Islamic Terrorism in the Middle East and its Impact on Global Security

Cover Page

Cite item

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of the increase in terrorist activity in the Middle East after the Arab Spring on the terrorist threat in other parts of the world. The aim of the work is to clarify, using quantitative methods, the factors, mechanisms and scale of the spread of Islamist terrorism from the Middle East. A qualitative study of time series with partial formalization is used to identify time lags between the rise of Islamist terrorism in the Middle East and its intensification in other parts of the world. It has been demonstrated that the rapid growth in the number of terrorist attacks recorded in the world after 2010 was primarily due to the explosive growth of Islamist terrorist activity in the “Afrasian” zone of instability in general and in the Middle East in particular. There is considerable evidence to suggest that this spurred terrorist activity after 2013 in the U.S., Western Europe, Turkey and Russia. The analysis shows that the “Islamic State” (ISIS) and its affiliates (prohibited in Russian Federation) have acted as the main export agent of terrorism to these countries and regions in an attempt to retaliate military strikes carried out by foreign powers in the Middle East. Among these foreign countries, Turkey was particularly hard hit by the increase in terrorist activities - the level of terrorist activity in Turkey between 2013 and 2014 grew 14 times. In the United States and Western Europe, the onslaught of Islamist terrorism has been accompanied by a threefold increase in the number of terrorist attacks recorded. A similar scale of the Middle East terrorist echo was observed in the Russian Federation. The ISIS efforts to expand and develop terrorist networks in Russia also resulted in the tripling of a number of terrorist attacks in this country. However, it would be wrong to exaggerate the scale of the Middle East terrorist “echo” in Russia. The previous waves of the terrorist threat between 2002 and 2004, as well as the second half of the 2000s (an echo effect of the Chechen wars) were much larger.

About the authors

Leonid M. Issaev

National Research University Higher School of Economics; Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia

Author for correspondence.
Email: lisaev@hse.ru

PhD (in Political Sciences), Deputy Head of the Laboratory for Monitoring the Risks of Socio-Political Destabilization at the National Research University Higher School of Economics; Research Professor at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

20, Myasnitskaya St, Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation; 6, Miklukho-Maklaya St, Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation

Marat B. Aisin

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Email: marataysin@gmail.com

Intern in the Laboratory for Monitoring the Risks of Socio-Political Destabilization

20, Myasnitskaya St, Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation

Ilya A. Medvedev

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Email: semyonkot@yandex.ru

Intern in the Laboratory for Monitoring the Risks of Socio-Political Destabilization

20, Myasnitskaya St, Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation

Andrey V. Korotayev

National Research University Higher School of Economics; Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia

Email: akorotaev@hse.ru

Dr. Sc. (in History), Head of the Laboratory for Monitoring the Risks of Socio-Political Destabilization at the National Research University Higher School of Economics; Senior Research Professor at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

20, Myasnitskaya St, Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation; 6, Miklukho-Maklaya St, Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation

References

  1. Grinin L., Issayev L., Korotayev A. Revolutions and Instability in the Middle East. Moscow: Uchitel; 2016 (In Russ.).
  2. Korotayev A., Issaev L., Rudenko M. Afrasian Instability Zone and Its Historical Background. Social Evolution & History. 15 (2): 88–99 (In Russ.).
  3. Korotayev A., Vas’kin I., Bilyuga S. Olson–Huntington Hypothesis on a Bell-Shaped Relationship Between the Level of Economic Development and Sociopolitical Destabilization: A Quantitative Analysis. Sotsiologicheskoe Obozrenie / Russian Sociological Review. 2017; 16 (1): 9–49. doi: 10.17323/1728-192x-2017-1-9-49 (In Russ.).
  4. Huntington S.P. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon & Schuster; 1997.
  5. Neumayer E., Plümper T. International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations. Br J. Polit Sci. 2009; 39 (4): 711–734. doi: 10.1017/s0007123409000751
  6. Pape R., Feldman J.K. Cutting the fuse: the explosion of global suicide terrorism and how to stop it. Choice Reviews Online. 2011; 48 (10): 48–59. doi: 10.5860/choice.
  7. Freedman L., Pape R., Bloom M. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Foreign Affairs. 2005; 84 (5): 172. doi: 10.2307/20031726
  8. Asal V. The Preconditions for Ethnic Suicide Bombing Campaigns, 1991–2003. Southern Economic Journal. 2006; 80 (4): 981–1001.
  9. Collard-Wexler S. Do Foreign Occupations Cause Suicide Attacks? The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2014; 58 (4): 625–657.
  10. Pickering J., Kisangani E. The International Military Intervention Dataset: An Updated Resource for Conflict Scholars. J. Peace Res. 2009; 46 (4): 589–599. doi: 10.1177/0022343309334634
  11. Burgoon B. On Welfare and Terror. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2006; 50 (2): 176–203. doi: 10.1177/0022002705284829
  12. Piazza J., Choi S. International Military Interventions and Transnational Terrorist Backlash. International Studies Quarterly. 2018; 62 (3): 686–695. doi: 10.1093/isq/sqy026
  13. Gassebner M., Luechinger S. Lock, stock, and barrel: a comprehensive assessment of the determinants of terror. Public Choice. 2011; 149 (3–4): 235–261. doi: 10.1007/s11127-011-9873-0
  14. Korotayev A., Vaskin I., Tsirel S. Economic Growth, Education, and Terrorism: A Re-Analysis. Terrorism and Political Violence. 2019: 1–24. doi: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1559835
  15. Krueger A.B. What makes a terrorist: economics and the roots of terrorism. Choice Reviews Online. 2008; 45 (08): 45. doi: 10.5860/choice.45-4501
  16. Azam J.-P., Thelen V. Foreign Aid Versus Military Intervention in the War on Terror. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2010; 54 (2): 237–261. doi: 10.1177/0022002709356051
  17. Vasiliev A., Isaev L., Korotaev A., Shishkina A. Instruments of the Islamic State «Soft Power»: Typology and Performance Evaluation. Aziya i Afrika segodnya. 2018; (12): 3–10. doi: 10.31857/s032150750002565-3 (In Russ.).

Copyright (c) 2020 Issaev L.M., Aisin M.B., Medvedev I.A., Korotayev A.V.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

This website uses cookies

You consent to our cookies if you continue to use our website.

About Cookies