Confucius Institutes - Soft Power or Trojan Horse? View from the Russian Far East

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Introduction

Confucius Institutes are non-profit educational institutions established by China in various countries to teach their citizens Chinese language and get acquainted with Chinese culture. Since 2004, when the first Confucius Institute was established in Seoul, Republic of Korea, there are now 541 institutes and 1,170 Confucius Classes in 162 countries.¹

Of the 19 Confucius Institutes in Russia, four are in the Far Eastern Federal District — in Vladivostok, Blagoveshchensk, Ulan-Ude, Komsomolsk-on-Amur. On the one hand, their success is facilitated by the region’s proximity to China, close economic cooperation and, as a result, the growing interest of the local population in Chinese history, culture and language. On the other hand, we should consider Russia’s course towards the internationalization of education, which has been obvious in recent decades, and the entry of Far Eastern universities into the international educational space. This process has expanded the opportunities for Chinese young people to receive higher education in Russia, and for the Russians to learn in China, including through student exchange programs.

Attracting people of all ages and population segments to study Chinese, the Confucius Institutes play an important role in strengthening business, cultural and educational ties. At the same time, the more active the Institutes have been promoted in Russia, the more accusations have been heard about the transaction of these organizations’ soft power into hard power, allowing China to implement strategic goals in spheres that stand far away from culture and education. These issues are of particular relevance in the Russian Far East, given the close proximity to China, the significant length of the Russian-Chinese border, and the critical demographic situation in the region. The Russian-speaking population of the Russian Far East have been steadily declining, while the Chinese one, on the contrary, have had tendency to increase. In writing this article, the authors set themselves the task of finding out whether the accusations against the Confucius Institute are justified and what can be done to counter them.

 Research Materials and Methods

The Confucius Institutes’ functions and operations have been described in quite a number of articles by researchers from Russia (Budaev, 2016; Byankin, 2014; Gurulyova, 2020; Mikhalev, 2017; Morozova, 2017; Samoilova & Lobanova, 2017; Selezneva, 2021) and other countries (Liu, 2009; Callahan, 2008; Hong, Qiu & Lin, 2013; Li, 2011; Wong, 2018). The bibliography reflects both the educational activities of these organizations and their role as a soft power instrument in international relations. Providing details of the Confucius Institutes’ founding and functioning, the authors link their activities to changes in Chinese politics and conclude on the important role of the country’s cultural influence in the international arena.

Despite the researchers’ great interest in these issues, the Russian Far East remains insufficiently studied in this regard. In addition, most of the articles are descriptive in nature, and only a few are tracing the idea of the ‘hardness’ and duality of Chinese educational soft power, as well as how China can use it to solve problems that are far away from developing cultural and educational cooperation. These points are especially important for the Far Eastern Federal District, since a fifth part of all Confucius Institutes in Russia operate on this territory. This prompted us to undertake a further examination of the topic, with a view to analyzing recent developments.

The authors understand soft power as a tool for implementing China’s foreign policy course in the 21st century. This is the main methodological position on which the study is based. Analyzing the Confucius Institutes functioning in accordance with this concept required the use of various methods, both of political science (typological and expert assessment) and historical ones (comparative, problem-historical, situational). The article is based on the information from the official website of the Center for Language Education and Cooperation (Hanban), Chinese and Russian periodicals, including the Internet sources, scientific publications of Russian and foreign researchers, as well as the authors’ empirical observations during their field research.

Confucius Institutes: Soft Power of Culture and Education

The idea of soft power has long been used by humanity, although it only received theoretical justification at the end of the 20th century in the publications of Joseph S. Nye, Jr., who saw it as a means of achieving success in the world politics (Nye, 2004; 2011). In contrast to hard power, which encompasses military operations, economic development, scientific and technological progress, soft power implies creating an attractive image of the country through spiritual values, such as language, culture, ideology, and public diplomacy.

J. Nye’s theory found a particular resonance in China, where ideologists found his ideas similar to Confucian teachings, in particular, about the close relationship between human upbringing and building a harmonious state (Wu, 2018; Li & Chen, 2019; Zhang Xiaoming, 2005; Zhang Guozuo, 2014; Zhang Xiping, 2007). Although Nye has not given specific instructions on how exactly soft power should operate and, moreover, his theory has got some critics, including Chinese ones (Mikhalev, 2017; Callahan, 2008; Wang & Lu, 2008), his books have been published in China, and the ideas have been used in shaping the country’s political course in the 21st century. Its most important component was the propagation of the Chinese language and cultural heritage throughout the world.

China initiated popularizing its language and culture abroad back in 1987, with the establishment of the Hanban Office under the State Council and the opening of Chinese cultural centres in various countries. But most vividly the soft power concept manifested itself after the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of China (2007), when the cultural and educational cooperation with other countries were identified among the critical components of the innovative development of the national culture. The goal was to enhance the role of Chinese culture in the world and to develop intercultural exchanges by borrowing the best world achievements in this field. The Confucius Institutes, which replaced the Chinese cultural centers, were identified as playing a pivotal role in these processes (Wu, 2018, p. 3).

The Russian Far East represents one of the first regions to fall under Hanban’s influence, as Chinese has long been popular here. Since the end of the 19th century, Chinese has been taught at the Men’s Secondary School and the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok. Subsequently, in 1920–1939, there was a Chinese department at the State Far Eastern University. After that, oriental departments were established in the Far Eastern State University and the Far Eastern State Technical V.V. Kuibyshev University (in 2011, they were merged into the Far Eastern Federal University, FEFU). The Chinese philology as a major is now also offered at Vladivostok State University and the universities of Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Blagoveshchensk, Chita, and Ulan-Ude. Moreover, Chinese as a second foreign language is studied by students of various majors in these and a number of other universities in the Far East. There are also a large number of specialized schools and Chinese language courses for children and adults in the region.

According to the Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in Vladivostok informs, the Far Eastern region ranks first in Russia for learning Chinese, surpassing both Moscow and St. Petersburg.² This could be one of the reasons to open the first Hanban institution in Russia, the Chinese Language Center, at the Far Eastern State University in 2000 (Se & Elantseva, 2019, p. 62) and carry out a large number of cultural events in the region in subsequent years (Pestsov, 2016, p. 145). The very first Confucius Institutes in Russia were also opened in the Far East: in Vladivostok (2006), Blagoveshchensk and Ulan-Ude (2007). The importance of the region for China is also evidenced by the fact that the 2009 meeting of the heads of all Confucius Institutes in the post-Soviet space was held at the Far Eastern State University in Vladivostok (Se & Elantseva, 2019, pp. 63–64).

Compared to Chinese cultural centers, the Confucius Institutes have significantly expanded their activities while fulfilling the mission of disseminating Chinese language and culture abroad (Liu, 2009; Hong, Qiu & Lin, 2013). However, the main function has remained the same — to develop educational programs and Chinese language learning worldwide. Chinese researchers consider this activity the most important part of the cultural soft power (Wang & Lu, 2008; Xu, 2012). They quote the Wall Street Journal, which praised the Chinese government’s strategy: “Encouraging language learning is the most effective way to expand a country’s influence and help deepen the outside world’s understanding of China” (Li, 2011, p. 38). Indeed, history knows multiple examples of language becoming an important component of international relations.

Educational programs, including the teaching of Chinese language and culture to anyone interested, preparation for Chinese language examinations at various levels, and the organization of study tours to China, are one of the five areas of work of the Confucius Institutes in the Far East region. Each regional Confucius Institute receives between 100 and 150 students of different ages each year, who can choose one of three levels of study, from basic to advanced. The total number of students ranges from 200 at the youngest Confucius Institute at the Amur Humanitarian Pedagogical University (Komsomolsk-on-Amur) to 900 at the largest one, at the Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok).³

The next Confucius Institutes’ goal is to help Chinese language teachers in Russian primary, secondary, and higher schools to improve their language teaching methods. Thus, centers for teachers’ advanced training have been created, and new textbooks and manuals have been developed, including multimedia ones. There are examples of Chinese and Russian educators’ mutual work at creating them. Research-oriented activities include supporting Chinese studies in the Russian Far East. Seminars, thematic roundtable talks, and conferences are being planned by each regional Confucius Institute. The largest and most meaningful event in this list is the annual Confucian Readings at the Far Eastern Federal University.

Competitions in Chinese and calligraphy, festivals, lectures, and concerts are included in the cultural and educational work plan. Much attention is paid to consulting activity, and special centers have been organized at the Confucius Institutes to provide information and reference literature to anyone whose business or other affairs are related to China, as well as to advise future applicants to Chinese universities (Se & Elantseva, 2019, pp. 62–63).

Over the past 15 years, the Far Eastern Confucius Institutes have played a leading role in developing Chinese education abroad. Having provided facilities to the population in learning Chinese and understanding Chinese culture, they succeeded in promoting cultural exchange between China and Russian Far Eastern cities. Such cooperation, as some Chinese researchers write, creates favorable external conditions for China’s peaceful development and fulfills the significant mission of implementing the country’s foreign cultural strategy (Liu, 2009, p. 150; Xu, 2012, p. 53).

At the same time, there are countries that don’t agree to work with Confucius Institutes, considering this project as a means of promoting China’s interests (Lekontseva, 2010, p. 30; Zavyalova, 2010, p. 58). Unlike similar organizations functioning abroad (British Council, German Goethe Institute, Spanish Cervantes Institute, French Alliance Française), Confucius Institutes are most often established in Russia as divisions of local higher-school institutions having friendly relations with Chinese universities. This is exactly the way all the Far Eastern Confucius Institutes have been founded as a result of inter-university cooperation. This has given the Chinese partners an advantage in legal procedures, such as accelerated registration, since all foreign cultural and information centers in Russia outside Moscow can only be established with the consent of the Russian government.⁴

At the same time, it should be noted that the Confucius Institutes, which occupy the territory of the Russian universities that provide them with teaching space and equipment, and have joint Russian-Chinese administrations, remain autonomous Chinese institutions with their own programs and policies. The educational literature that China provides through Confucius Institutes on a free or preferential basis to institutions teaching Chinese has been written in accordance with the official point of view. Thus, as researchers conclude, ideological influence is obvious (Mikhnevich, 2015, p. 96).

The press mentions the facts of undermining the academic freedom of partner universities by some Confucius Institutes, their engaging in industrial and military espionage, spying on Chinese students at Russian universities, and seeking to promote the Chinese Communist Party’s stance toward the Dalai Lama, Tibet, or Taiwanese independence.⁵ A number of authors focus on government funding of Confucius Institutes and therefore their complete dependence on the Chinese government (Lekontseva, 2010; Mikhalev, 2017; Callahan, 2008). These aspects have led to accusations towards a number of Confucius Institutes. In Novosibirsk and Blagoveshchensk, they were accused of violating Russian laws. In Yakutsk, the Institute was closed as allegedly promoting Chinese ideology and seeking economic expansion into Russian territory.⁶

Analyzing the situation in the Far Eastern Federal District we can identify three main aspects that confirm that the Confucius Institutes’ activities in the region have created certain advantages for China.

1. Soft power has contributed to China’s ‘peaceful’ expansion into the Far Eastern territory. The population outflow from the Russian Far East is well known, and this process has not abated for many years (Pestsov, 2016, p. 94), and if it does not stop, the issue of developing the region with the help of the Chinese neighbour may have arisen. Even today, almost all Far Eastern cities have some kind of Chinatowns, vast areas occupied by Chinese shops, restaurants, hairdressers, and workshops. Every spring, thousands of the Chinese are recruited to work in agriculture in Primorye and the Amur region, and thousands of hectares of agricultural land are leased to Chinese citizens.⁷

So far, the Far Eastern residents’ attitude towards the neighboring country remains wary. Citing population surveys, researchers call Chinese immigration the most pressing international threat to the Russian border (Pestsov, 2016, p. 144). As people become more and more familiar with Chinese cultural values with the help of Confucius Institutes, this wariness can gradually develop into trust, facilitating China's entry into the Russian Far East.

2. Confucius Institutes enhance the internationalization of Chinese higher education. Grant and exchange programs for free education in China are attracting talented young people from Russia. In the first decade of the 21st century, for example, saw about 17 thousand Russian students attending classes at Chinese universities (Bobylo & Sevastyanov, 2016, p. 77). The two pedagogical universities, in Komsomolsk-on-Amur and Blagoveshchensk, annually sent correspondingly 70 and up to a hundred students to China for long-term Chinese language courses and short-term internships and training before the coronavirus epidemic. Nowadays, when the border is open again, the student exchange is being gradually restoring.⁸

Some young people tend to stay abroad after their studies in China. The authors’ interviewing twenty Vladivostok State University (VVSU) students learning Chinese showed that they all positively assess the opportunity to continue their education in China. A half of the respondents would like to remain working there after studies. An example of one of the FEFU 2018 graduates, E. K., quite clearly explains this desire. Only two out of her eight classmates were able to find a job in Russia according their major, in the field of international economic activity, with a salary of up to 40 thousand rubles. In China they could earn 2–2.5 times more with their diploma.⁹ The students’ survey showed that they were looking forward to the final lifting of COVID-19 restrictions and the full opening of the Russian-Chinese border.

3. By spreading Chinese culture abroad, the Confucius Institutes promote the cultural development within their own country. As China pursues its dream of becoming a world power, it associates the peaceful achievement of this goal with the high level of national culture. According to some Chinese researchers, increasing the competitiveness in this sphere is an integral part of the county’s international cultural strategy (Liu, 2009, p. 150; Xu, 2012, p. 53). Chinese mass media are increasingly proposing to move away from traditional symbols (Chinese New Year, dragons, lantern festivals, lion dances, etc.) and more actively explore new directions by borrowing elements from other countries’ national cultures. As they write, contemporary Chinese culture should inherit the best traditional elements and combine them with international achievements.¹⁰ A good example of a cultural tandem is provided by Blagoveshchensk, where the annual Russian-Chinese culture and art festival supported by the local Confucius Institute has become a tradition. The 12th edition of the festival, in August 2022, took place even in the face of a pandemic.¹¹

Thus, the Chinese soft power of culture and education coexists with the hard power associated with economics and politics, allowing China to realize its strategic objectives. This is quite consistent with the characterization of soft power by J. Nye, who called it “the ability to get what you want through attraction, rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2004, p. 10). This thesis has been developed by Chinese researchers. Liu Zaiqi, for example, considers using soft power a wise strategy when the lack of hard power can be compensated for by increasing the ‘soft’ one. The weakening of soft power, he believes, will lead to a reduction in the total state power, even if the hard power is strong (Liu, 2009, p. 152). It is no coincidence that Chinese language and national cultural values being widely spread around the world gave birth to a new term — cultural trade — that well reflects the scope of Chinese cultural strategy. In this case, we can speak of soft power as a kind of ‘umbrella’ under which China intends to solve political and economic problems in the future.

In the summer of 2020, in response to the criticism, China undertook a structural reorganization of the Confucius Institute, explaining it by a number of problems that had emerged, such as a slowdown in the annual growth of the institutes, a shortage of teachers, a decrease in funding, and a mismatch between educational programs and the level of development of information systems. The Hanban office was renamed into the Center for Language Education and Cooperation. In parallel with it, the Chinese International Education Foundation was founded as a charitable organization by 27 leading Chinese universities.¹² The reform radically changed the affiliation of the Confucius Institutes: it became a non-state educational institution, receiving funding not from the government, but from Chinese and overseas universities, funded not by the government but by Chinese and overseas universities, which now play a major role in the management of the institutes. According to Zhao Lingshan, Vice Chairman and Secretary General of the Secretary General of the Foundation, the Confucius Institutes’ working mechanism will be improved since the international experience will be used, thus the quality of education will be enhanced. “The Foundation will help expand the Confucius Institutes’ platform, concentrate all resources, and achieve better development. Support for the Confucius Institutes abroad will become more diverse and streamlined,” he said.¹³

Without questioning these words, and recognizing the great assistance provided by the Confucius Institutes to lovers of Chinese language and culture around the world, we nevertheless suggest that the recent reforms do not change the essence of China’s use of cultural soft power. If promoting Chinese language and culture globally looks like an umbrella that helps China covers far-reaching plans, then the Confucius Institute’s reorganization is just an attempt to make this umbrella more durable and reliable. And yet, the example of the Russian Far East shows that the problem should be also viewed from the other side. “If Chinese influence in the Russian Far East is considered a threat, then it is growing,” says Doctor of Political Science, Chief Researcher at the Academic Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Peoples in the Far East S.K. Pestsov, “but the situation does not depend on China, it depends on us: the weaker we become, the more influence China gains.”¹⁴

Conclusion

The idea of soft power is very important today, when many countries choose a peaceful way in competition with rival countries, trying to attract the interest and sympathy of the world community. For any country, one of the major instruments of soft power is its cultural and educational institutions, such as the Chinese Confucius Institutes, which have been established in various countries since 2004 for teaching people the Chinese language and national culture. International language exchanges and cultural cooperation are undoubtedly an integral part of the future peaceful coexistence, and the role of soft power as a political tool will only grow from year to year. But when analyzing the pros and cons of the Confucius Institutes, it is important to consider the economic and political situation in the region where they are operating, otherwise these cultural and educational institutions cannot avoid the accusation of being a Trojan horse.

_{¹ There Are 550 Confucius Institutes in the World // RIA Novosti. December 10, 2019. (In Russian). URL: https://ria.ru/20191210/1562217842.html (accessed: 09.01.2023).}

_{² Stepanova E. Hieroglyph as a Priority. Why Do Far Easterners Learn Chinese? // East Russia. November 28, 2019. (In Russian). URL: https://www.eastrussia.ru/ material/ieroglif-v-prioritete/ (accessed: 08.02.2023).}

_{³ Authors’ field research materials (hereinafter referred to as AFRM).}

_{⁴ Regulations on The Procedure for The Establishment and Operating Conditions of Foreign Cultural and Information Centers on the Territory of the Russian Federation (Approved by Decree of the Russian Federation Government Resolution of July 24, 1995 No. 746; with Amendments and Additions of April 14, 2010) // Garant. (In Russian). URL: https://base.garant.ru/103816/#:~:text (accessed: 02.09.2023).}

_{⁵ What Is Hidden Under the “Cultural” Wrapper of Confucius Institutes? // Asia Russia Daily. October 2, 2014. URL: https://asiarussia.ru/articles/4494/ (accessed: 02.09.2023).}

_{⁶ NTDTV: The Confucius Institute in Blagoveshchensk May Be Shown the Door // InoTV. July 30, 2015. (In Russian). URL: https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2015-07-30/NTDTV-Institutu-Konfuciya-v-Blagoveshhenske (accessed: 18.02.2023).}

_{⁷ Melnikov M. A Million Hectares for the Chinese: Truth and Fiction, Benefits and Threats // Tsargrad. August 21, 2018. (In Russian). URL: https://tsargrad.tv/ articles/million-gektarov-dlja-kitajcev-pravda-i-domysly-vygody-i-ugrozy_153592 (accessed: 28.02.2023).}

_{⁸ AFRM.}

_{⁹ Stepanova E. Hieroglyph as a Priority. Why Do Far Easterners Learn Chinese? // East Russia. November 28, 2019. (In Russian). URL: https://www.eastrussia.ru/ material/ieroglif-v-prioritete/ (accessed: 08.02.2023).}

_{¹⁰ See: Ying Ni. How to Develop and Advance China’s Cultural Exports // China Daily. May 11, 2021. URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202105/11/WS609a32fca31024ad0babd39a.html (accessed: 12.02.2023); Zhao Ruinan. Chinese Culture That Goes Beyond Borders // China Daily. June 30, 2021. URL: https://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202106/30/WS60dbd7f9a3106abb319fb901.html (accessed: 12.02.2023).}

_{¹¹ Gumlevaya M. Russian-Chinese Culture and Art Fair Opened on Both Banks of the Amur // Vesti: Amur Region. June 22, 2021. (In Russian). URL: https://gtrkamur.ru/news/2021/06/22/168163 (accessed: 01.04.2022).}

_{¹² See: Quinn C. China: Confucius Institutes Get Rebrand // The Pie. July 9, 2020. URL: https://thepienews.com/confucius-institutes-rebrand/ (accessed: 09.02.2023); China Established a Center for Cooperation in Education // Rambler. July 5, 2020. (In Russian). URL: https://news.rambler.ru/education/ 44455544-kitay-uchredil-tsentr-po-sotrudnichestvu-v-oblasti-obucheniya-yazykam/?utm_content=news_media&utm_ medium=read_more&utm_source=copylink (accessed: 08.09.2023).}

_{¹³ Chinese International Education Foundation Holds the Fourth Meeting of Its First Council in Beijing // Chinese International Education Foundation. April 1, 2021. URL: https://www.cief.org.cn/newsinfo/1322206.html (accessed: 09.02.2023).}

_{¹⁴ Stepanova E. Hieroglyph as a Priority. Why Do Far Easterners Learn Chinese? // East Russia. November 28, 2019. (In Russian). URL: https://www.eastrussia.ru/ material/ieroglif-v-prioritete/ (accessed: 08.02.2023).}

About the authors

Natalia V. Khisamutdinova

Author for correspondence.
Email: natalya.khisamutdinova@vvsu.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-4536-2083
SPIN-code: 3324-0664

PhD, Dr. of Sc. (History), Professor of Cross-Cultural Communication Department, Institute of Pedagogy and Linguistics, Vladivostok State University: eLibrary SPIN-code: 3324-0664; ORCID: 0000-0003-4536-2083; e-mail: natalya.khisamutdinova@vvsu.ru

Yue Yang

Email: ian.iue1@dvfu.ru
independent researcher Harbin, China

References