The Role of Mediation in Resolving Conflicts Between Ecuador and Peru

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Abstract

The study deals with the problem of mediation in the settlement of the longest territorial conflict in Latin America between Peru and Ecuador, highlighting its origins. The main goal of conflict resolution is not only the elimination of the conflict itself, but the transformation of a real conflict situation into a peaceful process of social or political change, where mediation is a strategy or a tool to end the conflict. The authors use an integrated approach, where the most appropriate theoretical basis for considering and resolving these conflicts is neoliberalism, as well as the problem-chronological approach, the historical method, which makes it possible to trace the prerequisites and the development of the territorial conflict, and mediation efforts to resolve it. It was concluded that the Ecuadorian-Peruvian war, although it was the result of the perception of divergent territorial interests, was caused by the unsuccessful mediation activities of the guarantor countries (Brazil, USA, Chile and Argentina). The mediation activities of Brazil, the USA, Chile and Argentina in 1995-1998 led to the so-called “elegant agreement,” one way or another taking into account the interests of Peru and Ecuador. In this regard, the special importance of the mediation activities of the guarantor countries in resolving the conflict was emphasized, as well as their main tools, such as: negotiation processes, signing documents on the territorial dispute, participating in the demarcation of borders, monitoring compliance with the agreements reached, contributing to the active development of Ecuadorian-Peruvian relations after the signing of the peace treaty and preventing the escalation of the conflict in the future. As a result of the consideration of the role of each intermediary country in the settlement of the Alto Cenepa conflict, their own interests were touched and the key areas of participation in peacekeeping activities were listed, and it was concluded that Brazil’s position was the most active.

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Introduction

At the turn of the 20th—21st century, the conflict situations continued to arise and develop in various regions, and it took serious efforts to resolve them, including action from other countries (Francisco, 2003). In 1989—1995, for example, there were 96 armed conflicts in the world (35 of which had not been completed by 1995), and six of them were large enough to be classified as wars (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 1996). Modern conflicts are very complex and share three common characteristics. First, there have been internal political conflicts that have reached the international level. Secondly, they have a serious impact on the civilian population. And thirdly, the difference between armed groups with political goals and transnational criminal organizations is often very small. These conflicts give exactly the same rise to the human rights violations, lead to an increasing number of internally displaced persons both within and between countries, humanitarian crises and the illegal exploitation of natural resources.1

The young Latin American states that had gained independence from Spain sought to resolve the existing border disputes over resource-rich territories both during the armed conflicts that reshape the territories of these states, and through arbitration based on the principle of “own what you own” (Uti possidetis), which had developed in international practice, as well as through mediation and negotiation. Over two centuries, there were 12 military conflicts between the Latin American countries: seven in the 19th century and five in the 20th century, and three of them can be considered as major conflicts based on numbers of troops involved, area covered, duration, and death toll (Mitre, 2010).

The neoliberal approach, where one of the forms of interaction is the creation of a certain set of rules, norms (regimes), which must be followed by all participants in international processes, is the most appropriate for understanding the conflict resolution process (Setov, 2012). International regimes, according to S. Krasner (1991), are interpreted in a positive sense, and the interstate interaction is based on the desire for cooperation, and these forms of interaction do not involve aggression, but, on the contrary, lead to conflict resolution. Latin American states have a rich tradition of conflict resolution based on adherence to international law and the use of diplomacy (Starostina, 2005). In the face of the rising number of conflicts at the global level, the rich experience of Latin American countries attracts the attention of researchers to study such strategies or tools for conflict resolution (De Armas, 2003) as negotiation, mediation, conciliation or assistance, problem solving and reconciliation or intervention of third parties through the use of force (peace enforcement) (García, 2021).

Mediating in Latin American Conflicts

In 1914, Argentina, Brazil and Chile united their efforts and were able to resolve disputes between the United States and Mexico, and although the “ABC Pact”2 was not formalized, the mutual consultations and mediation were used by these countries in an attempt to prevent the Chaco war between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1932—1935, the war between Peru and Colombia in 1932—1933. The wars could not be prevented, but Argentina and Brazil took an active part in the signing of peace treaties. In 1929, in Havana, the countries of the region signed the General Treaty on Inter-American Arbitration, the Protocol on Progressive Arbitration, and in 1933, at the VII Inter-American Conference, it was put forward the Saavedro Lamas Pact, which spoke of supporting arbitration and resolving conflicts in a peaceful way, during direct negotiations, in the legal field and on the basis of the principle of equality of states. In 1948, along with the adoption of the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter, the Inter-American Treaty on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes was also adopted (Pact of Bogota).

At the UN, Latin American countries take an active part in conflict resolution and participate in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN. Countries use mediation services to resolve territorial conflicts, where the Queen of Great Britain, the President of the United States and the Holy See have been involved in resolving the issue. In the field of conflict resolution, mediation is a set of methods and strategies that can lead to the negotiations and eventually to a peace agreement between parties facing violence over political issues or territories (Bercovitch, 1992). There are the principles of mediation — the neutrality and impartiality of mediators, confidentiality, and voluntary consent of the participants and the implementation of negotiations with the participation of the conflicting parties.

There are the activities of the third parties such as negotiations or mediation between the elites of the conflicting parties, dialogue or assistance (usually at the civil society level). The mediating of the third party usually does not have the authority or power to dictate the outcome, and the conflicting actors keep the control. Its strength lies in the legitimacy and trust of the parties. Mediators, incapable of coercion, strive to build an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding (Sosa Villalba, 2017). In theory and practice there are some types of mediation: with or without the use of force, and some types of mediators: official, unofficial, institutional (such as the UN or governments). There are the main elements of mediation: the activity of the mediator as a source for creating, maintaining and improving communication, providing information between the parties, bringing them closer and developing goodwill to engage in joint negotiations (Almeida, 2019).

Most Latin American countries have adopted laws that define the legal provisions of mediation: Brazil,3 Paraguay,4 Argentina,5 Ecuador, Peru, Chile, etc. (Mera, 2013).

 One of the longest regional conflicts between Peru and Ecuador, which lasted almost 170 years (from 1830 to 1998) and was accompanied by periodic armed clashes, periods of tense peace and open hostilities caused by an unresolved territorial problem, was resolved through mediation (Klechenov, 1999).

The History of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian Territorial Rivalry

After the war of independence, Peru and Ecuador, which had seceded from Gran Colombia in 1830, competed for possession of territories in the basin of the river Amazon and highlands (Reig Satorres, 1980). The parties repeatedly applied for arbitration to the King of Spain, but Ecuador’s attempt to sell the land in the basin of the river Amazon claimed by Peru led to a rupture of diplomatic relations and war in 1857—1860. Ecuador was forced to recognize the disputed lands as Peruvian, but the conflict was not resolved. In 1910, the countries again found themselves on the brink of war, but the arbiter (the King of Spain) refrained from resolving the dispute, taking into consideration the already announced possibility of a military confrontation between the applicants (Alfredo, 1982).

Long diplomatic negotiations during the arbitration of the US President Coolidge did not lead to the signing of an agreement in 1924, and after the emergence of new controversies in 1938 the Peruvian delegation left Washington (López, 2004).

The number of border clashes increased, and by May 1941 Peru had concentrated about 20 thousand people on the border with Ecuador. There are still disputes about the fact who was the first to start hostilities, but on May 5, 1941, a well-armed Peruvian army entered the territory of Ecuador, conducting military operations with the support of artillery, aircraft, and warships blocking enemy ports (Pareja, 1988). The Ecuadorian armed forces could not resist an enemy, who, in addition to a large financial budget and a population more than twice that of Ecuador, had an undeniably large weapon potential.

Under these conditions, in October, with the mediation of Argentina, Brazil and the United States, and later Chile, an agreement was reached on a ceasefire and the demilitarization of part of the territory. However, after the Japanese bombing of the American port of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Peruvian-Ecuadorian war lost its relevance, as the strengthening of continental solidarity became the most important issue for the United States and Brazil. At the Third Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers (Rio de Janeiro, January 1942), a resolution was adopted recommending all countries to break off diplomatic relations with the Axis countries, but Chile and Argentina, which had close trade ties with Germany, stubbornly maintained their neutrality. At the same meeting, on January 29, 1942, Ecuador was forced to sign the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro with Peru under the headline “Peace, Friendship and Borders,” in which Argentina, Brazil, the USA and Chile acted as guarantors. As a result, Ecuador lost 278 thousand square km of territory (Peralta, 2021). The border between the two countries was defined only in general terms, so subsequent demarcation work in these hard-to-reach places proved difficult.

In 1947, the US Air Force carried out aerial photographic surveys of this territory and discovered the existence of a huge, previously unknown river, the Cenepa, 190 km long. This fact, according to Ecuador, was a significant error in previous calculations and made it impossible to implement the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro. In 1948, Ecuador suspended demarcation work, since 78 km in the Cordillera del Condor region, between the Cenepa and Santiago rivers and the Cenepa and Zamora Rivers, were not demarcated and eventually became a zone of constant friction, because each country began to deploy a military contingent in this territory, which had no boundary signs.

In 1960, the Ecuadorian authorities unilaterally declared the Protocol of 1942 as inefficacious (Cayo, 1995). The beginning of the conflict was not long in coming, and on January 22, 1981, Peruvian helicopters fired on the Pakish area (Díaz Burgos, 2015). The attack prompted the deployment of Ecuadorian troops and armor, and the Peruvian army mobilized one of its divisions towards Tumbes, bordering the province of El Oro. The ceasefire came on February, 2 after the long meetings and negotiations supervised by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States, acting as guarantor countries, and they reverted to the 1942 Protocol, which does nothing to resolve the deepened territorial disputes between Peru and Ecuador (Andrade, 2014).

After the Paquis War, diplomatic relations between the two countries continued, but the resolution of the territorial issue faded into the background, as priority was given to resolving the internal problems of Ecuador and Peru (Cayo, 1995). Ecuador had to deal with an external debt crisis in 1982, the catastrophic consequences of the destruction of infrastructure that arose as a result of the climatic cataclysms of 1982—1983, when large areas of the coast were flooded, leading to a reduction in export production. In Peru, there was a tense struggle with the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla movement, when more than 23 thousand people died as a result of violence and economic losses amounted to 10 billion USD, all against the backdrop of hyperinflation in the country (Mares & Scott, 2012).

In Peru, there was a tense struggle with the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla movement, when more than 23,000 people died as a result of violence and economic losses amounted to 10 billion USD, all against the backdrop of hyperinflation in the country (Mares & Scott, 2012).

With the coming to power of President Alberto Fujimori in Peru, a diplomatic channel for bilateral dialogue was opened for the first time in almost a decade with the aim of peacefully resolving the border dispute. Peruvian Foreign Minister Eduardo Torres y Torres Lara and his Ecuadorian counterpart Diego Cordovez attempted to develop a “gentleman’s agreement” to create a common security zone in the region (Mares & Scott, 2012). In January 1992, Peruvian President A. Fujimori made his first state visit to Ecuador in many years, followed by a series of high-level meetings, but the issue was not resolved (Peralta, 2021).

In July 1991, after the installation by the Peruvian side of the Pachakutik post in the disputed areas, Ecuador organized the Etza post. Since 1991, negative rhetoric and provocations have been used by both sides, and occasional shootings have been recorded. The situation worsened at the end of 1994 and escalated into an armed conflict in January. The course of hostilities themselves is described in detail (Espinoza Yépez, 2014), but the Alto Cenepa war between Ecuador and Peru, although it was a rather short-lived conflict — from January 26 to February 28, 1995, nevertheless, threatened to develop into a protracted war. In a short time, more than 140 thousand people were mobilized from both sides, the armies and air forces of both countries were involved in armed conflict, and the naval forces remained in a state of combat readiness. The fighting spread mainly to a strip of land 78 km long along the river Cenepa.

The intermediary countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States, joined in the settlement of the insoluble situation. A series of negotiations lasted almost three years, until 1998. On February 17, 1995, the Itamaraty Declaration6 was signed in the capital of Brazil, providing for a complete ceasefire and separation of the parties. The declaration also provided for the deployment of a mission of military observers of the guarantor countries in the disputed area.

Main Directions of the Conflict Settlement between Peru and Ecuador

The declaration signed in Montevideo on February 28, 1995, established the presence of military observers of the guarantor countries to monitor the ceasefire and the Mission of Military Observers of Ecuador and Peru. In March 1995, the withdrawal of the parties from the disputed zone began. By May, the process of withdrawing troops was fully completed, and on August 4, 1995, a demilitarized zone was established in the disputed territory. In the presence of representatives of the mediating countries, the Deputy Foreign Ministers of Ecuador and Peru signed an agreement on a ceasefire and separation of the parties (Espinoza Yépez, 2014).

On March 12, a military observer mission (Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru, MOMEP) began its work in Cuenca (Ecuador). The mission included six observers from Argentina, six from Chile, nine from Brazil, 10 from the United States and 92 members of the technical staff (Espinoza Yépez, 2014). The structure of MOMEP was formed, consisting of the General Coordinator, the General Staff, the Military Observer Group, the Support Group, the Air Unit and offices in Peru and Ecuador.

The tasks of MOMEP, which has been operating for almost four years, have changed at different stages, and its activities have also changed. MOMEP was in charge of the demilitarized zone, the Alpha zone and the control zone with a total area of 1540 square km. Military observers patrolled the airspace over the demilitarized zone and the zone of control, detecting any movement outside the agreement, checked the location of border detachments, randomly checked certain posts for the presence of weapons and ammunition, monitored demining tasks related to the border demarcation, medical care and cartographic activities.

On February 17, 1996, the number of military observers from the guarantor countries was reduced to four per guarantor country, and nine members from Peru and Ecuador were added to the organization, which strengthened the measures to build mutual confidence between the two countries. On March 6, 1996, Peru and Ecuador exchanged a list of complex issues that needed to be resolved, and on October 26, 1996, in the presence of guarantor countries, both states signed the Treaty of Santiago, aimed at the objective resolution of territorial disputes (Laban, 2009). In 1996 and 1997, relative calm was achieved on the border under the strict control of the MOMEP, while politicians and diplomats continued to negotiate. In the second half of 1998, the new tensions arose along the border, this time in the southern sector of the demilitarized zone, where MOMEP’s intervention succeeded in separating the opposing forces once again.

On October 26, 1998, following the efforts of the guarantor countries, the Presidents of Ecuador (Hamil Mauad) and Peru (Alberto Fujimori) signed the Act on the final settlement of the territorial dispute and its subsequent observance in Brazil, by which they “globally and finally eliminated the differences between two republics, so that, based on their common roots, both nations are projected on a path to a promising future of cooperation and mutual benefit,” in addition to affirming “the solemn renunciation of the threat and use of force between Peru and Ecuador, and of any action affecting the world and friendship between two nations.”7

MOMEP continued to carry out reconnaissance missions and air inspections in the areas of responsibility, as well as maintaining permanent operations centers and intensifying demining controls in connection with the installation of demarcation markers. This work, which became a priority for MOMEP, ended on May 12, 1999, when the demining acts were signed by the presidents of Ecuador and Peru, thus ending almost four years of MOMEP’s activities.

The operational activities and functions performed by the military observers were of fundamental importance for the separation of forces, the control during the demilitarization of the area, the inviolability of the abandoned territories, the verification of the available means and the control of mine clearance, the performance of complex, delicate and dangerous tasks, which were carried out with skill, prudence, discipline and determination. The main advantage of the mission was the fact that it could monitor the implementation of the provisions of the peace treaty by the parties as quickly as possible (Ojeda, 2015). In most cases, however, researchers are inclined to believe that two tools were vital for conflict resolution — negotiations and mediation, which were implemented by the guarantor countries (Radcliffe, 1998). The final demarcation of the borders took place in 1999 (Simmons, 1999).

In Latin America, the agreement to settle the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dispute in 1998 is called an “elegant agreement,” since it took into account, to a certain extent, the interests of both parties: Ecuador received part of the territory for private use and access to the river Amazon in order to ensure navigation, and Peru was given part of the sovereign territory (Laban, 2009). This agreement should also be considered as the starting point for the foreign trade activities between countries and the implementation of integration and security measures in the region (Arévalo, 2020).

However, it should be noted that the peace treaty was not supported by almost the entire population of Peru, who considered it extremely disadvantageous for the country. In December 1998, for example, a referendum was held, in the city of Iquitos, the administrative center of the border region of Loreto, in which 97% rejected the treaty. In the country, this figure, according to surveys, amounted to 76%. In Ecuador, on the contrary, the majority of the population (more than 58%) supported the signing of a peace treaty (Arévalo, 2020).

The Interests of the Mediating Countries in Resolving the Alto Cenepa Conflict

Latin American researchers often point to the fact that the Ecuadorian-Peruvian war, although the result of opposing territorial interests arose due to unsuccessful mediation and insufficiently detailed Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, which did not establish the border along the Cenepa River, and this area remained controversial for 50 years (Laban, 2009).

Moreover, despite the common interests of Peru and Ecuador regarding the development of integration processes, the force option of solving the problem continued to dominate at that time, since the antagonistic nature of relations between the countries in solving the territorial issue, and the presence of a chauvinistic culture, had for many years developed an extremely low level of interconnection between both societies and economies (Bonilla, 1996). It was the long-standing Ecuadorian-Peruvian rivalry that became a serious obstacle, which has only increased over the years (Ortíz, 1999).

The key role in ending the conflict between Ecuador and Peru was played by the guarantor countries: Brazil, the United States, Chile and Argentina. The change in the balance of power on the world stage that occurred after the collapse of the USSR, the development of democratization processes in Latin American countries and the withdrawal of military regimes from power, the deepening of integration processes and the growth of US interests in this region intensified the activity of intermediaries (Hens & Sanahuja, 1995).

A special role in the conflict resolution was assigned to Brazil, which participated in the resolution of regional conflicts both as an independent actor and within the Rio Group, the OAS, the UN (Soares de Lima & Hirst, 2006). The well-thought-out Itamaraty Declaration, signed in Brazil, marked the beginning of the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The establishment of a lasting peace raised the prestige of Brazil as a regional leader, which made it possible to create an international organization — the Amazon Pact (Organization of the Treaty on Cooperation in the Amazon River Basin, OTCA) in 1995, which included eight countries (Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Guyana, Colombia, Suriname). This strengthened MERCOSUR and its ties with the Andean Community of Nations (which included Peru and Ecuador), and then to create UNASUR (Borzova, 2012).

Chile had difficult relations with Peru and, in addition to common interests with other guarantor countries, sought to strengthen bilateral Chilean-Peruvian relations, primarily in the diplomatic and economic spheres.

Argentina was the only guarantor country that pursued exclusively regional interests: to ensure security and strengthen integration. Integration processes in the Latin American region developed at a rather dynamic pace in the 1990s, but in order to maintain this level it was necessary, firstly, to establish clear boundaries between countries, and, secondly, to ensure stability in economic relations between Latin American states (Laban, 2009).

For the United States, the expansion of the conflict in territories where the Americans had extensive economic ties was of no interests. In its role as mediator, Washington applied the full range of diplomatic measures (consultations, bilateral and multilateral negotiations, military observers), provided the technical side of MOMEP’s activities in delimiting disputed territories. However, it is important to emphasize that the US position in the negotiation process was rather cautious, since the US has been holding Summits of the Americas since 1994 with the aim of creating a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). That’s why the country did not want to dominate the settlement of the dispute and let Brazil take the lead.

The process of increasing regional security, preventing the spread of military conflict and arms race to neighboring countries, accelerating regional integration, ensuring their own economic interests in Peru and Ecuador met the interests of all the mediating countries. The guarantor countries, during lengthy negotiations, pointed to the predominance of coinciding interests, which allowed Ecuador and Peru to reach an agreement (Laban, 2009). The key role of the mediating countries was not so much to end the Alto Cenepa conflict (for this, the guarantor countries coordinated the cessation of hostilities in the absence of communication between Ecuador and Peru), but to exercise control over the next few years for the implementation of the reached agreements, the strengthening of political, economic, cultural cooperation between two countries. In this regard, we share the opinion of the Peruvian researcher Oscar Vidarte Arévalo that at present bilateral cooperation between Peru and Ecuador is manifested in the intensive dynamics of relations in various fields, due to the transformation of the foreign policies of both countries (Arévalo, 2020).

Conclusion

Territorial problems often lead to conflicts in international relations, and the experience of Latin American countries in applying strategies such as mediation of third countries, good offices and negotiations is extremely relevant today. The strategy of mediation itself, its theoretical and practical aspects, has received quite a deep coverage in Latin American historiography. The long-standing territorial conflict between Peru and Ecuador, in which the countries have repeatedly resorted to armed clashes, shows that mediation is a very complex and multifaceted process, in which the interests of the guarantor countries themselves play an important role.

Thanks to the guarantor countries, the Alto Cenepa war was completed, and the key measures to resolve the military conflict by intermediaries were: organizing the negotiations, control over the signing of documents on the final settlement of the territorial dispute, acting as guarantors in the implementation of the clauses of the signed agreements, separating the warring parties, establishing a demilitarized zone and participating in the demarcation of borders, in the disputed territory, and then promoting the development of bilateral cooperation. The study of the norms, methods, technical aspects of mediation and requirements for mediators is of undoubted interest in resolving complex conflicts, since it can radically change the foreign policy of warring states. The multifaceted nature of the measures taken, their systematic implementation, taking into account the interests of the conflicting parties, the coordination of actions and decisions of the guarantor countries contributed to the emergence of the term “multilateral peacekeeping” (Palmer, 1997), when the conflict was not only eliminated, but its further development was prevented. Bilateral relations were also radically modified by the vector change from long-standing mutual misunderstanding to fruitful cooperation and good neighborliness, as illustrated by the example of Ecuador and Peru.

 

1 Aguirre M. Dialogo, diplomatica y mediacion en America Latina // Nueva Sociedad. Marzo 2020. URL: https://nuso.org/articulo/dialogo-diplomacia-y-mediacion-en-america-latina/ (accessed: 17.03.2023).

2 ABC is a term used mainly in the first half of the 20th century to describe the leading South American states: Argentina, Brazil and Chile, which jointly developed approaches to solving regional problems and conflicts without involving extra-regional forces. It first came into use after the May-June 1914 conference in Niagara Falls (ABC conference), which aimed to prevent the outbreak of war between Mexico and the United States.

3 Lei 13.140/2015, de 26 de junho de 2015 // Presidência da República. URL: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2015/Lei/L13140.htm (accessed: 17.03.2023).

4 Ley nº 1.879/2002, de 24 de abril, del Arbitraje y Mediacion // Organization of American States. URL: http://www.oas.org/es/sla/ddi/docs/Paraguay-Ley%20de%20Arbitraje%20y%20Mediaci%C3%B3n.pdf (accessed: 17.03.2023).

5 Ley 24.573 de Mediación y Conciliación // Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos del Argentina. URL: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/25000-29999/29037/norma.htm (accessed: 17.03.2023).

6 The Declaration of Itamaraty // UN Peacemaker. February 17, 1995. URL: https://peacemaker.un.org/ecuadorperu-itamaratydeclaration95 (accessed: 17.03.2023).

7 Acta Presidencial de Brasilia // Congreso de la República del Peru. 26.10.1998. URL: https://www4.congreso.gob.pe/comisiones/1998/exteriores/acta.htm (accessed: 17.03.2023).

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About the authors

Alla Yu. Borzova

RUDN University

Email: borzova-ayu@rudn.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-9886-7977

PhD, Dr. of Sc. (History), Professor, Department of Theory and History of International Relations

Moscow, Russian Federation

Vinicio X. Medina Gonzalez

RUDN University

Author for correspondence.
Email: medina-gv@rudn.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0001-7267-6323

PhD (History), Assistant, Department of Theory and History of International Relations

Moscow, Russian Federation

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