Old Problems and New Perspectives for Neurophenomenology in Psychiatry: The Chronicle of the Radical Turn

On the wave of intensive development of cognitive sciences we see the intensive physiology, psychology and philosophy studies in the Russian tradition. Philosophy discusses the analytical think and the problem of free will, logic, epistemology and enactivism; the orient studies with attention to experience are very rarely. Against this background, psychiatric neurophenomenology as one of the most important field for science and practice is completely forgotten. The paper reconstructs continuity between the “old” philosophical theories in psychiatry in the 20th century beginning and the “new” interpretations in neuroscience. The author demonstrates the most characteristic parallels of this renewal: neurophenomenology problematizes the problem of description and understanding methodology, as K. Jaspers, accents the prelogical experience, as E. Strauss, tunes away from the subject-object split to immediate experience, as L. Binswanger, emphasizes the embodiment and totalization of communication, as R. Laing. Reliance on the analysis of actual modern discussions paper shows how traditional problems transforms in recent years, and what perspectives these transformations open for philosophy and interdisciplinary practice. The author studies psychiatric phenomenology of experience of J. Parnas, G. Stanghellini, L. Sass, D. Zahavi, K. Mundt, T. Fuchs and others, analyses the interdisciplinary potential of modern research and diagnostic programs. It is concluded that, by overcoming the biological and psychological dichotomy, by turning to the field of experience as a field of general interest, neurophenomenology creates a research field in which the philosophy of psychiatry overcomes its antinomianism.