The Accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union in 1947: Based on Materials from the National Archives of India

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Introduction

The study of the Kashmir crisis within the framework of historical science has been successful for a long time, since its inception in 1947. As the issue remains unresolved and is now in a latent phase, periodically reawakening, it vividly illustrates the history of divided peoples and draws our attention back to the role of little-studied political figures of that era. This is an example of the tragic legacy of the colonial system. The topic is made relevant by the discovery of new archival documents, which make it possible to more accurately recreate the details of the political history of the Kashmir crisis in 1947 and with their help, show the role and place of the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, his Deputy and Minister of States and Home Affairs, Vallabhbhai  Patel, Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten, Governor-General of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, as well as Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh in this crisis. The archival documents used in the article are highly  reliable and represent declassified official  and semi-official correspondence from the  main political figures involved in the Kashmir crisis of 1947. The materials, both  published and unpublished, have been sourced from the Government of India’s archives, located in the National Archives of the Republic of Delhi.^[1]

In Russian Indology and Pakistan studies, the Kashmir crisis and its current state are examined through the lens of the works  of authors such as V.Ya. Belokrenitsky,^[2]  V.P. Kashin (2018), M.Yu. Krysin and  T.G. Skorokhodova (Krysin & Skorokhodova, 2004), V.N. Moskalenko and N.V. Rubina (Moskalenko & Rubina, 2003), O.V. Pleshov (2003), A.L. Filimonova (2013), T.L. Shaumyan (2023; Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko & Shaumyan, 2003), L.A. Chereshneva (Chereshneva L., 2019), M.S. Chereshneva (Chereshneva M., 2019) and others. These authors demonstrate an understanding of the complexity of the interaction between secular and religious nationalist ideas as embodied in the Kashmir crisis.

The foreign historiography involved in this research is represented by monographs and articles by A. Ahmad Dar and H. Ahmad Shah (Ahmad Dar & Ahmad Shah, 2022),  С. Dasgupta (2002), S. Cohen (2002),  I. Copland (2005), D.P. Misra (2007), J. Singh (2009), H. Singh (2017) and others. The works of the following authors on political biography are also involved: R.R. Diwakar (1985),  K. Gha (2011), B. Hoey (1994), S. Wakhlu (2004), P. Ziegler (1985), etc. The Kashmir crisis in their works appears to be a manifestation of political Islam, linked to the doctrine and practice of the separatist  Muslim League and its leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who considered Indian Muslims to be a separate nation with the right to create their  own state.

In general, the entire body of documents has not yet been used in the historiography of the issue we are interested in, due to their multitude and lack of access to a significant  part of the classified sources, which makes Kashmiri issues and their political biographies permanently relevant.

The Origins of the Crisis

By 1947, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was one of the hundreds of States in colonial Hindustan that were subordinate to Great Britain, with a mixed ethnic and religious population. Muslims made up more than 77%  of the population, while Hindus and Sikhs  were in the minority, while the ruling dynasty, headed by Maharaja Hari Singh, was Hindu (Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko & Shaumyan, 2003, p. 252; Wakhlu, 2004, pp. 8–15).  Various political organizations operating in the state included the “Kashmir National Conference,” which was headed by Sheikh Abdullah and was the most influential force uniting supporters of reforming the eastern despotic regime (Chereshneva L., 2019,  pp. 416–418).

The mid-1940s represented a pivotal moment not only for Kashmir, but also for the broader geopolitical landscape of the region. Weakened by the World War II and the liberation movement, Great Britain was  forced to transfer power to Indian parties, dividing Hindustan into two dominions. On August 14–15, Pakistan and the Indian Union emerged, formed on religious grounds. The new India was led by the leader of the leading secular Indian National Congress party, Jawaharlal Nehru (Misra, 2007), while the last Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, was appointed Governor-General (Ziegler, 1985). Pakistan was led by the leader of the Muslim League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a supporter of the partition of Hindustan and the formation  of a separate Muslim state, while Liaquat  Ali Khan became the head of government (Cohen, 2002, pp. 109–122). During the transition period, British commanders  remained in charge of the separate branches of the armed forces in both dominions.  The majority of the Hindustani principalities joined the Indian Union (Chereshneva M.,  2019, pp. 58–64).

At the time of the creation of the two dominions, Kashmiri Maharaja Hari Singh decided to remain independent and Kashmir  did not join either of them (Singh, 2017). Located in the strategically important region of Northern Hindustan, bordering India and Pakistan, the USSR and China, this principality became the subject of a dispute between Delhi and Karachi, the capital of Pakistan until 1958. Each dominion sought to influence Kashmir, but the Maharaja maneuvered: Pakistan  was alien to him in religious affiliation and doctrine “two nations — two Indies” (Filimonova, 2013, pp. 4, 23–29), and in the Indian Union he was not attracted by the prospect of turning from a maharaja into a citizen of a democratic state. He was still dealing with the protests from his own Muslim population, who sympathized with M.A. Jinnah, since the State army was strong enough to maintain internal order. While receiving deputations and messages at his palace in Srinagar, the capital of the principality,  Hari Singh did not heed either the convictions of Lord Mountbatten or the exhortations  of J. Nehru, nor the advice of his esteemed Minister for Principalities, S.V. Patel, who  was convinced that the principality would very soon become a victim of provocations, which could cost the Maharaja his life (Krysin & Skorokhodova, 2004, pp. 10–18).

The present study aims to provide answers to a number of specific questions about the origin of the Kashmir crisis:

–  Why did Hari Singh still lean towards joining the Indian Union?

–  In the face of an external threat, did  he seek help from the Pakistani authorities?

–  Did the Nehru-Patel government make Hari Singh’s accession to India a prerequisite by agreeing to provide military assistance to Kashmir?

–  Which Indian politician played a crucial role in the country’s decision to deploy troops to save Kashmir, regardless of the political costs?

–  Is the Government of Pakistan involved in the tribal invasion of Kashmir from Pakistani territory?

The Order is “Help Kashmir!”

The tragedy occurred two months  after the celebration of India’s Independence Day. On October 15, 1947, Muslim militants from the Afridi and Mahsud Pashtun tribes invaded Kashmir from Pakistan (Dasgupta, 2002, pp. 42–45). Advancing almost unhindered at first in jeeps and buses, the militants, armed with modern weapons, numbering up to 5,000 people, broke into the Poonch districts, Mirpur, and a week later they took the city of Muzaffarabad (Dasgupta, 2002, рр. 42–45; Tanveer, 2019, pр. 91–92). Their success  was facilitated by the fact that part of the Muslim battalions of Hari Singh’s army supported the invaders. Burning down houses, raping and killing the local population, they sowed terror and chaos and relentlessly rushed towards Srinagar. Their goal was to capture and kill the Maharaja, and then annex Kashmir  to Pakistan.

On October 23, 1947, the Kashmiri Prime Minister, Mehr Chand Mahajan, wrote to  S.V. Patel: “We are under martial law…  The situation is deteriorating… Almost the entire Muslim part of our army and police either deserted or behaved inappropriately, and we are surrounded on all sides.”^[3] Although S.V. Patel suggested J. Nehru launching a military operation in Kashmir without delay, the Prime Minister expressed the hope that the issue could be resolved through diplomatic means.  He feared an unpredictable reaction from  M.A. Jinnah, rightly believing that the Kashmir issue could be raised at the UN. Moreover,  the use of violent measures by him, the best disciple of Mahatma Gandhi, an absolute pacifist and the leader of the struggle for freedom of the country, could affect the reputation of the prime minister and portray India in a false light in the eyes of the international community. In addition, Lord Mountbatten also favored for diplomatic methods.

Consequently, Kashmir found itself  in a difficult situation, and Hari Singh came  to the realization that the scale of the disaster, which he could not have prevented without outside help. He turned to the Indian Union for help.⁴ The Indian Prime Minister, Nehru,  was faced with a challenging decision:  he could either refuse him or decide to launch a military operation. In a conversation with Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel,  J. Nehru has openly expressed his concerns about a possible negative international  response. Patel unconditionally insisted on immediate action to save Kashmir, and Nehru agreed.^[5]

On October 25, 1947, the Government of India made the decision to launch a military operation in Kashmir.^[6] J. Nehru presented the relevant document to the Defense Committee and stated: “Troops, weapons, ammunition  and equipment must be prepared immediately and flown to Srinagar tomorrow.”^[7] The  political component of the decision related to the annexation of Kashmir: “The Maharaja should initiate accession to the Indian Union … We do not mean immediate annexation;  the people of Kashmir will decide this issue  in a referendum when law and order are  restored … Now we need to create an administration headed by Sheikh Abdullah, and perhaps he will form an Interim government later.”^[8] The question therefore arises as to whether the Government of Nehru Patel use  the complexities of Kashmir to incorporate  the principality into its composition, or did it decide to defend it, regardless of the results of the future expression of the people’s will. On this occasion, J. Nehru stated, “Regardless of the Kashmiris’ future decision, we will provide assistance to the State. Planes will be dispatched tomorrow.”^[9]

The Defense Committee has decided to deploy battalions of Sikh regiments to carry  out this complex operation.^[10] The Srinagar  airfield was located to the west of the city. Committee members who had visited Srinagar the day before the meeting noted that the runway near the city “is likely to be in the hands of militants in 36 hours.”^[11] Given these circumstances, the Committee arrived at the conclusion that “the risk of sending battalions to Srinagar is worth it” and “with the arrival of Indian troops, the morale of Kashmiris will rise significantly.”^[12]

Thus, India made a historic decision that would determine the future of Kashmir. The political consequences of such a decision for India itself could be ambiguous — both positive, such as the growing authority of the young Indian state in the eyes of its own citizens and Kashmiris, the possible entry of Kashmir into the Indian Union, and extremely negative, such as the aggravation of relations with Pakistan to the point of armed clashes; the emergence of intra-Kashmiri opposition to the Nehru government, international resonance, etc. The approval of the military operation plan was granted after taking all the circumstances into account.

On October 25, 1947, J. Nehru informed the Prime Minister C. Attlee in London:  “We have received an urgent call for help from the Kashmiri government ... and we will help them, this is our duty, which is in the national interest of India.”^[13] Regarding the question of the future fate of the State, he emphasized: “The issue of helping Kashmir in this emergency situation is not aimed at forcing it to join India.”¹⁴ There were no objections from London.

Descent from the Sky

On October 26, 1947, the Maharaja of Kashmir signed the Instrument of Accession to the Indian Union and appointed Sheikh Abdullah as the head of the administration, which was a forced step, but the Nehru — Patel government did not abandon the idea of holding a referendum in Kashmir after that.^[15] On that same day, Hari Singh sent Lord Mountbatten a lengthy letter,¹⁶ which subsequently proved to be a valuable source of information and assistance for our research.

“My dear Mountbatten,” he wrote, “it took me a while to decide which dominion to join.”^[17] Hari Singh reported that his troops were unable to stop “rampant violence and killings, the destruction of the Mahura power plant, which supplied electricity to the whole of Srinagar ... Wild forces are moving forward, [seeking] to capture the capital.”^[18] His statement about Pakistan’s role in the State’s disasters is important. “The mass infiltration of the tribes who arrived along the Manshera — Muzaffarabad Road would not have  been possible without the knowledge of  the Pakistani leadership … Radio and the Karachi press reported on these incidents  and even that the Pashtuns had established  a provincial government in Kashmir,” the letter said.^[19]

Hari Singh did not hide the fact that, “despite his repeated requests, Karachi had made no attempt to stop the militants on  their way to Kashmir.”^[20] At the same time, it did not follow from the document that the Maharaja recognized the tragedy as a result of his attempts to “sit on two chairs,” on the contrary, he presented himself as a devoted leader of Kashmiris: “As long as I am alive and rule Kashmir, [I] will not leave my people to their fate.”^[21] It only remains to add that he evacuated from Srinagar to Jammu, where he waited out the most dangerous period of the intervention.

On October 27, Indian troops were airlifted to Kashmir. The Sikh units began their combat mission immediately, coordinating their actions with the army of the principality. At a meeting of the Defence Committee on October 28, Lord Mountbatten noted: “In total, about 30 flights were carried out. Based on my experience of military operations, I believe that all responsible parties have done a wonderful job in organizing the flight of such a large number of people to Srinagar.”^[22]

The Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Air Force, T. Elmhurst, highlighted that “not a single Pakistani fighter jet from the Rawalpindi air base was lifted into the air to stop the movement of Indian aircrafts to Srinagar.”^[23] Pakistan did not expect India to risk carrying out such an operation, and any measures to contain Delhi required coordination with the British authorities, as they could lead to an Indo-Pakistani war. Therefore, in the first round of the confrontation, India won. Sheikh Abdullah informed J. Nehru: “People’s morale has increased a lot, especially after our fighters got down to business.”^[24] Thus, the Indian military operation to save Kashmir began rapidly and in an organised manner, completely taking the enemy by surprise.

The First Reaction of Pakistan’s Leaders

However, the explanations had to be given to the Pakistani side, and Governor-General Mountbatten took on this difficult mission, informing Jawaharlal Nehru in detail about  the progress of the negotiations. We possess  a recording of Mountbatten’s meeting with Liaquat Ali Khan in Lahore on November 1, 1947, sent to J. Nehru in a confidential  letter.^[25] The Prime Minister of Pakistan was very ill, and Mountbatten paid him a visit at his residence. This declassified information contains several important points for our research.

Firstly, Liaquat Ali Khan informed Mountbatten that “The Maharaja categorically refused any form of negotiations with Pakistan.”^[26] This statement contradicts Hari Singh’s above-mentioned words about his repeated requests for assistance from the Pakistani authorities. Finding out the truth about this issue is a very difficult task. Tactics of maneuvering could well have been inherent in Liaquat Ali Khan and Hari Singh.

Secondly, contrary to the widespread thesis in the literature that official Karachi was not involved in the tribal invasion of Kashmir and was deeply offended by the Maharaja’s position (Dasgupta, 2002, pp. 70–85), there is another episode in Mountbatten’s record: “I asked Liaquat Ali Khan, does he really expect  us to believe that armed Afridis and Mahsuds were able to come from near Peshawar by car, and the Pakistani government knew nothing about it? The Prime Minister did not deny that the Pakistani government was aware of the Pashtun movement to Kashmir (the italics are mine. — L.Ch.). But he explained that if ‘our government had attempted to prevent this movement, it would have created problems for itself with the rest of the tribes in the Frontier Province.’”^[27]

Thus, according to an archival source, if Karachi did not organize a militant raid on Kashmir, it certainly facilitated one, finding  that the massacre in Poonch, Mirpur and Srinagar would be less dangerous for it, and therefore more beneficial than tribal unrest within its own state.

Mountbatten’s second letter to J. Nehru comprises a record of talks with the Governor-General of Pakistan, Jinnah,^[28] at Government House in Lahore, to which Mountbatten’s Chief of Staff, Lord Ismay, was also present. The main complaint of M.A. Jinnah, expressed by him without delay, was that the Indian government “did not notify”^[29] him of its actions in a timely manner. Jinnah was not convinced by the explanations regarding the complexity of the situation, which required immediate resolution. Mountbatten then noted that Jawaharlal Nehru had nevertheless “telegraphed”^[30] Liaquat Ali Khan on October 26 about the decision to send troops. M.A. Jinnah checked his notes and replied that the telegram had arrived after the troops had landed and the annexation of Kashmir was based “on fraud and violence on the part of India.”^[31] Finally, the Pakistani leader emphatically stated that his country “will never recognize the annexation of Kashmir.”^[32]

Mountbatten countered by saying that “the violence came from the tribes for which Pakistan is responsible.”^[33] Summing up, he did not hide his triumph: “I consider the prospects of a tribal invasion of Srinagar unlikely now that Indian troops are deployed in the most important positions in Kashmir.”^[34]

By November 8, 1947, the defeat of the militants had been completed. Undoubtedly,  this event represented a great victory for  India, but at the same time it was the prelude  to the era of the Indo-Pakistani wars  over Kashmir, ultimately leading to its transformation into a prominent political “hotspot” in South Asia.

Conclusion

The underlying causes of the Kashmir crisis have their origins in the period of British rule in India. Established following the conquest of Indian lands, the State of Jammu and Kashmir seemed to be programmed for interfaith confrontation at the slightest distortion in government policy. Under Hari Singh, especially in 1947, Muslim protests against the regime of the Hindu maharaja became more frequent, and the army was used to suppress them. Many Muslims sought to enter Pakistan, but many were dissuaded by the invasion of militants, who even targeted their co-religionists from Kashmiri villages.

The problem arose due to the subjective factor, self-interest and lack of political will of Maharaja Hari Singh, as well as the use of his inaction and indecision by the parties to the conflict. The provocative invasion of the Afridi and Mahsud militants into the territory of the principality was carried out with the full knowledge of the Pakistani authorities, who did not stop the aggression due to the policy of appeasing the tribes of the Border Province, as well as counting on the weakening of Kashmir and the possibility of its annexation to Pakistan. The Maharaja’s appeal to the leadership of India and India’s subsequent active participation in defending the principality, defeating the Pashtun aggressors in late October and early November 1947, as well as the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union, took the Pakistani authorities by surprise. India did not stipulate the immediate entry of Kashmir into its territory as a prerequisite for its assistance, but it undoubtedly implied this and eventually received the rewards from the 1947 crisis.

During the events, the position of Indian Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel turned out to be particularly important for the fate of the principality, who not only ensured the integration of the principalities, but also suggested a possible dramatic scenario for the development of events in non-aligned Kashmir. It was he who, in extraordinary circumstances, insisted on launching a military operation to protect the Kashmiris, whereas Governor-General Mountbatten and Prime Minister Nehru had hoped for a peaceful settlement of the issue until the last moment. It seems that it was  S.V. Patel who prevented the worst-case scenario for India — the forced annexation of Kashmir to Pakistan.

The Governor-General of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was Patel’s counterpart in this duel of strategies. However, the strategy of undermining the Maharaja’s regime from within the principality and the uprising of Kashmiri Muslims turned out to be wrong. The provocation involving militants in the fall of 1947 eloquently convinced many Kashmiri Muslims, including the leader of the National Conference, Sheikh Abdullah, of the need for India’s commitment during this period. In essence, the annexation of Kashmir to India was the result of a duel of political thinking between Patel and Jinnah.

The Kashmir crisis could not be resolved during the events of 1947, as the parties’ claims to possession of the principality remained unresolved. However, Delhi was initially in a more advantageous position, since Hari Singh officially signed the Act of Annexation of Kashmir to India in 1947, which, nevertheless, did not stop the flywheel of the war.

^{1 See: National Archives of India (NAI). Government of India. Ministry of State. Political Branch. File No. 11(18)-PR/47. “Accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India”; Thematic Volumes on Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel : Kashmir and Hyderabad / ed. by P.N. Chopra. Delhi : Konark Publishers, 2002.}

^{2 Belokrenitsky V. Ya. Kashmir Impasse: Who, How and Why Is Fighting in Kashmir? // Russian Council on International Affairs. February 28, 2017. (In Russian). URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/kashmirskiy-tupik-kto-kak-i-pochemu-voyuet-v-kashmire/?ysclid=me2oalzf1b39037176 (accessed: 12.11.2024). See also: (Belokrenitsky, 2003; 2004).}

^{3 Mehr Chand Mahajan to Home and Sates Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel on Worsening Border Situation as Also in the State Due to Desertion by the Muslim League and Police. Srinagar dated 23 October 1947 // Thematic Volumes on Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel : Kashmir and Hyderabad / ed. by P.N. Chopra. Delhi : Konark Publishers, 2002. P. 31.}

^{4 Note in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. Note for Kashmir. The Decisions of the Defence Committee of the India Cabinet dated 25th October 1947 // NAI. Government of India. Ministry of State. 1947. Political Branch. File No. 11(18)-PR/47. L. 1.}

^{5 The fact confirmed by all historians of the Kashmir crisis. See for example: Belokrenitsky V. Ya. Kashmir Impasse: Who, How and Why Is Fighting in Kashmir? // Russian Council on International Affairs. February 28, 2017. (In Russian). URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/kashmirskiy-tupik-kto-kak-i-pochemu-voyuet-v-kashmire/?ysclid=me2oalzf1b39037176 (accessed: 12.11.2024). See also: (Kashin, 2018; Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko & Shaumyan, 2003). From the latest foreign works on Maharaja Hari Singh, see: (Singh, 2017).}

^{6 Note in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. Note for Kashmir. The Decisions of the Defence Committee of the India Cabinet dated 25th October 1947 // NAI. Government of India. Ministry of State. 1947. Political Branch. File No. 11(18)-PR/47. L. 1.}

^{7 Ibid.}

^{8 Note in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. Note for Kashmir. The Decisions of the Defence Committee of the India Cabinet dated 25th October 1947 // NAI. Government of India. Ministry of State. 1947. Political Branch. File No. 11(18)-PR/47. L. 1.}

^{9 Ibid.}

^{10 Ibid. L. 3.}

^{11 Ibid. L. 4.}

^{12 Ibid.}

^{13 Secret Telegram from Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru to Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Clement Attlee dated 25th October 1947 // NAI. Government of India. Ministry of State. 1947. Political Branch. File No. 11(18)-PR/47. L. 11.}

^{14 Ibid.}

^{15 Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir State dated 26 October 1947 // NAI. Government of India. Ministry of State. 1947. Political Branch. File No. 11(18)-PR/47. L. 6.}

^{16 Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir Hari Singh to the Governor-General of India Lord Mountbatten Regarding Pakistani Infiltration into Kashmir dated 26 October, 1947 // Thematic Volumes on Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel : Kashmir and Hyderabad / ed. by P.N. Chopra. Delhi : Konark Publishers, 2002. P. 31–32.}

^{17 Ibid.}

^{18 Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir Hari Singh to the Governor-General of India Lord Mountbatten Regarding Pakistani Infiltration into Kashmir dated 26 October, 1947 // Thematic Volumes on Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel : Kashmir and Hyderabad / ed. by P.N. Chopra. Delhi : Konark Publishers, 2002. P. 31–32.}

^{19 Ibid.}

^{20 Ibid.}

^{21 Ibid.}

^{22 Proceedings of the Meeting of the Defence Committee Held on 28th October 1947 // NAI. Government of India. Ministry of State. 1947. Political Branch. File No. 11(18)-PR/47. L. 10.}

^{23 Ibid.}

^{24 Demi-Official Letter from Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, Kashmir, to the Honorable Prime Minister of India, Dated the 31th of October 1947 // NAI. Government of India. Ministry of State. 1947. Political Branch. File No. 11(18)-PR/47. L. 33.}

^{25 Note of a Talk with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan at Lahore on 1 November 1947 // Thematic Volumes on Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel : Kashmir and Hyderabad / ed. by P.N. Chopra. Delhi : Konark Publishers, 2002. P. 36.}

^{26 Note of a Talk with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan at Lahore on 1 November 1947 // Thematic Volumes on Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel : Kashmir and Hyderabad / ed. by P.N. Chopra. Delhi : Konark Publishers, 2002. P. 37.}

^{27 Ibid.}

^{28 Note of a Talk with Mr. Jinnah in Presence of Lord Ismay at Government House, Lahore on 1 November 1947 // Thematic Volumes on Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel : Kashmir and Hyderabad / ed. by P.N. Chopra. Delhi : Konark Publishers, 2002. P. 38.}

^{29 Ibid. P. 39.}

^{30 Ibid. P. 40.}

^{31 Ibid.}

^{32 Ibid.}

^{33 Ibid. P. 41.}

^{34 Ibid. P. 42.}

About the authors

Larisa A. Chereshneva

Author for correspondence.
Email: chara.62@mail.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-1491-4968
SPIN-code: 6101-7447

Dr. of Sc. (History), Professor, Deputy Director for Research, Institute of History, Law and Social Sciences

References

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