Security Needs as a Fundamental Factor of the State Origin

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Introduction

The study of the basic principles of interaction between the individual, society and the state, in relation to the needs and interests of the individual, can be considered one of the most important theoretical and practical issues in modern social knowledge. Therefore, it is natural that today, in the era of global socio-cultural transformations, political and economic instability, increased attention is being paid by researchers to such a crucial aspect of this interaction as ensuring personal, public and, last but not least, national security. This topic is actively studied by contemporary Russian political scientists, lawyers and economists [1]. In Western countries, a special field of security studies has even emerged, bringing together representatives of various disciplines [2]. However, the plurality of opinions, approaches and concepts in a given field of scientific knowledge does not always have a positive influence on its further development. The natural consequence of the existing “polyphony of views” in security studies seems to be a cacophony of different disciplines, which in turn leads to a situation in which the results obtained often remain “unheard” and unclaimed. For example, the vast empirical psychological material on human needs and interests is often not applied to the analysis of the principles of interaction between the individual, society and the state in modern state-building studies. Leading political anthropologists are usually not inclined to consider the “need-based” factor as a significant factor in the analysis of the foundations of statehood [3]. It should also be noted that the so-called “psychological” theory of state formation, developed by L.I. Petrazhitsky, G. Tarde and Z. Freud [4. P. 21–22], today arouses significant interest only among legal historians, mainly because of the well-known gap between the most popular and well-founded views in psychology of the late 19th century and the understanding of human needs in contemporary psychology. Finally, these results are not usually applied in political psychology, which is mainly concerned with various ideal-typical forms of “political behaviour” of individuals (electoral behaviour, characteristics of the behaviour of political leaders, etc.), which in turn brings it closer to ethology and accordingly distances it from political science and political anthropology. In view of all these circumstances, the use of the best-known concepts of needs and interests in modern social science seems more than justified when analysing the specifics of the interaction between the individual, society and the state. It seems that this approach can help to identify specific mechanisms that link the processes of satisfying individual needs with the emergence of the state.

Human Needs and Interests as a Subject of Analysis  in Contemporary Social Science

The consideration of human needs as a crucial factor in the constitution of various forms of social interaction is now mainly carried out in psychology. Perhaps the best-known typology of human needs (the “pyramid”, also known as the “hierarchy theory”), which has largely determined the direction of further scientific research in this area, was developed by the famous American psychologist Abraham Maslow. The key thesis of his approach was that the scientific analysis of an individual’s subjective motivational preferences, which determine his or her social activity, should be “the study of motivation must be, in part, the study of ultimate human goals or desires or needs” [5. P. 22].

At the same time, it should be noted that despite the widespread scientific recognition and success of various psychological theories of needs, even the most thoroughly developed of them often fundamentally avoid addressing the key question of what a need actually is. It is telling that even A. Maslow’s now classic theory of needs has been described by the contemporary Russian psychologist  E.P. Ilyin as the kind of theory that is “not very precise in its use of scientific concepts”. For example, in one case in his book the need appears as a goal, in another as an urge, and in a third as a state” [6. P. 393]. Such widespread non-terminological use of the concept of “need” as something that, if not self-evident, at least does not require a rigorous, logically refined definition and special conceptual-theoretical justification, has led to a situation that the Russian researcher K.Kh. Momdzhyan describes as “lack of unity in understanding a number of the most important issues concerning the place and role of needs in human activity”, resulting in “the absence of a single, logically consistent typology of human needs” [7. P. 5]. A similar situation arises with the definition of the concept of “interest”, the meaning of which varies from discipline to discipline. In economics, for example, the interests of an individual are usually understood as the aspirations realised in one’s activities, aimed at obtaining income and therefore often interfering with one’s social ties and even leading to their dissolution. Psychology, on the other hand, emphasises the social, communicative nature of interests.

The lack of conceptual consensus in understanding the nature of human needs and interests and their interrelationship among representatives of various sciences, and even among psychologists, seems to indicate the necessity of using philosophical analysis. In this regard, special attention should be paid to one of the most complete and developed typologies of human needs in Russian social science, proposed by K.Kh. Momdzhyan. In his approach, "human need is considered as an objectively real property of a social subject, distinguished, on the one hand, from its mental projections (sensations, urges and desires generated by the need in the human psyche) and, on the other hand, from the objects satisfying it, which act as the object of the need" [8. P. 31]. The concept of interest, in turn, is defined by him as “the extra-psychic property of a social subject to need what is necessary for the creation, maintenance and use of the object of need” [8. P. 31]. As for the direct differences between needs and interests, according to K.Kh. Momdzhyan, they are manifested first of all according to the principle of the relation to the individual’s needs as the poles of the “ends-means” disposition. He writes that “most human actions are directly related to interests rather than to needs (although the need, which gives rise to interest as a means of its satisfaction, is latently contained in it and remains the primary cause of social actions)” [7. P. 9]. We share this understanding of needs and interests and consider it to be the most conceptually and theoretically grounded in contemporary social science. From the perspective of our research, the crucial point is the assertion that it is precisely need that “generates interest” and “remains the primary cause of social action”, leading, among other things, to the emergence of statehood.

The Pursuit of Security as a Fundamental Biosocial Human Need

Accordingly, the subject of scientific analysis capable of identifying the real patterns of interaction between the individual, society and the state should be the individual’s needs and interests, and above all the vital biosocial human need for security^[1]. These needs largely determine a person’s social identity, and their satisfaction is inextricably linked to the preservation of the fact and quality of life of individuals and human groups. It is precisely the biosocial need for security, as noted by K.Kh. Momdzhyan, that “implies protection not only from lethal threats but also from dangers directed at the quality of life (health, property, social status, dignity, self-respect, etc.)” [8. P. 33], and its satisfaction makes possible the private and public life of individuals.

In this respect, it is crucial to note that security needs, which arise for quite obvious purely biological reasons, are at the same time the basis of the needs of individuals to form social bonds and, consequently, to interact socially. Earlier [11] we wrote that in classical social philosophical thought the idea of the key role of security needs as a fundamental factor in state formation prevailed. Thus, even Plato, when speaking about the origin of the state, noted that “people gather together to live communally and help one another: such a joint settlement is what we call a state... It is evident that [the state] is created by our needs” [12. P. 369]. It is no coincidence that, in social contract theories, the transition from a natural to a rational legal state of human life organisation becomes possible only when security guarantees are provided for all the “signatories” of the agreement, the observance of which is assumed by the state. Similarly, the significance of security needs was assessed by G.W.F. Hegel, who believed that since “the state is the only condition for achieving particular goals and particular welfare” [13. P. 289], the state is the most developed form of representing the needs and interests of the individuals-citizens forming it. “The habit of security,” he writes in the Philosophy of Right, “has become a second nature; no one thinks that this is only the result of the action of special institutions” [13. P. 293].

It is noteworthy that A. Maslow also assesses the importance of safety needs in a similar way, reflecting that these needs “may serve as the almost exclusive organizers of behavior, recruiting all the capacities of the organism itt their service, and we may then fairly describe the whole organism as a safety-seeking mechanism” [5. P. 39]. It should be stressed that, according to A. Maslow, safety needs can satisfy the need for security and stability, but also for “structure, order, law, limits; strength in the protector” [5. P. 39]. In other words, it seems no coincidence that, in the individual’s consciousness (and probably in the subconscious), the feeling of loneliness, disconnection from group forms of social interaction, is usually associated not only with a sense of longing, “discomfort,” but also with some degree of concern about the level of security – not only personal but also societal security. After all, full participation in public life can ensure the completeness of one’s own existence.

Another aspect of our analysis concerns one of the most important theoretical and methodological problems, which deals with the subjectivity of different types of human social groups, including society and the state. Concepts such as “social needs” or “state interests”, which have entered the scientific discourse from everyday language, assign their own subjective status to these forms of socio-political organisation of human life, as if society or the state possessed their own unique properties and qualities, needs and interests, fundamentally different from those of individuals. This procedure of theoretically and methodologically “endowing subjectivity” goes back to the once very popular stance of methodological collectivism in social knowledge in the mid-19th century. Its proponents (e.g. L. Gumplowicz, K. Marx, É. Durkheim²) believed that people’s needs and interests were primarily, if not exclusively, determined by the degree to which they belonged to certain social groups, collectives or classes. Moreover, the individual was not considered as an independent, fully-fledged subject of activity, since its entire essence, according to the famous formula of K. Marx, “is not an abstraction inherent in the isolated individual. It is the ensemble of all social relations” [14. P. 3]. This allowed the proponents of this approach to assert that the needs/interests of the collective/society/state not only shape human needs and interests, but even create and define them.

The vulnerability of this position, in our view, lies primarily in the fact that, since neither society nor the state are living organisms, they do not have, and cannot have, purely “biologically”, their own needs and interests that are distinct from human needs and interests. For this reason, “society’s needs” and/or “state’s interests” (as well as “society’s interests” and “state’s needs”) cannot, strictly speaking, be the subject of scientific research. These concepts are nothing more than metaphors, as is the even more metaphorical concept of “conflict interaction” between the state and society, which is essentially a “second-order” metaphor. However, this “conflict” paradigm of analysing the interaction between people, society and the state does not only result from understanding the latter primarily as an “apparatus of repression”, but also, more or less explicitly, from representing the state and society as bearers of their own spirit, needs and interests. Conflict, on the other hand, is a form of interaction between subjects of action that occurs when these subjects believe, whether subjectively or objectively, that the satisfaction of the interests of one hinders the satisfaction of the interests of the other. Accordingly, any discourse on the “conflict of interests” between the state and society, the state and the individual, implicitly requires – even if it does not explicitly state it – the postulation of the existence of interests of all participants in the conflict, i.e. not only of individuals, but also of society, the state and various social groups. A characteristic feature of concepts that analyse the interaction of man, society and the state primarily from the perspective of a potential or actual conflict between them is therefore the attribution of subjective properties not only to the individual, but also to the state and society. P. Bourdieu gives a somewhat ironic but essentially accurate characterisation of such concepts: “I could quote you miles of texts in which the word ‘state’ acts as the subject of actions, as the predicate of many sentences. This is a rather dangerous fiction that hinders us from thinking about the state” [15. P. 62–63]. The further consequence of this “dangerous fiction” is the possibility of opposing the “interests” of the ruling and governed social groups, with the prospect of “hypostatizing” the latter as “opposing classes”. Accordingly, the conflict paradigm for analysing the interaction between the individual, society and the state is based on an explicitly asserted or implicitly assumed postulate about the inevitability and regularity of the confrontation between the state and society and/or the state and the individual. This confrontation is conditioned by the deep, existential contradictions inherent in their “needs” and “interests”. In other words, describing and analysing the interaction between the individual, society and the state solely through the lens of conflict discourse, where the causes and nature of the conflict of their “interests” are revealed and/or where the contradictions between their “interests” are highlighted, and further where ways of resolving such conflicts are proposed, essentially characterises only subjective experiences and representations. Such an approach is unlikely to claim scientific status, even if it is presented in the form of theoretical questions.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that, according to the contemporary understanding of man as a biosocial being, the emergence and development of the state as a form of organisation of social life is determined by the needs of the individual and corresponds to his interests. At the same time, our analysis demonstrates the existence of objective ontological foundations rooted in the needs of the individual (primarily the need for security), the satisfaction of which objectively requires their inclusion in a certain socio-political order, that is, essentially their subordination to this order, without which productive cooperation of individuals becomes impossible. Since such an order is formed in the process of interaction between the state and society, the integrative nature of this interaction and its correspondence with the vital needs of the individual turn out to be an objective necessity.

 

_{¹ In contemporary studies, the terms “security needs” and “safety needs” are often used  interchangeably, though they sometime differ in meaning. For example, A. Mylingova, in the  preface to her specialized work Safety and Security Risks Theory [9], uses them as synonyms;  other authors point to the possibility and even necessity of their conceptual-theoretical distinction. For more on this, see: [10. P. 238–239].}

_{² Among the most recent examples of this approach, one may recall the work of a contemporary follower of É. Durkheim, Mary Douglas, with the telling title “How Institutions Think”.}

About the authors

Ivan S. Golubev

RUDN University; Lomonosov Moscow State University

Author for correspondence.
Email: golubev_is@pfur.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-6939-0583
SPIN-code: 1819-3120

CSc in Philosophy, Assistant Lecturer of the Department of Social Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, RUDN University; Laboratory Assistant, Faculty of Philosophy, Lomonosov Moscow State University

6 Miklukho-Maklaya St., Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation; 27/4 Lomonosovsky Prospekt, Moscow, GSP-1, 119991, Russian Federation

Jielin Zhao

RUDN University

Email: chzhao_ts@pfur.ru
ORCID iD: 0009-0008-6511-0637

CSc in History, Senior Lecturer of the Department of National Economics, Faculty of Economics

6 Miklukho-Maklaya St., Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation

References

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