Regionalization of Peacekeeping in Africa: The Case of the African Union

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Introduction

One of the major trends of the last two decades has been the increasing regionalization of peacekeeping. This trend is most evident in Africa, where the AU and sub-regional organizations (Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)) have become increasingly autonomous and authoritative in conflict resolution, putting into practice the once proclaimed approach “African solutions to African problems.”

It’s probably not an exaggeration to say that the African Union (AU) is the most powerful regional security provider on the African continent, both because of the AU’s motivation to play a more active role in conflict resolution (peacekeeping operations have been deployed since 2002, specialized missions since 2003) and of the growing recognition that the UN cannot handle African crises alone. The AU provides political and technical support to various regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions, including against insurgent groups and terrorist organizations. In these operations, the AU Peace and Security Council issues mandates, provides strategic political guidance, coordinates international assistance and supports the technical base for multinational task force headquarters. These important functions qualify the AU as a forward-looking security provider, which, in the process of implementing peacekeeping tasks, has to simultaneously deal with many problems related to the formation of internal organizational structures (Iutiaeva, 2021, p. 194).

African-led peacekeeping has clear and undeniable advantages. These include a better understanding of the historical, socio-economic and political particularities of the country/region and the nature of the conflicts, a direct interest and a greater degree of legitimacy compared to interventions by external actors. However, despite the specificity of each operation, they all face an identical set of challenges that constantly affect performance and outcomes.

Conceptual issues of regionalization of peacekeeping are not as widely addressed as, for example, the practical components or the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. As a rule, the main focus is either on the analysis of the UN—AU cooperation (Bokeriya, 2022; Iutiaeva, 2021; Tijjani, 2018; Weiss & Welz, 2014; Williams & Boutellis, 2014), or on particular aspects of the AU’s peacekeeping and its cooperation with regional economic communities on these issues (Denisova, 2015; Kostelyanets & Tkachenko, 2017; Apuuli, 2020; Badmus, 2015; Gottschalk, 2020; Kostelyanets, 2021; Majinge, 2010; Murithi, 2008; Segun & Olanrewaju, 2017; Svensson, 2008a; 2008b; Williams, 2006; 2009). The literature on peacekeeping often consists of memoirs by former UN staff and diplomats, descriptions of individual missions in the context of conflict analysis and research on national peacekeeping strategies.

A number of publications are devoted to the interaction between the UN and regional structures, in which authors argue about the nature of this interaction — whether it is full and equal cooperation with a “division of labor” or a shift of responsibility from the UN, with its passivity and slowness, to regional actors (Bellamy & Williams, 2005; Bures, 2006; Tishkov, 2017). However, assessments of the potential for security regionalization range from skeptical to promising. Some Western authors remain wary of regionalizing peacekeeping in Africa (Williams, 2008; Møller, 2009; Feldman & Robert, 2008), questioning the rationality of the idea “African solutions to African problems,” criticizing existing experiences and cautioning against further steps in this direction. For example, the authoritative American scholar P.D. Williams justifies problematic knots in the logic of “African solutions”: undermining the authority of the UN; a way for African dictators to reduce criticism of their policies; an excuse for Western countries not to contribute troops to African peacekeeping missions (Williams, 2008).

Scholars advocating for greater regional engagement (De Coning, 2019) clearly focus on the agenda of “African solutions to African problems,” while acknowledging the gap between outcomes and expectations. The South African scholar M. Brosig gives a rather positive assessment of the interaction between the various actors in Africa, focusing on the emerging “complex security regime” (Brosig, 2013).

This paper analyses the development and evolution of the African Union’s peacekeeping practice, with over a dozen missions ranging from a small observer mission in Burundi to full-scale peace enforcement operations in the Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur, Liberia and Somalia. The largest of these are the African Union Mission in Sudan/Darfur (AMIS), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the UN — AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the AU — ECWAS African-led Mission in Support of Mali (AFISMA), and the African-led Mission in Support of the Central African Republic (MISCA) (Tables 1 and 2).  

 Table 1. African Union Peacekeeping Operations

Source: compiled by the author.

Based on the case study method, the principle of historicism and the chronological approach, the author proposes a classification and a comprehensive analysis of the most important AU operations, identifying the legal frameworks, the specificities and the results.

African Union Peacekeeping Missions: Expectations vs Opportunities

In the early 1990s, missions by regional forces mainly focused on supporting ruling regimes  and preventing unconstitutional seizures of power.  

Table 2. Hybrid Operations of the AU and Regional Economic Communities

Source: compiled by the author.

As they gained experience, they began to conduct full-scale peacekeeping operations. Mission tasks have ranged from security stabilization, civilian protection, ceasefire monitoring and counter-terrorism to peace-building, including election observation. With few exceptions, peacekeeping operations in such difficult conditions have required various forms of heavy external support from international donors, particularly in terms of training, equipment, logistics and funding.

AMIB: First Experience

The AU’s first peacekeeping experience was the Mission in Burundi (AMIB) (Wilén & Williams, 2018), which was deployed in 2003, before the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established, on the basis of a decision of the Central Authority of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Addis Ababa, adopted at the Summit of Heads of State and Government on February 3, 2003. Exactly two months later, the Central Authority issued a mandate for the deployment of AMIB for an initial period of one year, renewable until the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force.^[1] The priorities of the mission were to monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement, to ensure the disarmament, to demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants and to create favorable conditions for the subsequent deployment of a UN mission. Among other tasks, AMIB was responsible for disarming approximately 20 thousand ex-combatants at two demobilization centers in Muyang (Bubanza Province) and Buhinga (Rutana Province) (Badmus, 2015, p. 124; Murithi, 2008, p. 76). Despite the lack of the UN Security Council authorization, the legitimacy of AMIB was not questioned, as the 2000 Arusha Agreement^[2] provided for an international peacekeeping force in Burundi. One of the principles of the AU’s strategic engagement with the UN has been the understanding that the deployment of AMIB is a temporary measure pending the deployment of a UN Security Council-mandated peacekeeping mission.

Like the UN peacekeeping operations, AMIB was an integrated mission with a total of 3,355 civilian and military personnel, with military contingents from South Africa (1,600), Ethiopia (858) and Mozambique (228), and observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon,  Mali, Togo and Tunisia (43), mainly concentrated in Bujumbura (Badmus, 2015,  p. 123). A coordination center has been set up to ensure interaction between them. Ambassador Mamadou Bah (Guinea) was appointed Head of Mission and Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and Major General Sipho Binda (South Africa) was appointed Commander of the military contingent. Overall, South Africa’s contribution to the operation was a major factor in its success. In addition to providing the military leadership and half of the mission’s personnel, it has provided the most financial and logistical support of any African country.

The full implementation of the mandate has run into financial problems. The total budget for the deployment and maintenance of AMIB  over the 14-month mandate period was approximately 134 million USD, while the total AU budget for 2004 was 43 million USD.^[3] In these circumstances, urgent and substantial support of external donors was required, but the expected grants did not materialize. Actual contributions to the Trust Fund amounted to only 10 million USD (excluding in-kind contributions of 6.1 million USD from the US and the UK) (Badmus, 2015, p. 128).

In assessing the outcomes of the operation, many experts agree that AMIB was able to fulfil its mandate and stabilize the situation (Rodt, 2011). The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan praised the mission. However, the success  of the mission cannot be called absolute,  but rather limited. Although AMIB has managed to stabilize about 95% of the  country, with the exception of rural Bujumbura, enforce the ceasefire agreement, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and ensure the protection of returning political leaders, it has not been able to achieve a stable and manageable defense and security situation (Murithi, 2008).

The AU struggled to provide financial and logistical support for the mission. Despite repeated calls by the AU for African states to make voluntary financial contributions to the mission, only Senegal has responded to the initiative. The bulk of the funding came from external donors, mainly the European Union (EU), whose contribution was exclusively for the payment of subsistence allowances to soldiers for nine months, from December 1, 2003 to August 31, 2004, in accordance with the AU — EU Contribution Agreement (The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011, p. 33). In addition to the EU, the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and the German Technical Cooperation Organization provided financial support for food, medicine and other supplies (Rodt, 2011, p. 19). On June 1, 2004, AMIB was succeeded by the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), whose mandate expired  on 31 December 2006.^[4]

The next time the AU Peace and Security Council decided to send military experts and observers to Burundi in June 2015,^[5] following an attempted coup and the ensuing protests and riots in response to incumbent President  Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term.^[6] The monitors were tasked with documenting human rights abuses and demobilizing militias and other armed groups. In December, the AU PSC ordered the establishment of the 5,000-strong African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) to prevent further escalation of the conflict.^[7] Burundi was given 96 hours to accept the mission, but the Burundian authorities heavily opposed the arrival of the peacekeepers, calling it an interventionist action.^[8] In January 2016, African leaders  also failed to support the deployment of MAPROBU as recommended by the AU PSC, revealing a major rift between African countries and the AU Commission.^[9] This situation highlighted a number of important, if not critical, features of the AU as a security provider — the gap between ambition and actual capacity, the limits of the AU Commission’s authority, procedural flaws in decision-making in the PSC, poor coordination between Addis Ababa and the African members of the UN Security Council. In February 2016, the Burundian government agreed to allow  100 military observers and 100 human rights monitors into the country.^[10]

Missions to the Comoros:  A New Type of Operation

The African Union’s involvement in resolving the crisis in the Comoros took place in several phases and in different formats, including the use of military force to restore constitutional rule (Svensson, 2008b). The Organization of African Unity (OAU), the forerunner of the AU, was involved in the 2001 Antananarivo Peace Agreement. The OAU/AU’s political and diplomatic toolkit has been complemented by observer missions to support elections, facilitate the implementation of peace agreements, build confidence and monitor the security situation.

In November 1997, the Central Authority approved the deployment of the first OAU Observer Mission to the Comoros (OMIC I), with logistical and financial support from France (The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011, p. 50). The mission was responsible for monitoring the security situation in the Comoros, particularly in Anjouan. In 1999, however, OMIC I was withdrawn due to opposition from President A. Azali. Three other Observation and Security Support Missions were subsequently deployed: OMIC II from December 2001 to February 2002, OMIC III from March to May 2002, and OMIC IV from March to May 2004 (The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011, p. 50). In all cases, South Africa was the main donor. Due to the small number of missions (between 14 and 20 military observers in the first three missions and 39 in the fourth), support for the peace process was rather limited without effective monitoring of the situation on the three islands. The fourth military observer mission in 2004 was to support the provisions of the Beit Salaam Agreement and “help create the conditions of calm and security necessary to complete the reconciliation process.” In March-April 2004, 39 mission observers participated in the island’s local and national legislative elections, which were conducted in a generally calm atmosphere, despite isolated disturbances in Anjouan (Svensson, 2008b, p. 18).

The next round of elections took place in 2006. At the request of the government, the AU deployed a new larger Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC) of  462 military and police observers, as well as a civilian component, headed by an AU special envoy, to monitor and coordinate activities.^[11] As with OMIC I—IV, support was provided through the Peace and Security Department of the AU Secretariat. The task was to deploy military and civilian police to polling stations on all three islands. The AMISEC mission was able to create quite favorable conditions for the elections, which have been treated as the first democratic transfer of power in the Comoros.

In May 2007, another round of elections was scheduled to elect executive legislators for each of the Union’s islands. The need for the mission arose from the unrest caused by President M. Bakar’s refusal to step down at the end of his term. The ensuing political crisis led to armed clashes between the national army and the Anjouan gendarmerie. In response, the AU announced on May 9, 2007 the deployment of an Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to Comoros (MAES) to observe the electoral process.^[12] South Africa, Senegal, Sudan and Tanzania contributed troops, but South Africa withdrew its contingent following the extension of the mission.

Ignoring the AU appeals, President  M. Bakar organized elections in Anjouan, where he was re-elected with 89.6% of the vote, in  the absence of MAES monitoring. The Constitutional Court of the Union of the Comoros annulled the elections, while the AU and the international community strongly condemned the mechanism. Meanwhile, in June 2007, the islands of Grande Comore and Moheli held scheduled elections, which were monitored by the MAES. In October 2007, the AU Peace and Security Council imposed sanctions on President Bakar in Anjouan, which, contrary to expectations, had no effect. Unanimously condemning the unconstitutional change of government, after lengthy deliberations it was decided to launch a joint military operation, which started on March 25, 2008. The intervention, named “Operation Democracy  in Comoros,” consisted of 1,500 soldiers  from the Comorian National Army and allied troops from Tanzania and Sudan, with logistical and financial support from France and the EU, with the aim of removing M. Bakar, who incidentally did not put up serious resistance, and restoring the authority of the  constitutional government on the island (Svensson, 2008b, p. 20). Although the operation achieved its objectives, the AU continued to be present in the post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction processes in the Comoros. On June 29, 2008, elections for a new executive legislature were held in Anjouan under the auspices of the MAES, with  356 military and civilian observers from Tanzania and Sudan (The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011, p. 55).

AMIS: Questionable Outcome  with Strong Resolve and Low Capacity

In 2004, an AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) was launched to enforce the N’Djamena humanitarian ceasefire signed on April 8, 2004 between the Sudanese government and the two main rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement (Badmus, 2015, p. 178). The original AMIS consisted of 96 international observers (60 — from the AU, 18 — from Chad, 18 — from the US and the EU) and a force protection unit of 270 troops (World Peace Foundation, 2017a, p. 10).

AMIS I was mandated to monitor the ceasefire, verify the disarmament of government-controlled militias and support confidence-building measures, as well as to protect civilians and humanitarian workers. The situation was extremely difficult for AMIS and on October 20, 2004 the PSC approved the deployment of AMIS II with the right to protect civilians under imminent threat and extended its mandate until October 2005. An expanded AMIS mission was authorized in July  2005, known as AMIS IIE (Ekengard, 2008,  pp. 17—24). The emphasis was placed on proactive monitoring and prevention of attacks on civilians. A Darfur Integrated Operational Team has been established and a police component has been deployed to provide security in camps for internally displaced people (IDP). From October to the end of 2004, the number of mission members increased from 3,320 to 7,730 (World Peace Foundation, 2017a, p. 4).

The AMIS peacekeeping mission did succeed in reducing violence in the Darfur region, as well as preventing tribal conflicts, but failed in its basic tasks. The mission was unable to protect civilians who were in grave danger. The AU was not equipped for such an operation at the time. The AU Peace and Security Council was just set up. As the mission unfolded, it became clear that expectations began to exceed its mandate and actual capabilities. The original intention was for AMIS to monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement. Lack of experience, poor training of troops, inadequate resources and logistics could not help but affect the overall effectiveness of the mission, ultimately necessitating UN intervention. Despite being significantly cheaper than a similarly sized UN mission, AMIS has had persistent funding problems, including donor support.

Overall, in Sudan the AU has demonstrated the political will to pursue its mission as  a pan-African initiative. AMIS was originally set up with the expectation that it would be handed over to the UN. However, the UN negotiations with the Sudanese government on the need for a mission in Darfur have been delayed. The UN advance team in Sudan as a special political mission was initially established by the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1547 (S/RES/1547 of June 11, 2004) to monitor existing agreements and prepare for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in support of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed in Nairobi on January 9, 2005. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) itself was authorized  by the Security Council through resolution  1590 (S/RES/1590 of March 24, 2005). Following the Darfur Peace Agreement of  May 5, 2006, the UN Security Council  formally authorized the transition from AMIS to UNMIS by UNSC resolution 1706 (S/RES/1706 of August 31, 2006). UNMIS  was supposed to be able to expand its operations in Darfur with an additional 17,300 troops and 3,300 police officers, as well as 16 formed police units.^[13]

In July 2007, after lengthy political negotiations, a compromise was reached between Khartoum and the UN, allowing for the deployment of the United Nations — African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The transfer of functions was authorized with the adoption of UNSC resolution 1769 (S/RES/1769 of 31 July 2007), and on December 31, 2007 an official transfer of authority ceremony took place at UNAMID’s new headquarters in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur.

AMISOM:  New Facets of the Operation

The security and stability situation in Somalia, where the AU Mission (AMISOM) has been deployed since January 19, 2007 (Williams, 2019; Iutiaeva, 2021, pp. 197—198), has been equally arduous and stressful, leading in terms of scale, duration and loss of peacekeepers (around 4,000 soldiers in the 16 years of the mission).^[14] AMISOM was set up in a very difficult environment, with the al-Shabaab militants controlling most of Mogadishu and much of south-central  Somalia. The UN Security Council fully supported AMISOM by authorizing the African Union to deploy a multinational peacekeeping force on the basis of resolution 1744 (S/RES/1744 of February 20, 2007). However, the initial mandate of the operation was to establish a six-month mission with the rather ambitious but limited objectives of  (a) supporting dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia; (b) protecting the Transitional Federal Institutions and key infrastructure; (c) assisting the implementation of the National Security  and Stabilization Plan, in particular the effective re-establishment and training of all-inclusive Somali security forces; (d) contributing  to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance; (e) protecting its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its personnel.

However, the protection of civilians as such was not specified, despite the deteriorating situation in spring 2007. Subsequently, UNSC resolution 1838 (S/RES/1838 of October 7, 2008) added another task — to support the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement of August 19, 2008.

The military and civilian contingent was rather modest at just 8,100 personnel,^[15] with Nigeria and Ghana contributing troops. The mission was later expanded to include 19,586 troops from Uganda and Burundi, then Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Sierra Leone.^[16] Despite earlier commitments, Malawi declined to participate in the mission.

Until 2011, AMISOM’s strategy was predominantly defensive. The territory under official control shrank, while al-Shabaab maintained positions in the north and west of Mogadishu. All this contributed to the negative perception of the mission in Somali society, particularly in light of incidents in which civilians were killed and perceived by peacekeepers as combatants. Despite extremely high casualties, AMISOM forces drove the insurgents out of the capital in August 2011 and expanded the operation. An offensive by AMISOM and the Somali National Army almost completely liberated the city by 2012. The following years saw major offensives: Panua Eneo (2011); Free Shabelle, Eagles (March 2014), Indian Ocean (November 2014), Ocean Build (November 2014 — July 2015), Juba Corridor (July 2015), Badbaado 1a and 1b (2018—2019), which resulted in al-Shabaab being pushed out of major population centers in the south and center of the country. However, the peacekeepers’ victories have been intermittently followed by defeats for  al-Shabaab, which has continued to build its military capacity and resilience, occasionally regaining lost ground. In its numerous resolutions on Somalia, the UNSC has continued to describe the situation as a threat to international peace and security.

One of the insurmountable problems for such an ambitious and challenging mission was the lack of financial resources, despite having a much larger budget than other missions. This created the need for subsidies from the EU, the Arab League and individual donor countries (USA, UK, Italy, Sweden, and China).

Despite the traditional challenges faced by any regional peacekeeping operation, AMISOM has remained virtually the only force in the country to support the Somali government in its fight against al-Shabaab over the past 15 years. The peacekeepers managed to establish a “fragile peace” and contain armed clashes, although not completely and not everywhere, mainly in the capital and some strategically important areas (Badmus, 2015). AMISOM has been instrumental in protecting two transitional governments, two federal governments and two national electoral processes. This clearly speaks in favor of the mission, which continued to work to create a favorable political space for resolving internal problems, even though it did not play a key role in resolving the political crisis. AMISOM’s efforts have addressed the important humanitarian challenges of providing civilians with wide access to medical care and humanitarian assistance. AMISOM has been able to build the capacity of the Somali police through training, mentoring, advising and initiating quick impact projects, ultimately leading to improved law and order and increased cooperation between the police and Somali communities. In 2021, an article was added to AMISOM’s mandate providing for a gradual transfer of authority to the Somali National Army, which was almost twice the size of the peacekeeping contingent.

Thus, AMISOM has been relatively successful in achieving its key strategic objectives of (a) reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other militants; (b) providing security to facilitate the Somali political process and reconciliation efforts; and (c) transferring its security responsibilities to the Somali security forces.

The widespread perception that AMISOM has failed is not entirely accurate. The main accusation is that the mission could not provide adequate security throughout the country and to root out radical groups. However, such a demand should not be directed solely at the peacekeepers, who faced many constraints. The Somali government proved unprepared to tackle deep-rooted internal problems on its own, which required a solution not only from outside, but above all from within. In particular, the government’s relations with representatives of other autonomies and regions, including the secession, and with other countries, such as Kenya and even the AU, have become complicated. In 2021, for example, the AU Commission’s Special Representative in Somalia was declared persona non grata and forced to leave the country. Moreover, the protracted Somali conflict cannot be resolved by military means alone.

The operation ended in December 2021. On April 1, 2022, the African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)^[17] was launched with a mandate until the end of 2024 and a subsequent handover to Somali security forces. The number of new mission (18,000 military personnel, 1,000 police, and 70 civilians) and most of its mandate (support to the Somali transitional government, implementation of the national security plan, training of Somali security services) are the same as its predecessor. The only exception is that ATMIS’s mandate does not provide for direct involvement in offensive operations against terrorist groups. ATMIS has not been able to avoid funding problems. On April 9, 2023, the Peace and Security Council reiterated the need for additional funding to ensure that the targets are met and that the fight against al-Shabaab continues to be effective.

African Union Hybrid Operations  in Cooperation with the UN and ECOWAS: Practical Aspects of the Fieldwork

In addition to the AU-led operations, several mixed-type operations were launched (see Table 2).

UNAMID: First Hybrid Operation

The first and so far only hybrid peacekeeping mission conducted by the AU in cooperation with the UN is the Operation in Darfur (UNAMID),^[18] which was launched on July 31, 2007 on the basis of AU’s communiqué 79 on the situation in Darfur^[19] and UNSC resolution 1769 (S/RES/1769 of July 31, 2007). For the first time, the UNSC mandated the United Nations and the African Union to jointly manage a peacekeeping operation that not only replaced the previous AU mission in Sudan (AMIS), but also co-existed with another UN peacekeeping mission (UNMIS) and a separate UN—AU mediation process for Darfur. The principles of the mission were: the joint appointment of a Special Representative for Darfur; the appointment of an AU Force Commander in consultation with the UN; and unity of command and control (while ensuring a UN command and control structure, as well as support mechanism). Cooperation was in the interests of both organizations. The African Union needed the UN’s resources and drew on its vast experience, which it replicated in its operational roles. The UN needed the AU’s political support to deal with the Sudanese government, which opposed the presence of peacekeepers in Darfur, treating the conflict as an internal affair and the presence of foreign troops as a recolonization of the country. In addition to deploying the peacekeeping mission, it was the AU that mediated between the Sudanese government and rebel groups in Darfur. Furthermore, the UN relied on the AU’s ability to bring African states together, including on the issue of troop contributions, on the premise that the operation would have an “African character.”

UNAMID was mandated to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, monitor ceasefire agreements, protect civilians and humanitarian workers, promote the rule of law and human rights, disarm the Janjaweed, and resolve border issues between Sudan and Chad. Following the Doha Document for Peace, signed in Darfur in 2011, UNAMID has been engaged in internal dialogue and consultation processes.

In UNSC resolution 2148 (S/RES/2148 of April 3, 2014), the SC streamlined UNAMID’s mandate according to the following strategic priorities: (a) protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian access and ensuring the security of humanitarian organizations; (b) mediating between the Government of Sudan and  non-signatory armed groups on the basis of the  Doha Document for Peace in Darfur;  and (c) supporting mediation to resolve  inter-communal conflicts, including through root-cause interventions, with the UN country team.

UNAMID’s mandate allowed it to take all necessary measures to fulfil its tasks and was backed up by the necessary forces and personnel. At the time, it was the largest peacekeeping operation in the world.  As of July 31, 2007, the authorized strength of the mission was 2,587 peacekeepers, including 1,555 military personnel, 360 military observers and liaison officers, 3,772 police advisers and 2,660 formed police units. Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt and Ethiopia provided the bulk of the contingent. By mid-2011, 90% of the peacekeepers had been deployed. UNSC resolution 2063 (S/RES/2063 of 31 July 2012) reduced the number of military and police contingents to 23,743. Subsequently, at its peak, UNAMID had an authorized strength of  19,555 military personnel and about  4,000 police.^[20]

UNAMID was fully funded by the UN. The mission’s first-year budget was 1.48 billion USD, of which 20% was provided by Washington.^[21] Subsequently, UNAMID’s funding was reduced in line with the overall reduction in funding for peacekeeping  missions. While UNAMID’s budget was  1.040 billion USD in 2016—2017, it has fallen to a critical level of 257.9 million USD in 2019—2020.^[22]

Despite the bifurcated command and joint governance, the hybrid AU — UN partnership was political rather than operational. UNAMID’s hybrid nature inevitably created coordination problems throughout the mission’s 13-year lifespan, requiring flexibility and compromise on both sides. In particular, the UN controlled most of the budget and mandate, leading to a certain disconnect between the overall strategy and the “on the ground” needs of AU forces. Although by 2014 the methods and approaches of both organizations to the situation in Darfur had become more coherent, the impact of the hybrid partnership had increased as a result. At the same time, local populations and governments have become increasingly critical of the peacekeepers for failing to fundamentally improve security in the region. Relations with the Sudanese government deteriorated in 2014, with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir accusing UNAMID of supporting rebel movements and demanding that it leave Darfur.

It was during this period that the UNSC first indicated its intention to begin the process of phasing out UNAMID.^[23] This process began three years later with the adoption of the UNSC resolution 2363 (S/RES/2363 of 29 June 2017), which, in addition to extending the  mission’s mandate, called for the reduction of military and police personnel in two  phases over the next year, while continuing to monitor the situation on the ground. In February 2019, half of the UNAMID contingent was withdrawn from the region. On December 22, 2020, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 2559 (S/RES/2559 of December 22, 2020), which decided to terminate UNAMID’s mandate by the end of the year, while allowing a six-month period for the final withdrawal  of military and civilian personnel by  June 30, 2021.

Despite the difficult operational environment, UNAMID has achieved some successes that far exceed those of the AU mission that preceded it. Through AU mediation, peacekeepers have provided humanitarian access, protected civilians and negotiated subsequent peace agreements with varying degrees of success. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, which was signed only by the Government of Sudan  and the Liberation and Justice Movement,  laid the groundwork for further institutional and legislative reforms and created certain political mechanisms to address the root  causes of the conflict itself. It is to UNAMID’s credit that it prepared the conditions for the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, promoted it and communicated it to the public.

Admittedly, the mission had very limited scope to exert direct political influence  on the dynamics of the peace process. There was no peace to maintain in Darfur. A comprehensive peace agreement endorsed by all parties to the conflict also failed. The main rebel movements did not support the Abuja Darfur Peace Agreement or the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. In addition, the peacekeepers have struggled to monitor, verify and promote efforts to disarm the Arab Janjaweed militia, recognized by the UN as responsible for human rights and international humanitarian law violations in Darfur. Some of these groups were absorbed by the paramilitaries, while others defected to the rebels, notably the Justice and Equality Movement. In this difficult environment, the peacekeepers themselves were repeatedly attacked, mainly by the Janjaweed and armed tribal groups. During the operation, 289 mission personnel died.^[24]

Support for Sudan’s ongoing efforts to address peacekeeping challenges, protect civilians, facilitate the peace process and deliver humanitarian assistance has shifted from UNAMID to the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and the country team.

From AFISMA to MINUSMA

Subsequent hybrid operations have been conducted by the AU in cooperation with sub-regional organizations. In late 2012, the AU and ECOWAS initiated the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), which was authorized by the UN Security Council resolution 2085 (S/RES/2085 of December 20, 2012) (Korendyasov & Konstantinova, 2020; SIPRI, 2015, pp. 119—121). The resolution  was supported by the transitional government  of Mali. The objectives were to build the capacity of the national defense forces, to support the restoration of state authority in the north under the control of extremist armed groups, to ensure stabilization, to support the Malian authorities in maintaining security and consolidating state authority, and to reduce the threat posed by extremist groups, including  Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,^[25] the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa and their affiliates. The resolution established a multidimensional UN presence in Mali to provide coordinated and consistent support for the ongoing political process and security, including support for the planning and deployment of AFISMA. The former president of Burundi, Pierre Buyoya, who was also the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, was appointed head of the AFISMA. The mission had 3,300 military personnel, including 2,990 from Nigeria, Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, Benin, Ghana, Guinea and Togo, with the bulk of the force made up of troops from ECOWAS. The mission cost 455.53 million USD, of which the African countries of South Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Ghana contributed 23% of the total cost (World Peace Foundation, 2017b, p. 4).

The mobilization was slow and the deployment of AFISMA was delayed due to logistical problems and coordination difficulties. On January 10, 2013, Islamists launched an offensive in the south of the country and captured the town of Kona. As the rebels continued to advance towards Bamako, France launched its own military operation Serval (January 11, 2013 — July 14, 2014), to halt the advance towards the capital and help the Malian government regain control of the country. The decisive military action by France, Mali and AFISMA at this stage was quite successful, driving the Islamist fighters out of the main cities in northern Mali, including Timbuktu, by the end of January, and out of Kidal, the last city under their control, by early February. In terms of offensive readiness, AFISMA played an auxiliary role in securing the areas after their liberation. In addition, major troop-contributing countries such as Chad subsequently withdrew militarily, citing a lack of financial and material support for major counter-insurgency operations across vast territories. Dissatisfied with the results, France and the US called on the Security Council to replace AFISMA by the UN operation.

Following the letter of March 26, 2013 from the President of the ECOWAS Commission to the UN Secretary General requesting the transformation of the African operation into a UN stabilization mission, AFISMA was finally transformed into the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).^[26] All AFISMA personnel were redeployed and placed under UN command. For the first time, the transfer of authority from the AU to the UN created tensions between the two organizations and even provoked an unexpected reaction from the PSC in the form of a complaint. The AU believed it had the political capacity to respond to the full range of problems in Mali, and could deal with both a rebel uprising and an unconstitutional change of government. Although the UN had a different view, and the assessment of the AU’s potential in resolving this conflict was more than modest. The AU also felt that the transition had been too fast and opaque, with no recognition of AFISMA’s achievements.

From AFISM-CAR/MISCA to MINUSCA

Another operation that was also positioned as an exclusively African mixed-type  project was the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (AFISM-CAR/MISCA) (SIPRI, 2015,  pp. 124—127). This mission, transformed from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Peace Consolidation Mission in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) and formed from the ECCAS military contingent operating in the country, was established on July 19, 2013 by a communiqué of the AU PSC.^[27] The transfer began on  August 1, 2013, but took four months to complete. The deployment of MISCA was  slow, with ECCAS obstructing the process in every way possible. In addition, the new mission was headed by Special Representative Jean-Marie Mokoko, a general from the Republic of Congo and a political opponent of D. Sassou Nguesso.

The mission’s mandate was very broad:  (a) protect the civilian population and restore security and public order; (b) stabilize and restore central government authority; (c) reform and restructure the defense and security sectors; (d) create conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

In accordance with UNSC resolution 2127 (S/RES/2127 of 5 December 2013), foreign peacekeepers stationed in the country have been placed at the disposal of the MISCA. The initial MISCA contingent was 3,500, but the number of troops deployed proved insufficient. Following the violence in December 2013, the mission was increased to 6,000.^[28] Despite continuing security problems, the rapid deployment of MISCA forces and French peacekeepers prevented an even greater catastrophe in the country. Military and police contingents were provided by Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, DRC, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Chad, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. The peacekeepers were supported by French units (1,600 troops) as part of Operation Sangaris from December 2013 to May 2015 (World Peace Foundation, 2017c,  pp. 2—3). Meanwhile, Chad withdrew its  833 troops following allegations of an unprovoked attack on a crowded market in Bangui on 29 March 2014 that killed 30 people (Welz, 2014, p. 607).

MISCA has faced the same problems as other regional missions: weak institutional capacity, multi-level redeployment of contingents without performance testing, lack of a unified command structure, dependence on support from the international community, and confinement to the territory of Bangui. Six months later, MISCA was replaced by the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in accordance with UNSC resolution 2149 (S/RES/2149 of April 10, 2014). It got 10,000 soldiers and 1,800 police officers.^[29] The transfer of authority took place on September 15, 2014. Each new peacekeeping operation, from MICOPAX to MISCA to MINUSCA, has been more of an add-on to the previous operation than a strategically conceived new mission.

Conclusion

The African Union and sub-regional organizations have been among the most active security actors in Africa, responding quickly  to conflicts, often long before the UN  intervenes. Regional peacekeeping forces  are often deployed in the context of  ongoing hostilities and in the absence of a peace process, sometimes even without explicit authorization to use military force to protect civilians. However, the mandates are subsequently adapted, both in terms of the instruments and the scope of the tasks to be carried out.

Capping the “hot” phase of the conflict by addressing the priority tasks of containing the bloodshed allows us to prepare the “ground” for the subsequent deployment of international UN peacekeeping contingents when the conditions for political dialogue are favorable. This “division of labor” between the UN and regional/local actors most clearly reflects the current format of their interaction. With the launch of UNAMID’s first hybrid mission, however, a new model of cooperation is gradually emerging that, if not complementing the “simple division of labor,” is at least expanding its boundaries. Conducting peacekeeping operations in Africa exclusively with its own forces, at least without close consultation with the AU and sub-regional organizations, is becoming too burdensome for the UN.

The regional model of peacekeeping in Africa is quite clear. It is based on the capabilities of the actors involved: the African Union, as a continental regional organization, assumes a major role in the management of the regional security regime, while the regional economic communities perform operational functions, relying on regional security mechanisms. Unlike the AU, not all sub-regional organizations can be considered mature peacekeepers. In many conflicts, however, their decisive action has been instrumental in halting unrest and preventing it from spreading.

The presence of African regional forces in all the missions analyzed has generally had a positive impact on stabilizing the situation in conflict zones, although it has not always led to the expected results.

The political will, direct interest and responsibility, rapid response, knowledge of the nature and specifics of the conflicts, and the ability to engage in dialogue with most, if not all, of the parties to the conflict do not override the many problems faced by virtually all regional missions.

First, there is the low level of training and even lack of proper training for African peacekeepers. However, this problem can be solved by acquiring field experience and retraining programs. In addition, there are often delays in the deployment of contingents due to the lack of logistical capabilities for timely deployment.

Second, missions are often given unrealistic mandates with “impossible” tasks, especially given the number of contingents involved, their logistical support, modest resources and the poor training of peacekeepers.

Third, there is the lack of funding,  the lack of own resources and the dependence on external donor support. Without the political, financial and logistical support of the international community, African peacekeeping operations will remain difficult to deploy.

Fourth, in some missions there has been the problem of reaching agreement on the mandate of the operation, especially when the host country categorically refused the mission and described it as interference.

Finally, Africans are not always sympathetic to the temporary nature of such operations and the subsequent transfer of authority and integration into UN contingents after the successful completion of combat operations.

Obviously, the contribution of the AU and sub-regional organizations to peace and  security in Africa will continue to grow as experience is gained, organizational structures are improved and the conceptual foundations of conflict resolution doctrine are laid. This, however, requires a sober assessment of the scale and nature of the missions and, accordingly, the appropriate allocation of resources in advance.

^{1 Communiqué of the Ninety First Ordinary Session at Ambassadorial Level of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at Ambassadorial Level // The African Union. April 2, 2003. URL: https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ comapr03.pdf (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{2 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi // Arusha. August 28, 2000. URL: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_000828_Arusha%20Peace%20and%20Reconciliation%20Agreement%20for%20Burundi.pdf (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{3 Audit of the African Union // Security Council Report. December 18, 2007. URL: https://www.google.ru/ url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwji_93es7HrAhVR_SoKHcqiDC0QFjAJegQIChAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.securitycouncilreport.org%2Fatf%2Fcf%2F%257B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4 FF96FF9%257D%2FRO%2520Audit%2520of%2520the%2520AU.docx&usg=AOvVaw1-v0m_i4IgFEG6CE3aa7_4 (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{4 United Nations Operations in Burundi // Handbook of UN Security Council Practices, 2004—2007.  P. 172—176. (In Russian). URL: https://www.un.org/ securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/ru/sc/repertoire/2004-2007/04-07_05.pdf#page=36 (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{5 Peace and Security Council 515th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government, Communiqué // The AU Peace and Security Council. June 13, 2015. URL: https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-515-comm-burundi-13-6-2015.pdf (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{6 UN Security Council mission visits Burundi // UN News. January 22, 2016. (In Russian). URL: https://news.un.org/ru/story/2016/01/1278841 (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{7 Peace and Security Council 565th Meeting, Communiqué // The AU Peace and Security Council. December 17, 2015. URL: https://www.peaceau.org/ uploads/psc-565-comm-burundi-17-12-2015.pdf (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{8 The AU’s Challenged Responsibility to Protect in Burundi // ReliefWeb. January 18, 2016. URL: https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/aus-challenged-responsibility-protect-burundi (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{9 The African Union and the Burundi Crisis: Ambition versus Reality // Crisis Group Africa. September 28, 2016. URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/ burundi/african-union-and-burundi-crisis-ambition-versus-reality (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{10 Resolution 2279 (2016). Adopted by the Security Council at its 7664th meeting, on 1 April 2016 //  The UN Digital Library. April 1, 2016.  URL: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/824911?ln=ru (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{11 Peace and Security Council 47th Meeting, Communiqué // The AU Peace and Security Council. March 21, 2006. URL: https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiquecomoroseng-47th.pdf (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{12 Peace and Security Council 77th Meeting, Communiqué // The AU Peace and Security Council.  May 9, 2007. URL: https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ communiqueoncomoroseng.pdf (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{13 Resolution 1706 (2006). Adopted by the Security Council at its 5519th meeting, on 31 August 2006 // The United Nations. URL: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/484/64/PDF/N0648464.pdf?OpenElement (accessed: 15.03.2023).}

^{14 Peace and Security Council 69th Meeting, Communiqué // The AU Peace and Security Council. January 19, 2007. URL: https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ communiqueeng-69th.pdf (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{15 Peace and security in Africa: Briefing by the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) // The UN Security Council. 6561st meeting. Tuesday, 21 June 2011. P. 4. URL: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N11/381/40/PDF/N1138140.pdf?OpenElement (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{16 Communiqué of the 245th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council // The AU Peace and Security Council. October 15, 2010. URL: https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/final-communique-on-somalia-eng-.pdf (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{17 African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). URL: https://atmis-au.org/ (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{18 UNAMID Fact Sheet. Protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian aid & helping political process in Darfur // The United Nations Peacekeeping. URL: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unamid (accessed: 15.05.2023).}

^{19 Peace and Security Council 79th Meeting, Communiqué // The AU Peace and Security Council.  June 22, 2007. URL: https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ communiquehybridoperationeng.pdf (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{20 UNAMID Fact Sheet // The United Nations Peacekeeping. URL: https://unamid.unmissions.org/about-unamid-0 (accessed: 15.05.2023).}

^{21 United States Policy on Sudan // US Department of State Archive. April 15, 2008. URL: https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/fs/2008/103969.htm (accessed: 17.05.2023).}

^{22 UNAMID Fact Sheet. Protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian aid & helping political process in Darfur // The United Nations Peacekeeping. URL: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unamid (accessed: 15.05.2023).}

^{23 Blue Helmets are leaving Sudanese Darfur // UN News. December 31, 2020. (In Russian). URL: https://news.un.org/ru/story/2020/12/1393362 (accessed: 15.05.2023).}

^{24 UNAMID Fact Sheet // The United Nations Peacekeeping. URL: https://unamid.unmissions.org/about-unamid-0 (accessed: 15.05.2023).}

^{25 Hereinafter, an organization included in the list of terrorist organizations in the Russian Federation is mentioned.}

^{26 AFISMA Transfers its Authority to MINUSMA // The African Union. July 1, 2013. URL: https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/afisma-transfers-its-authority-to-minusma (accessed: 15.05.2023).}

^{27 Peace and Security Council 385th Meeting, Communiqué // The AU Peace and Security Council. July 19, 2013. URL: https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-com-385-car-19-07-2013.pdf (accessed: 15.05.2023).}

^{28 MISCA Establishment // MISCA. URL: http://misca.peaceau.org/en/page/110-about-misca (accessed: 15.05.2023).}

^{29 Resolution 2149 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7153rd meeting, on 10 April 2014 // The United Nations. URL: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/295/81/PDF/N1429581.pdf?OpenElement (accessed: 15.03.2023).}

About the authors

Alexandra V. Khudaykulova

Author for correspondence.
Email: alexandra_77@mail.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-0680-9321

PhD (Political Science), Associate Professor, Department of Applied Analysis of International Affairs

References