Administrative prejudice and the principle of Non bis in idem

The concept of administrative prejudice, which enables the imposition of criminal liability for repeated commission of an administrative offense, has been the subject of sustained scrutiny among scholars. This attention is driven by starkly contrasting doctrinal viewpoints on the appropriateness of utilizing administrative prejudice as a method of criminalization. Given the substantial and noteworthy arguments presented by both opponents and detractors of the criminalizing repeated administrative offenses, it is impractical to comprehensively address them in a single publication. Hence, it is justifiable to endeavor to evaluate key arguments put forth by scholars, including their linkage between administrative prejudice and the longstanding legal principle of non bis in idem. The aim of this study is to assess administrative prejudice within the framework of the principle of non bis in idem. The research methodology is rooted in dialectical materialism, employing both general scientific (system-structural, formal-logical, inductive and deductive, analysis and synthesis) and specific (formal-legal, comparative-legal) methods. The findings indicate that the domestic legislator does not appear to contravene the tenets of the non bis in idem principle by enacting norms involving administrative prejudice. A generous interpretation of this principle, which precludes taking into account prior offenses when addressing subsequent ones, is deemed unwarranted. Steadfastly holding that administrative prejudice is compatible with the principle of non bis in idem should logically necessitate proponents of this position to challenge several other established institutions and norms that require consideration of pre-criminal conduct, particularly recidivism and criminal record, essentially entailing an assessment of the “dangerous state of the individual”.