Protecting the interests of a retail investor i n the United States, China and Russia: the example of brokerage

Cover Page

Cite item


The main objectives in regulating brokerage activities are to ensure the interests of brokers’ clients while minimizing the regulatory burden. At the moment, in connection with the flow of households’ assets to the securities market, the Bank of Russia is actively developing direct tools to protect the interests of investors, including the mechanism for qualifying investors. However, its effectiveness is questioned by the expert and professional community. To assess the results of the use of direct and indirect regulatory instruments aimed at protecting retail investors, a comparative analysis of the regulatory policy in this area in countries with the most developed financial markets was carried out. Based on the results of the analysis of regulation in the United States and China, it was established that they used tools of both direct and indirect regulatory impact. Despite the differ-ences in regulation in both cases, the emphasis in regulation is placed on indirect measures of influence. Direct bans on access to financial instruments for certain categories of investors in the countries under consideration are not applied. It was also noted that despite applying certain measures in Russia, similar to the indirect regulation in the United States and China, their implementation is often sufficient, which reduces their effectiveness.

About the authors

Ainur A. Biktashev

National Research University Higher School of Economics; Bank of Russia; Masaryk University

Author for correspondence.
ORCID iD: 0000-0001-7314-2980

Doctoral Student, National Research University «Higher School of Economics»

bld. 3, Bolshoy Trekhsvyatitelskiy by-street, Moscow, 109028, Russian Federation; 102, Veveří str., Brno, 616 00, Czech Republic


  1. Abbott, K., Levi-Faur, D. & Snidal, D. (2017) Theorizing regulatory intermediaries: The RIT model. The ANNALS of the American academy of political and social science. 670(1), 14-35.
  2. Abbott, K. & Snidal, D. (2000) Hard and soft law in international governance. International organization. 54(3), 421-456.
  3. Abramov, A., Radygin, A. & Chernova, M. (2014) Regulation of financial markets: models, evolution, efficiency. Problems of Economics. (2), 33-49. (in Russian).
  4. Alifanova, E. & Yevlakhova, Yu.S. (2011) Trends in reforming the institutions of regulation of national financial markets. Finance and credit. 35(467), 2-6. (in Russian).
  5. Aglietta, M. & Rigot, S. (2009) The regulation of hedge funds under the prism of the financial crisis. Policy implications. Recherches économiques de Louvain. 75(1), 5-34.
  6. Baker, A. (2018) Macroprudential regimes and the politics of social purpose. Review of international political economy. 25 (3), 293-316.
  7. Baker, A. (2010) Restraining regulatory capture? Anglo-America, crisis politics and trajectories of change in global financial governance. International Affairs. 86(3), 647-663.
  8. Bernstein, S. & van der Ven H. (2017) Best practices in global governance. Review of International Studies. 43 (3), 534.
  9. Browne, J. (2020) The regulatory gift: Politics, Regulation and governance. Regulation & Governance. 14(2), 203-218.
  10. Campbell-Verduyn, M., Goguen, M. & Porter, T. (2017) Big Data and algorithmic governance: the case of financial practices. New Political Economy. 22(2), 219-236.
  11. Crain, M. (2018) The limits of transparency: Data brokers and commodification. New media & society. 20(1), 88-104.
  12. DeMenno, M. (2019) Banking on burden reduction: how the global financial crisis shaped the political economy of banking regulation. Journal of banking regulation. 1-28.
  13. Dunlop, C., Maggetti, M., Radaelli, C. & Russel, D. (2012) The many uses of regulatory impact assessment: A meta-analysis of EU and UK cases. Regulation & Governance. 6(1), 23-45.
  14. Finlayson, A. (2009) Financialisation, financial literacy and asset-based welfare. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 11 (3), 400-421.
  15. Fransen, L. & Burgoon, B. (2012) A market for worker rights: Explaining business support for international private labour regulation. Review of International Political Economy. 19(2), 236-266.
  16. Golodnikova, A., Efremov, A. & Tsygankov, D. (2021) Under the sign of the “regulatory guillotine”: how to break the vicious circle of deregulation and re-regulation? Law. (2), 105-117. (in Russian).
  17. Grimmelikhuijsen, S., Jilke, S., Olsen, A.L. & Tummers, L. (2017) Behavioral Public Administration: Combining Insights from Public Administration and Psychology. Public Administration Review. (1), 45-56.
  18. Grossman, E. & Woll, C. (2014) Saving the banks: The political economy of bailouts. Comparative Political Studies. 47 (4), 574-600.
  19. Horner, R. (2019) India’s Pharmaceutical Industry and the Enduring Public Regulation Challenge. Business Responsibility and Sustainability in India. 275-304.
  20. Jones, E. & Zeitz, A. (2019) Regulatory Convergence in the Financial Periphery: How Interdependence Shapes Regulators’ Decisions. International Studies Quarterly. 63(4), 908-922.
  21. Kastner, L. (2014) ‘Much ado about nothing?’Transnational civil society, consumer protection and financial regulatory reform. Review of International Political Economy. 21(6), 1313-1345.
  22. Kaurova, N. (2012) Macroprudential regulation of financial markets. Financial journal. 1. (in Russian).
  23. Kulakova, V. (2017) Financial regulation in the United States under the new president D. Trump. Money and credit. 10, 57-63. (in Russian).
  24. Lall, R. (2015) Timing as a source of regulatory influence: A technical elite network analysis of global finance. Regulation & Governance. 9(2), 125-143.
  25. Larionova, I. (2014) Model for assessing the effectiveness of banking sector regulation. Vestnik MGIMO. (1), 127-135. (in Russian).
  26. Makarova, A. S. et al. (2019) Environmental performance assessment of the chemical industries involved in the Responsible Care® Program: Case study of the Russian Federation. Journal of Cleaner Production. (222), 971-985.
  27. Mennillo, G. & Roy, S. (2014) Ratings and regulation: a case of an irreversible marriage? Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Working Paper. 14-0004.
  28. Nie, Y. & Han, X. (2019) Research on consumers’ protection in advantageous operation of big data brokers. Cluster Computing. 22 (4), 8387-8400.
  29. Overdevest, C. & Zeitlin, J. (2014) Assembling an experimentalist regime: Transnational governance interactions in the forest sector. Regulation & governance. 8 (1), 22-48.
  30. Quaglia, L. (2019) The politics of state compliance with international “soft law” in finance. Governance. 32 (1), 45-62.
  31. Pastushenko, E. & Zemtsova, L. (2017) The role of legal acts of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation in the regulation of relations in the sphere of the financial market. Actual problems of state and law. 35 (in Russian).
  32. Redert, B. (2020) Stakeholder Mobilization in Financial Regulation: A Comparison of EU Regulatory Politics over Time. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. 1-19.
  33. Rixen, T. (2013) Why reregulation after the crisis is feeble: Shadow banking, offshore financial centers, and jurisdictional competition. Regulation & Governance. 7 (4), 435-459.
  34. Selivanovsky, A. (2014) Protection of Investors' Rights in the Stock Market: Modern Challenges. Economy and Law. 37 (in Russian).
  35. Spendzharova, A. (2016) Regulatory cascading: Limitations of policy design in European banking structural reforms. Policy and society. 3, 227-237.
  36. Stellinga, B. (2020) The open-endedness of macroprudential policy. Endogenous risks as an obstacle to countercyclical financial regulation. Business and Politics. 22 (1), 224-251.
  37. Stellinga, B. & Mügge, D. (2017) The regulator's conundrum. How market reflexivity limits fundamental financial reform. Review of international political economy. 24 (3), 393-423.
  38. Underhill, G. R. D. & Zhang, X. (2008) Setting the rules: private power, political underpinnings, and legitimacy in global monetary and financial governance. International Affairs. 84 (3), 535-554.
  39. Wolff, J. (2019) Fighting risk with risk: solar radiation management, regulatory drift, and minimal justice. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. 1-20.
  40. Zhao, M., Ke, Y. & Yi, Y. (2020) The effects of risk factor disclosure on analysts’ earnings forecasts: evidence from Chinese IPOs. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics. 1-30.

Copyright (c) 2022 Biktashev A.A.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

This website uses cookies

You consent to our cookies if you continue to use our website.

About Cookies