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<article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:ali="http://www.niso.org/schemas/ali/1.0/" article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.2" xml:lang="en"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">RUDN Journal of Political Science</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="en">RUDN Journal of Political Science</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="ru"><trans-title>Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Политология</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn publication-format="print">2313-1438</issn><issn publication-format="electronic">2313-1446</issn><publisher><publisher-name xml:lang="en">Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia named after Patrice Lumumba (RUDN University)</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">53430</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22363/2313-1438-2026-28-3-710-730</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="edn">IXPWNT</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="toc-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>THE GREEN AGENDA AT THE SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="toc-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ЗЕЛЕНАЯ ПОВЕСТКА НА НАДНАЦИОНАЛЬНОМ УРОВНЕ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="article-type"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title xml:lang="en">Drivers of Coalition Formation Аmong Developing Countries in the UNFCCC Process</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="ru"><trans-title>Факторы формирования коалиций развивающихся государств в рамках переговорного процесса Рамочной конвенции ООН об изменении климата</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3001-8979</contrib-id><contrib-id contrib-id-type="scopus">57299912300</contrib-id><contrib-id contrib-id-type="spin">7439-1442</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name xml:lang="en"><surname>Chistikova</surname><given-names>Anna A.</given-names></name><name xml:lang="ru"><surname>Чистикова</surname><given-names>Анна Артёмовна</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Junior Research Fellow, Institute for the Economics of Natural Resources and Climate Change</p></bio><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>младший научный сотрудник Института экономики природных ресурсов и изменения климата</p></bio><email>ashuranova@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff1"><aff><institution xml:lang="en">HSE University</institution></aff><aff><institution xml:lang="ru">Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2026-11-15" publication-format="electronic"><day>15</day><month>11</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>28</volume><issue>3</issue><issue-title xml:lang="en">Green Politics</issue-title><issue-title xml:lang="ru">Зеленая политика</issue-title><fpage>710</fpage><lpage>730</lpage><history><date date-type="received" iso-8601-date="2026-11-16"><day>16</day><month>11</month><year>2026</year></date></history><permissions><copyright-statement xml:lang="en">Copyright ©; 2026, Chistikova A.A.</copyright-statement><copyright-statement xml:lang="ru">Copyright ©; 2026, Чистикова А.А.</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2026</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Chistikova A.A.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Чистикова А.А.</copyright-holder><ali:free_to_read xmlns:ali="http://www.niso.org/schemas/ali/1.0/"/><license><ali:license_ref xmlns:ali="http://www.niso.org/schemas/ali/1.0/">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0</ali:license_ref></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://journals.rudn.ru/political-science/article/view/53430">https://journals.rudn.ru/political-science/article/view/53430</self-uri><abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The international political process on climate change is institutionally enshrined primarily in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Conferences of the Parties (COPs), where the main directions of climate policy and the allocation of responsibilities are agreed upon. Negotiations are structured around intergovernmental coalitions. Historically, coalitions were formed based on status within the Convention itself - that is, membership in its Annexes. However, although under these conditions the common interests of developing countries are represented by a single, largest coalition - the “Group of 77 and China” - narrower groups have also emerged. It is proposed to categorize such coalitions according to the general mechanisms by which they are formed. For each coalition, the key characteristics of their negotiating positions are outlined, followed by a quantitative analysis of factors relevant to the climate context on which these groups may demonstrate homogeneity. It is concluded that many of the coalitions examined are characterized by homogeneity in terms of indicators relevant to the formation of their negotiating positions. The reasons for the low homogeneity of a number of coalitions have been identified; this is characteristic of groups formed primarily along political lines and of coalitions of countries with common geographical features. For different coalitions, the indicators along which their homogeneity is observed vary depending on the mechanisms of their formation and the principles underlying their negotiating positions.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="ru"><p>Международный политический процесс по климату институционально оформлен прежде всего в Рамочной конвенции ООН об изменении климата (РКИК ООН) и ее Конференциях сторон (КС), где согласуются основные направления климатической политики и распределение ответственности. Переговоры структурированы вокруг межгосударственных коалиций. Исторически коалиции формировались по статусу в самой Конвенции, т.е. принадлежности к ее Приложениям. Однако несмотря на то, что в этих условиях общие интересы развивающихся государств представлены единой крупнейшей коалицией - «„Группой 77“ и Китаем», сформировались и более узкие группы. Предложено выделить категории таких коалиций согласно общим механизмам их формирования. Для каждой коалиции приводятся ключевые характеристики их переговорных позиций, а затем проводится количественный анализ релевантных в климатическом контексте факторов, по которым данные группы могут демонстрировать однородность. Сделан вывод о том, что для многих из рассмотренных коалиций характерна однородность по показателям, релевантным для формирования их переговорной позиции. Выявлены причины низкой однородности ряда коалиций, что характерно для групп, сформированных в первую очередь с политической ориентацией, и коалиций стран с общими географическими особенностями. Для различных коалиций показатели, по которым наблюдается их однородность, различаются в зависимости от механизмов их формирования и принципов, на которых основывается их переговорная позиция.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>international climate change coalitions</kwd><kwd>climate change negotiations</kwd><kwd>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</kwd><kwd>developing countries</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>международные климатические коалиции</kwd><kwd>климатические переговоры</kwd><kwd>Рамочная конвенция ООН об изменении климата</kwd><kwd>развивающиеся государства</kwd></kwd-group><funding-group><award-group><funding-source><institution-wrap><institution xml:lang="ru">Исследование осуществлено в рамках Программы фундаментальных исследований Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики» (НИУ ВШЭ) и при грантовой поддержке факультета мировой экономики и мировой политики НИУ ВШЭ в 2025 г.</institution></institution-wrap><institution-wrap><institution xml:lang="en">The article was prepared within the framework of the Basic Research  Program at HSE University and with the grant support of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs of the HSE University in 2025.</institution></institution-wrap></funding-source></award-group></funding-group></article-meta><fn-group/></front><body></body><back><ref-list><ref id="B1"><label>1.</label><mixed-citation>Axelrod, R. 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