Fundamentalism: a Religious Cognitive Bias? A Philosophical Discourse of Religious Fundamentalism

Cover Page

Cite item


Fundamentalism has been widely reckoned as one among many other watchful social phenomena currently. There are two general approaches to it. The first is from those who perceive fundamentalism as a movement of militant piety found almost in any religion, and therefore fundamentalism cannot necessarily be identified with a violent movement. The second is from those who categorize fundamentalism as a political movement with an objective of worldly power, and therefore it is susceptible to turning into a violent movement. In investigating the two views closely, I attempt to put forward a couple of hypothetical inquiries. Is fundamentalism a common phenomenon and common feature found in almost any religion? The answer is yes. Is fundamentalism identical to violent movement? The answer is no. Is fundamentalism then impossibly and utterly unrelated to violent movements? The answer is no. If fundamentalism is unidentical with violent movements but not a few fundamentalists can also turn to be perpetrators of what is called religious violence or violence in the name of religion, then what arguments can be set forth to ensure that fundamentalism cannot be overlooked anymore as one among many other major social problems of our age? This article aims to examine fundamentalism through epistemological and axiological criticism, and to investigate that to a certain range fundamentalism is a form of religious cognitive and behavioral bias, and both as a militant piety and as a political movement fundamentalism should at best be approached from their interplayed relation.

Full Text


Let me begin the discourse on religious fundamentalism with an intellectual conviction of Bassam Tibi. He asserts that “fundamentalists are far more dangerous as ideologues of power than as extremists who kill, cut throats, and throw bombs” [1]. The aim of quoting Tibi’s words and placing them at the beginning of the article is to postulate my hypothesis that fundamentalism inevitably must be placed as one among many urgent social problems nowadays. The pivotal question that would be necessary to address to Tibi is: “Why are fundamentalists far more dangerous than extremists?” Before analyzing it further, I confidently surmise that it might be redundant to re-describe here the history of fundamentalism, simply because it has become a piece of common knowledge. I let the readers discover for themselves how it initially emerged in the American Christian church in the late 19th — the early 20th century.

I directly go to the four hypothetical questions propounded in the abstract with the following postulate. Fundamentalism is indeed unidentical with violent movements simply because each religion has its fundamentum (Latin, fundamentum: primary principles or rules) for their faith, and because many fundamentalists also promote peace. However, fundamentalism is also very likely to trigger violent acts in the name of religion. Therefore, the main locus of this study is to investigate and assess the two different standpoints. The former is from those who consider fundamentalism as a movement of militant piety and, therefore, they object to the presumption that fundamentalism is identical to violent movements. The latter is from those who count fundamentalism as a political movement, and hence perceive that fundamentalism likely turns into a violent movement only because it is affected by the political interests in worldly power.

To make it more comprehensible, I call the type of fundamentalism from the view of the former group religious-theological fundamentalism (RTF), and from the latter — religious-political fundamentalism (RPF). The term “theological” for RTF is to identify cognitive facets and their problems in fundamentalism. It is related to how fundamentalists gain religious knowledge, ideas, dogmas, or religious teachings for their religious faith. While the term ‘political’ for RPF is used to identify behavioral issues of the fundamentalists, particularly their political conduct and social behavior. Some scholars mostly consider the two types of fundamentalism disconnected from each other simply to strengthen their views that RTF would only turn into a violent movement if it is infiltrated by the political. Yet, I argue that RTF and RPF are inextricable, and the two types of fundamentalism should at best be viewed from their interplayed relation.

The ambivalence of fundamentalism

Fundamentalism likely turns into a violent movement since the fundamentalists are driven by political interests aimed at seizing worldly power — and in achieving that goal they justify any means, including violent means — and because fundamentalism inherently has religious cognitive and behavioral bias. I am to present a couple of scholarly views relevant to this study expressed by James Barr, Karen Armstrong, Bassam Tibi, Michael Barkun, Hal Markovitz, and also the Indonesian scholar Ahmad Syafii Maarif. They generally affirm that fundamentalism is unidentical with violent movements. But they also call to mind that fundamentalism can turn into a violent movement and that fundamentalists are also susceptible to becoming perpetrators of religious violence. I will not elaborate in detail on each of these takes. But let me concisely outline the primary ideas of some of those scholars to make my point clear enough to show the ambivalence of fundamentalism.

Let us consider James Barr's view on fundamentalism. Barr does not explicitly indicate that fundamentalism is wrong. In Escaping from Fundamentalism, he cynically persuades the readers to escape fundamentalism. He states that the “book does not seek to argue with fundamentalists and convince them they are mistaken,” asserting that the “book offers help to those who have grown up in the world of fundamentalism or have become committed to it but in the end come to feel that it is a prison from which they must escape” [2]. Behind this courtly phrase, Barr denotes the problems of fundamentalism, one of which is expressed in his epistemological inquiry: Is the Bible theologically perfect? The Bible, for Barr, contains “some books that were written at times different from those maintained in traditional views, that they were the product of tradition cherished, fostered and redefined by a large number of anonymous people, that they sometimes contain elements that are legendary, and that there are discrepancies and errors here and there in historical matter” [2. P. 110].

The viewpoint of Karen Armstrong is also noteworthy. She affirms that fundamentalists mostly are not violent [3]. She considers the emergence of fundamentalism as a reaction to secularism that separates religion from politics. The separation of the two entities, in Armstrong’s opinion, seems to be natural to western society, but not so for other cultures — their separation in cultures that never experienced secularization has often had negative consequences. The scholar uses Egypt as an example, following the case of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who evoked reactions from fundamentalist groups, one of which was Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood: MB). In facing this group, the president’s administration took repressive measures placing in torture prisons many of the Brotherhood’s members, including Sayyed Qutb, MB’s chief ideologue.

Armstrong admits that “when fundamentalist groups feel under attack, they become stronger, often retreat from the outside world, and creating a ‘world unto itself’, with their education systems, publishing houses, etc.”; she concludes that “being hostile to fundamentalist movements tends to have negative consequences” [3]. In addition, she does not overlook its shocking manifestations. Armstrong states that “fundamentalists have gunned down worshipers in a mosque, have killed doctors and nurses who work in abortion clinics, have shot their presidents, and have even toppled a powerful government. It is only a small minority of fundamentalists who commit such acts of terror, but even the most peaceful and law-abiding are perplexing, because they seem so adamantly opposed to many of the most positive values of modern society. Fundamentalists have no time for democracy, pluralism, religious toleration, peace-keeping, free speech, or the separation of church and state” [4].

Another notable view comes from Bassam Tibi. He submits a presumption that fundamentalism, particularly Islamic fundamentalism, has no relation to Islam as a religion—Islamic fundamentalism is a political Islam, called Islamism. Tibi objects to the equation of Islamism with Islam. Islam, according to the researcher, is a great tolerant faith, while Islamism is a militant ideology of religious fundamentalism [1. P. ix—xiv]. Interestingly, though Tibi realizes that fundamentalism is merely a political movement for worldly ends, he also reminds us of the horrific manifestations of the ideology of the fundamentalists. A simple question that might be necessary to be addressed to Tibi is: How can we ensure that fundamentalism is purely a political movement for worldly ends without being driven by transcendental ends?

I now come to the view of one of the prominent Indonesian Islamic intellectuals, Ahmad Syafii Maarif. Though Maarif measures that Indonesian (Islamic) fundamentalism is mostly driven by political aims, he also alerts his readers that fundamentalist movements are also stirred up and motivated by transcendental ends, which is to preserve religious dogmas they perceive to be absolute truths. Though fundamentalist movements are mostly triggered by political motives, Maarif argues, their religious dogmas and transcendental aims also play important roles in shaping their movements. He refers to fundamentalist groups like Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) that strongly urge the implementation of the Sharia (Islamic) law into the national constitution [5. P. 22].

Michael Barkun’s viewpoint is also notable for the cause. In Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism, Barkun, in a different way, states the equivocal premise that fundamentalism is only a myth. He does not equate fundamentalism with a violent movement. He also admits that although fundamentalists initially avoid violence, they can progressively turn to be violent [6. P. 56].

I finally invite the readers to consider the point of view of Hal Markovitz. Markovitz emphasizes that most fundamentalists are the promoters of peace. He cites as an example the American fundamentalist movements like Mennonites, Seventh-Day Adventists, the Amish, and Jehovah’s Witnesses who mostly stand as defenders of peace. Most of the adherents of these sects refuse to volunteer in US-led wars. Markovitz states that the “vast majority of religious fundamentalists preach messages of peace; some church members, including Mennonites, Seventh-Day Adventists, the Amish, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, refuse to serve in combat,” but he also adds that “fundamentalism can fuel violence and terrorism… and fundamentalists can easily turn to be violent” [7. P. 55].

The six scholars’ standpoints ultimately lead us to enquire about what must be done to counter fundamentalism. It would be appropriate to bring up this issue in the discourse only because fundamentalism is evidently endangering societal life. This is the main reason I, in this philosophical investigation, center my interest on social issues. This article aims to analyze philosophically the cognitive bias in fundamentalism and the behavioral bias of the fundamentalists.

Fundamentalism, I argue, would at best be studied not only as a movement of militant piety but also as a political movement. We could not say that fundamentalism is purely a religious movement or merely a political movement. Both fundamentalism as a movement of militant piety and as a political movement should be approached from their interplayed relation. The approach I use in investigating it, is a psycho-political one. This type of approach integrates psychological and political analysis.

From a psychological approach, fundamentalism is going to be investigated through the following question: Why do the fundamentalists confidently and firmly hold their sacred texts as the absolute truths that subordinate any other pieces of knowledge and value systems? The focus point of this approach is on the centrality of sacred texts for the fundamentalists [8]. Fundamentalism as a meaning system is approached from intratextuality, in the sense that religious texts play a vital role in shaping the religious cognition and behavior of the fundamentalists. Fundamentalism from a psychological approach is studied by investigating the significant role of religious texts for believers. It is stated that:

“…from a psychological perspective, we present fundamentalism as a meaning system. We believe that the meaning system the fundamentalists derive from their religious beliefs is what allows them to persevere in an inhospitable culture: It creates a way for them to interpret the world, as well as themselves in relation to the world. This meaning system encompasses all of life and is strongly felt, for it deals with issues of eternal importance. It also provides a framework for motivation, and in the process helps meet several personal needs for meaning, such as purpose, value, efficacy, and self-worth. Meaning, for fundamentalists, is found wholly within the pages of the sacred text. Thus, we propose that the primary criterion for understanding fundamentalism is its insistence that all of life be understood in relation to the text” [8. P. 5].

Meanwhile, the core of a political approach is on the centrality of external factors that transform fundamentalism into a political movement. From this approach, fundamentalism is approached from extratextuality. External factors are considered as the predominant causes for the rise of fundamentalism and determine the social behavior of the fundamentalists.

Employing these two approaches, I indicate two problems in fundamentalism. From the intratextual approach, I categorize fundamentalism as a religious cognitive bias (henceforth: RCB). RCB is related to epistemological issues of fundamentalism in the form of misinterpreting, misapprehending, or mis-assessing religious texts. I consider important three subject matters of fundamentalism as RCB that are to be brought up here—literalism, absolutism, and authoritative method. Meanwhile, from an extratextual approach, I categorize fundamentalism as religious behavioral bias (henceforth: RBB). RBB is related to social misconduct in the form of deviant behavior fundamentalists commit in the social sphere, such as extremism, sectarianism, and intolerance.

I use a psycho-political approach to substantiate my epistemic ground in examining fundamentalism, to which I attribute the intratextual approach to RTF and the extratextual approach to RPF. Concisely, from the intratextual approach, the investigation of the problem of fundamentalism as RCB is centered in RTF. Whilst, from an extratextual approach, investigation of the problem of fundamentalism as RBB is centered in RPF. But RTF and RPF would be approached from their interplayed relation.

The intratextual approach addresses the religious cognition of the fundamentalists with its key question of why they brace their sacred texts as absolute truths that subordinate any other value system. Whilst the extratextual approach deals with external factors that stir up fundamentalism in a political movement. I am going to explicate briefly two main criticisms of fundamentalism; epistemological criticism toward RTF and its religious cognitive bias (religious cognitive fallacies), and axiological criticism of RPF and its religious behavioral bias (deviant socio-religious behaviors).

Before highlighting the two critiques, let me briefly present the major features of fundamentalism. Barr points out three features of fundamentalism: (1) a very strong emphasis on the inerrancy of the Bible, the absence from it of any sort of error; (2) a strong hostility to modern theology and the methods, results, and implications of a modern critical study of the Bible; (3) an assurance that those who do not share their religious views are not really ‘true Christians’ at all [2. P. 1]. Whilst Thomas Schirrmacher shows four common characteristics of fundamentalism: (1) absolutism (infallibility/inerrancy of scripture and religious tradition); (2) exclusionism (the community of the chosen); (3) sharp boundaries against outsiders; (4) authoritarian organizational structure [9. P. 27].

Epistemological criticism on RTF and its RCB

If fundamentalism is unidentical with a violent movement, but the perpetrators of religious violence are partly carried out by fundamentalists, then the main locus of this philosophical investigation must also be centered on religious cognitive fallacies, some of which lie in the three interrelated problems such as literalism, absolutism, and authoritative method. In the following part, I am going to highlight a couple of problems from which fundamentalism to some extent is considered a religious cognitive bias. Absolutism, literalism, and the authoritative method are three interrelated cognitive problems of fundamentalism. Absolutism is related to the epistemological issue, literalism to the methodology of exegesis, and authoritative method to the model of approach to religious texts.

Let me start with literalism and its authoritative method. Literalism is criticized for its methodology that only applies historical-grammatical methods like in Biblicism of the Christian fundamentalist and Quranism of the Islamic fundamentalist. For the literalist fundamentalist, religious texts are counted as God’s direct-given words and considered absolute truths that must be placed as supreme standards for any other values, and therefore must be defended at all costs. Methodologically, literalism has been criticized by the liberalist’s methodology that construes religious sacred texts through the historical-critical method. Holy scriptures, for the liberalists, should be construed within their historical context.

The main question here is why the fundamentalists strongly believe that their sacred texts are considered absolute truths that must be defended at all costs. Let me use the critique of Nancy Murphy regarding the split between liberal and conservative theologians. “Foundationalism”, for Murphy, “is the theory of knowledge, based on the metaphor of knowledge as a building, that requires all beliefs to be justified by tracing them to a special category of beliefs that cannot be called into question,” and according to her, “foundationalism has contributed to the split between liberal and conservative theologies by forcing theologians to choose Scripture or experience as the source of foundational class of beliefs” [10. P. 2].

The problem of literalism and its authoritative method in fundamentalism is found in its foundationalism, through which the fundamentalists defend their sacred texts at all costs only because they believe that God they regard as the source of all truths ontologically exists. Thus, the sacred texts perceived as God’s given words must be considered absolute truths that cannot be questioned. I use Wittgensteins concept of God and Kierkegaards concept of faith as my critiques of religious foundationalism and the ontological approach of the fundamentalists.

Let me begin my criticism of literalism with the Wittgensteinian concept of God. I use Dewi Zephaniah Phillips’ commentary, which refers to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion, about the foundation of religious faith as my critique against fundamentalists. One of the main philosophical discourses of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion is his concept of ‘the existence and the reality of God’. In line with Wittgenstein, Phillips stresses that:

“What kind of philosophical and theological account does the concept of divine reality call for?... Because the question of divine reality can be construed as ‘Is God real or not?’ it has often been assumed that the dispute between the believer and the unbeliever is over a matter of fact… I suggest that more can be gained if one compares the question, ‘What kind of reality is divine reality?’ not with the question, ‘Is this physical object real or not?’ but with the different question, ‘What kind of reality is the reality of physical objects?’ [11. P. 1—2].

I argue that fundamentalist literalism and their foundationalism and ontological approach are untenable. God’s existence is not a matter of fact (either God is real or unreal), but it is about ‘what kind of reality of divine reality is’. The main problem is that in defending their literalism, the fundamentalists attempt to base their religious epistemology on the ontological argument of the existence of God. Through this ontological argument—that God is real and factually exists and directly communicates to humans—they presume that their sacred texts must be regarded as unquestionable truths and must be defended at all costs. Unlike the Wittgensteinian God, the God of the fundamentalists is a factual God that actively controls human beings, and on this belief, they set their religious texts as supreme and authoritative texts. For fundamentalists, sacred texts are not only considered as guiding or inspirational but primarily as authoritative only because they believe those texts are directly communicated by and descended from God.

Second, let us look at absolutism as one of the key attributes of religious fundamentalism. What is religious absolutism and on what ground is it justified and maintained? Religious absolutism in this field of study is a worldview that claims there is only one objective cognition of reality derived only from religious sacred texts. Let me begin my criticism of religious absolutism with Caputo’s objection to fundamentalism. Caputo lambasts fundamentalists for not recognizing that all religions are “woven from the cloth of contingency.” Religion and religious texts should be kept open-ended and revisable [12. P. 295].

Following Caputo, I argue that one of the main problems of absolutism lies in the ontological approach the fundamentalists take toward their sacred texts and because I consider fundamentalism a form of religious cognitive bias. Why? Absolutism is founded on the belief that God’s words written in sacred texts originated from and directly communicated by God. Therefore, those texts must be taken as inerrant, infallible, and supreme norms. Utilizing these principles of infallibility, inerrancy, and supremacy, the fundamentalists regard their sacred texts as authoritative ones to which any norms or value systems must refer. In these three principles, there must be two main suppositions that have to be proven by the fundamentalists; God’s existence is understood ontologically and God directly communicates with humans.

In brief, we may say that to identify the cognitive bias in fundamentalism is to find out the epistemological dilemmas of the ontological foundation the fundamentalists use for their religious premises. Fundamentalism, from the approach of foundationalism and ontologism, is ineluctably considered as cognitive bias only because God’s existence cannot be proven ontologically and objectively. By basing their claims of religious truths on an ontological foundation, the fundamentalists unavoidably have to prove that God is an objective entity and that God ontologically must exist.

To make clear what is meant by fundamentalism as a cognitive bias, I also use Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophical arguments against objective reasoning in religious belief [13]. First, the approximation argument with its main argument is that it is impossible to base religious belief on historical knowledge. For Kierkegaard, religious belief cannot be founded on objective reasoning of historical facts. Second, the postponements argument. One who bases faith on objective historical inquiry, according to Kierkegaard, will postpone religious commitments forever.

If faith is based upon historical documents to justify the truth of (Christian) faith, Kierkegaard argues, we are de facto trapped in a proposition “forever prospective”, as we place our religious commitment forever in the future. Third, the passion argument with its main premise is that faith is the highest passion in man, driven by uncertainty. Religious faith, for Kierkegaard, requires objective improbability. He states that “Anything that is almost probable, or probable, or extremely and emphatically probable, is something (one) can almost know — but it is impossible to believe” [13. P. 235]. It is the same as saying that religious faith is not founded upon ‘objective probability’ but upon ‘objective improbability’. 

 Since the fundamentalists base their religious claims on an ontological base, they have to encounter a couple of epistemological inquiries. They inescapably must face at least four elementary inquiries. How does God communicate and deliver His commands to humans? Is the communication either direct or indirect? How does a person receive and recognize God’s commands? As commonly believed in many religions that God’s commands are conveyed through dreams, visions, and revelations, then to what extent those ways can be taken as methods to prove God’s existence? These ontological queries weaken the position of fundamentalists, and those elementary questions are hard to overcome for one main reason that the existence of God cannot be grasped ontologically.

Axiological criticism on RPF and its RBB

In this part, I am going to analyze fundamentalism following axiological criticism. I center this analysis on the deviant social behaviors of fundamentalists. Their religious cognition must also be measured by their social conduct as it is the embodiment of what they have in mind, in their religious ideas and paradigms, some of which are adjacent to extremism, terrorism, sectarianism, and religious intolerance. Let me briefly examine one of those problems, that is fundamentalism and its adjacency to extremism. Fundamentalists to a certain extent are ideologues who play roles as fabricators of extremist thoughts.

I am going to show the nexus between fundamentalism and extremism, from which I convince the readers that fundamentalism to a certain extent is a manifestation of religious behavioral bias. Let me use the research of contemporary scholars like Molly Amman and Reid Meloy. In Stochastic Terrorism: A Linguistic and Psychological Analysis they reveal terrorist acts are dominantly driven by a certain worldview that encourages the extremists to be terrorists. Stochastic Terrorism (ST) is understood from its three fundamental features. First, ST is closely related to incitement by demagogues to someone or a group of people who are easily fooled and incited. That incitement usually tones an ideological incitement built upon the sentiment of identity. It performs through demonizing someone else or other groups to justify the violent acts of the evildoers. Second, ST is a random act of violence by extremists, driven by political incitement. Third, ST is a particular act of terrorism that cannot be predicted accurately but it can be analyzed statistically. Shortly, it can be said that ST is an act of terrorism against someone or a group of people through inciting the actors, and demonizing the targeted groups [14].

Stochastic terrorism is “defined as the incitement of a violent act through public demonization of a group or individual…by random extremists, triggered by political demagoguery … its pattern cannot be predicted precisely but can be analysed statistically… In other words, a specific act against the demonized person or group cannot be forecast, but the probability of an act occurring has increased due to the rhetoric of a public figure” [14. P. 3]. In stochastic terrorism, fundamentalists charismatic leaders play the role of demagogic ideologues. In their role as political demagogues, fundamentalist leaders are standing as the fabricators of extremist ideas. Their extremist political thoughts and agitations are disseminated and transmitted to the public. The ultimate recipients can randomly turn to be extremists, or their extremist thoughts support the existing extremist groups. Let me take two examples from Indonesia.

First, let us consider the case of Ali Imron, a Bali bomber in 2002. His confession about the role of instigators and extremist ideologues that drive him to commit violence implicitly discloses the correlation between fundamentalism and extremism. He confessed that he and the gang dare to be terrorists because they are taught by their instigators that they are fighting the heretics, the perverted, and also the modern systems incompatible with their belief. He also admitted that they are taught to kill the outsiders they consider infidels[1].

Second, is the case of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir is a spiritual leader of JI (Jamaah Islamiyah: Islamic Congregation). Although he denied his connection to the group, he was widely regarded as JI’s spiritual leader [15. P. 4]. JI is an Indonesian extremist and militant group affiliated with the transnational terrorist group al-Qaeda [16]. This Islamic charismatic cleric had been jailed after being found guilty of his involvement in the JI terrorist network. He might indirectly partake in the act of terrorism, but ideologically he plays a vital role in disseminating extremist ideology to his followers. Ba’asyir is known for his uncompromising refusal of any ideology and any governmental system outside the Islamic one, including his objection to democracy which he regards as a misguided system or the system of the infidels. Islam and its religious norms and values, for Ba'asyir, must be the foundation of the state constitution. He strictly adheres to the system of Hakimiyyah Allah (literally means: a divine order). His status as an ideologue in JI charged him as the mastermind of a series of terrorist acts. The table below is to make my point clear.

From the two cases, it might be challenging to disregard the fact that fundamentalism to a certain extent is inseparable from extremism. Extremist acts are the implementations of extremist ideas. Extremist fundamentalist leaders play the role of ideologues that channel their adherents to extremism. Extremist ideologies they hold are derived from their shallow interpretation of their religious ideas, and they use them for granted for their political and transcendental ends. To achieve their political and transcendental ends, the fundamentalists initially strive to transform the paradigm of their adherents by inserting their exclusive ideology, and at the same time demonizing any alien ideology they consider incompatible with it. The next step is to set a strategy of a discrepancy, that they differentiate themselves as the fighters of the pious ideology from the outsiders they regard as the perverted groups. Their goal is not only to change the system but also to convert other groups they deem to be perverted or infidel.


1 See TVNU (Televisi Nahdlatul Ulama: Nahdlatul Ulama Television in 2020) with the description: Ali Imron is a person who has been involved in the Bali Bombings. He participates in the campaign of deradicalization led by NU, in


About the authors

Eduardus Lemanto

Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University)

Author for correspondence.
Doctoral Student, Department of Social Philosophy 6, Miklukho-Maklaya St., Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation


  1. Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism. Berkeley: University of California Press; 1998.
  2. Barr J. Escaping from Fundamentalism. London: SCM Press; 1984.
  3. Grand S. What is Religious Fundamentalism? 2012 Feb 22. Available from: (accessed: 25.05.22).
  4. Armstrong K. Battle for God. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 2000.
  5. Maarif AS. Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita. Jakarta: PUSAD Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina; 2010.
  6. Weinberg L, Pedahzur A. Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism. Portland: Frank Cass Publisher; 2004.
  7. Marcovitz H. Religious Fundamentalism. San Diego: ReferencePoint Press; 2010.
  8. Wood RW, Hill PC, Williamson WP. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism. New York, London: The Guilford Press; 2005.
  9. Schirrmacher T. Fundamentalism: When Religion becomes Dangerous. Bonn: Verlag fur Kultur and Wissenschaft-Culture and Science Publication; 2013.
  10. Murphy N. Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda. Harrisburg-Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International; 2007.
  11. Phillips DZ. Wittgenstein and Religion. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 1993.
  12. Plant B. Wittgenstein, Religious “Passion” and Fundamentalism. The Journal of Religious Ethics. 2013;41(2):280-309.
  13. Adam RM. Kierkegaard’s Arguments Against Objective Reasoning in Religion. The Monist - Philosophy and Religion in the 19th Century. 1977;60(2):228-243.
  14. Amman M, Meloy JR. Stochastic Terrorism: A Linguistic and Psychological Analysis. Perspectives on Terrorism. 2021;15(5):2-13.
  15. Singh J. The Emir of Katibah Nusantara: Bahrumsyah. Journal of Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses. 2016;8(11):4-7.
  16. Singh B. The Revival of Al Qaeda’s Affiliate in Southeast Asia: the Jemaah Islamiyah. Journal of Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses. 2017;9(5):5-8.

Copyright (c) 2023 Lemanto E.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

This website uses cookies

You consent to our cookies if you continue to use our website.

About Cookies