Rethinking the globalization through the lens of indonesian traditional political culture

Abstract

The aim of the study is to identify original Indonesian approaches to the globalization phenomenon from Indonesia’s political culture standpoint, bearing in mind also the socio-political thought of the Indonesian people, as well as the historical and cultural features of the Indonesian statehood formation. The author analyzes the assumption that Indonesian society and the elites share original globalization perception, thus Indonesia’s self-positioning in a globalizing world is not only a matter of diplomacy or politics, but also a question of political philosophy and social psychology. From the point of methodology, the author relies on constructivism IR theory, as it necessary to study the Indonesian beliefs set regarding globalization and world development processes. As a result, the author concludes that the pandemic consequences and international crises are increasingly dividing the world, and globalization is often considered stalled, however, for the Indonesian mindset, globalization is an important world order element, while it is perceived not as total westernization or neocolonialism, but as a fair exchange between sovereign nations. The research contribution is also determined by the need to analyze non-Western approaches to key world development issues and the international actor’s communication, considering the transformation of the contemporary IR system and the global politics shift to the Asia-Pacific region.

Full Text

Introduction Globalization has become increasingly discussed in the contemporary society as a cause or as a consequence of major shift in international relations structure. Finding common denominators for this notion is magnetic but complicated. Till now this path is full of uncertainties. As a term drawn from the economics globalization is often understood as inevitable process of major economic regions integration, formation of the single market with multilateral economic institutions as the pinnacle of the system. Such an approach is often perceived as a hyper-globalist or neoliberal by media and politicians [1. P. 51]. According to the skeptical approach globalization processes occur mainly between the developed countries and their role in the larger scale systems cannot be exaggerated. The sceptics concern about abstract results and perspectives of the phenomena protected by neoliberal view, the lack of empirical evidence [2. P. 174]. The third approach known as transformationalist refers to an understanding of globalization as a process and as an end state. All of these approaches can be called economic-based or classical. Changes in economics entail changes in the other spheres, including international relations system, the configuration and level of basic actors etc. There are also critical assessments of the general globalization. For example, J. Petras believes that the globalization can be substituted by the term “Imperialism”, because the globalization is for the most part a manifesto [3. P. 42] or a mask for U.S. or Western-led Imperialism [4. P. 187]. The similar approach defining the globalization as a well-managed political process is taken by V. Shiva [5. P. 567]. In general, one can say that the globalization is perceived either as a natural or artificially directed process. The position of the constructivists is close to each version; it can even be called comprehensive. Identity researchers such as T. Hopf perceive the neoliberal order as a Western dominant identity Such identities are opposed by both national and regional identities, their influence is determined by the commonality or difference in the value base [6. P. 4]. Aim of the study Since we observe such an abundance of interpretations of globalization and approaches to its definition, we can rely on the fact that the Indonesian society and the elites that control the political processes in the country have also formed their attitude to the problem. Taking into account the fact that the Indonesian statehood is built on a complex and original base of unique Indonesian political and philosophical values that are more than one century old, it can be assumed that some global phenomena will be refracted in the Indonesian environment and we will get something considered as a unique syncretic approach to the definition of a particular phenomenon. The aim of this study is to identify original Indonesian approaches to the perception of the globalization phenomenon from the point of view of foreign and domestic policy, the socio-political thought of the Indonesian society, as well as the historical and cultural features of the Indonesian statehood formation. Materials and Methods To consider this issue, we need to choose an approach that could help to identify precisely the scope of cultural and social processes. The study is based both on general studies of globalization and approaches to its study in the socio-political sciences, and on country-specific classical and modern studies of Indonesia, its history, foreign and domestic policy and political culture. In case of Indonesia, I align myself with the constructivist position. Indonesia as an ancient civilization is based on a whole complex of its own traditions, ideology and worldview. Therefore, all its actions outside and inside initially pass through the prism of certain ideas, the elites and the masses build their perception of problems based on a stable indigenous system of behavior and thinking. These categories are of unique Indonesian origin and should be taken into account. At the same time, Indonesia does not exist in isolation, but acts within the framework of the rules established by global westernized constructs as a diplomatic power. For the sake of convenience, I will call them Westphalian nation-state and globalist neoliberal constructs. Many will argue and say that two systems cannot exist simultaneously. Realists or liberals would say that there is no alternative. Thanks to constructivism, we can assume that the coexistence of different systems and their complete development are possible and permissible. We can even assume that the society norms or behavior by nation-state or globalization agent within the external system will differ from its social matrix, political culture preferences and, accordingly, will cause a conflict of external actions and internal aspirations. Thus, we need to evaluate the historical value background of Indonesian political culture formation and the perception of external factors in this background. Main results Indonesia as a structure dominated identity For when we touch the structural dominance, we mean the hypothesis that there is a certain value structure and it does not change. At the same time, it affects the behavior of both elites and the masses. Indeed, the structure of Indonesian politics is characterized by great continuity. Pancasila ideology underlines such a continuity. The formation of the ideology of the independent Indonesia was preceded by several stages of statehood development. Such stages are traditionally distinguished by time periods of ancient, medieval and modern history. In this case, a historical retrospective is needed, since each period is associated with the network expansion of the Malay Archipelago with the outside world. Three main strata of Indonesian identity The first sociocultural stratum at the heart of the Indonesian statehood is the Hindu-Buddhist development model, which relied on an agricultural clan culture and navigation in order to strengthen the centralized power of large dynasties and to develop trade routes with leading regional centers [7. P. 71]. Till this day one can see a big number of Hindu-Buddhist monuments on Java, Bali or Sumatra as irrefutable evidence of Hindu-Buddhist influence. The earliest prototypes date back to the state of Kutai (V century A.D.) on the island of Kalimantan, and later ones related to the history of the great empire of Majapahit (XVI century A.D.). The local tribes have created the first states, turned to the caste system, Hinduism, Sanskrit and the Indian ideals of government. “Mahabharata” and “Ramayana”, “Bhagavad Gita” and other monuments of ancient Indian philosophy and literature has become the basis of the traditional culture of the nowadays Balinese or Javanese culture (despite the commitment of the majority of Javanese to Islam). This element has undergone significant changes in the course of history and have been adapted to the local worldview in the folk philosophical tradition. This phenomenon is called Javanese or Indonesian syncretism [8. P. 84-98]. This means that since about the V century AD, the population of the state formations of Java, Kalimantan and Sumatra were open to a new culture, active trade and cultural mixing. Islam advent and spread to Indonesia with Indian and Arab merchants heralded an era of local sultanates dominance. In Java, the legend attributes the Islamization to Wali Songo or nine holy preachers. Many of them originated from aristocratic families and preached through the local images and worldview by means of the shadow theater and the gamelan orchestra [9. P. 83-89]. Despite the fact that the Sultanate of Mataram, founded in 1587, is considered the winner of the old Hindu states, the Sultan court preserved many pre-Islamic traditions, and the ruler and his aristocracy continued the practice of meditation and faith in the mythical laws and beings of the old era (Kejawen). In the rural communities, Islam has also found its place among the already established adat laws. According to a number of versions, the above-mentioned preachers were Sufis and this fact contributed to the coexistence of adat and Islam in Java [10. P. 95]. According to the experts, the self-sufficiency of Mataram and Javanese sultanates led to some isolation of their culture and the decline of maritime trade [11. P. 405]. One can assume that such a trait is the forerunner of nationalism idea. An Islamic Malay model close to Arabia was formed in XV century AD on the island of Sumatra near the future territory of Indonesia (Aceh, Jambi) and Malaysia (Johor). The need for a centralized response to the threats of Europeans and neighboring powers influenced the choice of traditional Islam and focus on the figure of an absolute ruler. In neighboring Java, the supporters of the non-adat model began to be called santri. Sumatran sultanates were open to external interaction and were strong trading powers for a long time. The formation of a vast trading network was also influenced by the sea peoples of Sulawesi or Bugis-Makassar worldview. For a long time before the Europeans, Makassar ships reached Australia and traded with local Aborigines [12. P. 77]. The Chinese trading network was also crucial for the archipelago since its merchants contributed to the establishment inter-island contacts. The European world initially brought Christianity in the form of Catholicism and then Protestantism. The efforts taken by Protestants to translate the Bible into local languages have significantly contributed to a greater understanding. The Javanese core of aristocrats in the service of the Dutch retained both the traditions of the past and adherence to Islam as the identity of the anticolonial opposition. The Dutch have also consolidated the feudal foundations of society for the convenience of government. At the same time, many elements of European knowledge were adopted both by the Javanese themselves and by other large ethnicities of the Archipelago, for example, Batak, Sunda, Minangkabau, Makassar, etc. European intellectuals have also played a significant role in the formation of Indonesian identity through the systematization of the local history and culture, linguistic research or cooperation with such famous figures as Raden Saleh or Kartini [13. P. 161]. Needless to say, that this fact does not remove the responsibility from the European countries for the colonial exploitation, however, it must be recognized that these Europeans were people of anti-colonial views and showed respect for local communities. Ideology and foreign policy transformations Indonesian independent state was subsequently created in 1945 in Java due to the fact that the political and economic center of the Archipelago has always been located in Java from Majapahit till the end of the Holland rule. Obviously, Javanese views on power as a political and social phenomenon had a significant impact on the psychological portrait of the country’s elites and leaders. First president Sukarno also transferred the concepts of communality, harmony, collectivism and syncretism to Pancasila [14. P. 144]. The Pancasila contained the principles of social justice, which were equally understood by Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, Christians and even Communists. Belief in a single God made it possible not to single out a particular denomination as dominant, which predetermined a balance system towards secular bureaucracy and the army as the main forces of the state. Sukarno has also borrowed liberally from his own concept of Indonesian socialism - Marhaenism [15. P. 51]. Marhaenism was based on the rural community views of the Javanese and the philosophy of Islamic socialists from the anti-colonial movement Sarekat Islam. It is such figures of the movement as Cokroaminoto and Agus Salim who can be called the Sukarno’s teachers. They are revered, first of all, as the actual founders of Islamic socialism [16. P. 2173]. Thus, independent Indonesia was born at a time when the identity of the world was already framed in the form of a UN system and nation-states. The Indonesian constitution and ideology preserved the best cultural features of the Archipelago peoples, but the processes of the Cold War rather contributed to the isolation of Indonesia from capitalist and socialist pretensions. The latter somehow appeared in their Indonesian version within the country. The country has made significant efforts to protect the region, via ASEAN creation and the Non-Aligned movement [17. P. 38]. If earlier the structure was supported by the elites and the masses as a lifestyle, at the time it has become the personification of statehood. Suharto, who came to power after the defeat of the communist coup, retained the ideology developed by Sukarno and supplemented it with a number of theoretical and practical provisions. Moreover, democracy of the reformation period also underwent syncretism. Despite significant concessions and liberal laws, the very same configuration of elites has remained unaltered to this day. The Pancasila line was also reflected in Indonesia’s foreign policy aspirations. In 1948, the Prime Minister of Indonesia M. Hatta, commenting on the attitude of the young country to the processes of the Cold War, delivered a speech: “Rowing between Two Reefs,” in which he indicated that from the moment of gaining independence the country would be guided only by its own interests and would not allow superpower intervention [18. P. 65]. Traditional foreign policy directions The Hatta Doctrine has since formed the basis of the country’s foreign policy called “independent and active” foreign policy. “Independence” was defined as the ability of Indonesia to independently develop its position without external pressure, and “activity” implied attention to any constructive actions taken to establish peace between states. From the period after the ASEAN creation, three foreign policy directions can be distinguished from the structure of the Indonesian worldview and ideological base: the problems of Palestine or the Muslim world (religion identity), ASEAN integration and cooperation (collectivism and communality), peacekeeping or mediation (strive for harmony and peaceful methods). Indonesia as a trading country also pays significant attention to international trade and international ideas such as democracy. Thus, president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in his speech to the Indonesian Council on Foreign Affairs (ICWA) on May 20, 2005 pointed out that Indonesia’s experience is a prime example for the whole world, since in the country the principles of Islam coexist with the principles of democracy, and foreign policy remains is independent and active [19. P. 21]. A whole book can be written about the influence of these unique features and their brief mention is not detailed enough. In the context of the research topic, one must understand that globalization as an idea of the global identity field should be embodied first in the Indonesian consciousness and only then become part of its foreign policy. Discussion Indonesia and the globalization embodiment According to A.M. Murphy Indonesians always had a tendency to perceive the globalization as an inevitable economic process that Indonesia must survive to preserve national identity [20. P. 230]. That should come as no surprise, since the western type open market and investment attraction are strongly connected with Suharto’s “New order” regime. More specifically with the state-regulated partial liberalization without any social or political change. So, globalization is seen rather as a tool to ensure Pancasila national prosperity, but not as a replacement of statehood by Neo-liberal concept. This means that it has taken on an inconvenient form for adaptation by local culture. By the time the Reformation began, Indonesia had a negative image among the Western world due to the conflict in East Timor and the authoritarianism of Suharto. Thanks to the actions of the first reformation presidents, engineer Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and cleric Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia succeeded in liberalizing the constitution and ending the Timorese conflict. Moreover, Wahid has always been a staunch defender of religious tolerance, minority rights, and democratic values. Meanwhile tensions with the West have not added popularity to the globalization. Their successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, notwithstanding Sukarnostyle nationalism and accusations of Western representatives of demonizing her nation, established and strengthened both bilateral and multilateral relations of the country. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s two terms showed that Indonesia is an advocate of cultural values that are indigenous to its culture. Thanks to the efforts of Marti Natalegawa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia managed to become the main participant in the settlement of regional conflicts, Indonesia also proved to be a human rights defender in fact by proposing the creation of a profile body on this topic within the ASEAN framework [21. P. 51]. As already mentioned, Yudhoyono proclaimed the coexistence of democracy and Islam as a single value base of modern Indonesia. Since 2014, during the first term of Joko Widodo the presidency, Indonesia turned to a concept of the world’s maritime axis. Such an idea aimed at enhancing the maritime domination has historically entrenched in the Indonesian foreign policy with the 1957 Wawasan Nusantara doctrine. This document was a breakthrough for the republic which approved of the extension of the country’s territorial waters to 12 nautical miles and protected this international legal status Nowadays the issue of the Indonesian sea-status rose particularly acute in light of China’s Silk Road and the closed-down US Trans-Pacific Partnership. It is worth noting that in the case of successful implementation of one integration project or another, Indonesia will become dependent on China or the United States and the economic domination of the major powers in the region in any way would harm the economic position of the country. In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that Joko Widodo has promulgated the Maritime doctrine called «Indonesia - Global Maritime Axis». The key idea of the doctrine is to transform Indonesia into the world maritime power. Global Maritime Axis has international, regional and domestic issues and affects the interests of many sectors of the world politics and economy. Joko Widodo was re-elected in April 2019 on the wake of promises to improve the economy and infrastructure. The debates of Jokowi and Prabowo during the election were filled with discussions about the need to open up to the world for even greater investment or to isolate themselves from the world for conservative self-reinforcement. Now the president has directed all foreign policy to search for partners within the framework of bilateral relations, which again indicates a decrease in the intention to open up to the world. It is worth noting that during his speech at the World Economic Forum on ASEAN in September 2019, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo said he was an Avenger, fighting for free trade. “I and my fellow Avengers stand ready to keep Thanos from wiping out half of the population,” he said [22]. This was seen many as the globalization full endorsement by president. It is also important to touch on the topic of religion, since the strengthening of Islamic parties and the influence of religious groups can be regarded as another reason for the growth of isolationism in connection with the idea of Western identity as Islamophobic. The growing influence of populist parties and their leaders of conservatives will also not create the basis for the development of globalization as a positive idea [23. P. 81]. Conclusion In conclusion it should be said that the Indonesian culture consists of many historical sociocultural strata forming the matrix of its identity (Javanese values, maritime culture, Hindu-Buddhist and Islam identity, Christianity and European ideas) forming the perception of political processes and general mindset or rules of behavior. The unique case of Indonesia is that its historical values at the core of the nationalist model are very close in content (but not identical) to the values of neoliberal democracy and globalization that today represent the Western world. Every idea throughout history has become part of Indonesian culture. globalization for successful development must also go through such a process and become absolutely “ours” for the Indonesians. So far, this situation is far from ideal since the democratic powers of Western identity often considers local identities as lower class non-liberal concepts. This leads to misunderstanding and conflict, to isolation of the country from the world. If globalization comes into harmony with Pancasila, and its agents learn to understand the local specifics, then it has every chance of becoming a driving force for Indonesian development. Long before the Europeans, Indonesia and the Malay Archipelago were the center of cultural mixing, open trade and state entities, and non-state trading actors the size of a full-fledged state. Globalization as cooperation, as mutual understanding, non-conflict, and tolerance are embedded in the nature of the Indonesian identity and self-perception.
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About the authors

Nikita S. Kuklin

ASEAN Centre in MGIMO University

Author for correspondence.
Email: ns.kuklin@inno.mgimo.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-5715-847X

PhD, expert of the ASEAN Centre

76, Prospect Vernadskogo Moscow, Russia, 119454

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