donbass continued to be filled with names associated with the names of the fallen heroes of the “Russian Spring” and the Special military operation. This trend, which coincided with a similar trend in the rest of Russia, in 2022-2023 ensured the organic inclusion of Donbass in the contour of the all-Russian toponymic policy.

The presented case of symbolic politics considers the confrontation between the central government and the local community in the field of memory management in post-conflict Mariupol. The starting point of the study is the establishment of control of military units loyal to Kyiv over the city. The package of memorial laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada enshrined the glorification of the OUN and UPA (recognized in the Russian Federation as extremist organizations and banned) as the main direction of state memory policy and created the legal basis for “voluntary-forced” decommunization. The research question is what methods the central government uses to impose alien ideological attitudes on local communities and what forms of resistance the latter uses under legislative pressure. The methodological basis of the work is the case stage, combined with a toolkit of symbolic policy and institutional analysis, including the study of administrative practices, grassroots initiatives and acts of sabotage. The work shows that local elites minimized nationalist propaganda in the renaming processes, which contradicted the position of the Kyiv regime, which tried to manipulate public opinion through marginal public organizations and parties. As a result of dismantling and renaming (including decisions of the city council and the head of the regional administration), a model is fixed where the central government uses legislative novels and administrative pressure, and the local community uses available forms of sabotage of this policy.

The First World War - and especially the Battle of Gallipoli (1915-1916), known in Turkish historiography as the Battle of Çanakkale - has long played a crucial role in the historical consciousness of the Turkish people, serving as a cornerstone for the construction of Turkish national myth and identity. However, under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the representation of the Ottoman Empire’s involvement in its last major war is undergoing significant changes compared to the “classical” Kemalist vision for Turkey. The ideology of neo-Ottomanism introduces substantial adjustments to this image, shifting accents and replacing certain plots and meanings with others - often directly or indirectly opposed to the traditional memory of the First World War, as upheld by the main political rivals of R.T. Erdoğan, particularly the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP), which represents the center-left opposition. The authors conclude that while the overarching narrative of defending the homeland from the invading Entente powers, celebrating the brilliant victories of the Turkish army, and emphasizing the special role of Mustafa Kemal - who saved the state’s capital during the Dardanelles campaign - remains intact, the neo-Ottoman vision of history significantly alters the traditional approach to constructing collective memory of these events. It reorients emphases and actively promotes its own narratives and counter-narratives.

The 1999 NATO aggression on Yugoslavia represents a major trauma in modern Serbian society. This article examines the public narratives and commemorative practices surrounding this event employed by the Serbian state governments and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), tracing their evolution from the conflict’s end until 2024, with a focus on the years between 2015 and 2024. In the early 2000s, a clear divergence emerged. Post-2000 governments, focused on integration into Western-dominated institutions, like the European Union, downplayed and sidelined the remembrance of the NATO aggression. Conversely, the SOC consistently upheld a narrative of injustice and victimhood. After 2015, the Serbian government began adopting a more assertive commemorative policy. The state narrative became increasingly complex, oscillating between calls for reconciliation and outright defiance. Throughout this period, the SOC’s discourse remained steadfast, emphasizing victimhood and heroic sacrifice. Ultimately, the state’s narrative has converged with the Church’s, forming a symbiotic relationship. This partnership combines the state’s organizational power with the public trust enjoyed by the Church, particularly among younger generations, skeptical of government officials. This relationship has made the narrative of victimhood increasingly prominent within Serbian public consciousness.

The author engages in a dialogue with the authors of “The Politics of Historical Memory and Commemoration in Africa” about what it means for young African societies to develop their own historical memory outside the context of colonial determinism. The dialogue is structured through a review of this work, emphasizing its key structural elements. Key issues include the decolonization of the culture and history of African societies, the search for integrated, synthetic forms of national identity, challenging colonial determinism in history and culture, the conflict between official approaches to interpreting history and its public perception, the potential for societal division based on contradictions in historical memory, and the question of nostalgia for the colonial past.