‘Trumplomacy’ as a phenomenon of foreign policy decision-making

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Introduction: Historiography and Research Methodology

The peculiarities of political processes in the second decade of the 21st century have led to a variety of different forms and types of diplomacy. Specialized literature refers to such terms as ‘scientific diplomacy,’ ‘climate diplomacy,’ ‘digital diplomacy,’ and others (Reinhardt, 2020). “Diplomacy has long ceased to be the exclusive domain of foreign policy/diplomatic structures and diplomats ... who, within the framework of state institutions, professionally solve problems related to the implementation of the country’s foreign policy. Resolving the traditional foreign policy tasks of the state in the context of new conditions presupposes a certain rethinking of the functions of diplomacy and a significant expansion of the circle of participants in international communication. The diversity and multiplicity of political, economic, environmental, cultural, scientific, and other problems addressed in the international arena necessitates the urgent participation of representatives of business, culture, science, public figures, and non-governmental organizations in international negotiations and discussions” (Rusakovich, 2017).

This study examines the diplomacy of Donald Trump, or more precisely, his vision of diplomacy. Donald Trump, the 45th and 47th President of the United States, not only proposes an alternative concept of diplomacy but also actively implements it in practice.

 Both the first and, especially, the second Trump administrations are characterized by a personalized approach to foreign policy and attempts to move away from bureaucracy in diplomacy and decision-making. Trump demonstrates an intolerance for traditional procedures in foreign policy decision-making and is not inclined to use the standard mechanism of diplomacy. His leadership style resembles that of a family business, which values ​​loyalty and quick results over institutional norms. In other words, where traditional diplomacy implies multi-move combinations and complex political maneuvers calculated over the medium and long term, Trump tends to act “in one move” or “make a direct move.” Curiously, Trump “reveals” and even promotes this semantic model of conducting business in his own literary works. This approach is most clearly manifested in his works “The Art of the Deal” (Trump & Schwartz, 2010) and “Trump Never Gives Up,”^[1] published in 1987 and 2008, respectively.

Transactional diplomacy, which underlies Donald Trump’s foreign policy, stems from a business-oriented worldview that views international relations as a series of deals aimed at achieving immediate benefits. As I.V. Lyabukhov, a Senior Advisor to the Department for New Challenges and Threats at the Russian Foreign Ministry, has pointed out, this approach “reflects the notion of foreign policy as a competition for resources and influence, rather than as a system based on institutional commitments or ideological values” (Lyabukhov, 2025).

Thus, Donald Trump’s diplomatic practice appears to be based on two pillars. Theoretically, this is the phenomenon of transactional diplomacy, which is a specific form of international interaction based on the principles of exchanging concessions, similar to market or business practices. In this approach, diplomatic negotiations are interpreted as a pragmatic process of bargaining aimed at minimizing costs and maximizing specific benefits for each party. Politically and philosophically, Donald Trump’s diplomacy is based on the intellectual platform of neorealism. His foreign policy practice is guided by a ‘zero-sum game’ worldview, where external relations are threats, and economic nationalism is aimed at deals with relative gains. The president’s shift to informal channels and a small circle of trusted confidants imbues his decisions with a personal flavor and sets a high pace, but weakens the mechanisms that should support the White House’s long-term achievements. His “quick deal” diplomacy (which is, essentially pressure diplomacy) is successful only if the opposing side has fundamental and practical support. Otherwise, the White House’s seemingly “tough stance” fails to translate into practical results or even sustainable diplomatic strategies. A clear example of this is the course set by Donald Trump regarding the ‘absorption’ of Canada and the annexation of Greenland, which relatively quickly lost its foreign policy priority in the White House as the vectors of the international agenda shifted.

In conducting the study, the authors utilized a wide range of methods from both historical and political sciences. The former includes the historical-analytical method, the comparative historical method, and the retrospective method. The latter group of methods includes systemic, behavioral, normative-value, and sociological methods.

The authors see the key goal of the study as identifying the characteristics and providing an academic understanding of the fundamentally new diplomatic practices employed by Donald Trump within the framework of US foreign policy. The authors propose a definition of ‘Trumplomacy’ that synthesizes both theoretical approaches to the US President’s foreign policy work and an analysis of the practical results of this work, which already exist in sufficient quantity in different regions of the world.

Based on the academic goal, the authors have set practical research objectives, including a study of the personality of the 45th and 47th US presidents, an analysis of D. Trump’s foreign policy program,^[2] and a study of the impact of ‘Trumplomacy’ on the global agenda through the prism of regions.

An analysis of Trump’s personal characteristics is reflected in a study by A. Gromov (2025). In it, the author offers a retrospective assessment of the formation of the US president’s behavioral model through the history of three generations of his family, which has evolved from emigrants to the family of a billionaire and president.

A psychological portrait of Trump is convincingly presented in the work of E.A. Popova, in which the author examines the speech strategies in the political discourse of US presidential candidates Trump and Kamala Harris during the 2024 election campaign (Popova & Ivanova, 2024). Vietnamese political technology researcher T. Nguyen analyzes the linguistic characteristics of the US president in both his inaugural addresses (Nguyen, 2025). Russian researcher V.E. Kosyakov identifies political cynicism as a factor in the success of Trump’s election campaign during his first term (Kosyakov, 2022). The primary analysis of D. Trump’s personality has also been carried out by R.R. Gasymova and N.V. Podkovyrina (Gasymova & Podkovyrina, 2018).

Turning to the political portrait of the 45th and 47th US presidents, we would like to mention N.S. Latypova’s study on the history of emergency powers held by US presidents since the founding of the country until the end of Donald Trump’s first presidential term (Latypova, 2021). American political scientist S. Milkis examined the influence of Donald Trump’s personality on the US domestic political landscape, raising the complex issue of the US president’s interaction with the so-called ‘deep state’ (Milkis, 2025). Russian researcher N. Klyukin offers an analysis of Donald Trump’s foreign policy toolkit, developed during his first term (Klyukin, 2020). The US President’s diplomatic practice in the foreign policy arena has been academically reflected in the studies of S. Fitzsimmons (2022), M. Alserda (2025), J. Lin (2025), and D. Allin (2024), among others.  A comprehensive assessment of D. Trump’s political role, which developed during his first presidential term, is provided in a collective monograph edited by V.N. Garbuzov, a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and co-authors (Garbuzov, Zolotarev & Supyan, 2025).

Finally, the regional dimension of D. Trump’s diplomacy is explored in the works of Russian researchers P.P. Yakovlev (2025), N.O. Yudin (Yudin & Iwersen, 2025) and international authors E. Spencer (2025), M. Shahbaz (Shahbaz, Mustafa & Liaqat, 2024), P. Kuranchie (2024) and F. Grzegorzewski (2022).

Big Business in International Relations

Globalization has become a dominant factor in global political development, extending far beyond the economic sphere. This process has fostered the emergence of new powerful actors on the international stage, among which transnational corporations (TNCs) occupy a prominent place. Today, they have become independent actors in international relations, actively engaging in global processes, while globalization itself is developing under the control of a limited number of super-powerful corporations (Stanis & Kurylev, 2018).

In today’s world, the concentration of power has reached an unprecedented level. The largest technology corporations, the so-called ‘Big Tech’ (Alphabet, Meta,^[3] Amazon, Apple), exceed the gross domestic product (GDP) of many nation-states in terms of market capitalization and influence. Their digital platforms are shaping new global public spheres, rules of interaction, and information flows, effectively creating their own regulatory environment.

The expansion of TNCs has been particularly significant in recent decades. As non-state entities, they exert growing influence not only on the economy but also on political, military, information, scientific, technological, and environmental matters. In the technological realm, TNCs have become the main drivers of the race for leadership in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology, which directly impacts national security and economic sovereignty (Kurylev et al., 2017).

In the international political realm, TNCs have become both instruments and battlefields in the confrontation between great powers, particularly the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Sanctions wars demonstrate how corporations are forced to choose sides, and their global supply chains are becoming vulnerable. In the environmental sphere, under pressure from investors and society, oil, gas, and technology giants are assuming a role traditionally associated with intergovernmental organizations, declaring goals to achieve carbon neutrality (Stanis & Kurylev, 2020).

A distinctive feature of the current era is that some TNCs have begun to pursue their own “foreign policies,” independent of the official positions of their countries. A prominent example is Western companies continuing to operate in Russia after the start of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine, or, conversely, curtailing their operations under public pressure, de facto shaping the economic conditions of the conflict. 

The methods of political influence of TNCs have also evolved over time. Traditional lobbying has been supplemented by direct financing of election campaigns through Super PACs in the US, the creation of think tanks promoting narratives favored by corporations, digital lobbying, and influence through social media. CEOs of companies like Tesla or BP now often act as unofficial diplomats whose statements on international issues can have a greater impact on markets than official government communiqués.

Research confirms the increasing concentration of corporate power. In 2011, researchers at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology identified the existence of a “supergroup” of 147 companies controlling 40% of global capital.^[4] In the 2020s, this trend has only intensified: the dominance of “superstar” corporations, particularly in the IT sector, continues to grow, creating an unprecedented asymmetry between a handful of giants and the rest of the market, including entire countries.

Among all TNCs, American corporations play a leading role in global political processes, and the United States itself represents the most striking example of the integration of big business into government. This has been particularly evident in the Trump presidency, where the boundaries between state interests and private businesses have become significantly blurred.

Donald Trump: Businessman and Politician

In the modern context, the phenomenon of merging business and government in the United States has gone far beyond traditional lobbying. Today it is manifested in the direct transition of top executives and founders of corporations into key government positions (as seen in the Trump and Biden administrations), in unprecedented amounts of corporate spending on election campaigns after the decision of the non-profit organization Citizens United against the Federal Election Commission (FEC), as well as in the growing political activism of big business on issues relating to climate policy, social equality and voting rights.

However, the American experience is much broader and not limited to these examples. In Table presents some US political and government figures over the last 25–30 years and the business structures affiliated with them at different times.

As even this partial list demonstrates, the representation of big American business at various levels of power in the United States is more than impressive, and current President Donald Trump is not its first representative as head of state. However, in our study, we will focus specifically on him, as he is the only one to have successfully transitioned directly from the chair of a major campaign to the presidency. George Bush Sr. had a considerable distance between leading a company and the Oval Office, while Robert Perot and Michael Romney failed to “get there” at all, despite running for president, Perot even twice. Like George Bush Sr., Romney already had extensive political experience by the time he decided to run for president in 2012.

The Trump phenomenon represents a new model of interaction between business and government, characterized by an unprecedented blurring of the boundaries between the interests of the state and private business. This has been seen in the use of Trump-owned resorts for official events, the appointment of family members to key positions, and the active promotion of his personal brand, which sparked numerous ethical controversies and lawsuits.

Trump’s historical predecessor as a businessman-politician was Robert Perot, who gained a record 19% of the vote in 1992, demonstrating the existence of a strong protest electorate feeling betrayed by globalization and the political establishment. However, the key difference lay in his media strategy and political approach: while Perot relied on television talk shows and the creation of a third party, Trump effectively used social media to communicate directly with voters, which allowed him not only to mobilize the protest electorate but also to “capture” the Republican Party, turning it into an instrument of his political will (Lin, 2025).

Connections between US Government Officials and Business Structures

Name	Job Title	Corporation
Donald Trump	President of the United States (2017–2021, 2025–present)	Trump Organization
George Bush Sr.	President of the United States (1989–1993)	Zapata Corporation, Zapata Offshore Company
Richard Cheney	Vice President of the United States (2001–2009) US Secretary of Defense (1989–1993)	Halliburton, Procter & Gamble, Union Pacific, Electronic Data Systems
Condoleezza Rice	US Secretary of State (2005–2009)	Charles Schwab Corporation, the Chevron Corporation, Hewlett Packard, the Transamerica Corporation
Rex Tillerson	US Secretary of State (2017–2018)	Exxon Mobil
George Shultz	Secretary of State from 1982 to 1989 during the Reagan administration	President of Bechtel Corporation
Donald Rumsfeld	US Secretary of Defense (1975–1977, 2001–2006)	G.D. Searle & Company, General Instrument Corporation, Gilead Sciences
Charles Ervin Wilson	US Secretary of Defense in 1953–1957 during the Eisenhower administration	President and Chief Executive Officer, General Motors
Penny Pritzker	Secretary of Commerce from 2013 to 2017 under President Barack Obama	Founder of finance and real estate companies PSP Partners, PSP Capital Partners, and Pritzker Realty Group, co-founder of Artemis Real Estate Partners and Inspired Capital
Donald Regan	Secretary of the Treasury from 1981 to 1985, White House Chief of Staff from 1985 to 1987 during the Reagan administration	Chairman and CEO of Merrill Lynch
Peter George Peterson	U.S. Secretary of Commerce from 2023 to 2025 under the Biden Administration	Chairman and CEO of Lehman Brothers
Jeff Zients	White House Chief of Staff from 1985 to 1987 during the Reagan administration	Chief Operating Officer (1996–1998), Chief Executive Officer (1998–2000), Chairman of the Board of Directors (2001–2004) of the Advisory Board, Chairman of the Board of Directors (2000–2001) of the Corporate Executive Board
Mitt Romney	US Presidential candidate in 2012 U.S. Senator from Utah (since 2019)	Bain Capital
Ross Perot	Candidate for US President in 1992 and 1996	Perot Systems
Michael Bloomberg	Mayor of New York City (2002–2013)	Bloomberg L.P.

 Source: compiled by K. P. Kurylev, D. V. Stanis, N. P. Parkhitko and I. S. Pyatibratov.

Donald Trump’s political development has gone through several stages (Stanis & Kurylev, 2020). His first experience with Robert Perot’s “Reform Party” in 2000 ended in failure, but it served as a valuable lesson, demonstrating the dead end of creating a third party in the American political system. His subsequent “Birtherism,”^[5] campaign, during which he challenged the legitimacy of Barack Obama’s presidency, while widely condemned, allowed him to cement his image as a defender of “real America” ​and win the trust of the Republican Party’s ultra-conservative base.

R. Perot’s  2016 election strategy was revolutionary due to its innovative combination of three factors: the use of social media to directly communicate with voters, bypassing traditional media, the use of Big Data and microtargeting for personalized campaigning, and a focus on the issues of the “rust belt” and the “forgotten man,” which revealed deep socio-economic problems of deindustrialization and inequality that had been ignored by the political establishment for decades (Latypova, 2021).

The paradox of Donald Trump’s 2016 election victory, when he received a majority of the Electoral College votes but lost the popular vote by nearly 3 million, exposed the deep divides in American society and the vulnerability of the electoral system. His subsequent defeat in 2020 and spectacular return to the White House in 2025 proved the resilience of the political model he created. This model, based on a direct connection to the “voting base” and a confrontation with the “Washington swamp,” was tested by numerous legal challenges and ultimately led to his triumphant return to the White House in 2025, making him the 47th president of the United States.

Trump’s Behavioral Style

Donald Trump’s style, which has once again become the defining style of the White House since January 2025, can still be described as eccentric, idiosyncratic, and unique, but no single definition is exhaustive. This style seems woven from contradictions, intertwined into a script understood only by the head of the White House and under his control. His staff and partners ascribe diametrically opposed qualities to him: he loves a clear schedule but acts impulsively, thinks in global terms but immerses himself in the smallest details, values ​​competition but acts as the absolute master of the situation (Gromov, 2025).

His first term as president (2017–2021) was the practical embodiment of this style, characterized by a constant personnel shuffle, governance via Twitter (now X^[6]), and the creation of an atmosphere of “permanent scandal” (Kosyakov, 2022). After leaving the White House and during his second election campaign in 2024, these traits only intensified. Despite the unprecedented burden of simultaneously running an election campaign and facing numerous legal proceedings, Donald Trump’s phenomenal work ethic and resilience only reinforced his image as an “unwavering fighter” among his supporters. This ability to maintain a busy schedule, juggling presidential duties with personal legal battles, continued after his inauguration in 2025.

The paradox of Donald Trump’s leadership style is that his impulsiveness and penchant for micromanagement, whether approving Christmas decorations in Trump Tower in the past or lighting details in the Oval Office today, are combined with exceptional strategic acumen (Nguyen, 2025). He accurately captures and articulates the deepest fears and hopes of his voter base regarding immigration, deindustrialization, and culture wars. It was this ability, rather than adherence to party doctrine, that has allowed him not only to mobilize a multimillion-strong movement but also to completely reshape the Republican Party, transforming it into the “party of Trump.”

A previous analysis of his personality profile (Gasymova & Podkovyrina, 2018) remains strikingly relevant at the time of writing. The dominant traits of ambition, fearlessness, dynamism, and narcissism continue to define his presidency. The events following the 2020 election and the storming of the Capitol on January 6, 2021, demonstrate the extreme manifestation of these qualities, demonstrating that his “thirst for power” and unwillingness to admit defeat could directly threaten the political stability of the United States. Now, having returned to power, he uses the same rhetoric, but from a position of strength, systematically portraying past and current prosecutions as politically motivated attacks by the ‘deep state,’ which invariably resonates with his supporters (Kuranchie, 2024).

 “The ruling political class in the United States has managed to so disappoint both Americans and citizens of other countries that the very expression of a willingness to start ‘doing things differently’ inspires a certain optimism. The shakeup he has inflicted on the US political Olympus will force both the establishment and the opposition to genuinely change their approaches and the rules of the game that have been established for decades, albeit not as radically as D. Trump proposes” (Drobnitski, 2016).

This statement, made in 2016, now sounds not just prophetic, but like a fait accompli. The “shakeup” has been so profound that it has led to a fundamental transformation of the Republican Party, which is now, in essence, the “party of Trump.” His political style—confrontational, populist, and based on personal loyalty—has become the new norm for a significant portion of the American political landscape. The outcome of the 2024 elections and Trump’s return to the White House have proven that the ‘Trump phenomenon’ and the societal divide he embodies and skillfully manages are not a temporary aberration, but a persistent and defining reality of American politics for years to come. Trump is not just a representative of the “new populism” that, unexpectedly for most supporters of liberal democracy and unbridled globalization, is gaining momentum in many countries around the world. Donald Trump’s proclaimed slogan of restoring the United States’ undisputed leadership rests on a whole set of entirely pragmatic ideas. This makes Donald Trump’s personality all the more intriguing— a flamboyant and unconventional politician who, despite being a businessman poorly integrated into the US political establishment, managed to win the 2016 presidential election (Kuznetsov, 2020), lose the subsequent election, and return to the White House four years later.

Trump’s Foreign Policy Doctrine

Donald Trump’s foreign policy doctrine, shaped during his first presidential term and solidified after his return to the White House in 2025, represents a consistent and evolving implementation of the “America First” principle. This course not only radically broke with the post-war tradition of American foreign policy, but also significantly diverged from the official agenda of the Republican Party. As Bloomberg foreign policy commentator James Rogin^[7] has aptly noted, citing Trump’s former adviser, Stephen Nunberg, the current US president’s doctrine can be called “Reaganite realpolitik”— a policy free from ideological dogma and adapting to changing circumstances. A key difference was the refusal to include such liberal values ​​as democracy promotion, humanitarian intervention, and the protection of human rights abroad in the category of “national interest.” According to S. Nunberg, D. Trump “does not think that the United States should pay in blood or money for attempts to change the system in other countries” (Klyukin, 2020).

In practice, this manifested itself in a series of abrupt steps during his first term to dismantle multilateral structures: withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Paris Climate Agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear deal, and the World Health Organization. Protectionism became the cornerstone of his economic policy, culminating in large-scale trade wars with China and his allies in the European Union (EU), where Trump prioritized bilateral deals. His direct, undiplomatic negotiating style and reliance on personal relationships with leaders like Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un shocked the traditional establishment but found enthusiastic support among his base, tired of foreign adventures. A unique feature of  his diplomatic style—‘Trumplomacy’—was strategic unpredictability, based on the personal factor and using chaotic rhetoric as an instrument of pressure and replacing the traditional mechanisms of classical diplomacy.

After winning the 2024 presidential election and returning to power in 2025, Donald Trump transformed this revolutionary approach into a more systemic and rigorous “America First 2.0” strategy (Allin, 2024). Pointed trade conflicts were replaced by a policy of accelerated deglobalization, marked by the introduction of universal basic tariffs on all imports. The confrontation with China has finally turned into a total strategic and technological confrontation. Relations with traditional allies were redefined through the lens of “conditional Atlanticism”: commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was made directly dependent on immediate and tangible material contributions from partners.

Thus, the evolution of the Trump doctrine from the first to the second term marks a shift from shocking deconstruction to the purposeful construction of a new international architecture based solely on tough pragmatism and economic nationalism (Fitzsimmons, 2022). If initially “America First” was a challenge to the global status quo, then by 2025 it has turned into a systemic force, redefining the rules of the game and consolidating the US refusal to play the role of guarantor of the liberal world order.

‘Trumplomacy’ as Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Style

‘Trumplomacy,’ which emerged during Donald Trump’s first presidential term, has evolved from a set of provocative tactics into a more structured, but equally radical, foreign policy strategy. Its theoretical foundation is transactional nationalism 2.0, where the original “America First” concept is not only retained but taken to its logical conclusion. In practice, this is reflected in a more systemic approach to strategic ‘decoupling’ and ‘de-risking’ in relations with China, as well as a commitment to forcibly transforming international organizations to align with narrow US interests or withdrawing from those structures that are not amenable to such revision.

This philosophy is directly linked to another key principle: the consistent unilateralism and rejection of multilateral restrictions. In this paradigm, key decisions are to be made exclusively in Washington, and international institutions are viewed not as venues for compromise but as instruments for legitimizing decisions already made by the United States, leading to further dismantling of the current global governance system. What makes ‘Trumplomacy’ unique is the hybrid unpredictability that has become its signature style. This consists of a combination of confrontational public rhetoric, broadcast through the Truth Social platform, with closed, pragmatic negotiations (Spencer, 2025). This deliberate creation of such “strategic turbulence,” according to the Trump administration, allows it to maintain the initiative and keep opponents in a state of uncertainty (Popova & Ivanova, 2024).

All these elements are crowned by the principle of the ultimate de-ideologization of foreign policy, combined with an attempt to distance itself from the influence of ‘deep state’ (Milkis, 2025). Donald Trump’s second term was marked by a deepening of pragmatic, morally unbiased cooperation with autocratic regimes, where human rights and democratic norms were openly declared secondary to the immediate interests of national security and economic gain for the United States. Taken together, these principles form a coherent, albeit confrontational, doctrine that redefines the role of the United States in the world, prioritizing not its values-based global leadership, but its power dominance, based on pure pragmatism. Moreover, although the entire world has traditionally been included within the scope of US foreign policy interests, certain regions seem to be of greater priority to the current US president than others. Thus, the African direction of US foreign policy today can, with a certain degree of conventionality, be called secondary (although Trump’s hostile statements toward Nigeria in late October 2025 and his refusal to attend the G20 Forum in South Africa under the pretext of “communist tyranny” in that country^[8] do not allow us to classify this region as “peripheral”). Leaving aside the hostile rhetoric toward Venezuela and vague discussions about “declaring war on drug cartels,” the Latin American region can also be largely classified as a “secondary priority.” However, since the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has traditionally perceived this region as its own “backyard,” making only occasional situational exceptions to this rule (Yakovlev, 2025).

Let’s take a look at the practical implementation of Donald Trump’s foreign policy program in the regional context.

The People’s Republic of China

Donald Trump’s policy toward China represents the most consistent and systematic embodiment of the principles of ‘Trumplomacy’ in the context of a new paradigm in US—China relations through a combination of trade wars, technological containment, and strategic rivalry (Alserda, 2025). His approach, based on direct pressure tactics and rejection of multilateral mechanisms, has led to a fundamental reconsideration of the foundations of interaction between the two powers. Notably, this is evident in both the first and second terms of his presidency. Relations with China are the primary target of ‘Trumplomacy,’ which is also the focus of US measures aimed at third countries.

The initial and most visible manifestation of this policy was the trade war that was unleashed in 2018. Trump imposed successive waves of tariffs on Chinese goods valued at over USD 500 billion, citing the need to combat unfair trade practices, forced technology transfers, and systemic intellectual property rights violations. Unlike previous administrations, which had attempted to resolve disputes through dialogue within the World Trade Organization (WTO), Trump opted for unilateral coercion, using economic pressure as leverage to extract specific concessions from Beijing.^[9] The result of these actions was the first trade agreement of January 2020, which, however, did not resolve the underlying systemic bilateral contradictions, but only recorded China’s commitment to increase purchases of American goods.^[10]

A key aspect of US—China interaction under D. Trump has become the trade war, which the American leader explains as a need to create an international market that is fair to the U.S.^[11] To achieve this goal, Trump first imposed tariffs of 10%, then 20%, and ultimately threatened a 125% tariff on China. The 10% tariff on all imports from China took effect on February 4, 2025. On February 27th, Trump announced an increase in tariffs by another 10% for March 4th, a decision that has already been implemented. Then, as the bilateral standoff escalated, the tariffs reached 145%, but on June 11th, 2025, the US President announced a trade agreement with China that would leave in place the existing 20% ​​tariffs and 10% “reciprocal” tariffs (for a total of 30%), while suspending the higher tariffs for 60 days. On August 11th, President Trump announced that the increase in the reciprocal tariff to 125% would be suspended for another 90 days.^[12] China, for its part, responded by restricting the supply of rare earth metals to the United States, which are a crucial resource for both the IT and defense industries.^[13]

At the same time, China is much less dependent on the US in relative terms: American exports account for about 2.5% of China’s GDP. Nevertheless, in 2024, the US was the largest buyer of Chinese products, and high tariffs risk harming both economies. However, the damage to China could be mitigated by the fact that China is simultaneously expanding trade with the rest of the world and is in many ways less vulnerable to bilateral trade disruptions than the US.^[14] The tariffs themselves pose a macroeconomic risk to the global economy, given the unstable position of the United States.^[15] If the mistakes of ‘Trumplomacy’ lead to a recession in the United States, it could have negative consequences for the entire global economy.

At the discourse level, Donald Trump has elevated China to the status of a major threat to the US national security,^[16] exerting pressure on China not only directly, but also through other countries. For example, one of the conditions for imposing American sanctions against Russia was the imposition of European sanctions on China. At the same time, Trump himself is somewhat contradicting his own rhetoric by actively pursuing a possible comprehensive deal with China, thereby sending mixed signals: China is simultaneously an enemy and an important element of the international economic and political systems.

As a result, the measures described, despite their obvious targeting of China, have only strengthened the latter’s influence on the international stage. While the United States was previously a country with which China valued maintaining cultural and diplomatic ties, these relations have now shifted to a purely transactional nature, removing any need for Beijing to seek Washington’s approval. By minimizing international relations to bilateral deals, Trump has created a situation in which key US opponents no longer need Washington to restrain their own ambitions.

At the same time, the Trump administration launched an unprecedented technology war aimed at curbing the growth of Chinese high-tech companies. Central to this strategy was a global campaign against Huawei, including its inclusion on the US Commerce Department’s ‘blacklist’ and lobbying to ban the use of its equipment by US allies under the pretext of national security threats. Similar restrictions were extended to other Chinese tech companies, such as ZTE, TikTok, and WeChat, demonstrating a commitment to strategic ‘tech decoupling’ and protecting US leadership in critical sectors, including artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

Trump’s China strategy has also influenced the perception of third countries, such as India, which, despite all the difficulties in interacting with China, are increasingly gravitating toward Beijing. By imposing punitive tariffs and confrontational rhetoric on both friends and foes, the US has undermined the trust of its partners, whose cooperation is critical for effectively countering China. This has had the unintended effect of making China appear more reasonable on the global stage, positioning itself as a proponent of multilateralism, as opposed to its ‘Trumplomacy’ stance.

The foreign policy aspect of ‘Trumplomacy’ toward China was characterized by a shift in emphasis from the regional to the global dimension of rivalry. The Trump administration openly challenged the Belt and Road Initiative, accusing China of creating “debt traps” for developing countries, and also stepped up engagement with Taiwan, approving arms sales and sending high-ranking officials to the island, which provoked a sharp reaction from Beijing and contributed to the escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait (Grzegorzewski, 2022).

Although Trump’s rhetoric and methods have been criticized for their unpredictability and propensity for escalation, his administration succeeded in consolidating a bipartisan consensus in Washington on the need for a tougher line toward China. The course toward strategic competition, first clearly articulated under Donald Trump, has become the new norm for American foreign policy, continuing to define the US approach even after his return to the White House in 2025, where pragmatic calculations and the language of sanctions continue to dominate diplomatic interactions.

It appears that tariffs will not only be maintained, but also become more universalized. The focus will shift to complete technological decoupling, restrictions on American investment in China, and increased pressure on allies to join the sanctions regime. This could significantly increase the risk of direct conflict over Taiwan.

India

Trump’s India policy is a unique example of combining strict economic protectionism with a strategic partnership based on a shared interest in containing China. This dualism became even more pronounced after Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, when India became firmly established as a key element of Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

From the very beginning of his first term, Trump criticized the US trade deficit with India, calling it “unfair.” In 2019, his administration eliminated Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits for Indian exports, affecting goods worth approximately USD 6 billion. Trump has also repeatedly complained about India’s “high tariffs” on US goods, particularly Harley-Davidson motorcycles (Shahbaz, Mustafa & Liaqat, 2024). In 2025, these tensions escalated: the Trump administration imposed targeted tariffs on Indian IT services and pharmaceuticals, citing the need to protect American jobs and intellectual property. At the same time, Washington increased pressure on India for market access, threatening additional trade restrictions.^[17]

In the US—China standoff, India has become the country that has demonstrated the perniciousness of ‘Trumplomacy’ for the US itself. Traditionally, India has been viewed as an important geopolitical ally of the US in the region, a key counterweight to China. However, Donald Trump, whose primary motivation is to balance the trade balance, has managed to damage US-Indian relations by imposing a series of restrictive measures.

The US tariffs on India have reached 50%, ultimately outstripping even the restrictions imposed on China. The impetus was India’s purchases of Russian crude oil. These tariffs could reduce India’s exports to the US by nearly 52% in the medium term and reduce gross domestic product by 0.9%. Moreover, these tariff measures are significantly damaging the policies of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has placed significant emphasis on the textile industry, which has been particularly affected by Trump’s measures. Some small factories that exclusively export to the US have already closed.^[18]

At the same time, Trump has been pressuring India, demanding access to politically sensitive sectors of the country’s economy, such as agriculture. In exchange, Trump offers little more than a reduction in economic pressure.^[19] In this sense, one can trace the similarity of ‘Trumplomacy’ with the Chinese philosophy of Legalism, in which reward is the absence of punishment.

India’s relations with Russia remained a significant stumbling block. In 2025, the Trump administration tightened enforcement of CAATSA,^[20] imposing sanctions on Indian companies cooperating with the Russian defense sector. This created tension in the relationship, as India has historically relied on Russian arms.

Energy cooperation has also become an area of ​​contention: the Indian side, responding to Washington’s demands to reduce imports of Russian oil, has stated that this is only possible if American restrictions on oil purchases from Iran and Venezuela are lifted or relaxed.^[21]

However, Trump doesn’t limit himself to economic measures alone, actively downplaying India in his rhetoric and resorting to outright insults. Specifically, the US president called India’s economy “dead.”^[22] This assessment, however, is far from the truth, as the Indian economy is growing faster than even China, which Trump hasn’t described in that way.^[23]

‘Trumplomacy’ has become a real challenge for India, which has long enjoyed its position as an important international political broker, maintaining working relations with the United States, the European Union, and Russia simultaneously. However, Trump has deprived India of this ability to maintain balance by demanding unconditional loyalty.

However, the effect was likely unexpected for Washington: India moved toward rapprochement with China, a country with which the Modi government has always had difficult relations and which, as noted, is portrayed by Donald Trump as the greatest threat to the United States. A striking symbol of this rapprochement was the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Beijing and his participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, where Russia was also a major participant.^[24] Thus, Donald Trump’s actions have led to a significant regional partner of the United States moving closer to countries that are themselves under pressure from Washington.

Furthermore, a shift in domestic political sentiment can be observed in India. In particular, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has actively promoted the idea of ​​a “Self-Reliant India,” which extends not only to trade but also to defense, energy, and innovation.^[25]

Despite economic differences, the strategic partnership between the two countries has strengthened significantly. Donald Trump publicly supported India’s tough line against China following border clashes in Ladakh. In 2025, the administration strengthened military cooperation within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), facilitated the supply of advanced weapons, including fighter jets and air defense systems, and conducted joint military exercises in the Indian Ocean. Cooperation in technology has become particularly important: the US provided India with access to critical semiconductor technology and jointly developed alternatives to Chinese telecommunications infrastructure.^[26]

At the time of writing, the US—India relationship is exhibiting a paradoxical dynamic: the strategic partnership has reached an unprecedented level, while economic tensions persist. ‘Trumplomacy’ toward India has proven effective in the military-strategic sphere, but has proven limited in resolving trade and economic issues. The future of the relationship will depend on the two sides’ ability to balance strategic interests and economic differences amid growing global rivalry with China.

Ukraine

Donald Trump’s policy toward the Ukrainian conflict shaped a radically new approach, based on the principle of “America First” and a consistent rejection of Washington’s traditional role as the guarantor of European security. After returning to the White House in 2025, this course crystallized into a concrete strategy, combining elements of pragmatism, direct pressure, and a fundamental reconsideration of US international commitments.

Hopes for a transformation of the situation around Ukraine and the beginning of a peace negotiation process were sometimes linked by observers to the possible arrival of a Republican leader in the White House, whose position, amidst a sharp standoff with American Democrats and US globalist elites, indicated an intention to quickly resolve the conflict (Gushchin, 2025).

From the beginning of its second term, the Trump administration started implementing its campaign promise to “end the endless war,” which resulted in freezing of new military aid packages to Kiev and the reduction of existing support. The White House’s public rhetoric emphasized the need to “stop the bloodshed at any cost,” accompanied by demands that European allies cover costs and shoulder the bulk of the financial burden. This approach was reinforced by systematic pressure on Ukraine to force it to make territorial concessions in exchange for vague “security guarantees,” which provoked strong opposition from Kiev.^[27]

A characteristic feature of ‘Trumplomacy’ was the use of direct, informal channels of communication with Vladimir Putin, bypassing traditional diplomatic procedures and without significant consultation with European partners. The appointment of a special envoy for closed-door talks with Moscow and the president’s personal telephone conversations with the Russian leader created an atmosphere of strategic uncertainty, raising serious concern both in Kiev and in European capitals, where these actions were perceived as preparations for a separate deal.^[28]

At the same time, the administration launched a multilateral pressure campaign, issuing an ultimatum to NATO countries to independently provide military supplies to Ukraine and assume the bulk of the funding for the restoration of Ukrainian infrastructure.^[29] This position provoked a crisis in transatlantic relations, prompting European governments to accelerate the creation of alternative security mechanisms independent of American involvement.

Trump favors peace in Ukraine both because the United States spends significant sums of money on Ukraine and because of his desire to blame Joseph Biden and his team for fueling the conflict. He also wants to resolve the conflict quickly, attempting to do so strictly on his own terms and focusing his attention on his competitor, China. Furthermore, unlike Biden, Trump has no connection to the current Kiev regime and is not personally interested in its unlimited support. However, all this does not indicate a willingness to engage in a serious discussions about the European security system with Russia as an equal partner (Gushchin, 2025).

By the fall of 2025, President Trump’s policies had significantly reduced Ukraine’s operational capabilities, creating the preconditions for resuming negotiations, but on significantly less favorable terms for Kiev. The resulting vacuum of American leadership has intensified processes of European strategic autonomy, while simultaneously deepening rifts within the alliance itself. The result of ‘Trumplomacy’ was not a resolution to the conflict, but its transformation into a new phase, where pragmatic calculations in Washington finally have prevailed over alliance commitments, setting a precedent for a fundamental rethinking of the European security architecture.

The conflict in Ukraine is the most striking example of Donald Trump’s departure from his predecessor’s policies. ‘Trumplomacy’ entails an immediate halt or sharp reduction in military aid to Ukraine in order to force Kiev to negotiate with Russia on Moscow’s terms. This will be motivated not by support for the Kremlin, but rather by transactional logic: ending “useless” spending, seeking a “deal” with the Kremlin, and redirecting resources toward containing China.

NATO

Donald Trump’s relationship with NATO has become one of the most striking manifestations of his “America First” foreign policy doctrine. His approach, combining tough pressure, pragmatic calculation, and open skepticism about the Alliance’s value, was radically different from the policies of all his predecessors and has had a profound impact on transatlantic relations.

Donald Trump’s approach to NATO and the US’s role in the Alliance can also be characterized as transactional. The US President is primarily concerned not with the organization’s combat readiness, but with the fairness of the burden distribution between the US and other NATO members.

A key element of ‘Trumplomacy’ toward NATO has been the demand that allies immediately increase their defense spending to the target of 2% of GDP.^[30] The White House president viewed NATO not as a strategic alliance based on shared values ​​and interests, but as a club where contributions (defense spending) should be directly converted into protection. His famous question, “What’s in it for us?” reflected this pragmatic, ideological view.

To achieve a balance within NATO that is acceptable to the United States, Donald Trump has resorted primarily to pressure. Unlike previous administrations, Trump has used public forums (NATO summits) to make direct accusations and threats. He has repeatedly stated that the United States “bears a disproportionate burden” and that the alliance is “obsolete.” His most radical instrument was the unambiguous declaration that the United States could withdraw from NATO if its allies do not comply with his demands. This has created unprecedented strategic uncertainty for Europe, which for decades has relied on American security guarantees. Back in 2024, when he was not yet president, he stated that if the Alliance’s member countries did not agree to increase budget spending on NATO, he “would encourage Russia to do whatever it wants.”^[31]

At the same time, Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that NATO as a structure is no longer necessary and is obsolete. He views it as a kind of insurance program, under which participants either pay for “full coverage” or are not eligible for full participation. Specifically, in 2018, Trump proposed expelling Norway from NATO.^[32]

Thus, Donald Trump views NATO not as an international military alliance, but as a platform for satisfying personal political ambitions and American economic needs. NATO, in his understanding, is a club of the elite, the privileges of which can only be enjoyed by states that are solvent and, more importantly, those that are pleasing to the United States.

From a purely practical point of view, D. Trump’s logic in relation to NATO has justified itself. Alliance member countries agreed to increase the cost of maintaining the structure’s activities to 5% of GDP by 2035 (Yudin & Iwersen, 2025).

All these actions fit within the proposed concept of ‘Trumplomacy,’ as they correspond to its basic postulates. Everything declared and implemented by D. Trump in relation to NATO corresponds to the principle of “America First,” not only in the context of satisfying American interests first, but also in terms of bringing the will of the United States to the forefront. If previously NATO was considered a pro-American structure, where the United States was “first among equals,” now NATO is an alliance of countries competing for the favor of the United States, which significantly changes both the dynamics of relations and the nature of the entire organization. The United States is now less a member of NATO and more an auditor and supplier of weapons. NATO conflicts are no longer US conflicts, but rather a marketplace.

Moreover, D. Trump has extended the issue of international security beyond NATO, making himself an active player in this area. Thus, in October 2025, the White House issued a presidential executive order pledging to defend Qatar in the event of an attack by another country, in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Charter. The order stated that the United States would consider “any armed attack” against Qatar “as a threat to the peace and security of the United States.”^[33] This example is doubly telling. First, Trump took this action after receiving major investments from Qatar in the US economy. Second, this decree did not prevent Israel from striking Qatar without any US sanctions. Therefore, we can see how Trump’s transactional approach simultaneously motivates his decisions, while at the same time, it is not backed by any actual actions.

Finally, Trump does not deviate from the concept of ‘Trumplomacy’ in that his activities toward NATO are linked to a number of other areas of interest to the US President. As a result, Trump’s rhetoric toward NATO is also a mechanism for addressing other political issues. In particular, unwilling to impose sanctions on Russia himself, Trump is demanding that NATO member states cease purchasing Russian energy resources and impose tariffs on China. The ‘sword of Damocles’ of the US withdrawal from NATO remains a lever of pressure. In the long term, Donald Trump’s approach to NATO will lead to the formation of a vassal system within NATO, whereby the US, through the Alliance, will be able to dictate Europe’s policies. This would naturally lead to a rebalancing of regional relations, with the EU receiving greater autonomy but fewer security guarantees due to the reduction of US financial and military involvement. The erosion of trust in the US as a reliable ally has already forced Europe to consider strategic autonomy. Initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the EU have received additional impetus.

One can predict a possible rethinking of NATO as an international structure, which could lead to the Alliance’s atomization, even potentially leading to disintegration into smaller defense blocs. Without the United States’ cohesive role, the Alliance becomes more of a burden than a shield for many member countries. This depends not on President Trump, who is in his final term, or on the administration that succeeds him, but on the growing centrifugal tendencies within the organization itself, which, nonetheless, have been provoked by the US leader.^[34]

Donald Trump’s style has created a deep rift within the alliance, dividing it between countries that viewed his methods as a necessary “shakeup” and those who saw them as an existential threat to Western unity.

‘Trumplomacy’ in relations with NATO represented a strategy of managed crisis. Using financial pressure and the threat of unilateral withdrawal, Donald Trump forced allies to increase defense spending, achieving tactical success. However, this strategy was predicated on undermining the alliance’s fundamental principles—mutual trust and collective security. In the long term, it accelerated Europe’s reassessment of its reliance on the United States and sowed the seeds of a potential transformation of NATO, the consequences of which are still shaping the geopolitical landscape today.

However, a US withdrawal from NATO is not currently expected, as it would be a strategically risky move. Rather, a ‘Trumpisation’ of the Alliance, which would involve transforming it into a purely military bloc, abdicating of political functions and withdrawing American troops from countries “not fulfilling their obligations,” and focusing on confronting China as the primary objective, contradicts NATO’s original purpose. This could lead to a de facto split into a “European” and “American” branch of NATO.

The Middle East (Israel and Palestine)

Donald Trump’s policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has demonstrated a radical departure from decades of American diplomatic tradition based on the principle of “land for peace.” The current White House leader’s approach, characterized by unilateral actions in favor of Israel and a systemic disregard for Palestinian interests, has led to a fundamental transformation of the parameters for conflict resolution.

This approach represents a complex combination of an “America First” ideology aimed at avoiding protracted foreign policy conflicts and an extremely ambitious, deal-oriented diplomacy aimed at achieving a historic agreement. Donald Trump combines a stated desire to end the war with unwavering support for Israel. Accordingly, the US president’s approach to this Middle East conflict fits perfectly within the concept of ‘Trumplomacy.’

The central element of this strategy has been a series of symbolically significant and controversial foreign policy decisions aimed at legitimizing key Israeli demands. The recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in December 2017 and the subsequent relocation of the American embassy there not only violated international consensus but also effectively removed one of the most sensitive issues of the holy city’s final status from the agenda. This move, perceived by Palestinians as an act of annexation, led to a rupture in relations with the Palestinian National Authority and made it impossible to resume direct negotiations under the previous conditions.

A further escalation of unilateralism was demonstrated by the recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Syrian Golan Heights in 2019, which set a dangerous precedent for legitimizing territorial gains resulting from military conflict. However, the most structural consequences came with the presentation of the so-called “Deal of the Century” (Peace to Prosperity) in January 2020. Developed without Palestinian participation, the plan envisioned maintaining Israeli control over a united Jerusalem, annexing Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jordan Valley, and establishing a Palestinian state with limited sovereignty on fragmented territory. Despite its declarative focus on economic development, the plan ignored key Palestinian demands for the right of return and sovereignty, making it unacceptable to the Palestinian leadership.

The result of ‘Trumplomacy’ in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has not been a resolution, but rather a systemic destruction of the previous diplomatic framework. The Trump administration’s unilateral actions legitimized Israel’s maximalist positions, marginalized the Palestinian leadership, and created new realities on the ground, significantly complicating the possibility of returning to negotiations based on the two-state solution. This legacy continues to define the parameters of US policy in the region, demonstrating the effectiveness of the tactic of creating irreversible change as a tool of foreign policy influence.

After returning to the White House in 2025, Donald Trump began diligently cultivating the image of a peacemaker who ends wars. Consequently, Donald Trump’s policy on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, initiated during his first term, not only persisted after his 2024 presidential victory, but also acquired new and more radical features. The course of unilateral actions in favor of Israel was transformed into a consistent strategy for creating irreversible change on the ground.

President Trump’s approach to ending the conflict reveals a characteristic of ‘Trumplomacy’—a transactional approach. For the US, the most important thing is to “close the deal”—to bring the parties together at the negotiating table, and shift responsibility for maintaining peace to third parties. This can be seen in the Trump—Blair 20-point plan^[35] for forming a new administration in the Gaza Strip: Trump intends to lead the structure personally, but security issues, disarmament of militant groups, and humanitarian aid are delegated to the UN, Arab countries, and the EU.

At the same time, D. Trump views the conflict itself as something unrelated to the United States, despite his consistent support for Israel’s actions in Palestine.^[36] Among other things, the US administration lifted a partial arms embargo on Israel, accelerated the release of billions in military aid, and approved major arms sales.^[37] This is where the “America First” idea comes into play: Donald Trump is not interested in direct US intervention in this conflict, preferring to provide his ally with the means to wage war, but not his own military might.

As with other examples of the US president’s use of ‘Trumplomacy,’ the detrimental effect of this approach on the Middle East is evident. The active US involvement in conflict resolution as a defender of Israeli interests is perceived by countries in the region as intervention. This has demonstrated that the military partnership with the United States is not unconditional and reliable, as most clearly demonstrated by Israel’s unpunished strike on Qatar (September 2025^[38]), a key US military ally in the Middle East. Moreover, Donald Trump’s proposals, particularly those concerning Palestinian resettlement, have complicated the diplomatic process, alienated key Arab partners, and sparked international criticism, potentially complicating the achievement of sustainable peace.

The Trump administration’s “America First” doctrine prioritizes unilateral, transactional deals over multilateral cooperation and shared values. This approach has left the United States more isolated on the global stage and led allies to question the reliability of American leadership. Trump’s position and proposed plan for resolving the Gaza conflict significantly alter international relations, exacerbate interactions with traditional allies, change the dynamics in the Middle East, and challenge the existing world order. Trump’s approach to the conflict ignores the positions of European countries, particularly those that have recognized Palestine as a state. This deepens the transatlantic political divide and undermines the activities of EU countries in the region. Moreover, Trump’s unconditional support for Netanyahu’s decisions diminishes the status of international institutions such as the International Criminal Court, whose judges have been sanctioned by the United States, and the UN, which has been criticized by the US president. Ignoring the Palestinian settlement issue also threatens regional stability in the Middle East. This issue is particularly concerning for Jordan, where the potential for a large influx of Palestinian refugees threatens the legitimacy of the current government.

The approach taken by the White House has reinforced the international community’s view that the United States is no longer a neutral arbiter, but a biased power seeking its own gain, even at the cost of alienating allies and undermining international institutions. This has not only complicated the path to peace in Gaza, but also contributed to greater instability and fragmentation of the international system. As a result, countries are increasingly forced to balance their interests against Washington’s unilateral actions in order to protect their own interests.

Conclusion

Donald Trump’s return to power in 2025 confirmed that ‘Trumplomacy’ is not a temporary anomaly, but a persistent challenge to the foundations of classical diplomacy. A comparative analysis revealed systemic changes that continue to transform international relations even after the four-year hiatus of the Biden administration. Significantly, this period failed to fully restore trust among allies and predictability to US foreign policy—the legacy of Trump’s approach proved deeper than previously thought. Trump’s second term has cemented the perception of Washington as an unreliable partner, whose policies can change dramatically every four to eight years, undermining the very idea of ​​long-term alliance commitments.

The tactics of ‘managed chaos,’ which form the core of ‘Trumplomacy,’ are no longer perceived as diplomatic exotica and are becoming the new normal, to which other international players—both allies and adversaries of the United States—are forced to adapt by developing their own strategic “shock absorbers.” This adaptation manifests itself in the accelerated creation of alternative security mechanisms and economic alliances independent of American participation. This transformation reflects a deep crisis of liberal internationalism, and ‘Trumplomacy’ is both a symptom and a catalyst for the systemic decomposition of the liberal world order. It consistently accelerates the processes of regionalization and fragmentation of the global system, where power and bilateral deals are decisively beginning to prevail over norms and multilateral institutions.

In conclusion, it should be recognized that Donald Trump’s second presidential term marks the final institutionalization of ‘Trumplomacy’ as a new and alternative paradigm for American foreign policy. Its main outcome is not tactical success in individual negotiations, but a rather fundamental transformation of the US role in the world—a shift from the status of guarantor of the stability of the liberal order to that of a source of permanent turbulence, operating solely according to the logic of short-term interests. This inevitably leads to several systemic consequences: the accelerated formation of a multipolar world, in which US allies will be forced to pursue more independent policies, particularly evident in the example of the European Union, while competitors will intensify the creation of alternative institutions, as China and Russia are doing.

Thus, ‘Trumplomacy’ transcends the personal style of a single politician and becomes a factor in the structural restructuring of the entire system of international relations, defining the contours of a new global reality, in which predictability and stability give way to flexibility and adaptability in the face of constant uncertainty.

 

 

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About the authors

Konstantin P. Kurylev

RUDN University

Email: kurylev-kp@rudn.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3075-915X
SPIN-code: 3131-8642

PhD, Dr.Sc. (History), Professor, Head, Department of Theory and History of International Relations

bldg 2, 10 Miklukho-Maklaya St, Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation

Daria V. Stanis

RUDN University

Email: stanis-dv@rudn.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-9824-0365

PhD (Economics), Associate Professor, Department of Public and Municipal Administration

bldg 2, 10 Miklukho-Maklaya St, Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation

Nickolay P. Parkhitko

RUDN University; Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation

Email: npparkhitko@fa.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-7678-5735
SPIN-code: 6478-1225

PhD (History), Associate Professor, Department of International Journalism, RUDN University; Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation

6 Miklukho-Maklaya St, Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation; 49/2 Leningradsky Prospekt, Moscow, 125167, Russian Federation

Ivan S. Pyatibratov

Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation

Author for correspondence.
Email: ispyatibratov@fa.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3652-8483
SPIN-code: 4868-3772

PhD (Political Science), Associate Professor, Department of Political Science

49/2 Leningradsky Prospekt, Moscow, 125167, Russian Federation

References

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