De-Dollarization in ASEAN and BRICS Countries amid the Emerging World Order

全文:

Introduction

Rising geopolitical tensions and the increasing weaponization of the dollar are driving interest among Global South nations in developing alternative financial mechanisms (Marcos, 2024, p. 38). The authors test the hypothesis that de-dollarization in these states is driven by two imperatives:

it reflects a drive to establish more resilient and independent mechanisms for economic interaction, aimed at minimizing the vulnerability to the destabilizing actions of major powers,

as a narrative, it reflects a re-evaluation by Global South states of their role within existing global governance structures.

Methodologically, the authors draw upon a constructivist understanding of international relations, positing that reality is not a given but is continuously constructed through shared experiences and ideas, as “the objects of our knowledge depend on our interpretation and language” (Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1999; Adler, 2002). The study utilizes a broad range of sources, including official ASEAN and BRICS documents, national strategies, and public statements by leaders of member states. The research methods include comparative analysis, SWOT analysis, and scenario modeling, enabling a comparison of de-dollarization experiences across ASEAN and BRICS countries and the identification of potential future trajectories for this process.

De-Dollarization as an Economic Trend

For ASEAN countries, the idea of ​​using national currencies is not fundamentally new one. The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 served as a catalyst for debates on de-dollarization in the region. At that time, ASEAN began actively discussing the development of regional monetary integration and the establishment of alternative currency systems (Rövekamp & Hilpert, 2014, p. 2). In the 2010s, ASEAN nations revisited the concept of de-dollarization as a means to enhance financial resilience and diversify currency reserves (Kubo, 2017, p. 172).

Concurrently, BRICS began to position itself as a focal point for establishing a financial and economic world order alternative to the Western-led system (Kondratov, 2015, pp. 149–150; Morozkina, 2024, p. 153; Shelepov, 2025, p. 159). At the 5th BRICS summit in Durban in 2013, a decision was made to establish the New Development Bank (NDB); this move was a response to criticism regarding the insufficient representation of the group’s member states within the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

With the escalation of international tensions in the early 2020s, de-dollarization came to be viewed as a key element in the concept of building a multipolar world (Kuznetsov, 2024, p. 165; Nogueira Batista, 2024, p. 161; Azhogina & Kitaeva, 2024, p. 90).

Financing Instruments and Mechanisms in ASEAN Countries

ASEAN has a long history of monetary and financial cooperation. Its institutional foundation was laid as early as 1977 with the signing of the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA). This mechanism gained particular significance following the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, which ultimately spurred the creation of a larger and more institutionalized mechanism: the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). Launched in 2000, the CMI is a network of bilateral swap agreements among the ASEAN+3 countries (ASEAN plus the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and the Republic of Korea).

In 2010, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) was launched based on the original Chiang Mai Initiative; it pooled the resources of ASEAN+3 countries into a multilateral currency swap mechanism (totaling USD 240 billion in 2012^[1]) to provide liquidity to countries facing a crisis. Contributions are distributed unevenly, with China and Japan each accounting for approximately 32%.^[2] This creates an asymmetry of influence. The main issue is that a participating country can request only up to 30% of its quota without the obligation to turn to the IMF;^[3] in other words, access to the bulk of the funds is strictly tied to the approval of an IMF program, which sharply diminishes the CMIM’s status as an independent source of liquidity.

Indonesia plays a central role in promoting alternative financial mechanisms within ASEAN, having initiated the establishment of the Local Currency Settlement Framework (LCSF) in 2016. The Local Currency Bilateral Swap Arrangements (LCBSA), agreements concluded between the central banks of two countries that enable the exchange of their respective national currencies without using the US dollar, serve as the key mechanism underpinning the regional local-currency settlement system.

According to a 2023 report by the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), the use of local currencies in settlements between ASEAN countries and their partners rose from approximately 5% in 2016 to 15–18% in 2022–2023; however, this positive trend does not alter the fact that over 80% of transactions are conducted in US dollars.^[4] It is for this reason that, to further develop the bilateral settlement system, ASEAN countries adopted the Local Currency Transaction Framework (LCTF) in 2023; this framework entails launching a multilateral settlement and clearing mechanism and laying the foundation for digital currency integration.^[5]

Currently, the LCSF/LCTF is being integrated with the instant QR payment system based on the Regional Payment Connectivity (RPC) platform, which was launched in 2022. By June 2025, the ASEAN Regional Payment Connectivity initiative, aimed at developing cross-border payments using QR codes and instant payment systems, encompassed nine of the ten ASEAN member states; Myanmar was the only country not participating. The LCSF/LCTF mechanism facilitated the shift by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore toward settlements in local currencies with China. The mechanism also supports the expansion of local-currency settlements between ASEAN nations and India: such agreements were reached between India and Malaysia in 2023,^[6] and between India and Indonesia in 2024.^[7] For its part, India has introduced Special Rupee Vostro Accounts (SRVAs) to encourage international settlements in rupees.^[8]

The processes of establishing an alternative financial infrastructure are simultaneously driving the development of transport corridors, infrastructure nodes, and logistics hubs that link the economies of the Global South. China has been particularly active in this arena, having rapidly increased its infrastructure investments in Southeast Asia over the past decade as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. In 2019, at the ASEAN—China Summit in Bangkok, Thailand, a joint statement was signed regarding the synergy between the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 and the Belt and Road Initiative.^[9] According to data from the American Enterprise Institute’s (AEI) China Global Investment Tracker, China’s investment in infrastructure projects across ASEAN countries totalled approximately USD 41 billion between January 2020 and December 2024. The transport and energy sectors accounted for the largest share of these investments. The lowest investment volumes were recorded in real estate, utilities, finance, technology, and agriculture, with a combined share of 15% (Figure 1). Among the recipient nations, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia attracted the largest inflows, collectively accounting for over 60% of the total investment (Figure 2).

Figure 1. China’s Investments in ASEAN Countries, by Sector, 2020–2024
Source: compiled by P.P. Kalugina and N.S. Kuklin on the basis of: China Global Investment Tracker // American Enterprise Institute. URL: https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/ (accessed: 25.06.2025).

Figure 2. China’s Investments in ASEAN, by Country, 2020–2024
Source: compiled by P.P. Kalugina and N.S. Kuklin on the basis of: China Global Investment Tracker // American Enterprise Institute. URL: https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/ (accessed: 25.06.2025).

Over the past five years, the 1,035-kilometer China—Laos Railway has emerged as one of the most significant joint projects between China and ASEAN. China holds a 70% stake, while Laos holds 30%. In the context of de-dollarization, it is noteworthy that 60% of the project’s cost was financed by the Export-Import Bank of China through a loan denominated in yuan.^[10] The China—Laos Railway has become an integral part of the major ASEAN Express railway project launched in 2024.

China is also participating in the construction of the Bangkok—Nong Khai high-speed railway in Thailand, the East Coast Rail Link in Malaysia, and the Jakarta—Bandung high-speed railway in Indonesia. Yuan-denominated lending shields governments from the currency risks associated with dollar-based borrowing. Small businesses along these railway routes are also shifting to settlements in local currencies, thereby creating a “demand zone” for non-dollar financial mechanisms in everyday economic activity. Thus, infrastructure projects are acting as drivers for the transformation of the financial architecture in Southeast Asia.

Despite China’s proactive stance on the internationalization of the yuan, it is important to note that other BRICS nations are also taking the initiative on this issue, which is already on the agenda of Russian-Thai negotiations.^[11] Brazil is demonstrating interest in intensifying cooperation, including in the area of ​​infrastructure projects; ASEAN is its third-largest trading partner.^[12]

However, the expansion of the yuan and China’s growing presence in the region are also triggering a counter-reaction. In a number of ASEAN countries, deliberate dollarization is evident, serving as a hedge against potential dependence on the yuan. For instance, in Cambodia, the US dollar is used in everyday transactions virtually on par with the national currency. In Vietnam and Laos, the US dollar also maintains a foothold in the shadow economy due to the volatility of the national currency. This suggests that currency instability can hinder de-dollarization.

 BRICS Financial Instruments and Mechanisms Amidst De-Dollarization

In practical terms, the key achievements of the BRICS group in building an alternative financial architecture are the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).

The NDB’s paid-in capital stands at USD 50 billion, contributed in equal shares by each member country. In addition to the five founding nations, the bank’s membership includes Bangladesh (2021), the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (2021), and Egypt (2023), comprising two countries from the expanded BRICS group and one external participant. A major obstacle preventing the NDB from becoming a driving force for de-dollarization is the fact that 55% of the value of BRICS projects is still financed in US dollars.^[13] Following the launch of the Russian Federation’s special military operation in Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent expansion of anti-Russian sanctions, the NDB suspended new projects in Russia, which undermines the bank’s credibility as a tool for countering ‘sanctions wars.’

The CRA was originally conceived as an alternative to the IMF; the mechanism allows countries to access US dollar funds via currency swaps to stabilize their exchange rates under terms more favourable than those offered by the IMF. The CRA has a total volume of USD 100 billion, with contributions allocated as follows: China (41%), Brazil, India, and Russia (18% each), and South Africa (5%).^[14] However, it is unlikely that the participating countries would actually draw upon the resources of the Reserve Pooling Arrangement, given their substantial international reserves. The arrangement could serve as a source of external financing; yet, there is still a significant constraint: under current regulations, a participating state may access up to 30% of its maximum access limit without an IMF program, provided other agreement conditions are met and the funding parties consent. Access to the remaining 70% is contingent upon an active IMF program that includes financing and compliance with its conditions,^[15] though the final decision rests with the Arrangement’s Council. Thus, the participants in this financial mechanism remain somewhat dependent on the requirements of global financial governance institutions.

Within BRICS, settlements in national currencies also take place between Egypt and the UAE, Iran and Russia, Iran and India, India and the UAE, Indonesia and the UAE, and the UAE and Ethiopia. According to some estimates, the share of national currencies in trade transactions between BRICS countries reached 65% in 2025.^[16]

China is consistently advancing the internationalization of its currency (Gusev & Tsibulina, 2024, pp. 87–99; Mamaeva, 2024, pp. 62–63). As the strongest player within the BRICS group in the global financial system, it aims to further strengthen its international standing. Within the BRICS framework, China has shifted to settlements in national currencies with Russia (with approximately 95% of transactions handled via the yuan—ruble pair), as well as with Brazil, South Africa, the UAE, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Indonesia. The CIPS, a Chinese platform independent of SWIFT, serves as the operator for these national-currency settlements and swap agreements. All payments are conducted in yuan, bypassing Western clearing centers.

India is also making significant progress in implementing rupee-denominated SRVA accounts for investors. According to Reserve Bank of India data, the volume of import and export transactions in rupees grew by more than 41% year-on-year during the period spanning 2025 and the first half of 2026.^[17]

For its part, Russia is implementing a de-dollarization strategy by expanding the use of the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) as an alternative to SWIFT. Russia is promoting the use of the SPFS for international settlements. The role of the ruble and the yuan has grown significantly in transactions between Russia and China: the Chinese CIPS system plays a key role in cross-border yuan transactions, while the SPFS facilitates the exchange of financial messages between connected Russian and foreign participants.

Foreign Policy vs. Political Narratives

The establishment of alternative trade and financial mechanisms by ASEAN and BRICS nations is driven not only by economic pragmatism, but also by the ideological imperatives of their policies, reflecting the high-context nature of non-Western cultures (Stobbe, 2018, p. 24). Calls for de-dollarization articulate the stance of these civilizations within the global community, where Westernization is viewed predominantly negatively (Kuklin, 2023, p. 128). While integration into global systems spurred economic growth across the Global South (Hebron, 2024, pp. 51–52), it has also exacerbated inequality and eroded cultural practices, placing pressure on national identities (Efremova, 2018, pp. 41–43). Against this backdrop, a political narrative of de-dollarization has emerged, framing it as a pathway to greater autonomy. Governments in the Global South are adopting adaptation strategies, creating hybrid governance models to preserve their cultural identities (Kinnvall & Jonsson, 2003, p. 33). Indonesia’s experience warrants particular attention in this context, as the country continues to spearhead the de-dollarization process in Southeast Asia.

In the period leading up to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, Indonesia’s economy was expanding rapidly. This positive economic momentum served as a key pillar of legitimacy for Suharto’s “New Order.”

During the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia turned to the IMF. Amidst a lack of deposit insurance and the closure of insolvent banks under IMF supervision, there was a massive outflow of capital from the country. President Suharto blamed the international capital for the crisis and the destruction of Indonesia’s distinctive economy.^[18] The crisis culminated in protests and the resignation of Suharto after a 30-year rule. Until the early 2000s, post-reform Indonesia remained heavily dependent on the IMF, a situation that fostered a collective trauma among the public and the elites, including the military.

In the wake of the crisis, a narrative critical of the dollar, the IMF, and globalization began to take shape and gain traction in Indonesia. The agenda of de-dollarization became a part of an anti-globalization trend. However, this ‘anti-dollar narrative’ was never consistent. Under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014), the country experienced rapid growth (reaching 6.1%) and actively attracted foreign investment. There was little criticism of international financial mechanisms, and ASEAN nations supported stabilization strategies centered on renewed investment in the region (Case, 2015, p. 374).

The situation shifted against the backdrop of deteriorating relations between Russia and the West in 2014, and the imposition of anti-Russian sanctions. In 2016, following Donald Trump’s election as US President, Joko Widodo addressed a forum of 100 Indonesian economists, stating: “If we measure Indonesia’s economy only with the US dollar, the results will be bad, while other countries also have same experiences,” President Jokowi said, adding that the results would be different if Indonesia measures the economy with euro, yuan, or won; and the outcome would probably be better.^[19]

The year 2022 marked the culmination of the de-dollarization narrative, marking a new phase of escalating global tensions against the backdrop of the conflict in Ukraine. Indonesian leadership viewed the potential for the unilateral blocking of the SWIFT interbank system and the freezing of Russian assets as the weaponization of a Western-centric system of economic and financial mechanisms.^[20] As early as March 2023, Joko Widodo urged citizens to move away from foreign payment systems, such as MasterCard and Visa and switch to local alternatives. In May 2023, during the ASEAN summit in Labuan Bajo, Indonesia, he raised the issue of local-currency settlements for discussion among the Association’s member states. The discussions resulted in the adoption of an ASEAN leaders’ declaration on expanding regional payment capabilities and promoting local-currency transactions, as well as a commitment to support the use of local currencies for economic and financial operations among ASEAN member states.^[21]

BRICS is also actively working to shape a new paradigm in global finance (Arnold, 2025). Russia is pursuing a policy of moving away from the US dollar in response to the West’s sanctions policy. However, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated, this strategy is driven more by economic necessities than by ideological considerations.^[22] It appears that the Russian perspective on de-dollarization is rooted in the idea that a multipolar financial system would be more equitable if it were better shielded from politicization and weaponization.

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva plays a pivotal role in the de-dollarization process at both national and international levels; he advocates for strengthening ties among BRICS nations and diversifying currency reserves to reduce reliance on the US dollar, while also actively promoting the creation of new financial mechanisms to implement joint projects on both bilateral and multilateral bases.^[23]

China’s approach to de-dollarization is more pragmatic. As with the Russian narrative, de-dollarization is embedded in the broader logic of the global order’s evolution. Although de-dollarization is not explicitly mentioned in official Chinese policy documents due to the specific nature of relations with the United States, it is an integral part of the strategy to internationalize the yuan.^[24]

At the same time, BRICS nations do not demonstrate a unified stance on the issue of de-dollarization. India, in particular, has never expressed support for the idea of ​​weakening the dollar, maintaining instead a pragmatic approach that reflects the complex economic ties individual BRICS members have with the West. South Africa’s position is also characterized by a cautious attitude towards de-dollarization.

An analysis of strategic documents from ASEAN and BRICS countries reveals that, despite the implicit concept of establishing a multipolar financial system, de-dollarization is not explicitly mentioned. Neither do national development plans for BRICS countries list the development of this format as a primary objective, nor do ASEAN strategic documents contain provisions prioritizing cooperation with BRICS. Common ground between ASEAN and BRICS is found in goals regarding digital transformation, technological leadership, and innovation-driven development, as well as in the principles of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, which are central to both blocs.

Perceptions of threats also differ somewhat across the foreign policy and external economic policy documents of the two blocs. Here, the ‘ASEAN-centric’ approach of Southeast Asian nations is once again apparent. Specifically, within the geopolitical sphere, these countries are concerned about the rivalry between the US and China—and the pressure to choose sides in that conflict, as well as territorial disputes in the South China Sea, nuclear risks (including the situation surrounding North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, the AUKUS trilateral security partnership, and potential conflict over Taiwan), and the slow pace of reform in global governance institutions. For their part, BRICS nations focus more on threats of a global nature, including new types of hybrid warfare and civilizational threats, the hegemonic ambitions of certain countries, unilateralism, protectionism, and the weakening of multilateral cooperation mechanisms. Within the economic sphere, ASEAN countries are more concerned with issues such as the middle-income trap, uneven development, reliance on raw materials and energy price volatility, insufficient integration into global value chains, as well as debt problems and budget deficits. Meanwhile, BRICS nations characterize the geoeconomic landscape as “confrontational,” fearing multi-layered sanctions pressure, secondary sanctions, restricted access to technology and finance, including potential decoupling—disruptions to production and supply chains, and the impact of unilateral sanctions on capital outflows and the bloc’s currency reserves. Regarding narratives and conceptual alignment, the policy documents of both ASEAN and BRICS reflect a shared understanding of the multifaceted and systemic nature of threats, the risks posed by the technological divide and climate change, and concerns regarding food and energy security.

There is a notable difference in the approaches taken by these groupings towards multipolarity. ASEAN advocates for an inclusive multipolarity that preserves elements of the existing international system within the framework of an “inclusive regional architecture.”^[25] During Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship, the requirement to establish a stable financial system resilient to external shocks was enshrined in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration “ASEAN 2045: Our Shared Future” and the “ASEAN Community Strategic Vision 2045.”^[26] BRICS, meanwhile, demonstrates a focus on reshaping the architecture of international economic relations and global politics to eliminate the effects of the Western-centric ‘rules-based order.’

Countries participating in the de-dollarization process within ASEAN and BRICS can be classified according to three types of motivation:

1. ‘ideological’ motivation (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil), based on the conviction that the global order must be transformed—a view shaped by historical experience and political-cultural values,
2. ‘pragmatic’ motivation (India, South Africa), involving selective support for local, politically neutral initiatives without aiming for systemic de-dollarization,
3. ‘hybrid’ motivation (Russia, China), combining an ideological component with the pragmatic pursuit of national interests, where ideology is not the deciding factor in decision-making.

Opportunities, Constraints, and Scenarios for Shaping an Alternative Financial Architecture

The trend towards de-dollarization, which is gaining discursive momentum, points to a significant likelihood that the fragmented bilateral settlement schemes in national currencies will eventually merge into a unified financial architecture. Three scenarios appear most probable:

1) a balanced system of multilateral settlements in national currencies,

2) the yuan serving as the foundation of a BRICS—ASEAN financial architecture,

3) transition to settlements using central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).

In the first scenario, a key advantage is the low barrier to entry, as countries can utilize existing payment systems. The absence of a dominant currency makes this scenario attractive, alleviating concerns that relations with China might replicate the pattern that led to the dollarization of the global economy (Volynsky et al., 2024, pp. 8–16). Significant limitations of this scenario include liquidity fragmentation and market shallowness, which can lead to substantial volatility: a sharp surge in demand for a particular currency could leave banks unable to find counterparties without causing significant exchange rate fluctuations.

In the second scenario, the advantages include the established infrastructure of China’s CIPS and the ability to rapidly onboard participants, driven by the PRC’s efforts to internationalize the yuan. A key challenge lies in the risks of geopolitical asymmetry: the dependence on the monetary policy of the People’s Bank of China could be perceived as a threat to monetary sovereignty. CIPS-participating banks remain vulnerable to secondary sanctions from the US and the EU; since they simultaneously serve clients in dollars and euros, the risk of losing access to Western currency channels compels them to tighten compliance controls or forgo high-risk transactions.

Against the background of the limitations of the first two scenarios and the trend towards the digitalization of financial relations (Voskresenskiy, 2024), the third scenario is of greatest interest—the transition to payments in digital currencies. Unlike the yuan scenario, the CBDC corridor does not make any currency a liquidity anchor, allowing individual central banks to control their token and maintain monetary sovereignty. Unlike a network of multilateral settlements in national currencies, multicurrency CBDC corridors can quote any currency pair within the platform, creating a single pool of liquidity and providing instant PvP settlements that are more reliable, cheaper and faster than traditional correspondent bank transfers. CBDC settlements are also more resistant to sanctions risks: transactions are carried out in the obligations of a pool of central banks, which is technically and legally more difficult to disable than one platform or an individual bank.

SWOT Analysis of the Transition Scenario to a Multi-currency CBDC Settlement Platform

Strengths	Weaknesses
Cost reduction Proven effectiveness of pilot projects	Regulatory heterogeneity across states Low maturity of CBDCs outside the PRC Potential competition from cryptocurrencies
Opportunities	Threats
Settlements in proprietary assets The role of trendsetter: BRICS and ASEAN countries will gain the opportunity to set standards for the global regulation of digital currency usage Growth of fintech innovations	Fragmentation: potential competition between mBridge and BRICS Bridge Vulnerability to cyber threats The concentration of data centers in Southeast Asia among Chinese providers increases the risk of simultaneous compromise of multiple nodes

 Source: compiled by P.P. Kalugina and N.S. Kuklin.

Key precursors to the development of a unified platform for digital currency settlements include the mBridge platform (launched in 2021 at China’s initiative) and the BRICS Cross-Border Payment Initiative (announced in 2024). The primary costs associated with transitioning to CBDC-based multi-currency settlements fall into three areas:

1) regulatory fragmentation: disparities in currency legislation drive up compliance costs and create risks of legal conflicts,

2) the technological immaturity of most CBDC projects outside China,

3) cybersecurity: the compromise of cryptographic keys could lead to unauthorized token issuance or the blocking of settlements—necessitating multi-factor signature schemes and continuous code auditing, which significantly increases operational costs. Additional cyber risks stem from the high concentration of server infrastructure in Southeast Asia within the jurisdictions of Chinese cloud providers; these providers are actively expanding their presence and virtually dominating the market in Thailand and the Philippines—creating infrastructure concentration risks—while Chinese companies manage the majority of computing nodes in seven of the twelve major Asian economies.^[27] These circumstances create a quasi-monopolistic position for China’s central bank.

A summary SWOT analysis of the scenario involving a transition to a multi-currency CBDC settlement platform is presented in the Table.

A coherent set of measures is required for a multi-currency CBDC settlement platform to leverage its strengths and capabilities while minimizing vulnerabilities and external threats. First and foremost, it is critical to prevent the fragmentation of technology and liquidity. A second priority is investment in systemic cyber resilience. A third area of ​focus is regulatory harmonization within the BRICS—ASEAN bloc. Central banks and financial authorities will develop a common regulatory framework; this will reduce compliance costs while positioning the BRICS—ASEAN bloc as a driving force for progress in the regulation of CBDC settlements.

Conclusion

The apparent alignment of BRICS and ASEAN strategic approaches does not guarantee their actual convergence. The conceptual framework through which these countries and their political leaders interpret de-dollarization remains rather vague, encompassing widely varying and sometimes contradictory meanings. Despite some specific institutional achievements by BRICS and ASEAN in establishing mechanisms to overcome US dollar dominance, there are currently no grounds for excessive optimism regarding a rapid or profound alignment of their financial strategies. A Memorandum of Understanding between ASEAN and BRICS has been in effect since 2016, facilitating the establishment of joint working groups on finance and digitalization tasked with coordinating efforts to develop alternative payment mechanisms. Some progress was made at the 2023 ASEAN—BRICS summit in Jakarta, where the parties agreed to launch pilot projects for settlements in national currencies among small businesses. However, these initiatives remain experimental and cover only a limited segment of trade transactions.

It is difficult to argue that the concept of de-dollarization, at least until there is a unified understanding of it, can serve as a basis for forging a collective, trans-regional ‘anti-Western identity’ among Global South nations.

While de-dollarization within ASEAN and BRICS represents an irreversible trend, its success hinges on overcoming three barriers: technological (CBDCs), regulatory (legal harmonization), and political (willingness to forgo the ‘dollar shield’); without coordination between ASEAN and BRICS, the process will remain fragmented.

 

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^{2 The Amended Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) Agreement // Bank of Japan. July 17, 2014. P. 4. URL: https://www.boj.or.jp/en/intl_finance/cooperate/rel140717a.pdf (accessed: 15.09.2025).}

^{3 Ibid.}

^{4  Expanding Local Currencies Transactions in ASEAN+3 Cross Border Payments // AMRO Policy Position Paper. December 2023. URL: https://amro-asia.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/AMRO-Policy-Position-Paper_Expanding-LCT-in-ASEAN3-Cross-Border-Payments-v2_Dec-2023.pdf?clckid=618f076d (accessed: 25.06.2025).}

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^{6 Question No. 271: Trading in Local Currencies // Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. July 21, 2023. URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha?dtl/36851/QUESTION+NO271+TRADING+IN+LOCAL+CURRENCIES (accessed: 15.09.2025).}

^{7 Reserve Bank of India and Bank Indonesia Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Promote the Use of Local Currencies for Bilateral Transactions // Bank Indonesia. March 7, 2024. URL: https://www.bi.go.id/en/publikasi/ruang-media/news-release/Pages/sp_264424.aspx (accessed: 15.09.2025).}

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^{21 ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Advancing Regional Payment Connectivity and Promoting Local Currency Transaction // ASEAN. May 10, 2023.URL: https://asean.org/asean-leaders-declaration-on-advancing-regional-payment-connectivity-and-promoting-local-currency-transaction/ (accessed: 15.06.2025).}

^{22 Grudtsinov R. Putin: We Did Not Abandon the Dollar; We Were Shut Out // Parlamentskaya Gazeta. November 7, 2024. (In Russian). URL: https://www.pnp.ru/economics/putin-my-ne-otkazyvalis-ot-dollara-nam-otkazali.html (accessed: 15.06. 2025).}

^{23 Pietrobon E. After the Dollar // Valdai International Discussion Club. May 23, 2023. (In Russian). URL: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/posle-dollara/ (accessed: 17.06.2025).}

^{24 Aliyev M., Xiao Y., Ryazanova S. Mechanisms of China’s De-dollarization Within the Framework of the Yuan Internationalization Strategy // Russian International Affairs Council. February 6, 2025. (In Russian). URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/activity/publications/mekhanizmy-dedollarizatsii-knr-v-ramkakh-strategii-internatsionalizatsii-yuanya/ (accessed: 17.06.2025).}

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^{26 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2045: Our Shared Future // ASEAN. May 26, 2025. URL: https://asean.org/kuala-lumpur-declaration-on-asean-2045-our-shared-future/?clckid=3b054183 (accessed: 17.06.2025).}

^{27 America v China: Who Controls Asia’s Internet? // The Economist. October 8, 2024. URL: https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/10/08/america-v-china-who-controls-asias-internet?clckid=61a45dbf (accessed: 25.06.2025).}

作者简介

Polina Kalugina

MGIMO University

编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: kalugina_p_p@my.mgimo.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-4044-4856
SPIN 代码: 7946-6628

Assistant to the Dean, School of International Relations; Expert, Center for Analysis and Promotion of Research Results

76 Vernadsky Ave, Moscow, 119454, Russian Federation

Nikita Kuklin

MGIMO University

Email: ns.kuklin@inno.mgimo.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-5715-847X
SPIN 代码: 3900-3617

PhD (History), Expert, ASEAN Centre, Associate Professor, Department of Oriental Studies

76 Vernadsky Ave, Moscow, 119454, Russian Federation

参考

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