Applied Quantitative Analysis of R.T. Erdogan’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy in 2014-2022

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Introduction

Since 2014, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been the president of the Republic of Türkiye. His nine-year leadership has witnessed one of the most turbulent periods in world history in the post-Cold War era. R.T. Erdogan is known to be a master of diplomatic games (Nadein-Raevskiy, 2017). For nine years, he has been manoeuvring between the U.S., Russia, NATO, and the European Union (EU), projecting his influence in the post-Soviet space and Africa and taking into account neighboring states in the Middle East. Thus, many agree that his policy is multifaceted in nature (Guliev, 2022; Mayorova, 2022), although estimates differ when it comes to specific avenues and priorities. In this sense, the idea of collecting data on all of R.T. Erdogan’s diplomatic contacts from the beginning of his presidency in 2014 until December 2022 has emerged. This could contribute to a quantitative, descriptive and, if possible, qualitative analysis of selected dimensions of foreign policy that the Turkish leader himself pursues.

Relevance

The growing role of Türkiye in the system of international relations predetermines the rationale of the research. The state longs for a greater say in the world arena, actively turning to diplomatic instruments. In this way, Ankara seems to try to influence many regions and countries, to participate in resolving conflicts, etc. (Irkhin & Moskalenko, 2021). The qualitative method and the collection of data of all meetings and contacts of R.T. Erdogan during his presidency help to define a real geography of the president’s diplomatic efforts and underline the main important directions of his foreign policy. The aim of the research is to identify main foreign policy avenues of the Turkish president.

Literature Review

So far, many scholarly papers have already examined Türkiye’s foreign policy, with researchers usually turning to classical approaches to studying international processes. Hence, political realism has been popular among experts, who analyze Turkish foreign policy, using its core terms and provisions (Grafov, 2022; Kiraz, 2018). In addition, a wide range of studies focus on foreign policy ideologemes as their content and significance explain Ankara’s choice of priorities (Nadein-Raevskiy, 2021; Yavuz, 2020). Meanwhile, a number of researchers express skepticism about this approach and consider the analysis of Turkish politics based on ideological factors as unjustified and subjective (Ataç, 2019).

Within the systemic approach and neorealism, researchers consider both Türkiye’s domestic and foreign policies and analyze the impact of the country’s internal dynamics on its foreign policy course (Druzhilovsky, 2010). Moreover, some scholars emphasize the role of ideational factors and values in shaping Ankara’s foreign policy (Avatkov, 2019), while others actively use the historical method as it shows how Turkish foreign policy develops and changes over time (Balcı, 2013). Special attention should be paid to the works that examine how Ankara’s actions in the world arena are determined by factors such factors as soft power (Çevik, 2019) or the religious factor (Taş, 2022). A number of works focusing on the comparative analysis of Turkish foreign policy before and after the 2016 coup attempt stand out (Haugom, 2019; Aras, 2019).

The multi-vector nature of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East has also been studied through selective analysis of documents, speeches, news, and events, presenting a complex picture of how Ankara pursues its national interests (Guliev, 2022).

This literature review shows that the aforementioned authors use general methods of scientific research, emphasizing one or another factor in order to use it as the basis of their analysis. The main problem of this approach is that the selectivity of the analyzed events, statements, visits, etc. leads to ignoring a large amount of data that is significant in the context of the research results. However, an exception to this abundance of works was a study by Turkish scholars who used an empirical method to analyze Türkiye’s multi-vector foreign policy, using international agreements ratified by the Turkish parliament as the unit of measurement (Çakır & Akdağ, 2017). In this regard, it is remarkable how special quantitative methods are applied by calculating all the visits and meetings of the Turkish president in order to study the multi-vector nature of Türkiye’s foreign policy.

The use of the quantitative event analysis in international relations dates back to 1966, when Charles A. McClelland initiated the WEIS project, a specifically encoded data of world events aimed at studying their interconnections. It was later replaced by similar projects, such as Edward E. Azar’s COPDAB and the GEDS of the University of Maryland (Degterev, 2019,  р. 262). The development of the Internet has made it possible to collect large sets of data. The GDELT system automatically collects data using Google services.¹ The measurement and evaluation of indicators are conducted on  the basis of different scales, with the  Goldstein scale being the most frequently  used. It evaluates an event in terms of cooperation/competition (Goldstein, 1992). A similar scale was developed at Tsinghua University (Degterev, 2019, р. 263).

Such databases and scales have both obvious advantages and disadvantages. The former consist in collecting data on a global scale, automatically processing it, and being universal regardless of the country. The latter was revealed in the GDELT system by Russian scholars. It tends to collect English-speaking resources, and news in other languages is excluded from the database, which significantly distorts the results (Badrutdinova, Degterev & Stepanova, 2017, p. 85).

There is another approach that evaluates an event based on its impact on relations. Bahgat Korany, professor at the American University in Cairo, was the author of this methodology. It codifies the significance of an event rather than its character (Degterev, 2019, р. 265). A similar approach is used in the Globalization Index of the University of Zurich.² It is worth noting that nowadays this methodology has become subject to criticism due to its uncovered flaws. To a large extent, this approach depends on the quality and comprehensiveness of a field-specific statistics. A similar methodology has emerged in Russian science, although it focuses on indicators that are more obvious and easier to search for (Badrutdinova, Degterev & Stepanova, 2017).

Sources Review

The official website of the President of the Republic of Türkiye has become the source of information for the database. It is available in Turkish, Arabic, French, and English. The information for the database is taken from the sections “Presidential Agenda” and “Speeches and Statements.”

Description of the Database

To conduct the research, we have collected a database that covers all international contacts of R.T. Erdogan from September 2014 (when his first term began) to December 2022.

The database contains 2399 contacts. Each diplomatic contact has been recorded, emphasizing six key characteristics: a date of the event, a type of contact, a counteragent, a city of the contact, a weight, and a link to the information on the website. If there were several contacts during a visit, each one was counted separately. Given the different types of diplomatic activity, seven types of contacts were distinguished:

• visit to Türkiye — when a politician paid a visit to the Republic;
• visit of R.T. Erdogan — when the President of Türkiye paid a visit to another country;
• multilateral contact — when the President of Türkiye participated in multilateral formats (in this case, all contacts with participants were considered separately);
• on the sidelines — when the T. Erdogan personally met with representatives of other states on the sidelines of multilateral formats;
• phone call — when there was a bilateral telephone conversation;
• telegram to or from Türkiye.

A counteragent is a country, an international organization, an unrecognized state, a separate region (e.g., Gagauzia), civic or political organization. Weight is a range from  1 to 5 that has been used to make quantitative estimations and average calculations easier:  5 is for visits, 4 — for phone calls, 3 — for contacts on the sidelines of events, 2 — for a multilateral contact, and 1 — for telegrams.  A city of contact is a place where a meeting took place. A link to a contact’s information is essential for verification.

We performed the analysis of the database using the Microsoft Excel toolkit and the Pandas library, which is based on the Python programming language.

Is R.T. Erdogan’s Foreign  Policy Multi-Vectored?

While analyzing Türkiye’s foreign policy under the incumbent president, one is sure to point out its multi-vectored nature (Guliev, 2022), which can be seen in official documents. Politicians consider this type of strategy as effective in addressing global issues.³ Yet, it is quite problematic to say what makes Türkiye’s foreign policy multi-vectored. There is neither a common understanding of the  term nor criteria that could help define it, which would allow researchers to attribute  any factors or events to this type of  strategy.

The aim of the research is to analyze the multi-vector nature of R.T. Erdogan’s foreign policy by applying empirical research methods. In the qualitative analysis of the problem, the authors made lists of countries with whose representatives the Turkish president has interacted most frequently. Further, the first 20 countries will be considered. The authors decided to analyze this number of states, as they account for 43% of all contacts that  R.T. Erdogan has had, while interactions with the next 10 countries amount to only 8%.

The bar chart presented above shows the top ten countries by total number of contacts (Figure 1). The diagram helps determine both a counteragent and the format of the interaction. Cumulatively, these ten states account for 26% of all contacts of Türkiye’s leader.

It is noteworthy that the USA and Russia took the first and second place, respectively. Türkiye is trying to balance between the great powers. Despite all the differences with the U.S., Washington remains an important partner for Ankara, as they are bound by a continuous history of cooperation and NATO membership. At the same time, it is crucial for Türkiye not to rely on relations with one state and to diversify its contacts. Russia is a balancing element, with which Türkiye is deepening its political and economic ties, implements major projects, and cooperate in a number of regions (Avatkov & Sbitneva, 2020, рр. 118—120). The database clearly demonstrates Ankara’s balancing policy, as it does not want to unconditionally support any particular country, developing ties with major international actors and maintaining flexibility.

Azerbaijan is in third place. In its foreign policy, Türkiye puts a high premium on Azerbaijan, which can be proved by the motto “One nation — two states.” Since Azerbaijan’s independence, Ankara and Baku have taken a significant step towards unification in many areas of life, and they continue to promote integration in the “Turkish way” (Avatkov, 2022, рр. 95—96). It is these aspects that make Azerbaijan essential for R.T. Erdogan.

It is worth noting that the EU, its member states and Great Britain are also on the list.  This shows that the European path of Turkish foreign policy is still relevant. This is  primarily due to the fact that the  EU is Türkiye’s main trading partner.  

Figure 1. The Top 10 Countries by Total Number of Contacts
Source: compiled by the authors.

Moreover, Ankara actively cooperates with European partners in addressing refugee issues, resolving conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, etc. (Baracani, 2021, pp. 45—86). Relations with France should be emphasized. Most of the contacts are multilateral  formats and meetings on the sidelines of summits, with few visits and calls made. This shows that Paris is not a top priority in Ankara’s foreign policy.

Another international organization, the United Nations, is in the group of the second ten actors (Figure 2). In his speeches, R.T. Erdogan often stresses that the institutions of global governance, especially the UN, are unsuccessful in implementing the tasks entrusted with (Erdoğan, 2021, рp. 102—116). However, in its global policy, Türkiye is longing to become one of the reformers of the international system. This political vector is briefly expressed in the phrase “The world is bigger than five,” which has become a calling card of the Turkish president’s public speeches. On the one hand, Ankara advocates the reform of the UN, putting its own view of the future framework of the organization on the table (Altun, 2022,  pp. 101—139). On the other hand, it cooperates with various institutions and organizations, by locating regional centers of the UN agencies in Istanbul.^[7] Finally, Türkiye is trying to play a leading role in the Organization.

Ukraine is the 12th on the list, as Türkiye is improving its relations with the state in all spheres. It is a crucial source of military technology and a suitable place for Ankara to do business. Due to the start of the special military operation of the Russian Federation and Türkiye’s attempts to play the role of a mediator, contacts between the two countries have intensified (Avatkov & Guzaerov, 2022).

Like the first ten, the second ten includes countries from the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, and the EU member states. In addition, there are two Central Asian countries on the list, namely Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. They prove that the Turkic vector is important in Türkiye’s foreign policy (Ivanova, 2019).

Figure 2. The Second 10 Countries by Total Number of Contacts  
Source: compiled by the authors.

Quantifying the Quality  of International Contacts

The rankings considered above are based on a simple approach — the higher the number of contacts, the higher country’s place on the list. This approach has one obvious disadvantage; all types of contacts count equally. For instance, five bilateral visits might count as five multilateral meetings. This approach fails to provide a full understanding of the situation. Thus, a visit is an activity when representatives of states communicate directly with each other, whereas multilateral talks presuppose that leaders simply attend the event and have minimum contact with each other. To avoid this issue, the authors introduced “weight” as a characteristic of a contact.

Accordingly, the database contains two numerical characteristics for each contact: the number and the weight of each type of contacts for all countries. This makes it possible to find the arithmetic mean weighted average for each country. This indicator differs from the arithmetic mean in that it focuses on the measures with the biggest weight, whereas the arithmetic mean focuses on the most frequently met weights, which might present a misleading picture of the study. The weighted arithmetic mean will range from 0.00 to 5.00.

As the chart above shows, the first three places are occupied by the Middle Eastern countries (Figure 3). It is also worth noting that Qatar, Pakistan, and the EU remain in the top ten, as they are in the chart, showing the total number of contacts (see Figure 1). This means that these countries and the EU are at the top of R.T. Erdogan’s foreign policy agenda, whether counted by number or by weighted average. The top ten also includes “brotherly” Azerbaijan, “allied” Ukraine, and Saudi Arabia, with which Türkiye needs to reconcile in order to encourage investment.

Some countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Italy, etc.) and the UN remain in the list of the second ten actors, while the U.S. and Russia occupy the 12th and 14th places respectively (Figure 4). This is due to the fact that in the structure of Türkiye’s contacts with the U.S. and Russia, meetings within multilateral formats have a great weight, which contributed to the total number of contacts. This situation is particularly pronounced in relations with France and Italy. The weighted average of the two countries is close to 3.00, which means that most of R.T. Erdogan’s contacts with representatives of France and Italy were limited to contacts on the sidelines of multilateral meetings, which cannot be called active diplomacy.

The next part of the research is devoted to comparing both approaches on the basis of the scale of participation of regions in different rankings. Regardless of the counting method, the Middle East, the Balkans, the post-Soviet space, and Europe are evenly distributed among the first twenty actors. Each of the four rankings includes representatives of each region (except for the top ten countries by number of meetings, which does not include the Balkans (Table 1)).

If different counts give the same results, one can conclude that the results are relevant. As for the weighted average, there might be countries outside the Top 20 that are comparable to the Top 10. However, in these cases, the number of contacts will be insignificant, which means that relations with these countries cannot be regarded as an active way of Türkiye’s foreign policy. It can be said that the weighted arithmetic average is to some extent an intensive dimension of diplomatic activity, while the sum of contacts is its extensive expression.

The aforementioned part of the analysis aimed at calculating the average mean might seem excessive. However, the weighted average creates an additional level of assessment and measurement of diplomatic activity (Figure 5). This figure clearly demonstrates how different the international interactions are between Türkiye and Germany, on the one hand, and Türkiye and Qatar, on the other. When it comes to the number of contacts, Qatar and Germany have insignificant differences, which might mean that these countries are equally crucial for Recep Tayyip Erdogan. However, the addition of the weighted average shows how much more intensive the interaction is between Ankara and Doha than between Ankara and Berlin. Meanwhile, the UN and the EU have the same results in both indicators, which show that these institutions are important to the Turkish leader.

Figure 3. Top 10 Countries by Middle Average

Source: compiled by the authors.

Figure 4. The Second 10 Countries by Middle Average
Source: compiled by the authors.

Table 1. Ratings Comparison 

Ranking of states /  actors 1—22 by total number	Ranking of states /  actors 1—22 by middle
1.   USA	1.   Qatar
2.   Russia	2.   Libya
3.   Azerbaijan	3.   Iraq
4.   Germany	4.   Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH)
5.   The UK	5.   Ukraine
6.   Qatar	6.   Azerbaijan
7.   Iran	7.   Albania
8.   France	8.   Pakistan
9.   The EU	9.   Saudi Arabia
10. Pakistan	10. The EU
11. Albania	11. The UN
12. Ukraine	12. USA
13. The UN	13. Iran
14. Italy	14. Russia
15. Libya	15. Kazakhstan
16. Saudi Arabia	16. The UK
17. Uzbekistan	17. Greece
18. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH)	18. Uzbekistan
19. Greece	19. Germany
20. Bulgaria	20. Bulgaria
21. Iraq	21. Italy
22. Kazakhstan	22. France

Source: compiled by the authors.

Figure 5. Summary Dot Chart of Rankings of Countries from 1st to 20th Places  by Number and Middle Average
Source: compiled by the authors.

The Figure 5 makes it possible to categorize the first twenty states according to their diplomatic style. The first group consists of the countries that are to the left of 4.00 on the horizontal line, which means that Türkiye’s diplomatic activity in relations with them is low. The second group consists of countries to the right of the above-mentioned weight, and they enjoy active diplomatic connections with Ankara. It is noteworthy that contacts with the U.S. and Russia are the most frequent, but in terms of quality they are equal to interactions with Iran. The countries leading in terms of quality of contacts (Qatar, Libya and Iraq) rarely interact with Türkiye.

This illustrates that no matter how much R.T. Erdogan claims to be making his state a global player, his active diplomacy is pursued primarily at the regional level. This includes the South Caucasus, the Middle East, North  Africa, the Balkans, and Ukraine. In other words, Ankara is more active in the  regions close to Türkiye. In his fundamental work, Strategic Depth, Ahmet Davutoglu dubbed this area a “close continental basin” and called for an active foreign policy to increase Türkiye’s influence there (Davutoğlu, 2001,  pр. 183—221).

Domestic Vectors of R.T. Erdogan’s  Foreign Policy and “Track Two”  Diplomacy

While collecting the data, it was noted that apart from the meetings with top state officials, R.T. Erdogan also actively interacts with representatives of regional authorities of different countries, leaders of political parties and movements, non-profit organizations and the academic community. Despite the small number of contacts, this data is interesting from the point of view of studying R.T. Erdogan’s “track two” diplomacy.

Such an active interaction with officials of Iraqi Kurdistan is evident (Figure 6). Amid the ongoing conflict between Türkiye and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), Ankara has to contact with other Kurdish forces to deprive the PKK  of the opportunity to cooperate with them.   

Figure 6. Intra-Country Vectors
Source: compiled by the authors.

In addition, Türkiye and Iraqi Kurdistan have close economic ties, especially in the import of oil (Pusane, 2020, p. 394).

Germany ranks fourth in Türkiye’s political contacts, and Ankara has a special interest in North Rhine-Westphalia, as it is one of the most developed regions.

The same is true for relations with Russia. Recep Tayyip Erdogan held a number of personal meetings with the Rais of the Republic of Tatarstan. First and foremost, this is due to Tatarstan’s active foreign policy, which substantially facilitates Russian diplomacy, especially in light of the harsh sanctions regimes against the state (Nasyrov, 2022,  рр. 95—96). In addition, Türkiye and the Republic of Tatarstan have economic relations. There are six Turkish companies in the Alabuga special economic zone alone.^[8]

Other regions are connected with the Turkic vector of Türkiye’s foreign policy. For example, the Gagauz strive to actively cooperate with Ankara (Tsibenko, 2022, p. 91). As for Türkiye itself, it maintains contacts with both Turkic states and peoples living in other countries to form its own subsystem of international relations. The same applies to relations with Tatarstan, whose position and economic power within the federal state would become a conduit for Turkish interests in Russia. However, Ankara’s capacity for the latter has been greatly reduced, and the government of Tatarstan is more focused on economic cooperation.

Depicted in the chart, Sanjak is a historical region of Serbia with a predominantly Muslim population. It is typical for Türkiye to cooperate with such parts of the population, as it is trying to become a leader of the Islamic world (Dolgov, 2021, р. 152). For this purpose, active diplomacy is used, including with representatives of small religious communities, in order to create an image of a defender and champion of the “Islamic world.”

 Figure 7. Other Contacts
Source: compiled by the authors.

R.T. Erdogan actively pursues “track two” diplomacy, engaging with religious, academic, and ethnic groups (Figure 7). All the representatives shown in the chart above are not officials or members of delegations, but they promote the interests of religious, political, academic or ethnic groups in their countries. However, the president’s website does not always provide information about the people with whom he meets, which makes it difficult to analyze the objectives of these meetings. This chart might lay the foundation for a more in-depth research on R.T. Erdogan’s foreign policy, using case-study methods.

All the organizations and meetings presented above can be divided into several groups.

Firstly, Türkiye’s president interacts with representatives of religious organizations (meetings with Jews and Muslims in the U.S. and Catholics in Syria).

Secondly, R.T. Erdogan meets with members of national minorities of states (Crimean Tatars in Ukraine, Turkmens in Iraq and Syria, and Arabs in Israel).

Thirdly, he holds conversations with members of non-profit and civic organizations, political movements (Bosnian NGOs, Hamas, and the Union of European Turkish Democrats), academic circles and think-tanks (the Atlantic Council^[6] and the European Council on Foreign Affairs).

The analysis of communication with non-state actors has confirmed the accuracy of the vectors of Türkiye’s foreign policy highlighted in the previous part of the research. Only actors from the U.S., Europe, the post-Soviet space, the Balkans, and the Middle East are included. “Track two” diplomacy is starting to complement official policy. Such an approach opens up opportunities for informal contacts between the state leadership and the religious and academic elites of other countries, which provides a better understanding of the  situation in a country before making political decisions.^[7]

Türkiye is actively considering an opportunity to lobby its interests in these countries, which exactly explains the frequency of contacts with the above-mentioned actors. Pursuing closer ties on the basis of ethical, cultural, religious, and ideational unity, Türkiye establishes contacts with these organizations. The very fact that the Turkish president meets with them indicates their importance in the political life of the state.

Conclusion

The quantitative analysis of visits, meetings, and phone calls during the presidency of R.T. Erdogan allowed the authors to identify the five main vectors of Türkiye’s diplomatic activity. They are as follows:

1. the global vector (four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council);
2. the European vector (the EU, the UK, France, Germany, and Italy);
3. the post-Soviet vector (Russia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan);
4. the Balkan vector (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, and Bulgaria);
5. The Middle East vector (Qatar, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia).

It should be noted that each vector covers the entire region. Germany, France, and Italy are the locomotives of the EU, while Great Britain is a crucial political actor in the Euro-Atlantic region. The post-Soviet vector reflects all three sub-regions: South Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. The Balkan vector covers countries from the southern, eastern, and western parts of the peninsula. The Middle East vector includes the Maghreb region, the Persian Gulf states, and West Asia. The global vector encompasses the main international organization, the UN, and four of the five members of the UN Security Council (excluding China). Furthermore, the Turkish president pursues “track two” diplomacy within these vectors by actively communicating with local academic, political, civic, and religious elites.

South-East and East Asia, Africa (excluding its northern part) and South America are lower on the agenda. In addition, it is quite problematic to define a Mediterranean vector of Türkiye’s foreign policy. The only countries Ankara interacts with there is Greece, as they are bound by mutual territorial claims and general multilateral meetings, and Libya, where Türkiye is an active party to the conflict. What is also blurred is the Black Sea vector, which includes Romania and Georgia.

The quantitative method used in the paper, where the political activity of the Turkish president is the only characteristic, allowed the authors to clearly define the geography of  R.T. Erdogan’s personal diplomatic efforts. The number of regions and the quality of contacts with both countries and their representatives uncovers the main vectors of Türkiye’s  multi-vectored foreign policy. At the same time, the quantitative analysis makes it possible to avoid a biased, ideology-driven perspective. Moreover, it is easy to verify and qualitatively compare the data included in the research.

The quantitative event analysis used in this study has the advantages and disadvantages, inherent in any other quantitative methods. It is important to note that the database is not limited by the research, can be applied to other studies, and can be expanded over time. The method allowed the authors to determine patterns that could not be found using descriptive, historical, or qualitative methods.

 

_{¹ The GDELT Story // The GDELT Project. URL: http://gdeltproject.org/ (accessed: 15.03.2023).}

_{² KOF Globalisation Index // ETH Zürich KOF. URL: https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html (accessed: 15.03.2023).}

_{³ Türkiye’nin Girişimci ve Insani Dış Politikası // Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı. URL: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/genel-gorunum.tr.mfa (accessed: 24.03.2023).}

_{⁷ Türkiye // UN Group on Sustainable Development. (In Russian). URL: https://unsdg.un.org/ru/un-in-action/turkey (accessed: 23.03.2023).}

_{⁸ Residents // Alabuga. (In Russian). URL: https://alabuga.ru/ru/residents/ (accessed: 24.03.2023).}

_{⁶ The organization has been pronounced unwanted in the Russian Federation.}

_{⁷ Mesut Özcan: Turkey and Russia Should Provide Guidance and Assistance in the Middle East // Russian International Affairs Council. October 30, 2018. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/interview/mesut-zcan-turkey-and-russia-should-provide-guidance-and-assistance-in-the-middle-east/ (accessed: 28.03.2023).}

About the authors

Igor V. Vokhmintsev

HSE University

Author for correspondence.
Email: igor.nk.ru@gmail.com
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-0607-6885

Master’s Student

Moscow, Russian Federation

Razil I. Guzaerov

Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences; RUDN University

Email: guzaerov99@bk.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-0006-9975

Junior Researcher, Department of Middle and Post-Soviet East, Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAS); Postgraduate Student, Department of Comparative Politics, RUDN University

Moscow, Russian Federation

References

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