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ИДЕИ И ПОЛИТИКА В ИСТОРИИ IDEAS AND POLITICS IN HISTORY

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Научная статья / Research article

Буддизм и национализм в идентификационных процессах в Азии в конце XIX — начале XX веков

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Аннотация. Изучается влияние буддизма и национализма на идентификационные процессы в условиях политических трансформаций конца XIX — начала XX вв в странах Азии. Отмечается процесс возрождения буддизма (в виде «буддийского модернизма») в ряде стран и его сочетание с ростом национализма (в России, Монголии, Тибете, Китае, Японии), наряду с осознанием буддистами своего единства. Национализм и религия оказались в тесном взаимодействии в контексте борьбы с колониализмом и духовной экспансией Запада (Индия, Китай, Япония), движения к независимости (Тибет, Монголия), обновленческих процессов (особенно у буддистов России). Отмечается обусловленность взаимодействия буддизма и национализма многими объективными причинами, переменами в мировоззрении, а также высокой активностью отдельных личностей (Р. Тагор, Тай-су, Учида Рёхей, Далай-лама, А. Доржиев). Автор приходит к выводу: высокий запас цивилизационной прочности позволил буддистам различных направлений и стран утверждать свои базовые принципы как необходимые для сохранения своей культуры и самобытности, как маркеры идентичности.

Ключевые слова: буддизм, национализм, идентичность, Далай-лама, возрождение, религия, цивилизация

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Buddhism and Nationalism as Sources of Identity in in Asia of the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

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Abstract. The article examines the influence of Buddhism and nationalism on identification processes in Asian countries in the context of political transformations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Significant revitalization of Buddhism (sometimes called “Buddhist Modernism”) in a number of countries coincided with the growth of nationalism (especially in Russia, Mongolia, Tibet, China, and Japan), as well as the growing perception of Buddhist transnational unity. Nationalism and religion collaborated in their reactions to a number of important phenomena: the anti-colonial movement, the resistance against western cultural expansion (India, China, Japan), the aspiration of independence (Tibet, Mongolia), the renovation processes (in particular, among the Russian Buddhists). These phenomena were caused by objective factors, the changes in worldviews, as well as with activity of some individuals (Tagore, Tai-su, Uchida Ryohei, Dalai Lama, Agvan Dorjiev). The high level of civilizational depth allowed Buddhists of various traditions to assert their basic principles as important to identity resources.

Keywords: Buddhism, nationalism, identity, Dalai Lama, revitalization, religion, civilization

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Конец XIX — начало XX вв. был особенным периодом для народов и стран Азии и Европы, поскольку он принес бурный рост национализма. Э. Хобсбаум соотносил подъем национализма и рост среднего класса в Европе с развитием таких массовых традиций накануне Первой мировой войны, как фестивали, праздники, спортивные мероприятия [1]. Они находили одобрение у Церкви, поскольку одновременно новый импульс получали идейно-политические структуры (партии, движения), также заинтересованные в поддержке со стороны религии.

Согласно М. Мур, национализм — это нормативная аргументация моральной значимости принадлежности к определенной нации и ее ценностям [2. С. 5]¹. Национализм как идеология, обосновывающая как отличие, так и превосходство определенного народа, имеет различия, поскольку он, будучи

¹ Большое значение для теории национализма имели работы Г. Кона, изучавшего в сопоставлении восточный и западный типы национализма (этнический и политический), напр.: [3].

универсальной категорией, зависит от специфики культур, жизненного опыта традиций [4. Р. xiv]. Во многих случаях религия была важной частью национализма, и это в полной мере относится к буддийским обществам Азии в конце XIX в. Цель исследования — изучить взаимодействие буддизма и национализма в этом регионе, их влияние на формирование новых контекстов идентичности. На наш взгляд, буддийская традиция обеспечивала народам эмоциональную силу, которая мистифицировала рациональное мышление, в то время как их стремление к равенству — социальному, религиозному и иному — представляло собой идейную основу для решения проблем, связанных как с подъемом национального сознания, так и с возрождением учения Будды в разных концах Азии. Отмеченное определило поставленную в исследовании задачи: выявить особенности и последствия индо-китайско-японского взаимодействия, а также осветить вопросы: Далай-лама и национально-религиозное возрождение в Тибете и Монголии; обновленчество и рост национализма (панмонголизма) у российских буддистов.

1.

Практически одновременно с ростом националистических настроений в «буддийских» регионах происходит то, что можно охарактеризовать как возрождение (обновление) буддизма. В изучаемый период, в связи с прозелитизмом христианских миссионеров и активной политикой стран Запада, возрождение буддизма, иногда называемое «буддийским модернизмом» [5. S. 37], приводило к осознанию буддистами разных стран своего единства и созданию трансбуддийских структур и организаций, дальнейшему развитию локальных вариаций буддизма, их сотрудничеству, рефлексировалось на политической и иной активности буддистов в разных странах [6].

Среди стран, в культуре которых определенным влиянием обладал буддизм, прежде всего следует выделить Индию. Будучи исторической родиной возникновения и развития буддийского учения, на стыке XIX и XX вв. Индия явила не только первые зачатки возрождения роли и влияния этой древнейшей мировой религии, но и оказала воздействие на соответствующие народы и страны. Причин для этого было немало, например, политическое, культурное, религиозное и другое давление со стороны английских колонизаторов, и стремление индийского общества не только сохранить свою самобытность, но и явить возможные резистентные феномены.

В Индии параллельно шли процессы как индусского, так и буддийского возрождения (также и исламского). Это же видение обеспечивало открытость индийской культуры, т. е. актуализацию ее традиционной способности к влиянию на иные культуры. Начало росту интереса к буддизму в Индии было положено в конце XIX в., когда духовные лидеры страны Свами Вивекананда и Бал Гангадхар Тилак указали на духовную сторону их культуры как основу для сдерживания Запада, чьи духовно-идеологические достижения (хри-

стианство, политические учения) оказывали негативное воздействие на традиционную Индию. Исследование прошлого индийской культуры требовало возрождения ее оснований, для чего следовало изучать древние тексты, и они призвали к духовному возрождению [7. Р. 20]. Более того — они заявили о миссионерской значимости духовно-религиозного наследия своей страны, обосновывая его как фундамент строительства новой Азии. Впервые идея о паназиатской значимости индийской духовности была изложена Свами Вивеканандой на Парламенте Религий в Чикаго в сентябре 1893 г. Известным продолжателем идей Вивекананды стал Рабиндранат Тагор.

Азии, как считал Р. Тагор, следует реструктурировать свои национальные культуры: арийские, семитские, монгольские и др. [8. Р. 131–132]. Он не акцентировал буддизм, но помнил, что в историко-религиозном прошлом Азии буддизм был широко распространен по всему континенту. Осенью 1904 г. Р. Тагор писал о том, что «Китай, Япония и Тибет... приглашают Индию... как своего гуру», и мир «крайне нуждается в бесценных плодах учености наших древних риши²» [8. Р. 44].

Р. Тагор полагал, что ислам и христианство — религии пришлые, индуизм — это религия одной Индии, а буддизм стал всемирной религией, и что буддизм сможет и в дальнейшем оказать значительные услуги Индии. Столь значимый акцент на свою национальную культурно-цивилизационную специфику как сущностную для духовного возрождения народов, в культуре которых был представлен индийский элемент, в те годы был присущ во многом лишь Индии. В тот период в Китае, а также в России нарастали кризисные явления и распространялись идеи, теоретическими основаниями укорененные в западных политических традициях и духовной культуре.

Один из виднейших российских буддологов начала XX в. О.О. Розенберг указывал на особенность ситуации того периода — Индия открывалась миру, используя потенциал буддизма: «Замкнутая в значительной мере в своей внутренней жизни Индия выходит на широкую мировую арену, и движущим началом этого культурного воздействия Индии является создание индийского духа — буддизм» [9. С. 156]. Ему же принадлежит интересная мысль, что буддизм является начальной ступенью для познания идеологий и религий стран Востока, поскольку, будучи первой мировой религией, он за несколько веков до начала арабских завоеваний заложил долгосрочные основы своего влияния в Центральной Азии: «Не понять нам народов Востока, если мы не будем знать их души... Быть может, пропасть, разделяющая душу Запада и душу Востока, не столь глубока, быть может, уже перекинут через нее мост буддизмом...» [9. С. 41–42].

Одним из первых «мостов», «перекинутых» буддизмом в изучаемый период, стало продвижение идеи возрождения этой религии из Индии в Китай;

² Риши — мудрец, просветленный человек.

в обеих странах рост интереса к буддизму оказался тесно связан с активностью Р. Тагора. С целью сближения двух великих государств и борьбы с колониализмом Тагор посетил Поднебесную весной 1924 г. Будучи повсеместно известным после получения Нобелевской премии мира, он стремился использовать свой авторитет ради объединения ряда стран Азии на базе индийской культуры. На посыл о том, что «Китай и Индия сближаются не ради политических или экономических целей, но в интересах человеческой любви», Цзе-суй, губернатор Нанкина, ответил при встрече с Р. Тагором 20 апреля 1924 г., что в Китае 700 лет ждали послания из Индии [8. Р. 153]. Индийская сторона и китайские буддисты оценивали визит Р. Тагора как восстановление отношений их стран ради новой Восточной цивилизации, воспринимаемой как буддийская цивилизация [8. Р. 159]. Да и само приглашение Р. Тагору посетить Китай содержало буддийскую терминологию: «Сейчас Вы — великий буддийский поэт — прибываете из родной земли Будды в нашу сестринскую страну с нектаром Ваших мыслей; конечно же, мы осознаем радужность, которую Вы распространяете везде, где мир сотрясают Ваши слоноподобные шаги» [10. Р. 267]. Наставник Тай-су, известный китайский буддийский деятель, сказал Р. Тагору о необходимости возрождения ранней буддийской школы Читтаматра.

Вообще же политики и интеллигенция Китая отнеслись к идеям индийца настороженно. В частности, Лян Сумин, автор капитального труда о философии Востока и Запада, полагал, что Восточная цивилизация, провозглашенная Р. Тагором, отличается от китайской, а Ку Хуньмин считал, что буддизм нанес вред китайской цивилизации [8. Р. 206–207]. Сунь Ятсен понимал термин «Восточная цивилизация» как аналог термина «Китайская цивилизация» и надеялся на подъем конфуцианской культуры. Большую кампанию против визита Р. Тагора проводила КПК³. Однако есть понимание, что прибытие Р. Тагора в Китай было знаковым событием в китайско-индийских культурных отношениях [11. Р. 233, 251].

Большой успех воззрения Р. Тагора имели в Японии, куда он прибыл в конце мая 1924 г. Здесь возрождение (модернизация) буддизма шло на основе синтеза таких методов и подходов, как получение знаний в Индии, адаптация христианских миссионерских методов обучения и социальной работы. В те годы были заложены основания для санскритизации японского буддизма.

Японские буддийские организации (Нитирэн, Сото и др.) в период реформ Мэйдзи и последующего развития страны прилагали все усилия для

³ Такая реакция, в известном смысле, была объективна: имевшее место на стыке веков восстание боксеров идейно основывалось на отдельных буддийских идеях; династия Цин, павшая вскоре после этого восстания, оказывала особую поддержку лидерам тибетского буддизма, поэтому антибуддийские настроения были присущи практически всем основным политическим силам Китая изучаемого периода.

развития и укрепления роли буддизма, причем не только в Японии. Так, в ходе оккупации Кореи японскими войсками (с 1910 г.) они стремились распространять свое влияние в корейском обществе, всячески поддерживая возрождение их буддизма [12. Р. 102]. Тогда в Корее был активен Такеда, представитель Сото, «глубоко заинтересованный в возрождении корейского буддизма» [12. Р. 109]. В период оккупации северо-восточного Китая они проводили подобную политику и среди монгольских лам.

Японские буддисты оценили слова Р. Тагора об объединении Азии на основе индийской культуры как призыв родины Будды к возрождению духовного родства и взаимопомощи. Поддержка буддийских общин властями страны позволила им получить всякую помощь и поддержку, ими были разработаны собственные оригинальные проекты и идеи. В частности, Ватанабе Кайкёку разработал идею о союзе буддистов Японии, Китая, Индии, Бирмы и Тибета, а Учида Рёхей выступил за культурный союз Японии, Китая и России против стран Запада: «без поддержки Японии, чья цивилизация является антитезой западной цивилизации, как Россия может надеяться освободить себя?» [8. Р. 113].

Китайские буддисты также давали новые трактовки буддизму для просвещения своих соседей. В 1925 г. к японским буддистам прибыл упоминавшийся Тай-су, который накануне второй мировой войны организовал поездку китайских буддистов по Индии и странам Юго-Восточной Азии. Тогда же эти страны посетил известный китайский буддийский деятель Лигуан. В годы войны Тай-су говорил, что только восточная (буддийская) культура даст миру вечный мир [13. Р. 12, 14]. Эти китайские борцы за буддизм выступали за «модернизацию» буддизма, японские монахи также считали себя «подлинными» «защитниками» буддийского учения [13. Р. 15].

По Н.В. Абаеву, возрожденческие процессы в буддизме в тот период создали «модернистские» формы современного буддизма [14]. Эти же «реформаторские» процессы явили вариативность реакций национализма: если в Китае он усиливался, в т. ч. на антибуддийских дискурсах, то в Японии эта религия содействовала росту японского национализма, особенно в его внешних проявлениях (в Корее и Монголии).

Возрождение буддизма в период конца XIX — первой трети XX вв. на огромном пространстве Азии была связана с двумя основными факторами: 1) «обратным ориентализмом», то есть с модернизацией и национализмом и 2) отсутствием светского лидера в антиколониальной борьбе. Несмотря на то, что оно несло в себе отпечаток реалий Индии, где нарастала борьба с английским колониализмом, и соответствующих стран, ее влияние на подобного рода процессы в ареале тибетского буддизма трудно переоценить: она в ряде случаев влияла на политический контекст событий Цинской империи, катализировавшие процессы национализма и возрождения буддизма в национальных окраинах страны.

2.

Ревитализация буддизма и развитие национализма среди последователей тибетского буддизма, как в самом Тибете, так и за его пределами — у монголов, бурятов, калмыков, тувинцев и народов Алтая, не были связаны с антиколониальной борьбой, но оказались под большим влиянием событий, происходивших на территориях двух империй — Цинской и Российской. Идеи панмонголизма и панбуддизма оказались крайне востребованными в исследуемый период и тесно сопряжены с развитием отношений между основными региональными игроками: Великобританией (британская Индия), Китаем и Россией.

В конце XIX в. буддийские институты Тибета развивались на фоне возраставшего интереса к региону со стороны английских индийских колониальных властей. Соглашения, подписанные в 1890 и 1893 гг. между Калькуттой и Пекином, укрепили власть англичан в Сиккиме [15], и позже, ввиду опасений существования планов русского правительства по захвату Тибета, Лондон решил направить в Лхасу военный контингент под командованием капитана Ф. Янгхазбенда. Действительно, после неудачных войн с Турцией и потерей влияния в Европе Россия к 1890-м гг. включила в орбиту своего влияния среднеазиатские народы: казахов, узбеков, таджиков, позже туркменов, и оказалась в значительной близости к Тибету. Будучи заинтересованными в стабильной ситуации в Средней Азии, русские власти принимали во внимание обеспокоенность Пекина в отношении Тибета, постоянно подогреваемую Лондоном и Калькуттой:

«4 сентября 1902 г. Телеграмма министра иностранных дел В.Н. Ламздорфа посланнику в Пекине И.М. Лессару о том, что российское правительство не замышляет никаких агрессивных действий в отношении Тибета. Можете дать Китайскому Правительству самые положительные заверения, что, помимо приема в прошлом году почетной депутации от тибетцев, прибывшей в Петербург для приветствования Государя Императора от имени Далай-Ламы, никаких сношений между Россией и Тибетом не устанавливались. Таким образом, сообщение англичан об агрессивных замыслах русского правительства по отношению к названной области представляет чистый вымысел» [16. С. 44–45].

Очевидно, что все стороны конфликта желали установления доверительных отношений с Далай-ламой, и наиболее активными оказались англичане, чей экспедиционный корпус с конца 1903 г. стал продвигаться в сторону центрального Тибета. Поскольку цели англичан были неясны для тибетского руководства, Далай-лама XIII Наванг Лобсан Тубдэн Гьяцо летом 1904 г. бежал к монголам и в ноябре прибыл в Ургу, в ставку Богдо-гегена. Он намеревался, судя по документам и свидетельствам, далее пройти на территорию России, но разрешения не получил [16. С. 58–67] и покинул Монголию весной 1906 г. По пути в Тибет Далай-лама в сентябре 1908 г. прибыл в Пекин, где импера-

тор Гуан-суй вернул ему титул, отобранный по причине бегства в Монголию; теперь Далай-лама был объявлен как «Великий, Благой, Самосуший Будда», с добавлением «Верный и Покорный» [17. С. 174]. В Лхасу он вернулся лишь в декабре 1909 г.

К тому времени, ввиду договоренностей, подписанных между правительствами Великобритании, Китая и России в период 1904–1907 гг. [18. С. 229–230; 19. Р. 203–207; 16. С. 91, 114], Тибет фактически оказался под управлением (сюзеренитетом) Китая. Еще с 1903 г. китайские войска стали продвигаться из восточного Тибета в сторону его центральной части, что, вероятно, было связано с упоминавшейся выше экспедицией Янгхазбенда [20. Р. 39]. Первые китайские отряды оказались недалеко от тибетской столицы практически одновременно с возвращением в Лхасу Далай-ламы в конце 1909 г. Поскольку ситуация для Далай-ламы оказалась крайне запутанной, он, полагаясь на дружественные отношения Великобритании и России, принял решение бежать на юг, в Индию, так как дорога на север, к монголам, была уже перекрыта китайскими солдатами [16. С. 129]. Далай-лама прибыл в Индию (Дарджилинг) в середине февраля 1910 г., где находился до весны 1912 г. Столь длительные периоды отсутствия Далай-ламы в Лхасе влияли на рост тибетского национализма, а неоднократное лишение его цинскими правителями титула «Далай-лама» лишь углубляли уважение тибетцев к своему духовному лидеру.

Синьхайская революция и падение династии Цин дали новый мощный подъем как национализму, так и религиозному возрождению тибетского общества, чему способствовало также провозглашение Далай-ламой независимости Тибета в феврале 1913 г. Дальнейшее развитие ситуации в Тибете было тесно связано с социальными и экономическими реформами, инициированными Далай-ламой, и укреплением буддизмом своего положения в регионе. Вместе с тем визит Далай-ламы в Монголию оказал большое воздействие на российских буддистов, на развитие у них идей панбуддизма и панмонголизма.

3.

В XIX в. последователи тибетского буддизма Цинской и Российской империй оказались под воздействием двух разновекторных процессов: с одной стороны, они, будучи подданными разных государств, соотносили себя с определенными административно-государственными единицами, где они проживали, с другой, благодаря обновленческим процессам в буддизме, осознавали свое единство и когерентность. Например, в XVIII в. монголами себя считала, прежде всего, монгольская аристократия, но в XIX в. произошли перемены, связанные с тем, что и правящие элиты, и простые монголы все менее идентифицировали себя представителями монгольского улуса и все более относили себя к определенному хошуну в рамках административного устройства

Цинской империи. В основном отмеченное касалось южных монголов, у которых сформировалась дуальная идентичность — как подданных мультиэтнической Цинской империи и относящихся к конкретному хошуну (знамени) [21. Р. 147, 152]. Ситуация во Внешней Монголии несколько отличалась: здесь фигура Богдо-гегена имела более центростремительную силу, нежели административная значимость маньчжурской хошунной (знаменной) системы.

Й. Элверског считает важным выделить географический фактор как существенный для развития новой монгольской идентичности в рассматриваемый период: «В дополнение к ... институционализации баннера как политической единицы, еще одним фактором, который способствовал этой идентификации с конкретными местностями, было растущее осознание монголами как своей, так и мировой географии» [21. Р. 152]. Такого рода перемены в мировоззрении дали важный для монгольской идентичности результат: ввиду возникновения различия «между людьми и фактической землей, которую они населяли», в работах монгольских историков появился термин *ogon* («земля»), как отличный от *ulus* («государство»), что он оценивает как «глубокий сдвиг в монгольских концептуализациях пространства и места» [21. Р. 152]. Под влиянием таких перемен даже буддизм стал восприниматься ими не как элемент (обще)монгольской идентичности, но как составляющая хошунной системы [21. Р. 163]. Отмеченное Й. Элверскогом представляется важным, поскольку географический фактор оказал существенное воздействие также на развитие идей панбуддизма. Действительно, в развитии национального самосознания монголов, в т. ч. благодаря религиозной ситуации во Внешней Монголии в начале XX в., рефлексировала, прежде всего, политическая ситуация в Китае и России, ее ближайших соседей. Известное влияние оказало и развитие монгольской сангхи, где было заметно воздействие т. н. «бурятской интеллигенции» [22. Р. 176–180]⁴; известный монгольский лама Зава Дамдин, критически настроенный к происходящим в буддизме переменам, тем не менее, оценивал свою миссию как «очищающую» и «выстраивающую» его революционные времена [22. Р. 12].

Нечто подобное (влияние географического и политического факторов на идентичность) имело место у российских буддистов: так, калмыки, с первой трети XVII в. заселившие Прикаспий и южное Поволжье, называли себя ставропольскими, астраханскими, донскими, уральскими, буряты — агинскими, иркутскими, забайкальскими, хоринскими и др. Однако, в отличие от ситуации у монголов, у российских буддистов, проходивших сквозь существенные перемены в их административных институтах и территориях, ломавших устоявшиеся (меж)этнические, межлузные и иные связи, религия продолжала быть связующим фактором, позволявшим определять наличие их извест-

⁴ Речь идет о влиянии обновленческого движения, развивавшегося в Бурятии, на монгольскую сангху.

ного единства. Однако и она подчинялась складывавшимся обстоятельствам; у монголов это выразилось в отказе южных монголов от признания Богдогегена как своего духовного лидера, у калмыков были свои «улусные» хурулы, где могли отказать в присутствии представителям иных улусов. Даже титул «багша» (настоятель хурула) у калмыков имел разное значение: например, у торгутов им был собственно глава хурула, то есть один человек, у дербетов так мог называться любой лама [23. С. 43].

Как бывает в ситуациях системного кризиса, в обществах перманентно возникают течения, стремящиеся утвердить свое видение будущего религии, указать свой путь. Опорой таких течений обычно служит авторитет ранних традиций. В российском буддизме с конца XIX в. они проявились в виде упомянутого выше обновленчества, охватившего калмыцкое, бурятское, алтайское и тувинское сообщества. Обновленческое движение выступало за восстановление прежних ориентаций и паттернов поведения путем возрождения «чистоты учения» Будды и создание предпосылок к системному религиозному образованию.

Российские буддисты встречались с Далай-ламой в Монголии в 1904–1906 гг. Конечно, они посещали Тибет для встречи с ним и ранее, однако, ввиду политических и иных обстоятельств, такие визиты не были частыми; возрождение буддизма увеличило число паломников в Страну Снегов. Так, в 1895 г. Лхасу посетила группа бурят во главе с царским придворным П.А. Бадмаевым, которая встретила со своим земляком Агваном Доржиевым, одним из приближенных Далай-ламы. Уже спустя три года А. Доржиев прибыл в Санкт-Петербург как посланник тибетского лидера. Несколько позже, в 1899–1902 гг., в Тибете побывал известный бурятский ученый и исследователь Г. Цыбиков. Много бурятских лам обучалось в тибетских монастырях; обновленчество среди бурятских лам имело значительный общественный резонанс среди верующих [24].

Была высока активность и калмыцких буддистов: Э.Э. Ухтомский писал в 1889 г., что «...иные калмыки... ездили недавно в Забайкалье к бурятам и в Ургу (... там находится великий буддийский «святой» Чжебдзундамба-хутухту), или же морем из Одессы на Тянь-дзинь, порт Пекина, и далее через китайскую границу в Тибет. За границей скупались книги, кумиры, получалось посвящение и наставление от знаменитых вероучителей» [25. С. 20–21]. В 1891–1894 гг. в Тибете побывал Бааза-багши Менкеджуев, дважды — в 1898–1900 и 1902–1903 гг. — на поклон к ламам прибывал багша Пурдаш Джунгруев, в 1904–1905 гг. — бакша Потаповской станицы Дамбо Ульянов. Ставропольский калмык Овше Норзунов также на стыке веков неоднократно посещал Тибет и сделал первые фотографии Лхасы и Поталы.

А. Доржиев, самый видный российский буддийский деятель конца XIX — начала XX вв., сыграл большую роль в возрождении буддизма у калмыков. В литературе обычно отмечается, что именно он инициировал построение в кал-

мыцких степях первых буддийских философских школ Чоря. В действительности это было сделано по указанию Далай-ламы. Согласно документу, хранящемуся в Национальном архиве Республики Калмыкия, в 1902 г. на аудиенции у Далай-ламы был старший бакша Ики-Цохуровских хурулов Чонгон Монголов с группой лам. В документе отмечено: «Святейший Далай Лама, расспрашивая о быте и образе жизни наших калмыков и на доклад бакши Монгорова о способе процветания буддизма и благоденствии народа заметил, что распространение таковых возможно при условии изучения основ философии буддийской религии только в школах Чоре и таким образом настаивая учредить означенную необходимую как для поднятия образования духовенства, так и для благоденствия народа школу, изволил подарить бакше Монголову 30 томов священного писания Будды для изучения таковых во вновь построенных школах Чоре и приказал своему ближайшему сановнику, бурятскому хамбо ламе Агван Дорджиеву учредить и руководить основанием Чоре» [26. С. 66–67].

Первая школа Чоря, появившаяся после указания Далай-ламы, была открыта в 1907 г. в Малодербетовском улусе, ее возглавил сам А. Доржиев, с 1899 г., когда он впервые посетил калмыков, занимавшийся выполнением поручений Далай-ламы. Второй Чоря был открыт в 1908 г. в Ики-Цохуровском улусе. Именно Чоря были предназначены выпускать подготовленных буддийских священнослужителей для работы в сложных политических, социальных и экономических условиях Калмыцкой степи начала XX в.

Среди особенностей возрождения буддизма у калмыков в конце XIX — начале XX вв. следует назвать возвращение тантризма в хурульные практики и ритуалы. По мнению А. Берзина, учение и практики тантры Калачакры «тибетцы и монголы... в начале XX века распространили ... среди калмык-монголов на Волге...» [27. С. 42]. Действительно, имеются соответствующие архивные сведения и свидетельства современников.

В конце XIX в. российские власти отмечали, что «...калмыцкая степь в последнее время начинает посещаться инородцами-ламаитами из других частей империи» [28. Д. 395. Л. 218], и выступали за запрет ламам из других регионов получать «увольнительные свидетельства и паспорта для поездки в калмыцкие степи» [26. Д. 77. Л. 3 об.]. Свидетельство можно найти, например, в записях Ф.И. Щербатского: в своем «Кратком отчете о поездке в Ургу» он отметил, что, прибыв в Ургу, перед встречей с Далай-ламой (состоялась в мае 1905 г.) он некоторое время позанимался тибетским языком с неким тибетцем, «бывавшего у калмыков и потому немного знавшего по-русски» [29. С. 251]. Прибытие буддийских священнослужителей из других регионов к калмыкам свидетельствовало в том числе об их стремлении укрепить отношения с местными верующими, поддержать у них ослабевшую сангху и возродить транснациональную общность буддистов. Подобное имело место и у бурятов [30. С. 179–187]. Ввиду давней активности «чужих лам» среди бурятов во «Временной инструкции по управлению делами ламайского духо-

венства в Иркутской губернии, июль 1890 г.» предусматривались наказания для местного буддийского духовенства, уличенного в связях с ними: «Виновные в сношениях с заграничным духовенством подвергаются выселению на жительство в отдаленнейшие места Сибири по распоряжению Иркутского Генерал-Губернатора» [30. С. 305]. Однако ситуация оставалась той же и в начале XX в.; так, в письме Императорского Российского Генерального Консула в Урге Иркутскому Генерал-Губернатору от 20 мая 1909 г. № 596 отмечено, что некоторые тибетские и тангутские ламы «стремятся проникать за средствами к бурятам в Забайкалье, и, немногие, к астраханским калмыкам» [31. Л. 35]. В этих регионах были организованы поиск и депортация таких «гостей».

Что касается тантризма, то он был знаком калмыкам уже ко времени прихода их в Нижнее Поволжье в 1630-х годах. Например, в Автобиографии Далай-ламы Пятого Нгаванг Лобсан Гьяцо отмечено, что в 1643 г. он лично провел тантрическую службу для калмыцкого (торгутского) правителя Дайчина и его окружения [32. Р. 223].

Вероятно, у калмыков тантрическим был Цаган-Аманский хурул [33. С. 31]. Скорее всего, имея ввиду тантризм, православный священник П. Смирнов писал в 1870-х гг., что ламы на службах надевают на голову особый «кокошник» с изображениями бурханов (будд) [34. С. 20]. Судя по описанию этого головного убора, речь идет о совершении этими ламами тантрических обрядов, посвященных идамам класса Анутгарайога-тантры, например Ямантака и Гухьясамаджа. Как отмечал А. Позднеев, обрядовая практика у калмыков не имела отличий от подобных практик у бурятов и монголов, и по квалификации калмыцкие ламы не уступали духовенству монгольских монастырей [35. С. хiii]. Таким образом, особенностью обновленческих процессов у калмыков следует считать, в частности, возрождение тантрических практик в хурульных ритуалах.

Что касается народов Алтая, то у них стремление сохранить свою этническую и культурную самобытность под натиском русской колонизации привели к становлению идеологического движения — «белой веры» («ак дьанг», «бурханизм») [36]. У тувинцев того периода конфессиональную ситуацию характеризуют как достаточно пеструю и носившую «несколько запутанный характер» [37. С. 85].

Еще в 1871 г. российский посланник в Монголии А. Корниров считал, что «нельзя не предположить, что вступление Халхи и прилегающей к ней России в обоюдные сношения не пройдет без влияния на последователей буддизма с той и другой стороны» [31. Д. 575. Л. 56–56 об.]⁵. Неудивительно, что

⁵ Интерес монголов к своим родственным народам, в частности, к калмыкам, возрос с конца 1860-х гг., когда встал вопрос о нахождении инкарнации у ойратов Китая или у российских калмыков скончавшегося в 1867 г. Седьмого Богдо-гегена. Следовательно, уже с конца 1860-х гг. можно отсчитывать начало возрождения интереса калмыков к Далай-ламе и единоверцам на Востоке.

в июле 1906 г., после отбытия Далай-ламы из Монголии, в Секретной докладной записке титулярного советника Кузьминского Российско-Императорскому Генеральному Консулу в Урге отмечалось, что влияние Далай-ламы в Монголии за время его пребывания там позволило выявить значение «пробуждающегося национального самосознания монгольского народа» [31. Д. 1468. Год 1906. Л. 36 об.]. Полагаю, что эту оценку можно отнести и к российским буддистам.

Религиозная идентичность российских буддистов развивалась наряду с этнической, и вместе с тем идея о важности единения буддистов империи превалировала над идеологией (этно)национализма; идеи панмонголизма оказались подчинены идеям панбуддизма. Внутри страны активность лам возросла после объявления в 1905 г. императорского манифеста «Об укреплении начал веротерпимости». Из последствий принятия этого документа можно выделить: возврат казаков калмыков и бурят, принявших крещение, к буддизму; рост числа лам и культовых построек; более упрощенная процедура получения пасов (паспортов) для выезда в зарубежные религиозные центры; официальное определение буддистов «буддистами-ламаитами», а не «идолопоклонниками» и «язычниками», и др. Активность буддийских деятелей была столь высока, что члены Особого Совещания, собравшиеся в Санкт-Петербурге в конце января 1906 г., посчитали необходимым отметить возможное стремление лам «ко всемирному господству» и «образованию... панбуддизма» [31. Дело 1467. Год 1904–1906. Л. 13 об.]. Тем не менее, учитывая важность буддизма во внутренней и внешней политике государства, власти поддержали идею строительства буддийского храма в Санкт-Петербурге. Глава МИД А.И. Извольский писал летом 1908 г.: «Благосклонное отношение наше к этому желанию Далай-ламы (построить храм) произведет глубокое впечатление в нашу пользу как на него самого, так и на многочисленных ламаистов в пределах России» [28. Д. 448. Л. 1]. Министр МВД П.А. Столыпин отметил, что он относится «со своей стороны вполне сочувственно к таковому ходатайству духовного главы последователей буддийского исповедания» [28. Д. 448. Л. 2], а царь Николай II в начале 1909 г. записал: «Буддисты в России могут чувствовать себя как под крылом могучего орла» [28. Д. 446. Л. 35].

Установление власти большевиков в России, революционные события в Китае и Монголии оказали известное воздействие на все религии — они значительно ослабели; в тех условиях не могло быть и речи о какой бы то ни было религиозной активности. Буддизм вскоре после 1917 г. стал признаваться новыми властями как исчезающая религия. Среди уникальных последствий тех событий следует указать на такое проявление идей панмонголизма, как попытка бурят объединиться с Монголией и создать Бурят-Монгольское государство, с особым акцентом на религиозную и этническую общность. Тогда же предлагалось включить и калмыков в состав нового возможного государства, но как это выглядело бы географически, так и не было решено.

4.

Религия традиционно помогала народам сохранять чувство культурного и цивилизационного единства, даже если они были разделены границами [38. Р. 15]. Верующие, хотя и проживали в разных концах света, могли образовывать особенные транснациональные сообщества, способные объединять людей и институты разных стран и территорий [39. Р. 137]. Иначе говоря, всегда существует объективный процесс появления новых способов взаимодействия для объединения и связи людей, в том числе одной культуры, пребывающих в различных государствах и принадлежащих разным национальностям. Конфессиональное самоопределение традиционно помогало преодолеть узость этнической самоидентификации; вместе с тем, религия дефинируется как системообразующий фактор — «чтобы оформить данную общность как отличную от других» [40. С. 337]. Тем самым происходит дифференциация этой общности от иных, не обладающих таким компонентом. Осознавая себя буддистом, личность тем самым соотносила себя не только с определенной этнической общностью, но связывалась с единоверцами в разных регионах мира. Таким образом, географический фактор терял свою пространственную значимость, но вместе с тем расширял границы присутствия «своих». Прежнее мировоззрение («мы — они») претерпевало значительные метаморфозы, рождалось представление о «своих» и «чужих». Новая дихотомия «свой — чужой» также изменяла свое внутреннее содержание; «своих» становилось значительно больше, но именно это привнесение нового элемента, т. е. связь с некими дальними «своими», служило важнейшим условием преодоления ограниченности племенных и этноцентрических ориентаций, давало важный результат — не только помогало расширять «свое» сообщество, но и преодолевать конфликтность с представителями «чужих».

Заключение

В конце XIX — начале XX вв. важнейшими условиями возрождения буддизма и национализма, их взаимодействия между собой, были: нахождение взаимного консенсуса; проведение «внутреннего» диалога между носителями учения Будды, представленных в разных политических, социальных, культурных средах; возрождение ранних религиозных практик. В таких условиях большую роль сыграли как отдельные личности (Р. Тагор, Тай-су, А. Доржиев и др.), так и религиозные институты (Далай-лама, Богдо-геген), которые в условиях политических трансформаций (Индия, Китай, Япония, страны Юго-Восточной Азии), продолжая придерживаться основных положений религии и культуры, в своих действиях ориентировались на реалии конкретных ситуаций, совершали поездки с практическими целями. Что касается роли политических событий и процессов, потрясавших Цинскую

и Российскую империю, то они, обладая собственной политико-исторической (региональной) спецификой, концептуально соотносились с проявлениями возрожденческих процессов в религии и национализме (в своих крайних проявлениях — панбуддизм и панмонголизм) в ее национальных окраинах (монголы, буряты, калмыки, тувинцы, народы Алтая). Следует особо выделить значение фигуры Далай-ламы в возрожденческих процессах у российских буддистов в начале XX в. и в признании важности этой религии царской властью.

Таким образом, существует взаимообусловленность культуры, социальной структуры (этнически окрашенной) и соответствующих моделей поведения, в узком понимании — религии и идентичности. Культурно-религиозный (в т.ч. исторический) трафарет оказывал безусловное воздействие на общество, наряду с постоянным переосмыслением культурных представлений и символов, непосредственно влияющих на поведение этноса и любого социального организма. Такой трафарет должен постоянно актуализироваться, т. е. должны вновь и вновь повторяться конфессионально-цивилизационные маркеры и паттерны, и контакты близких в культуре и религии народов. Именно такого рода обстоятельства мотивировали буддистов разных стран и регионов в конце XIX — начале XX вв. на совместную борьбу за сохранение своей идентичности, часто являвшейся немаловажной составной национализма.

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Научная статья / Research article

Южнокорейская «молодежная культура» 1970-х и государственная политика модернизации

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Аннотация. Рассматриваются особенности проекта модернизации Пак Чонхи и выясняется социально-экономическое и культурное влияние модернизации под руководством государства на возникновение и развитие южнокорейской «молодёжной культуры» 1970-х годов. Авторы выделяют конкретные политические меры и общие социально-экономические тренды, вызвавшие появление «молодёжной культуры»: быстрая урбанизация и резкий рост городского населения; увеличение доходов и уровня потребления домохозяйств; изменения в структуре разделении труда; расширение как школьного, так и университетского образования и распространение средств массовой информации. Наряду с этим анализируется влияние политики частичной и управляемой вестернизации и девелопменталистского дискурса 1960-х годов на формирование ценностей «молодёжной культуры» 1970-х. Результаты исследования объясняют, как такая государственная политика способствовала возникновению «молодёжной культуры» 1970-х, которая парадоксальным образом содержала в себе набор ценностей, отличных как от официальной идеологии периода Юсин, так и от ценностей старшего поколения. Поколение хангыля, родившееся после Корейской войны, стало главной движущей силой этой культуры, но столкнулось с непониманием и осуждением как со стороны старшего поколения, так и со стороны государства. В конце концов, под давлением государства, эта «молодёжная культура» пришла в упадок во второй половине 1970-х годов

Ключевые слова: Республика Корея, Юсин, молодежная культура, модернизация, вестернизация

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South Korean “Youth Culture” of the 1970s and State-Led Modernization

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Abstract. The article examines features of Park Chung-hee’s project of modernization and identifies socio-economic and cultural influence of such state-led modernization on the creation and development of South Korean “youth culture” of the 1970s. The authors highlight several specific policies and socio-economic trends that led the emergence of “youth culture”: rapid urbanization and drastic increase in urban population; increase in urban families’ incomes and consumption; changes in the division of labor; expansion of both school and university education and dissemination of mass media. Along with that, the article analyzes the influence of the policies of managed westernization and developmentalist discourse of the 1960s on the formation of values of this “youth culture”. The paper explains how these state-led policies paved the way for the creation of “youth culture” that paradoxically contained drastically different values compared to both official discourse of the Yusin government and values of parental generation. The new generation born after the Korean War, the so-called Hangeul generation, became the main driving force behind it, but faced repetitive misunderstanding and condemnation from both the older generation and the state. Eventually, due to state’s pressure, this “youth culture” experienced decline in the second half of the 1970s.

Keywords: Republic of Korea, Yusin, youth culture, modernization, westernization

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Введение

Период правления Пак Чонхи (1961–1979) считается решающей эпохой в истории Республики Корея, когда бедное и полуаграрное государство, опустошенное Корейской войной (1950–1953) и пострадавшее от некомпетентной политики Ли Сынмана (1948–1960), прошло через полномасштабную модернизацию и показало значительный экономический рост. Наряду с этим, с точки зрения истории развития южнокорейского

демократического движения, в силу авторитарного характера режима Пак Чонхи его президентство считается «темным временем», в течение которого происходили массовые нарушения гражданских свобод и подавлялись протесты. Можно выделить два периода правления Пак Чонхи: первый — относительно менее авторитарный период до 1972 г. (иногда называемый «мягким авторитаризмом» [1. Р. 8]); второй — после принятия конституции Юсин, установившей фактически режим единоличной власти президента Республики Корея.

Проводимая правительством Пак Чонхи политика модернизации (известная как «модернизация Родины», *Чогук кындэхва*) оказала огромное влияние не только на экономику страны, но и на все сферы жизни, и глубоко повлияла на саму ткань южнокорейского общества. Такая политика, однако, была полна противоречий, так как осуществлялась в крайне сжатых формах, и в которой «динамическое сосуществование несоизмеримых друг с другом исторических и социальных элементов приводило к построению весьма сложной и постоянно меняющейся социальной системы» [2. Р. 446]. Из-за этого правление Пак Чонхи часто рассматривается как ключевой период в южнокорейском опыте «сжатой модернизации» или «сжатой модерности».

Именно в этих условиях в начале 1970-х годов возник новый тип культуры, так называемая «молодежная культура» (*чхоннён мунхва*)¹ — вестернизированная городская культура молодых людей, принадлежавших к поколению, родившемуся после Корейской войны и иногда называемым «поколением хангыля» (*хангыль седэ*)². Этот термин появился потому, что из-за государственной образовательной политики молодежь в большинстве своем писала только на хангыле и их знание традиционных китайских иероглифов было ограниченным. Говоря о «молодежной культуре», следует различать два основных поколения — родительское (часто его называют *кисон седэ*), что можно дословно перевести как «устоявшееся поколение» или «зрелое поколение», в противовес «незрелому») и младшее поколение, вышеупомянутое *хангыль седэ*. «Молодежная культура» 1970-х являлась, по сути, одной из первых форм популярной культуры и была связана с зарождением массового общества в Республике Корея.

Люди, принадлежавшие к поколению хангыля, имели совершенно иной исторический опыт: они не застали японский колониализм и Вторую мировую войну, они также не были свидетелями Корейской войны — напротив, они

¹ Из-за того, что «*чхоннён мунхва*» является самоназванием для этого феномена, а также активно используется в научных и публицистических статьях на корейском языке, данная работа использует кавычки для того, чтобы отделить этот феномен первой половины 1970-х годов («молодежная культура») от молодежных культур в принципе.

² Тем не менее, следует отметить, что между разными поколениями не существует строгих границ, и иногда людей, родившихся в конце 1940-х годов, также относят к поколению хангыля.

видели, как их страна развивалась и восстанавливалась от послевоенной разрухи, избавляясь от полной нищеты. Следовательно, этос этого поколения заметно отличался от идеалов их родителей. Будучи непосредственными реципиентами такой «сжатой модерности», эти молодые люди имели иной набор основных ценностей (они были более индивидуалистичны и гедонистичны), поведения (их эмоциональность и чувственность отличалась от поколения родителей, и часто воспринималась как девиантная), устремлений и предпочтений в культурном потреблении (в плане моды, музыки, литературы, досуга и т. д.).

Основной тезис данного исследования состоит в том, что южнокорейская «молодежная культура» 1970-х годов была, по сути, побочным продуктом государственной политики модернизации. Это явление можно полностью понять только в социально-политическом, экономическом и культурном контекстах, созданных модернизационной политикой Пак Чонхи, и эти же контексты определили время ее возникновения (начало 1970-х годов). Таким образом, цель данного исследования заключается в выявлении влияния различных аспектов модернизации под руководством государства на создание и развитие южнокорейской «молодежной культуры» 1970-х годов. Подчеркивая различные направления такой политики, которая во многих отношениях привела к непредвиденным результатам, авторы надеются внести свой вклад в дискуссии о последствиях модернизации под руководством государства в незападных странах, часто проводимой в чрезвычайно «сжатой» форме.

«Молодежная культура» 1970-х и социально-экономическая политика Пак Чонхи

Вопрос о том, почему южнокорейская «молодежная культура» возникла именно в 1970-е годы, напрямую относится к проекту «модернизации Родины» в целом. 1970-е действительно стали его пиком, когда государство сосредоточилось на развитии тяжелой и химической промышленности³, а также на модернизации сельской местности в рамках Движения за новую деревню⁴. Однако, хотя это время стало определяющим не только с точки зрения экономического развития Республики Корея, но и в идеологическом и дискурсивном плане, сама основа для возникновения «молодежной культуры» была заложена ранее, в 1960-е годы.

³ Стремление Пак Чонхи развивать тяжелую и химическую промышленности восходит к началу 1960-х годов, но оно было отложено до 1970-х «из-за отсутствия иностранного капитала и технологий, а также ограниченных возможностей государства по принудительному сбережению» [3. Р. 119].

⁴ Движение за новую деревню было начато в 1970 г., но его активное внедрение началось именно после принятия конституции Юсин [4. Р. 133–147].

Модернизационная политика Пак Чонхи в целом не была последовательной и монолитной. К примеру, Джон Ли отмечает, что Пак Чонхи изначально не выступал за экспортно-ориентированную экономику и был больше сосредоточен на создании экономически независимого государства, экспортирующего сырье, полезные ископаемые и сельскохозяйственные товары, а потому «расхожее мнение, что южнокорейские планирующие органы [с самого начала] проводили экспортноориентированную стратегию индустриализации, является ретроспективным конструктом» [5. Р. 55]. Стратегия экономического развития Республики Корея стала такой, какой мы ее знаем, только во второй половине 1960-х годов — более того, в ней происходили существенные изменения и в конце 1960-х, и в 1970-е [5. Р. 55–117]. Следовательно, чтобы понять влияние политики модернизации на «молодежную культуру», следует изучить социально-экономические изменения, происходившие на протяжении всего периода правления Пак Чонхи.

Во-первых, с начала 1960-х и на протяжении 1970-х годов в Республике Корея происходила *стремительная урбанизация и миграция сельского населения в крупные города* (преимущественно в Сеул). По данным Пак Мённима, в период с 1960 по 1966 год из сельской местности в города мигрировало в общей сложности 1 409 000 человек, и темпы такой миграции еще больше выросли в период с 1966 по 1970 год, что привело к совокупной миграции более чем 2 млн человек в Сеул [6]. Следовательно, к началу 1970-х годов крупные города уже впитали в себя большие массы населения, что послужило фундаментом для развития «молодежной культуры» — более того, такая миграционная картина сохранится на протяжении всего десятилетия.

Несмотря на то, что чрезмерная миграция вела к переизбытку рабочей силы и серьезному социальному неравенству внутри города, она способствовала формированию новой идентичности горожан (в противовес сельским жителям). При сохранении классового деления и неравномерного распределения доходов внутри города после первых двух успешных пятилеток *доходы южнокорейских семей в среднем значительно выросли* [7], что привело к *росту потребления*. Например, данные, приведенные Ким Воном, свидетельствуют о том, что национальное потребление в целом увеличилось с 245,7 млрд вон в 1961 г. до 10 трлн вон в 1977 [8. С. 276]. В частности, такой рост уровня потребления позволил молодежи (в основном из среднего класса, но и низшие классы получили больше возможностей потреблять культурные блага) стать отдельной группой потребителей, способной влиять на процессы культурного производства.

Повышение покупательной способности среди молодежи произошло благодаря прогрессу в разделении труда и индустриализации, в результате которого молодежь среднего класса получила возможность не принимать участия в устоявшихся процессах производства. Так Ли Херим замечает, что в традиционных обществах все молодые люди должны стать

основными агентами производства по достижении определенного возраста, но к 1970-м годам часть городской молодежи «была освобождена от обязанности [участия в] труде и производстве» [9. С. 15]. Значительно выросло количество занятий для подработки: репетитором, ассистентом в институте или других организациях, билетером и т. п. У молодых людей появились различные возможности откладывать себе карманные деньги [9. С. 15]. Такая повышенная финансовая независимость позволила молодым людям самим решать, какие культурные продукты потреблять, что привело к другой модели потребления и поведения в свободное время, легко отличимой от старшего поколения.

Одним из важных факторов, оказавших влияние на отличную от родителей идентичность поколения хангыля, также была проводимая с 1960-х годов государственная *политика по расширению начального, среднего и высшего образования*. Расширение образования отвечало задачам подготовки квалифицированных работников и менеджеров, необходимых как для эффективного государственного управления, так и для заполнения новых рабочих мест, создаваемых в процессе модернизации производства. Но распространение всеобщего школьного образования имело дополнительные политические импликация, поскольку использовалось правительством для идеологической обработки и дисциплинирования населения с раннего возраста. Вместе с этим расширение системы начального образования не только дало молодым людям больше возможностей для трудоустройства, но и универсализировало их школьный опыт, таким образом сделав их более сплоченным социальным классом.

Несмотря на то, что в 1970-х годах студенты университетов все еще были относительно малочисленной привилегированной социальной группой, их число было намного больше, чем десять лет назад. Примечательно также и то, что противоречия в образовательной политике Пак Чонхи привели к ряду социальных проблем, например, к проблеме *чэсусэнов*⁵, которая была особенно серьезной до второй половины 1970-х годов [8. С. 356–363]. Но парадоксальным образом эти *чэсусэны* в то же время составляли значительную часть «молодежной культуры» 1970-х годов. Например, Ли Ёнми отмечает, что «„молодежную культуру“ 1970-х годов часто объясняют, сосредотачиваясь на студентах, но это объяснение справедливо только с той точки зрения, что студенты руководили направлением этой культуры. Однако в количественном отношении студенческая молодежь была довольно небольшой группой. Учащиеся средних и старших классов,

⁵ Проблема *чэсусэнов* («занимающихся учебой для повторной сдачи вступительных экзаменов») была связана с единым государственным экзаменом, необходимым для поступления в университет. Не получив нужное количество баллов или провалив экзамен, выпускники школ тратили по несколько лет на обучение в *хагвонах* (частных школах дополнительного образования) для успешной пересдачи экзамена.

чэсусэны и подростки, отказавшиеся от поступления в университет, были гораздо более многочисленны, чем студенты, и они составляли крепкий фундамент, который поддерживал эту „молодежную культуру“ [10].

Помимо роста экономической самостоятельности и образованности, еще одним условием, определявшим субъектность городской молодежи с 1960-х и на протяжении 1970-х годов стало *распространение средств массовой информации* (радио, ТВ, газет и т. д.) и широкомасштабное распространение массовой культуры через них. С середины 1960-х годов радио расширило свое присутствие в повседневной жизни — если в 1953 г. количество радиоприемников составляло всего 180 000, то в 1963, когда появилось коммерческое радио, оно увеличилось примерно в 9 раз до 1 666 000, а в 1973 г. — до 4 447 000 [11. С. 194]. Вместе с тем в 1970-х годах наблюдался быстрый рост количества телевизоров, особенно в крупных городах. Согласно имеющейся статистике, количество телевизоров в стране в 1970 г. составляло менее 400 тыс., а в 1979 г. их количество уже достигло почти 6 млн [12].

Роль в поддержке и распространении этих медиа принадлежала и государству: оно не только отказалось от монополизации новых видов СМИ, но и финансово поддерживало их; или же, к примеру, инициировало движение по отправке радио в деревни [13]. Оба этих типа СМИ должны были функционировать как идеологические инструменты, поддерживающие военную диктатуру. Ли Херим подчеркивает, что «средства массовой информации распространялись на институциональном уровне в политических целях. Военный режим в то время нуждался в средстве [...] для установления собственной легитимности и распространения идеологии „модернизации Родины“» [9. С. 18]. Тем не менее, эти медиа активно использовались «молодежной культурой» и способствовали ее распространению. Например, радио стало одним из важных каналов распространения музыки, созданной молодежью. Существовало несколько ди-джейских программ, к примеру, в форме ночных радиопрограмм, таких как «Полуночный дозвон», «Тебе, кто забыл ночь» и «Звездная ночь», которые представляли недавно записанные песни и рассказы слушателей, особенно молодых слушателей. Даже телевидение (медиа, которое гораздо более жестко контролировалось государством) показывало «молодежную культуру» в начале 1970-х годов, ярким примером чего было транслировавшееся на KBS-TV в начале 1973 г. шоу «Марш молодежи», где молодые фолк-исполнители исполняли свои песни [14].

Эти социально-экономические изменения оказали глубокое влияние на ценности и взгляды подрастающего поколения и провели черту между ними и поколением их родителей. Такое фундаментальное межпоколенческое различие лучше всего выражено в одной из статей, опубликованной в августе 1970 г. в газете «*Чунан ильбо*» под названием «Поколение хангыля среди тревог и конфликтов»:

«Сегодняшнее поколение хангыля не жило в социальных условиях страданий, бедности, беспокойства и давления, как поколение родителей. В отличие от старшего поколения, они не жили в эпоху, когда нельзя было выбирать ценности, когда нельзя было критиковать ценности и где допускалось только послушание. Как таковые, они живут в обществе с улучшенным экономическим благосостоянием, которое сформировалось в [более] открытых социальных условиях. Эти условия роста и развития естественным образом создали различия в их образе мышления и ценностях» [15].

Таким образом, социально-экономические условия модернизации под руководством государства стали основой для возникновения «молодежной культуры» 1970-х годов в Республике Корея. Несмотря на то, что некоторые ранние формы молодежных культур существовали и до этого времени, их масштаб был гораздо меньше и они не существовали в контексте массового общества. Соответственно, только в 1970-е годы социально-экономические условия позволили возникнуть относительно массовой молодежной культуре.

«Молодежная культура» 1970-х и дискурсы вестернизации и традиции

Кроме общей социально-экономической политики, на становление «молодежной культуры» оказали решающее влияние и более широкие дискурсивные аспекты «модернизации Родины». Таким образом, чтобы полностью понять это явление, важно изучить культурные и идеологические аспекты правления Пак Чонхи, уделив особое внимание сложным отношениям между модернизацией и вестернизацией в рамках проекта *Чогук кындэхва*, а также на то, как эти отношения менялись с течением времени.

Несмотря на противоречия в экономической политике Пак Чонхи, отмеченные ранее, можно сказать, что с момента его прихода к власти экономическое развитие естественным образом становилось приоритетным по сравнению с другими сферами общественной жизни. Кроме того, по крайней мере в этой области конечная цель (превращение в богатую и развитую страну) была ясна, даже если процесс достижения такой цели не был. В этом смысле дихотомия *хучжингук-сончжингук* (неразвитая, отстающая страна — развитое, передовое государство) была одной из важнейших идеологических конструкций как в 1960-е, так и в 1970-е годы. Эта идеологема делила страны на два типа: во-первых, богатые западные (или, по крайней мере, вестернизированные, как Япония) государства с развитой индустриальной экономикой; во-вторых, бедные незападные (и, следовательно, невестернизированные) государства, не прошедшие через модернизацию. В книге «Путь нации: идеология социальной реконструкции» (выпущенной в начале 1960-х, вскоре после военного переворота) сам Пак Чонхи писал о том, что «очевидно, что мериллом цивилизации сегодня является Запад».

[16. С. 11]. Внутри этой дихотомии упор делался на количественные критерии, такие как ВВП, ВВП на душу населения, объемы производства и экспорта (как специфические аспекты экономики развитых стран) [16. С. 12] или, говоря словами Ким Чжонгхэ, «девелопменталистские термины» [17. Р. 388].

На протяжении 1960-х годов Республика Корея постоянно маркировалась как «неразвитая страна», и для того, чтобы снять оковы бедности и отсталости, корейцам надлежало приложить все усилия для участия в экономике модернизации. Пройдя через нее, страна сможет в будущем, наконец, стать «передовым государством», так что эта дихотомия, по сути, действовала как дополнительный инструмент политической и экономической мобилизации. Главной моделью и конкретным образом «развитой страны» для РК были США, что во многом было следствием их тесных политических и экономических связей. Кан Мёнгу пишет, что «США, внедряя западные идеи и товары в Южную Корею во время ускоренной модернизации [...], стали образцом, которого Республика Корея должна была придерживаться во всех секторах. [...] Южная Корея стремилась походить на США [...] в политике, общественном устройстве, экономике и культуре» [18. Р. 183].

Кроме того, дискурс «передового государства» был тесно связан свосприятием корейской истории, культуры и даже идентичности. На протяжении 1960-х годов Пак Чонхи неоднократно осуждал корейскую традиционную культуру (неотъемлемой частью которой было конфуцианство или, если быть точнее, неоконфуцианство) как «коренную причину фракционности, формализма, лакейства и непрактичного дискурса, которые „деформируют“ политическое развитие, вызывают социальный застой и тормозят прогресс науки и техники» [3. Р. 124]. До периода Юсин Пак Чонхи также определял корейскую историю как «историю, от которой следует избавиться, историю подчинения сильному, фракционности и унижений», в таких книгах, как вышеупомянутый «Путь нации: идеология социальной реконструкции» [19].

Из-за этого в 1960-е годы политика государства колебалась между стремлением к экономической модернизации и пренебрежением к традиционным корейским ценностям. Однако, поскольку модернизация сама по себе была универсализирована на основе исторического опыта Запада, она была неизбежно связана с вестернизацией. Более того, в 1960-е годы правительство Пак Чонхи целенаправленно продвигало вестернизацию в некоторых сферах жизни, например, в моде [20]. Стоит отметить, что основные императивы, стоявшие за этим, носили экономический и прагматический характер (например, традиционный ханбок был неудобен для выполнения фабричных работ и требовал много ткани для его изготовления), тем не менее они оказали определенное влияние на сознание подрастающего поколения хангыля.

Другим ярким примером политики вестернизации, напрямую повлиявшим на зарождающуюся «молодежную культуру», которая имела

тенденцию быть сексуально более открытой и эмоциональной, была семейная политика. Государственная Программа планирования семьи была направлена на поощрение сексуальности (особенно женской, что подробно освещалось в различных журналах, выходивших в рамках этой программы), что шло вразрез с традиционными конфуцианскими представлениями [21. С. 809]. Несмотря на то, что основная причина такой политики носила опять же экономический характер (правительство Республики Корея стремилось снизить высокую рождаемость, поскольку она считалась препятствием для экономического развития), она имела долгосрочные последствия. В результате жесткая связь между сексом и деторождением, присущая корейской традиционной культуре, была разорвана путем добавления категории удовольствия, что было быстро воспринято молодым поколением.

Одной из наиболее важных частей политики вестернизации была трансформация образовательной системы, которая уже была вестернизирована (или, если быть точнее, американизирована) в 1960-х и начале 1970-х годов, когда поколение хангыля ходило в школу и получало начальное и среднее образование. Ли Ёнми пишет, что:

«Как поколение, которое не испытало колониального господства или войны, в школе они изучали хангыль, корейскую историю и *демократию в американском стиле*, они росли, *постоянно видя [людей], стремящихся к либерализму в американском стиле*, и их старших братьев и сестер, которые протестовали. Более того, такие молодые люди, рожденные в послевоенной атмосфере, составляли „большинство“, а взрослые проявляли удивительное рвение, чтобы дать образование [своим детям], дабы как следует воспитать этих „детей новой страны“» [10].

Внутривестернизированной системы школьного образования происходило знакомство поколения хангыля с западной культурой, иногда даже в ущерб корейской традиционной культуре. Ян Хиын, знаковая фолк-исполнительница 1970-х, писала, что «даже во время уборки в школе мы слушали *менуэты*» [22] и, отвечая на критику касательно того, что «молодежная культура» слишком вестернизирована и «не принадлежит корейской традиции», задавала в ответ другой вопрос: «Но разве это наша вина в том, что у нас никогда не было возможности познакомиться с *пхансори* или другими традиционными корейскими музыкальными инструментами и мелодиями во время школьного обучения?» [22].

Тем не менее, в 1970-х годах (а точнее, после принятия конституции Юсин) Пак Чонхи изменяет свою политику в отношении вестернизации и модернизации. С этого времени он начинает активно утверждать и развивать традиционную корейскую культуру, которая теперь рассматривалась как ключевой элемент построения нового общества. Более того, для реализации этой новой идеологии было реорганизовано государственное управление

культурой. Культурная сфера стала более институционализированной (в случае, например кинематографа) и подверглась жесткой цензуре. Для поддержки «здоровой» (то есть идеологически правильной) культуры правительство также вводило пятилетние планы культурного развития, и в 1970-е годы эти планы в основном тратились на традиционную культуру [23. Р. 40].

После принятия новой конституции Юсин в 1972 г. взгляд Пак Чонхи на национальную историю претерпел изменения. С успехом Планов по экономическому и социальному развитию и установлением режима Юсин он начинает описывать корейский исторический опыт как «историю преодоления многих невзгод и национальных кризисов» [23. Р. 40]. Таким образом, только в 1970-е годы национализм полностью перерос в новую форму национальной гордости, и уже не был самоуничижительным, как это было в прошлом.

Кроме того, с начала 1970-х Пак Чонхи начал горячо превозносить сельских жителей и сельские районы в целом. До этого сельская местность и люди, которые там жили, были первоочередными объектами модернизации, символом отсталости, однако в 1970-х Пак Чонхи начал подчеркивать важность сельской местности в противовес городам. Хван Бёнчжу отмечает, что Пак Чонхи «критиковал город как место, подобное Содому и Гоморре, которое было испорчено вестернизацией, и восхвалял сельские районы как сокровищницу давних национальных традиций» [8. С. 192]. С этой точки зрения сельская местность и ее жители были поставлены в центр новой стратегии «модернизации без вестернизации».

В этой ситуации режим Пак Чонхи также начал подчеркивать критику вестернизации и выступать за незападный модернизационный дискурс, сильную национальную идентичность и субъективные национальные взгляды. Ко всему прочему, это было связано и с дискурсивной стратегией «локализации» демократии на политическом уровне [24. С. 103]. Государство предпринимает попытку частичного возрождения традиционных корейских ценностей именно в 1970-е годы, когда корейская национальная идентичность воспринималась как стремительно исчезающая в процессе модернизации, а некоторые интеллектуалы выступали за «кореизацию» модернизации. В этом смысле весь этот процесс может быть отчасти понят как «политизация традиционных ценностей вообще и конфуцианства в частности, и как „конфуцианизация современности“» [25. Р. 134].

Таким образом, более точным способом описать идеологическую и культурную политику Пак Чонхи в 1960-х годах было бы назвать ее попыткой *частичной и управляемой вестернизации*. В целом государственная стратегия того времени предусматривала вестернизацию ради модернизации, и степень такой вестернизации в основном диктовалась экономическими стимулами, которые позволили бы экономике страны расти. Однако эта «центрированность» на экономике имела далеко идущие

последствия, которые в конечном итоге вышли за рамки чисто экономических и прагматических измерений и вылились на другие сферы жизни, а именно в культурную сферу.

К началу 1970-х гг., когда произошла переориентация государственного дискурса с управляемой вестернизации на «кореизацию» модернизации, поколение хангыля уже получило начальное и среднее образование в более вестернизированной среде (более того, внедрение в систему образования или подконтрольных власти СМИ этих «заново открытых» традиционных ценностей не было быстрым и легким процессом). При этом было бы преувеличением утверждать, что государство полностью отказалось от политики вестернизации — в некоторых сферах продолжали преобладать тенденции по вестернизации, например, в отношении планирования семьи или сексуальной политики (хотя опять же это почти полностью диктовалось экономическими соображениями) [21]. Тем не менее, этот идеологический сдвиг произошел относительно поздно, и к 1970-м годам урбанизированное поколение хангыля уже оторвалось от жестких традиционных ценностей, присущих старшим поколениям.

Это, в свою очередь, повлияло на их восприятие Кореи, ее социальных и культурных особенностей, и сделало молодых людей, выросших в 1960-х годах, более восприимчивыми к западной культуре и менее восприимчивыми к корейской традиционной культуре и ценностям. Обозначая Республику Корея как неразвитую страну, которая всеми силами должна была стремиться к уровню США, Японии или стран Европы, государство способствовало тяги молодежи к культурным продуктам западного образца.

Выросшее в этих условиях поколение хангыля видело, что наиболее политически близкое развитое государство — США — отличается не только экономически, но и культурно, и информацию о современной американской культуре вообще и американской контркультуре в частности можно было легко найти в газетах и еженедельных журналах того времени. Интересно, что такие настроения прямо выражались в некоторых газетных статьях — рассуждая на тему молодежных культур в принципе, Ким Бёнйик еще в 1970 г. писал, что «несмотря на то, что Республика Корея является государством, не развитым экономически (*кёнчжечжок хучжингук*), она чувствительна к «передовой культуре» (*сончжин мунхва*), и признаки молодежной культуры медленно, но широко проявляются, вне зависимости от того, возникают ли они естественным образом или являются просто модными веяниями» [26].

Иными словами, дискурс «передового государства», транслируемый властью, стал дополнительной предпосылкой для «молодежной культуры». Начиная с 1960-х годов южнокорейская молодежь стремилась подражать американским культурным тенденциям, связанным с зарождающейся

там молодежной культурой, например, в моде (мини-юбки, длинные волосы) или музыке (психоделический рок и фолк-музыка). Очевидно, что частичная вестернизация в этом смысле неизбежно началась сразу после окончания Второй мировой войны, когда американские солдаты высадились на Корейском полуострове, но контекст стремления стать развитой страной многократно способствовал такой вестернизации. К середине — концу 1960-х годов молодые южнокорейцы перешли от простого подражания американской культуре к созданию локализованных и вполне аутентичных ее версий — например, корейский рок или фолк-музыка имели иные культурные коннотации и стилевые особенности по сравнению с аналогами в США, и они играли особенно важную роль в южнокорейской «молодежной культуре» 1970-х годов. Именно в это время меняется и сущность популярной музыки, и «вместо того, чтобы просто быть инструментом развлечения [...] поп-музыка все больше стала признаваться как способ социального и политического самовыражения» [27. С. 31].

Южнокорейская «молодежная культура» 1970-х, являясь результатом государственной политики модернизации, была чужда (или даже враждебна) режиму Юсин, который маркировал ее как «декадентскую» и вводил различные меры, направленные на ее подавление (запрет некоторых песен, запрет на дискотеки, поддержание комендантского часа, мероприятия по контролю длины волос и мини-юбок и т. д.). В конце концов, все это привело к ее распаду после 1975 г., когда были приняты «Президентские чрезвычайные меры по охране национальной безопасности и общественного порядка», которые усилили идеологический контроль за сферой культуры, и разразился так называемый «марихуановый скандал», во время которого под арест попали ключевые деятели «молодежной культуры» 1970-х годов [28. С. 298–302].

Заключение

Таким образом, политика модернизации, проводимая правительством Пак Чонхи, создала социально-экономическую основу для возникновения «молодежной культуры» в начале 1970-х годов, городской культуры поколения хангыля, которая находилась под влиянием западных трендов и была одной из первых форм поп-культуры в Республике Корея. Необходимо выделить несколько конкретных политик и социально-экономических тенденций: стремительная урбанизация и резкий рост городского населения; рост доходов городских семей, что привело к росту потребления; изменения в разделении труда; расширение как школьного, так и университетского образования и распространение средств массовой информации. Говоря об идеологической сфере, особое внимание следует уделить вестернизации 1960-х годов, обусловленной стремлением РК стать развитой страной,

подобно США, а также меняющейся политике в отношении традиционной культуры и ценностей.

«Молодежная культура» 1970-х годов достигла такого масштаба и приобрела свои черты именно в этих социально-экономических условиях. По большому счету, в 1960-е правительство Пак Чонхи стремилось провести модернизацию, которая включала бы лишь частичную и управляемую вестернизацию ради экономического развития. Однако всесторонне контролировать приток западной культуры и новых ценностей оказалось невозможным, и молодежь, выросшая в то время, впитала их и стала менее чувствительной как к государственной идеологии, так и к ценностям старшего поколения.

Ценности поколения хангыля, выросшего в 1960-е, противоречили изменениям в идеологии проекта модернизации, произошедшие после принятия конституции Юсин. Таким образом, «молодежную культуру» 1970-х годов можно назвать как *побочным продуктом государственной политики модернизации*, так и своего рода ответом на нее. В конечном итоге «молодежная культура» того времени столкнулась с сильным давлением со стороны государства и пришла в упадок во второй половине 1970-х. Последующие формы молодежных культур будут отличаться от нее, так как они возникнут в других социально-экономических и политических условиях.

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СОВРЕМЕННЫЙ МИР CONTEMPORARY WORLD

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Research article / Научная статья

Evolution and transformation processes of China's educational policy and governance in 1978–2019

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Abstract. Since the beginning of the period of reforms and openness, the PRC has constantly promoted a phased reform of the education system to modernize educational functions, rise new builders of socialism and support economic transformations in the country. Due to the active regulatory and management work, described in detail in the article with the help of instrumental observation, China gradually achieved several important results. State educational policy shifted from focusing on expanding the scope and improving the quality of education to its connotation-based development. The study of the Chinese experience of modernization of the education system has not only theoretical, but also practical significance, since successful Chinese examples of deep and rapid transformation of the national administrative system and state functions, as well as a clear adjustment of the characteristics of educational policy to current national priorities can be considered for partial application in other countries, including Russia. In order to adapt elements of the Chinese experience to the realities of other countries, such as Russian Federation, it is necessary to fully understand the context, features and stages of the educational policy evolution of the People's Republic of China, which is done in this article.

Keywords: China, educational policy, educational governance, regulatory framework, education institutions, functional transformation

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Эволюция и трансформационные процессы политики и управления в сфере образования в Китае в 1978–2019 гг.

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Аннотация. С начала Политики реформ и открытости КНР постоянно продвигала поэтапную реформу системы образования с целью модернизации образовательных функций, воспитания новых строителей социализма и поддержки экономических преобразований в стране. Благодаря активной регуляторной и управленческой работе (подробно исследованной с помощью инструментального наблюдения) Китай постепенно добился нескольких важных результатов. Государственная образовательная политика сместила акцент с расширения охвата и повышения качества образования на его развитие, основанное на коннотации. Изучение китайского опыта модернизации системы образования имеет не только теоретическое, но и практическое значение, поскольку успешные китайские кейсы глубокой и быстрой трансформации национальной административной системы и государственных функций, а также четкой корректировки характеристик образовательной политики в соответствии с текущими национальными приоритетами могут быть рассмотрены для частичного применения в других странах, включая Россию. Чтобы адаптировать элементы китайского опыта к российским реалиям, необходимо полностью понять контекст, особенности и этапы эволюции образовательной политики Китайской Народной Республики, что и было сделано авторами исследования.

Ключевые слова: Китай, образовательная политика, управление образованием, нормативно-правовая база, образовательные учреждения, функциональная трансформация

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Introduction

Education is one of the basic tools of modern society and nation-states. It not only carries general cultural and professional functions but also represents a channel for the distribution of social statuses and a factor in the formation of a new quality of the economy. The state educational policy in the narrow sense is a system of measures aimed at implementing the priorities of the state in the field of education, therefore, using its example, it is possible to objectively trace the evolution of national goals in a set period. Despite the series of difficult

events of the 20th century, consistent and carefully controlled from above educational reforms in China have become an example of one of the most successful transformations in this area [1]. The role of education in China's development is difficult to overestimate — it acts as one of the foundations of the security and survival of the socialist regime and helps to maintain the accelerated pace of economic development. The educational policy reflects the political and economic reforms carried out by the Government and the CPC — this area serves as a kind of litmus test for studying the intentions of the top leadership and is of serious interest to foreign researchers. Studying the evolution of the formation of the educational policy of modern China can deepen the understanding of the social processes and factors of this country and expand the empirical knowledge base on the behavior of the rising powers. In addition, a certain similarity of the educational systems of Russia and China, supplemented by an improved understanding of the PRC's education governance, opens space for all kinds of comparative studies.

This article is supposed to consider the evolution of the educational policy of the PRC in the format of natural interaction between such categories as basic and higher education [2]. Each of the categories is considered in accordance with the ideological aspect – the educational policy and practice of the CPC and the principles of socialist education with Chinese specifics. This paper seeks to form a theoretical and practical understanding of education policy in China in recent decades and to answer the question about how the government adjusted the management of education in China between 1978 and 2019 in accordance with national priorities?

Research

In the PRC, the core of the education governance system has always been and remains the relationship between the government and educational institutions, that is, state functions and methods of managing higher education, or the issues of “what to manage” and “how to manage” [3]. For this reason, since the establishment of the PRC, its main goal in the field of educational policy has been to create a “centralized and unified” management system [4]. During the ten years of the upheavals of the “cultural revolution” (1966–1976), education in general and higher education in particular in China turned out to be the most affected industry and an extreme manifestation of the “revolutionary model of education” in a specific political situation [5]. This forced the country's leadership to take measures aimed at reviving and modernizing the national education system, which coincided with the beginning of a grandiose practice of reforms and openness. The period of transition of the educational policy of the People's Republic of China from the correction of management to reform and development began.

The first installations in this direction were adopted at the third plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 11th convocation in 1978 and fixed at the 12th CPC Congress in 1982, which also added education to the number of priority links along with agriculture, energy, and transport [6]. The new set course implied the introduction of nine years of compulsory education, the elimination of illiteracy, the development of vocational and higher education. With these goals, the projects “Basic popularization of nine-year compulsory education” and “Basic eradication of illiteracy among young people” (referred to in Chinese discourse as “liang ji” (“two foundations”)) were launched. The CPC raised the “two foundations” to the “highest priority”. The emphasis was placed on the effectiveness of training as a necessary condition for strengthening the economy through improving the quality of the workforce [7. P. 992]. In 1985, a full-fledged reform of the education system began with the adoption of “Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Reform of the Education System” was adopted [8] and “Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of China”, which provided legal guarantees of human rights in the field of children’s education [9]. These transformations established the strategic status of educational policy, emphasized the need for the development of high technology, supported the tradition of respect for teachers and education, and set the goal of education to develop human resources for economic modernization.

The basis and inspiration for the ideological aspect of the first educational transformations was laid by Deng Xiaoping’s educational theory [10]. At the beginning of reforms and openness, Deng Xiaoping inherited and developed Mao Zedong’s enlightenment thought from a scientific point of view, establishing the strategic status of education as a priority direction of development, and maintaining the tradition of respect for knowledge, talents, teachers and education for the party and society: “Education must face modernization, face the world, and face the future. ... Science and technology are the first productive force” [11. P. 210]. These provisions of Deng Xiaoping’s educational theory emphasized for the first time that China should not only have its own high technologies, but also occupy the first place in the global high-tech sphere. This became a priority for many years.

In March 1986 Deng Xiaoping approved a letter proposing Wang Daheng and four other scientists to track and promote high-tech research and launched the high-tech research and development plan “863 Program” [11. P. 214]. According to it, universities had to actively participate in high-tech research, cultivate outstanding talents, and rely on global breakthroughs in high technology. In 1987, the report of the 13th National Congress of the CPC proposed “to put the development of scientific and technological progress and education in the first place, so that economic construction could be translated into the direction of relying on scientific and technological progress and improving the quality of workers” [11. P. 230].

In 1988, the State Council promulgated the “Regulations on the Eradication of Illiteracy”, which contained specific provisions on literacy targets, standards, planning goals, as well as policies and measures. At that time, there were 180.03 million illiterate and semi-illiterate people over the age of 15 in China. Their share in the total population was 15.5 %. It was planned that by the end of 1992, the number of years of education per capita for adult citizens would average 6.5 years [12. P. 17].

The core of Deng Xiaoping’s theory of education was the transformation of the heavy burden of the population into a resource of talents: “In China, the strength of national power and the sustainability of economic development increasingly depend on the quality of workers, as well as on the number and quality of intellectuals. In a country with a population of one billion people, education should be encouraged, since the advantages of huge human resources are second to none” [11. P. 214]. This argument gave China a new mission to develop human resources and social productivity in education.

Priority to the development of education implied financial investments in this area, which was a pragmatic characteristic of Deng Xiaoping’s education theory [10]. According to him, “the correlation of economic development with the development of education, science, culture and health care is broken, and spending on education, science, culture and health care is too small and disproportionate” [11. P. 210]. Deng Xiaoping repeatedly asked high-ranking party cadres to pay attention to the development of educational financing, emphasizing the incompetence of those who do not care about this area: “Be patient in other aspects and even sacrifice a little speed to solve the problem of education well” [11. P. 173–174]. The popularization of compulsory education was supposed to follow the path of developing large-scale education in poor countries, using the opportunities of social mobilization and party organizations at all levels. The Chinese people had to “tighten their belts” to raise funds for the management of schools. Nevertheless, these ideas laid the political foundation for the formulation and implementation of the goal of achieving 4 % investment in education financing.

Thus, the first results of modernization were the approval of the concept of compulsory free nine-year education and the introduction of guarantees for its receipt, because of which the number of students in schools increased slightly and the gap in the availability of education between the city and the countryside was reduced [7. P. 992–994]. Until the 1990s, the main goal of educational policy in China was the restoration of the system and indicators that existed before the “cultural revolution”, and the main motivation was the education of “new builders of socialism” capable of supporting the course of creating a socialist system of a market economy.

Despite the rhetoric and all the efforts, by the early 1990s China was still the second country in the world in terms of the number of illiterate

populations, there was a serious gap in the quality of education in urban and rural areas and an extremely low percentage of university applicants among rural residents. After five years of work since the release of the “Regulations on the Eradication of Illiteracy”, the illiteracy rate among the adult population was reduced to less than 15 %, and the illiteracy rate among young people decreased to less than 5 %, but the indicators of progress were insignificant [12. P. 18]. The educational policy had to gain a deeper meaning and be adjusted in accordance with the economic transformations of the country. It was the principles of building a socialist market economy that became the basis for reform during this period, because economic prosperity depended a lot on the qualitative characteristics of workers.

As a result, in 1992 the Central Committee of the party decided to promote the reform of the education system vigorously, paying special attention to comprehensively stimulating the viability of existing schools. The reform included the school management system, the investment system, the assessment system, and the employment system for further education. In 1993, at the fourth session of the 6th convocation of the National People’s Congress, the “Teachers Law of the People’s Republic of China” was adopted [13], and in 1995 at the third plenary session of the NPC — “Education Law of the People’s Republic of China” [14], which approved the socialist modernized education system and the statuses of participants in educational relations. The financing of public education, step-by-step management and step-by-step responsibility were introduced into practice: from now on, the main source of finance for educational institutions became government appropriations divided into appropriations of the central government and local authorities.

Higher education caused more difficulties than basic education. The Chinese higher education system was formed during the first five-year plan, which is compatible with the highly centralized planned economic system in the early days of the founding of the PRC [15]. Under this system, ordinary colleges and universities were divided into “strips” (“tiao”) of the central system and “sections” (“kuai”) of local government. Some integrated universities, as well as scientific, technical, and ordinary colleges were under the direct jurisdiction of the central Department of Education, while other central departments participated in the management of specialized higher education institutions that trained talents for their industries. With the market transformation of the economy, such an education system became a narrow, “bottleneck” (“pingjing”), limiting development [10].

Due to the influence of political upheavals in the late 1980s, the reform of the higher education management system abruptly stopped, and only three years later it was revised. In 1988, the State Council issued a “Temporary Regulation on Responsibility for the Management of Higher Education”, describing the responsibilities of the newly created National Commission

on Education for the Management of Higher Education. The “Opinions of the National Education Commission on accelerating the reform and active development of general higher education”, approved by the State Council in early 1993, indicated the need of reform is to align relations between the government, society and schools and make higher education institutions independent legal entities in accordance with the principle of separation of powers [16. P. 166].

In February 1993 The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council published a more authoritative “Outline for Education Reform and Development in China” to “reform a system that is too comprehensive and too unified”. The Central Committee stressed that the reform of the higher education system was mainly to resolve the relationship between the government and higher education institutions, the central government and local authorities, the National Education Commission and various business departments of the Central Government, as well as gradually establish a system of macro-management of the government and independent management of institutions of public interest [17]. At the same time, it was established that legislation explaining the rights and obligations of higher education institutions should be adopted in the relations between the Government and institutions. This was aimed at ensuring the transition of that higher educational institutions into a real legal entity focused on social self-government [16. P. 167–172].

In 1995, at the National Scientific and Technical Conference of Education, Jiang Zemin proposed to implement a strategy of rejuvenation of the country with the science [12. P. 18]. In 1997, the 15th National Congress of the CPC clearly stated that it was necessary to “grow hundreds of millions of highly qualified workers and tens of millions of specialized talents that are compatible with the requirements of modernization and development of our country’s huge advantages in the field of human resources” [18]. Next year, the National Leading Group for Scientific and Technical Education was established. Thanks to this strategy, perception of education as a ground for the emergence and spread of innovations began to form in China.

In 1995, “Opinions of the National Education Commission on Deepening the Reform of the Higher Education System” were published. Since that the development of educational materials and programs at all levels became the center of the implementation of the goals of quality education. The document also introduced the concepts of “organizer” (“juban zhe”), “manager” (“guanxue”) and “university manager” (“banxue zhe”) and developed the goal of institutional reform until 2000 to introduce these terms into practice [19. P. 8]. Putting forward these three concepts theoretically did not make sense, because it did not help to provide greater autonomy to universities. In addition, they were not easy to distinguish and understand in practice, especially for state higher education institutions.

In fact, the process of reform of the higher education system in the 1990s did not concern the rights and obligations of these three concepts. He only developed a dialogue on two-level management and integration of regulations, as well as on specific measures such as “joint construction”, “university unification” and so on [19. P. 9–11]. These measures achieved some results, but most of them were carried out from top to bottom through administrative channels, combined with simultaneous reform of the financing system and the implementation of several major projects. Many aspects of the higher education management system not only failed to change the situation with excessive inclusiveness and excessive unification, but even concentrated resources for university management in the hands of the administration, which strengthened its power and authoritarianism. As a result, relations between the Government and universities only worsened.

Nevertheless, in 1998, at the fourth session of the 9th convocation of the National People’s Congress, based on the “Education Law of the People’s Republic of China”, the “Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China” was adopted, emphasizing the previously outlined course on socialist modernization, combining study with production and a socialist market economy [20]. The State Council was appointed as the coordinating body for resolving financing issues. In 1999, the “Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Reform of the Education System” was adopted. It was aimed at improving the quality characteristics of students, the formation of self-discipline and personal development in order to maximally contribute to the development of socialism idea. In the same year, adjustments and reforms were made to the management systems of 25 colleges and universities, 34 colleges and universities for adults, as well as hundreds of secondary schools and technical schools. Subsequently, the State Council adopted a “Decision on Further Adjustment of the Management System and the Structure of the Placement of Educational Institutions Belonging to the Departments of the State Council” [12. P. 20].

In 1999, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji proposed to expand the scope of admission to higher education institutions, as this could ease the pressure on basic education and thereby contribute to improving its quality. Human capital development remained a priority, but still with clear economic challenges behind it. This had some positive results: over the next 5 years, the average annual growth rate of the number of university students was 26.5 %, and the average annual growth rate of the number of graduate students was 28.5 %. By 2006, the number of university students reached 25 million [21. P. 110–112]. For the first time, Chinese higher education in China began to move from an elite stage to a popular one.

The entry into the 21st century became a new stage for the PRC in the field of educational policy. By 2000, the goal of the “two foundations” was achieved

as planned: China got rid of the status of a great illiterate country, nine-year education was spread over most of the country [12. P. 25]. But from that point forward the PRC had the task of adapting to the demands of the time, building a modern educational system that would manage universities in accordance with the principles of the rule of law, independent governance, democratic oversight, and public participation [22. P. 11–13]. Building a new type of relationship between the government, educational institutions and society became highly important again [23. P. 4].

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the improvement of China's higher education policy has been based on six basic needs: striving for world status (construction of "world-class universities and first-class specialties"), systematic marketization, revolutionary popularization, structural optimization, organizational digitization, and comprehensive internationalization. This model was called the Chinese University 3.0 model, fundamentally different from the earlier versions [21. P. 118].

In November 2002, the 16th National Congress of the CPC was held, at which the goal of comprehensively building a wealthy society was put forward, which also influenced educational practice. A course was taken to increase equality in education. According to Hu Jintao, "equality in education is an integral part of the social justice that the party strives for" [24]. The State Council adopted several measures to promote equality in education. First, free basic education has begun to be introduced in urban and rural areas across the country. To help vulnerable groups of the population (families with economic difficulties, children of city migrant workers, residents of rural areas) and to solve the problem of difficulties with school attendance, the policy of "two benefits and one allowance" ("liang mian yi bu") began to be implemented for them at the stage of compulsory education [10].

Secondly, a number of social policy measures were taken for vulnerable groups of the population: a national system and mechanism of student loans have been created; the system of financing policy for students experiencing economic difficulties has been improved; the problem of education for "three categories of children" ("san tong") (girls, disabled children and children from ethnic minorities in poor areas); a program of educational "partner support" ("dui kou zhiyuan") (for example, "Partner support for school projects in poor areas in the East and West" and "Large and medium-sized cities partner support from large and medium-sized cities for school projects in poor areas of autonomous regions, municipalities, directly subordinated to the Central Government") [12. P. 25].

At the turn of the century, all strata of society began to put forward higher demands for the reform of the higher education system. China's accession to the WTO in 2001 also spurred the legislative process in the field of educational policy to increase compliance with the requirements

of the world market [25. P. 14–15]. From an economic point of view, over the past decades, the central Government had been playing a leading role in the development and financial support of the higher education. By the 2000s this role had significantly increased compared to the 1980s and 1990s [10. P. 21]. The increase in university funding made it possible to strengthen the capabilities of Chinese universities in the field of scientific research. From 1978 to 2007, the global share of SSCI publications in China increased from 0.01 % to 0.67 %, of which more than half were published over the past 10 years mainly due to accelerated investments in funds and personnel [26]. New actions were required to preserve positive results.

For these reasons, reform policies were implemented one after another in full swing. In 2004, the Ministry of Education published the “2003–2007 Education Revitalization Action Plan” [27]. The plan was based on the “Law on Administrative Licensing”, promulgated in 2003, and proposed to reform the system of administrative approval of education, clean up the projects of administrative licensing of education and explore the possibility of creating a “modern university system” [28]. This concept was first proposed in the “Draft of the 11th Five-Year Plan for the Development of National Education”, published in 2007 [29].

At the same time, vocational education began to develop intensively. In 2005, the State Council published the “Decision on vigorously developing vocational education”, which clearly traced the orientation of education to service and employment: promoting the transformation of vocational education from planned training to market-based, from direct public administration to macro-management, from the traditional orientation of vocational education to employment [25. P. 4]. Guided by the policy of these “three transformations” (“san ge zhuanbian”), professional colleges and universities have begun to overcome the dilemma of “plan and demand” (“jihua yu xuqiu”). Changes were made to the curricula, and a talent training model was introduced as part of an employment orientation with the help of a team of teachers “with two mentors” (“shuangshi xing”) [15. P. 7].

Due to the orientation of the management of professional educational institutions to the education of talents and the need for employment, interaction between professional colleges and local enterprises and authorities was strengthened. This made it possible to increase the employment opportunities of students, strengthen their professional literacy and entrepreneurial abilities. Such transformations of vocational education as a result made a significant contribution to the “made in China” program and the industrial revolution [25. P. 19–20]. New highly qualified employees, graduated from the transformed vocational schools, contributed to the active development of the manufacturing industry, construction, information technology, transport, and cultural tourism in China.

Another trend of the Chinese educational policy of the 2000s was the development of independent innovative and technological talents, whose connection with the sustainable development of the country's scientific and technical industry was noted by Hu Jintao at the National Scientific and Technical Conference [30]. The National Strategy for Cultivating Innovation contributed to the reform of basic education curricula. Thus, in February 2001, the State Council approved the “Plan for the Reform of the Curriculum of Basic Education”, which marked the official transition of education from the theoretical level to the practical [15. P. 7]. In the same year, the State Council approved the establishment of a Textbook Development Center for Basic Curricula under the Ministry of Education of China to strengthen research in the field of educational policy.

In 2005, the Ministry of Education published “Opinions on Further Strengthening of Undergraduate Teaching in Higher Education Institutions”, emphasizing the importance of improving the quality of education and focusing on reforming teaching methods, curricula, and models of talent education. As a result, the “national high-quality curriculum” (“guojia jingpin kecheng”) was released, and in 2007 the Ministry of Education published “Opinions on Further Deepening the Reform of Undergraduate Education and Comprehensive Improvement of the Quality of Teaching” and “Opinions on the Implementation of Projects to Improve the Quality of Teaching in bachelor's degree and the Reform of Teaching in Higher Education Institutions” together with the Ministry of Finance. These documents contributed to the relaunch of “quality engineering” (“zhiliang gongcheng”) in research and general education universities and professional colleges [15. P. 7–8].

Updating the “Compulsory Education Law of the People's Republic of China” in 2006 contributed to the development of human resources through educational policy. The principle of “man is the root of everything” was first introduced [10. P. 7–8]. The principle may mistakenly seem focused on the personality of students, however, on the contrary, it made education the “root of everything” and proved the possibility of influencing the personality of students. Nevertheless, these changes, at least on paper, made students a subject, and not just an object of education, and expressed the beginnings of a humanistic attitude to upbringing. Students' own activity and self-knowledge became an integral part of the educational process.

In May 2010, the State Council of the People's Republic of China and the CPC Central Committee published and adopted the “National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development 2010–2020” based on the previous policy of modernization of education. The document proposed to “overcome the trend towards administratization” and “abolish the model of administrative management”. The presentation of the problem in such

a volume reflected the courage and determination of the central Government to reform the higher education management system. The aim of the reform laid down in the program was “to promote the separation of government and universities”, as well as “the separation of leadership and management” [31]. Considering the new policy of this period, especially this document, it can be found that the model of education development and the value system of China have undergone three main changes: the development of innovative talents has become the center of deepening the education reform; comprehensive improvement of the quality and efficiency of school management has become the basis of educational innovation and development; equity in education and the promotion of education as attributes of the national economy and people’s livelihoods have become more significant.

The policy and practice in the field of education after the 18th Congress of the CPC evolved again. Firstly, in 2016, at the National Conference of Colleges and Universities on Ideological and Political Work, Xi Jinping introduced the principle of “four services” (“si ge fuwu”) of educational policy: serving the realistic goals of the country, the people, the CPC, reforms, and openness [10. P. 7–8]. Due to them, ideological work in educational institutions, intensified after the publication in 2013 of “Opinions on the cultivation and application of basic Socialist values”, became clearer.

To strengthen the ideological leadership of the Party “Opinions on Strengthening Party Building in Primary and Secondary Schools” were published in 2016. According to them the party organizations of secondary schools fully provided leadership based on the principles of socialism and the quality of ideological and political theory courses. The National Bureau of Educational Materials comprehensively analyzed the ideological and moral values in school textbooks and simultaneously strengthened the development of thematic university courses. The Central Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Education organized 2 rounds of revision of unified textbooks and curricula for ideological and political theory courses at colleges and universities.

After the 19th CPC Congress in 2017, a human-oriented educational policy began to take shape, with justice, equality and access to high-quality education becoming priorities. The difference between justice and the protection of the rights of vulnerable groups in China, in contrast to Western discourse, was very noticeable. In the decisions of the 19th Congress, the emphasis was shifted from social assistance to the poor, primarily in rural areas, to the fair distribution of educational resources since social justice called for providing rural and urban youth with equal opportunities for development [15. P. 8–9].

The second change was the transformation of teaching methods through such documents as: “The Plan for the Implementation of Patriotic Education

in a New Era” 2019, “Opinions on Deepening the Reform of Education and Teaching and Comprehensively Improving the Quality of Compulsory Education” 2019, “Guiding Opinions on the Promotion of the Reform of Methods of General Secondary Education in a New Era” 2019, “Opinions on the Comprehensive Strengthening of Labor Education in Primary and Secondary Schools in the New Era” 2019, “Conclusions on the Pilot Work on the Reform of Basic Subjects in Some Colleges and Universities” 2020, “Conclusions on the Comprehensive Strengthening and Improvement of School Physical Education in the New Era” 2020 in order to strengthen physical education, “Conclusions on the Comprehensive Strengthening and Improvement of Work on Aesthetic Education in Schools in the New Era” 2020 in order to strengthen aesthetic education, “Overall Plan for Deepening Educational Evaluation Reform in the New Era” [32]. The meaning of all the documents was to support the comprehensive development of students by improving the quality of teaching and introducing methods of physical, labor, and aesthetic development to classical training.

In the documents listed above, there were already fewer statements about the upbringing of the builders of socialism and the vocation of education to support the accelerated modernization of the country’s economy. Of course, education was still aimed at producing highly qualified personnel, but at the same time, Chinese educational policy in pursuit of socialist justice supported the global trend for equality and equal opportunities. Thanks to the funding, by 2017, it was possible to achieve the working goal of “not allowing a student to drop out of school due to family financial difficulties” [33]. By this time, the total financial assistance to students exceeded 470 billion yuan (69.99 billion dollars), and the total investment in educational institutions reached 220 billion yuan (32.76 billion dollars) [10. P. 13].

Changes in governance and the role of Government in education deserve special attention. In 2017, in connection with the entry of socialism with Chinese characteristics into a new era and the general promotion of the reform of the “Deregulation and Maintenance” of the national administrative system, the Ministry of Education published “Opinions on Deepening the Reform of Simplified Management, Decentralization and Management Combined with the Optimization of Higher Education Services”, proposing to break down the institutional barriers that restrain development of higher education, and further decentralization of power in favor of local colleges and universities, deregulation of colleges and universities, simplification and removal of the burden, as well as giving schools more autonomy [34].

Through this document, the authorities recognized the existence of relations between them and educational institutions in the “master-slave” format [15. P. 9]. In the same year, the Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Directorate of the State Council published “Opinions on Deepening the Reform

of the Education System and Mechanism”, which raised the problem of “governance and decentralization” to an unprecedented level [35. P. 78-80].

With the adoption of several policy documents, the Chinese reform of the education management system made some positive progress in decentralization. For example, administrative approval issues were reduced, projects such as “National Key Disciplines” and “National Outstanding Doctoral Dissertations” were canceled. The disadvantage of these projects was that they assumed the complete dependence of such important issues as the choice of key disciplines and the best scientific papers only on the decisions of the Central Government. Mechanisms such as independent enrollment, evaluation of the rank of teachers, remuneration for work, attraction and distribution of talents, international academic exchanges, awarding of scientific degrees and the use of self-financing funds were delegated to universities to varying degrees [33].

However, “decentralization” is only one aspect of the reform of the higher education management system, while the greatest attention, according to Chinese researchers, should have been paid to “simple management”, since if the political issues of the competent department are not reduced or significantly simplified, there will inevitably be a risk of a need for decentralization again. Another problem is that, judging by the pilot project of the “modern university system” over the past ten years, the main reason why it has not been effective is that the reform is seen as pure university reform or reform on campus, ignoring the improvement of relations between the government and universities [36. P. 68]. With the current education management system in China, it is difficult to build a “modern university system” without first transforming state functions and reforming the management methods of competent departments.

The difficulties of management in education begin with the problems of understanding this term. In Chinese, two words are used for “management” (“*guanli*”) or “governance” (“*zhili*”). Both words are translated as “management”, but the first term refers more to management, while the second is related to governance through the involvement of several parties [37. P. 66–67]. Based on the analyzed policy documents, it can be concluded that in the management of higher education in China during the time under study, there was a transition from a “*guanli*” to “*zhili*”, that is, a transition from the simple transmission of orders and directives from above and their implementation on the ground to joint decision-making by authorities and educational institutions. The term “*zhili*” appeared and came into use in China in the late 1990s, when new management theories were developing in China [1. P. 8]. The term immediately began to be included in official policy documents and became part of the political language. The concept has opened a new vision for the reform of the higher education management system in China.

In the “Draft of the Education Plan”, published in 2010, the issue of improving the management structure of the university was raised. Although

here the term “zhili” was intended only for universities and mainly refers to internal management, its appearance in official authoritative policy documents caused a great response in the higher education community. At the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2013 the “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Major Issues of Comprehensive Deepening Reform” was adopted. The document stated that the goal of comprehensive deepening of the reform is to improve the socialist system with the characteristics of China and to promote the modernization of the national governance system and management capabilities [15. P. 8–9]. The document raised the issue of governance to the level of a national strategy, mentions the importance of linking the governance of the country and individual organizations.

The definition of the concept of “zhili” in China was proposed by the Global Governance Committee in 1995: “Governance is a combination of many ways in which various public or private individuals and institutions manage their common affairs. It is a continuous process of reconciling conflicting or different interests and taking joint measures” [4. P. 40]. In accordance with this definition, the characteristics of governance can be described as follows: it is not a set of rules and not an activity, but a process; the basis of the process is not control, but coordination; governance includes both the public and private sectors; governance is not a formal system, but a continuous activity [4. P. 41]. Some Chinese scientists have generalized this term, arguing that the characteristics of governance are mainly process, coordination, multi-personality, continuous interaction, etc. [35. P. 78] There is a clear distinction between “management” and the traditional concept of “governance”: management is basically a controlling activity, and governance is basically a coordinated process; management mainly uses power to implement from top to bottom, and governance is mainly achieved through equal consultation and cooperation; management mainly reflects a stable hierarchical system, and governance basically reflects a continuous dynamic balance. In simple words, “guanli” relies on vertical relations between the upper and lower levels, and “zhili” reflects the planar relations between several subjects. Traditional management in the PRC uses the political power of the government to implement unidirectional management of social and public affairs by issuing orders, formulating policies, and implementing policies. On the contrary, the new governance concept is a process of interaction between levels, which is mainly carried out through cooperation, consultation, partnership and the establishment of identity and common goals.

In 2018, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China published the “Implementation Plan to Accelerate the Modernization of Education (2018–2022)” [38]. In 2019, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council published “China’s Education Modernization 2035” [39]. One of the ten main strategic objectives set out in the documents was “promoting the modernization of the education management system and

management capabilities” [38]. Specific measures included improving the level of public management services and increasing the ability of the Government and local authorities to make full use of modern management methods, such as laws, standards, and information services, as well as improving the ability of educational institutions to self-government. The documents were clearly focused on political decentralization, deregulation and facilitating the transfer of state functions to universities. Finally, China has moved closer to the model of joint governance, which has been discussed since the 1990s.

Starting from the “Draft of the Education Plan” in 2010 and ending with the “China’s Education Modernization 2035” in 2019, a vision of modernization of higher education management was gradually formed, and the thinking of the manager went from the university level to the system level [39. P. 17]. The management system had turned into a sum of various elements, including the subject, procedures, management rules, coordination methods, distribution of powers and adjustment of the management itself. The governing body could be analyzed from the point of view of the “organizer”, “manager”, “university organizer” and other stakeholders of higher education. For colleges and universities supported by central financial funds, the organizers were residents or taxpayers of the whole country; for colleges and universities supported by local financial funds – all local taxpayers [39. P. 17].

The National People’s Congress is a fundamental political system in China. That is why it has become an organizer for universities directly subordinate to the Central Government. Local People’s Congresses at each administrative level have become an organizer for local universities. According to the provisions of the Law on Higher Education, the “managers” of Chinese higher education institutions are the State Council and its competent departments of education, local authorities, and their competent departments of education. Regardless of the nature of educational institutions (including private secondary schools), they must accept the management of “managers”. The essence of the problem lies in the management functions. The assistants of such managers should be teachers and administrative heads of educational institutions, as well as, ideally, students, since in China they pay for the training of students and deserve a place in the management system — this is recognized by Chinese experts [35. P. 78]. Other stakeholders, such as parents of students, donors, and related social institutions, can also be included in the management process, if necessary.

Summing up, the evolution of educational policy can be described as follows. At the first stages of the reform, the state policy on higher education in the PRC was aimed at getting rid of the chaos caused by the “cultural revolution” and restoring the former respect for teachers and intellectuals. The reforms deepened significantly in the 1990s. From that moment on, the main emphasis was placed on improving the education management model [15. P. 8–9]. As a result, by 2020, the management of education and higher education in China has developed a lot: for the effective implementation of the goal and mission

of education, a joint community consisting of organizers, managers, school administrators and other important stakeholders of higher education institutions has been created. The overall structure of this community is flat, not vertical, and its effective functioning was based on equal interaction, negotiations, and reconciliation between the subjects. According to this definition, the so-called “ability to manage higher education” represents the ability of management entities to fulfill their powers and the ability of subjects to interact, negotiate and coordinate continuously and equally.

The role of the Government in education policy has also changed. From the point of view of the subjects of governance, the Government continues to play a dominant role. The second most important role is played by the ruling party. The role of the legislature is extremely limited, and the degree of legalization in the field of higher education is low [22. P. 7]. Judging by the content of regulatory documents, the leadership and management of the ruling party in education is constantly expanding and strengthening. The general trend is that the role of the government as a “producer” is weakening, and its role as a “supplier” is strengthening. In general, the government still plays the role of “producer”, and this affects the autonomy of higher education institutions. However, after reforms and openness, a significant number of management functions has been delegated to provincial governments [40]. Although the relevant reforms and policy documents have repeatedly called for granting colleges and universities more autonomy, reducing State administrative interference and encouraging independent management of colleges and universities, the Government is still accustomed to mandatory management of educational institutions. It is gratifying that after the construction of a service-oriented Government the share of the Government using coercive methods shows a downward trend [19]. As a result, the autonomy of educational institutions, especially universities, has not increased much, but the social functions of higher education have strengthened.

In general, the policy regarding higher education in China during the period under review corresponded to global trends in this area: the globalization of education, the transfer of powers from the state to individual higher education institutions, the increase in the autonomy of universities on issues such as funding, enrollment, and decision-making [41. P. 154–157]. In addition, the PRC skillfully integrated its national priorities and political needs into the development of educational policy [23. P. 8–9]. The preservation of the state’s macro-control over education, the introduction of the concept of accountability and the priority of education over training made it possible to maintain political stability; the mass dissemination of higher education and the policy of attracting talent ensured the achievement of economic modernization; the granting of greater autonomy to local authorities in matters of education supported the trend towards strengthening provincial

authorities; the emphasis on international educational standards and global recognition ensured the rise of the PRC's authority abroad and its infusion into international networks.

Conclusion

The main conclusion of the paper is that the state policy in the field of education in the PRC has gone through several transformational processes since 1978 till 2019: from localization to internationalization; from extensive growth to intensive growth; from unconditional authority of the teacher to approach, focused on students, but based on teachers; from education for all to human resources power; from raising the builders of socialism to raising talents; from more talents to high-quality talents; from expanding the scale and quantitative indicators to development of education based on connotation; from vertical relationships between government and educational institutions and top-down directives to planar relations and equal cooperation between the subjects. For most of the reform period, the priority of the state was collective values that ensure the survival of the Chinese socialist regime and are an expression of the vital need of the PRC for active economic construction, which means high-quality personnel. The labor force was perceived as a single whole and an instrument requiring modernization through educational policy, and not as individuals requiring internal harmonious development.

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Research article / Научная статья

Security Policy Options for Japan in Three Time Frameworks

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Abstract. This paper examines security policy options for Japan at the present stage that may be worth considering in the short term, the midterm, and the long term, respectively. Hence, the aim of the paper is to examine foreign policy security options for Japan in the foreseeable future. While providing a comprehensive overview of the Japanese foreign and security policy at the present stage, the article employs the case study methodological framework to analyze Japan's foreign policy objectives in case of Tokyo's relations with the most critical partners in the Asia-Pacific Region — namely, the United States, China, Russia, ASEAN, and Taiwan. Examining the origin and further development of the QUAD, the authors highlight the absence of ASEAN members and India's hesitation to institutionalize the grouping, while analyzing the Russia-Japan relations they focus on common interests in security cooperation, as well on its limitations. As a result, in the short term, the expansion of the Japan-US alliance to the Indo-Pacific region is the most plausible option. However, without involving the ASEAN countries, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy can only add Australia and India to the existing Japan-US alliance. In the midterm, an alliance with Russia may be, with some serious limitations, geographically a natural option. In the long term, Japan might need to find a proper place in a China-centered order in East Asia. Therefore, the authors conclude that the relative decline of US influence in East Asia is unavoidable in the coming decades, Japan must adjust or even reconsider its security policy.

Keywords: Japan, China, Russia, US, Indo-Pacific, FOIP, Japan-Russia relations, QUAD

Authors' contribution:

Toyoda Tetsuya — The paper concept and Introduction and Conclusions, “Japan's Place in Pax Sinica” parts.

Vaseneva Ekaterina — The “The QUAD as a failure of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy” section and literature review.

Takahama Ryo — The “Russo-Japanese Alliance?” section, case study analysis and literature review.

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Потенциальная стратегия Японии по обеспечению национальной безопасности

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Аннотация. Исследуются стратегические опции политики в области обеспечения национальной безопасности Японии на современном этапе, которые целесообразно рассмотреть в краткосрочной, среднесрочной и долгосрочной перспективе соответственно. Цель исследования — анализ стратегических планов внешней и оборонной политики Японии в обозримом будущем. Всеобъемлющий обзор японской политики в области обеспечения безопасности на современном этапе опирается на сравнительные методы и case study для анализа внешнеполитических целей Японии в рамках отношений Токио с наиболее важными партнерами в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе: США, Китаем, Россией, АСЕАН и Тайванем. Рассматривая возникновение и дальнейшее развитие Четырехстороннего оборонного формата (QUAD), авторы подчеркивают отсутствие в нем членов АСЕАН и нерешительность Индии в вопросе институционализации группировки. Анализ российско-японских отношений акцентирует внимание на общих интересах в сотрудничестве в сфере безопасности, а также на его ограничениях. По результатам анализа авторы приходят к выводу, что в краткосрочной перспективе расширение японо-американского альянса в Индо-Тихоокеанском регионе является наиболее вероятным вариантом. Однако без привлечения стран АСЕАН стратегия Свободного и открытого Индо-Тихоокеанского региона (FOIP) может лишь расширить участие Австралии и Индии в рамках существующего альянса Япония–США. В среднесрочной перспективе сотрудничество с Россией может быть, но с некоторыми серьезными ограничениями, географически естественным вариантом. В долгосрочной перспективе Японии, возможно, придется столкнуться с вызовом поиска места в китаецетричном международном порядке в Восточной Азии. Авторы делают вывод о неизбежности относительного снижения влияния США в Восточной Азии в ближайшие десятилетия, в связи с чем Япония должна скорректировать или даже пересмотреть свою политику безопасности.

Ключевые слова: Япония, Китай, Россия, США, Индо-Тихоокеанский океан, QUAD, японо-российские отношения

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Introduction

China's tremendous economic rise since the 1990s has profoundly changed international relations in East Asia. China's GDP, which was only 11 % of Japan's GDP in 1989, has become 281 % of the same in 2019 [1]. With its abundant financial and human resources, the Chinese government is building up a formidable arsenal to “resolutely safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity” with the understanding that “the South China Sea islands and Diaoyu Islands are inalienable parts of the Chinese territory” [2]. The Chinese government has already taken assertive actions in the South China Sea starting with the forcible takeover of Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and the recent construction of military bases on the Spratly islands [3]. In June 2021, the members of G7 declared that they “remain seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo and increase tensions” [4].

The Japanese government recognizes such a situation in thinly veiled words in its *Diplomatic Bluebook 2021*:

“The balance of power in the international community is shifting dramatically due to the rise of emerging countries, among other factors. Inter-state competition, in which states seek to shape an international order to their advantage as well as to increase their influence, is emerging more prominently. Meanwhile, the universal values are under increasingly severe attacks, with the COVID-19 crisis being used to attempt to change the status quo, and there is growing uncertainty over the existing order [5. P. 16]”.

The power that uses the COVID-19 crisis “to attempt to change the status quo” is the Chinese Government, reaping, indeed, the greatest benefit from the pandemic. While most countries around the world are suffering from economic damage in the wake of the pandemic, China's GDP saw a growth of 2.3 % in 2020 and is expected to grow by 8.5 % in 2021 (as of June 2021) [6]. We are witnessing the accelerated process of China's domination of the regional economy in East Asia, which comes necessarily with military domination. How should the Japanese government deal with the “growing uncertainty” in the coming years or decades with China's ascendancy in East Asia

The answer to this question may depend on which time framework we refer to. The answer in the short term is provided by the *Diplomatic Bluebook* mentioned above, according to which “the Japan-U.S. Alliance has become more solid than ever before” and “[t]he two countries are working closely to resolve regional and

international issues, including those regarding North Korea, and to maintain and promote a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)’[5, p.21]. The efforts to expand the alliance from bilateral relations to the Indo-Pacific security cooperation have led to the QUAD cooperation of the US, Japan, Australia, and India; with the conspicuous absence of ASEAN countries. If the Indo-Pacific region has been conceptualized as if to block the southward expansion of the Chinese military, the formation of the QUAD without China’s southern neighbors is problematic.

As for the security policy option in the midterm, we will examine if there is any viability for the idea of Russo-Japanese security cooperation. If the territorial dispute remains unsettled between Moscow and Tokyo, building a security partnership between the two nations is unimaginable. The so-called Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine and Japan’s economic sanctions in response made it even less acceptable to the public opinions in both nations in the short term. However, in the mid-term, a settlement of the territorial dispute, which will take time long enough to let both sides lose sight of the 2022 crisis in any way, can bring security cooperation between the two governments into perspective.

In the long term, China’s domination in East Asia is much anticipated, simply because it is eleven times more populous than Japan. For Japan’s security interests, it must be included in the theoretical exercise of setting up a regional security framework with China at its center. Is it altogether impossible for Japan to cooperate with China on security issues or is it possible under certain circumstances and conditions? The political and economic futures of both China and India, not to mention that of North Korea, remain unforeseeable. However, it is not entirely absurd to imagine that the Chinese government would accept the universal values of democracy and the rule of law in the future, even though it is also quite possible that the Chinese political system might take the other direction. What we do here is not more than a theoretical exercise, which should help us understand what cooperation we need to seek with the Chinese government and other governments in the region.

The QUAD as a failure of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy

As mentioned above, the Japanese government is currently pursuing the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy in cooperation with the US, which was initiated by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and given momentum by the Trump administration.

Origin of the FOIP concept

The first instance of formulating the FOIP concept is usually traced back to Prime Minister Abe’s speech held in Kenya in August 2016, in which he claimed that Japan had the “responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian

Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous”[7]. Three months later, Prime Minister Abe visited India and briefed Prime Minister Modi on the FOIP Strategy [8].

The US government warmly welcomed Japan’s initiative and clarified its anti-China nature in December 2017, in its National Security Strategy paper, signed by US President Donald Trump:

“A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region. (...) China presents its ambitions as mutually beneficial, but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific. States throughout the region are calling for sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence [9]”.

In other words, Japan and the US share a vision, if not a strategy¹, that they should defend the sovereignty of nations in the region and the rule-based free and open maritime order against China’s hegemonic ambition².

Absence of ASEAN members

If the FOIP strategy is to defend “the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific” against Chinese dominance, the direct beneficiaries of this strategy should be the small and medium countries in Southeast Asia; however, those very countries have not shown much support for it, to say the least. After formulating the concept in the National Security Strategy paper, the ASEAN 10 governments only cautiously took note of the “recent initiatives, including the Indo-Pacific concept” at the ASEAN summit in April 2018[14]. Despite some rhetorical support in bilateral meetings with Japanese or US envoys³, ASEAN members have carefully avoided confrontation with China by not committing themselves to an anti-China strategy⁴.

Without ASEAN participation, what was conceived as the FOIP concept turned out to be a mere revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), a strategic dialogue between the US, Japan, Australia, and India. It was originally

¹ It should be noted that the Japanese government since 2018 is talking more of the Indo-Pacific "vision" than the Indo-Pacific "strategy." For the change in tones in Japanese discourses, see [10, p. 25; 11, p. 95;12].

² For the development of the concept under the Trump administration, see [13].

³ For example Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia "welcomed and expressed support for Japan’s new initiative [for] Free and Open India and Pacific Strategy" at his meeting with Prime Minister Abe on 7 August 2017 [15] and Prime Minister Thongloun of Laos promised "to participate actively in the discussions in ASEAN" on the cooperation under the proposed Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy on 12 June 2018 [16].

⁴ For example, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi cautioned that "the concept should not be used as a containment strategy"[17].

initiated by Shinzo Abe during his relatively brief premiership in 2006–2007 and was phased out unceremoniously after Abe's resignation in September 2007 and sinophile Kevin Rudd's election as the Australian Prime Minister in December same year. Ten years later, during the expanded ASEAN meeting in 2017, Shinzo Abe, Narendra Modi, Malcolm Turnbull, and Donald Trump agreed to revive the QUAD to deal with China's threat in the South China Sea. It was no accident that it was revived on the occasion of an ASEAN meeting as the region of Southeast Asia connects the Pacific and the Indian oceans, and their participation is indispensable to make the FOIP a meaningful entity. However, the QUAD cooperation is yet to attract ASEAN countries to rally with their anti-China cause[18;19;20].

India's hesitation and the QUAD's future

The QUAD members held their first joint military drill ("Malabar") in September 2007, though it was quickly abandoned with the change in political leadership in Japan and Australia. When Australia's return to Malabar was discussed in 2018, the Indian government showed hesitation at that time. It took more than a year to finally agree to hold a military drill with HMAS Ballarat of the Royal Australian Navy in November 2020 in the Arabian Sea.

With the inauguration of Joe Biden in January 2021, the future of the QUAD has become uncertain. For the moment, President Biden's policy against China seems not much different from that of his predecessor. In the *Interim National Security Guidance*, published in March 2021, the Biden administration declared to "support China's neighbors and commercial partners in defending their rights to make independent political choices free of coercion or undue foreign influence"[21]. We are yet to see what policy Biden will take in the course of his term(s) of office, even if the human rights issues in the Xinjiang province may make a post-Trump détente impossible⁵. Both Australia and India have divided public opinions regarding their attitudes towards China, and their foreign policies have seen much oscillation between pro-China and anti-China directions[23;24]. We may see further development of security dialogues between the four governments in the coming years, but it will not be easy to involve ASEAN countries in this strategy. Even among the four existing members, it might never reach the level of a military alliance. Besides, the formation of an Australia-UK-US trilateral partnership, AUKUS, for information and technology sharing in September 2021 reminded us of the uniqueness of English-speaking nations' collaborative relations as we have seen with the operation of ECHELON (also called Five

⁵ On 6 December 2021, Press Secretary Jen Psaki of the White House announced that "The Biden administration will not send any diplomatic or official representation to the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics and Paralympic Games given the PRC's ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and other human rights abuses" [22].

Eyes), the surveillance program of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States⁶. With the rise of AUKUS, we already see a relative decline of attention paid to QUAD.

Russo-Japanese Alliance

From the geopolitical perspective, there are some natural reasons for Moscow and Tokyo to cooperate, as well as considerable limitations.

Geographical destiny in historical perspective

Back in the early 20th century, soon after the Russian empire established its first outposts in the Far East, the Russian and Japanese empires clashed over the Korean peninsula. However, after the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, the two empires concluded a series of treaties to strengthen their cooperation, only to be interrupted by the communist revolution in 1917. After the long years of Soviet rule, the Russian government sought cooperation once again with Japan. In 1992, President Yeltsin formulated his East policy and advocated for a Northeast Asian multilateral security consultation mechanism[27]. More notably, the Six-Party Talks (the framework of North and South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the US for discussion on North Korea's nuclear development) conducted from 2003 to 2009 were initially suggested by Russia in, as early as, 1994[28]. Along with the strong motivation for the multilateral approach, Russia has shown eagerness to establish good-neighborly relations with Japan since Yeltsin's presidency. Despite the Northern territorial issues, he signed with Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa the Tokyo Declaration, a mutual agreement for negotiation toward the conclusion of a peace treaty. Yeltsin also proposed the Japan-Russia strategic partnership in 1997. Clearly illustrated by Yeltsin's rapprochement with Japan, "Russia does not perceive Japan as a major security threat and believes that robust security and political dialogue with Japan on regional issues in East Asia holds strategic importance"[29].

Common interests for a possible Russo-Japanese alliance

Three elements are often cited as reasons for security cooperation between Japan and the Russian Federation.

One reason is the North Korean issue. It is hoped that Moscow may be able to exercise a restraining influence on Pyongyang. The leaders of both governments have been confirming for multiple times that they will coordinate their actions

⁶ For Echelon (Five Eyes), see, for example, [26].

closely for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is a “common goal for Japan and Russia”[30]. It should be also noted that in an interview with Russian News Agency TASS, Japanese foreign minister Taro Kono emphasized that “for the solution of the North Korean problem, Russia has a very important role to play as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and also a member of the Six-Party Talks”[31]. Of course, Russia does not have the leverage that the Soviet Union once had, but it seems to Japan that Russia can still play a constructive role in dealing with the North Korea issue [32, p. 868.].

Second, Japan’s motivation to incorporate Russia into its security framework reflects the desire to prevent Russia’s relations with China from becoming too close. James Brown, for example, states that “although Russia on its own is not a serious threat to Japan, the formation of a consolidated China-Russia bloc would represent a major concern”, as well as points out that “Beijing and Moscow share a hostile view of the US-led global system that is so vital to Japan”[32, p. 869]. Japan’s fears of the emergence of the land-power giant are emphasized in the White Paper published by Japan’s Ministry of Defense, according to which the two states “have a common view on promoting the multi-polarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order”[33]. Japan’s anxiety about the emerging security threat intensified in August 2015 when “Russia and China conducted their largest naval exercises in the Sea of Japan to date, while in 2016, joint drills were carried out in the South China Sea”[32, p. 870]. Their entente may be a serious challenge to the US-led international order; thus, Japan may become anxious to neutralize the China-Russia united front by establishing strategic cooperation with Russia in the security realm.

It is also crucial for Russia to strike a balance between strategic competition and cooperation with China, especially in the fading US-led international order. Anna Kireeva pointed out that “the reason for stepping up Russian policy in this area is the fact that, despite close political and military cooperation with China, it is the role of one of the stakeholders in the polycentric order, rather than a hierarchical China-led order in Asia, that is more consistent with Russian interests in this part of the world”[29].

Third, another plausible explanation for Japan’s interest in security ties with Russia is the desire to ensure energy security. According to the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPC), “oil still accounts for about 40 % of Japan’s primary energy supply, and more than 80 % of imported oil comes from the politically unstable Middle East” [34]. For its energy security, Japan started looking to the North in search of an alternative source. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the import of LNG from Russia accounts only for 9 % in 2019[35], but Brown emphasizes that Japan is “interested in the development of the northern route, which runs above Russia’s Arctic coastline”. He insists so because “this route becomes increasingly

ice-free,” and hence, “it offers the potential for additional energy resources to be supplied to Japan, either from sources in the Russian Arctic itself or shipped from the Atlantic [32, p. 872].”

Limitations

We have examined above why Japan-Russia security cooperation may be beneficial to both countries. It is the case that Russia is potentially a reliable security partner. That being said, with a sober look at the current international and domestic situations in both states, it seems too optimistic that a diplomatic breakthrough will come into reality even in the midterm, say, in ten or twenty years.

Even if the territorial dispute is ever to be resolved, there are serious doubts about the benefits of Russo-Japanese cooperation. First of all, Russia’s influence is limited. As Andrei Lankov pointed out, if Pyongyang shows some signs of friendship with Moscow, it is with an expectation for the latter to act as a mediator with the West. However, since the Crimean crisis in 2014, Moscow lost much of its political leverages, and Pyongyang largely lost interest in heeding advice from Moscow[36].

Second, unlike in the 1990s, Russia today does not see Japan as the top priority in Asia, which means that Russia will not pursue further security cooperation with Japan at the risk of jeopardizing China-Russia relations. Certainly, there is a mutual desire to maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific, including Northeast Asia, but Russia considers “China to be too important both politically and economically to risk angering Beijing for the sake of ties with Japan”[32, p. 877].

Third, the consideration of energy transactions is interesting both for Russia and Japan but may not be essential in the overall bilateral relations. Recently, the Vladivostok LNG project was expected to deepen mutual trust through long-term, pragmatic energy cooperation, but after the resignation of Prime Minister Abe, we are yet to see any sign of a breakthrough. Regarding bilateral cooperation in the energy sector, Hirofumi Arai claims that “external and internal conditions have changed significantly, making it more difficult for the two governments to identify a project that would serve as a new symbol of cooperation”[37].

In addition, apart from the international factors, domestic constraints in both states prevent the bilateral relations from taking a step forward. According to Gilbert Rozman, public opinion in Japan and Russia stands in the way of signing a peace treaty and fully normalizing relations more than seventy years after WWII ended [38, p. 11].⁷ Both Abe and Putin were obsessed with reconstructing their own national identity during their terms, with criticisms from patriotic nationalists

⁷ Rozman’s claim is based on 4 countries’ Joint Public Opinion Survey conducted in Japan, U.S., China, South Korea in 2015. See [39].

that any territorial compromises are not acceptable. The domestic oppositions are blocking the peace treaty and security ties between Russia and Japan; thus, it may not be realistic for the two governments, for another couple of decades, to meet each other halfway.

Japan's Place in Pax Sinica

Few people have ever seriously examined the possibility of Japan's alliance with China. In doing so in this paper, we should consider the following three factors: Japan's security interests, the Taiwan question, and the possibility of regional collective security with China at its center.

1. Japan's security interests reconsidered

There are two major issues in Japan's security policy: namely, the development of nuclear missiles in North Korea (North Korea issue) and the possible takeover of the Senkaku Islands by China (Senkaku issue). The security of navigation in the South China Sea and the West Indian Ocean are also important, but not as much as the North Korea issue or the Senkaku issue, as they do not threaten the Japanese territory directly.

Since the Sino-Japanese diplomatic crisis in September 2012, Chinese activities in Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku islands have intensified [40]. Consequently, Japan and the US have reiterated their firm commitment to the alliance. The Trump administration gave Japan reassurance that the Japan-US Security Treaty should apply to China's attack on the Senkaku islands [41]. Immediately after the election of Joe Biden to the presidency, Prime Minister Suga made a phone call on 12 November 2020 to confirm "his [Joe Biden's] commitment that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands" [42]. In May 2021, Japanese Ground Forces conducted the first large-scale joint exercise with the US and French forces, apparently to enhance their capabilities to face possible Chinese landing on the Senkaku Islands [43].

However, the US commitment is not unconditional or unlimited. The US government remains neutral as to the question of sovereignty over those islands. When the US Defense Department spokesman, John Kirby, made an off-camera statement that "we hold with the international community about the Senkakus and the sovereignty of the Senkakus, and we support Japan obviously in that sovereignty," — that is, the US government supports the Japanese claim of sovereignty — he officially corrected his unofficial statement three days later. He admitted that "there is no change to U.S. policy regarding the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands" and regretted his own error in overstepping from official neutrality [44]. The US commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands is conditioned by the legality of Japanese territorial sovereignty there, and once it changes its opinion on international law, the US government may change its attitude at any moment without violating its treaty obligations.

China already has the largest navy and the largest army in the world, which are now going through the process of modernization supported by its economic growth⁸. If the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy overweighs the US navy in the near future, the US government would have scant reasons to keep its commitment to Japan's defense over a possible clash over the Senkaku islands at the cost of US interests. If Japan can ever solve the Senkaku dispute in its favor, it would be only through diplomatic negotiations and/or a judicial settlement in the International Court of Justice or other judicial forums.

As for the North Korean issue, the question is not whether the US government maintains its commitment to the common defense against North Korea. It will certainly do so as long as the dangerous regime remains in power in Pyongyang, as North Korea's nuclear development poses a direct threat to the US national security. Building up an anti-ballistic defense system in Japan contributes to the US national security⁹. The question for Japan, however, is whether the US is the most important partner to deal with the North Korea issue. Even under the current conditions, China may have more leverage over Pyongyang through its economic and political connections than Washington does through military coercion.

In short, of the two major security issues Japan faces, the US cannot be a great help on the Senkaku issue, and China can offer more help than the US on the North Korean issue. If we focus on only these two questions, a security cooperation with China may be worth a consideration.

2. The Taiwan question

One serious impediment to Japan's security cooperation with China is the question of Taiwan. The defense of Taiwan has been the central question in the Japan-US alliance since the conclusion of the Japan-US Security Treaty for "the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East" (Article 1 of the 1951 Japan-US Security Treaty). The concept of the Far East was kept after the revision of the treaty in 1960 in the preamble and articles 4 and 6 as "a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East" (Preamble of the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty). After the treaty was revised in 1960, the Japanese government issued a statement to clarify the geographical scope of the Far East, which covers "the area around Japan north of the Philippines including the areas under the administration

⁸ The US Department of Defense recognized that "The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of approximately 350 ships and submarines, including more than 130 major surface combatants [while the U.S. Navy has only 293 ships]" and that "the People's Liberation Army Army (PLAA) is the largest standing ground force in the world, with approximately 915,000 active-duty personnel in combat units" [49, P. 43, 40].

⁹ For example, National Security Strategy, *supra* note 10, claims that "The United States is deploying a layered missile defense system focused on North Korea and Iran to defend our homeland against missile attacks" [9, p. 8].

of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Republic of China (Taiwan)”[46]. The Japan-US alliance was established not only for Japan’s defense but it was also for Taiwan’s defense.

After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the PLA attacked Taiwan twice in the 1950s¹⁰. The 1955 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty lost effect after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the US in 1970, but the latter maintains its commitment to Taiwan’s defense with the Taiwan Relations Act, in which the US declared “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” and “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan” (Section 2(b) 5 and 6).

For the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué in September 1972, the legal status of Taiwan was hotly debated between the Chinese and Japanese governments. The outcome was the text of Article 3 of it:

Article 3. The Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.

Even though there may be various interpretations for this ambiguous text, the Japanese government has never been engaged in direct support for Taiwan’s defense since then. However, after the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–96, Tokyo and Washington issued New Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation in 1997 to enhance the “mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan”. The vaguely formulated “situations in areas surrounding Japan” is generally understood to include possible Chinese attacks against Taiwan.

Recently, the Covid-19 pandemic has brought international attention to Taiwan’s undue isolation. The World Health Organization (WHO)’s refusal of Taiwan’s participation in its activities, under the influence of the Chinese government over its Director-General, elicited reactions from many countries. In August 2020, the Trump administration sent Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar to Taiwan, the first visit by an American official since 1979. In January 2021, the Biden Administration pledged “to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability” [47]. Moreover, as a result of the Japan-US Summit held on April 16, the problem of Taiwan was mentioned in the Joint Statement, which has never happened before since the 1970s [48].

¹⁰ In the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954–1955 the nationalists abandoned the Tachen Islands, but during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958 the nationalists resisted the communists’ shelling on the Kinmen islands with support of the U.S. Navy.

Security cooperation with China is utterly incompatible with the Japan-US alliance, and Japan cannot develop security cooperation with China until Taiwan is conquered by the PLA or the Chinese government acknowledges Taiwan's own sovereignty, or perhaps the end of China's communist regime.

3. Regional collective security with post-communist China

We do not know what will happen in a couple of decades in China. Even if the Taiwan question should be settled in one way or another, and a Sino-Japanese security cooperation becomes possible, it may not necessarily be in Japan's interest in the long term because of political instability in China. China's domestic politics is marked by the 2009 Ürümqi Massacre and the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests. Despite tremendous efforts by the Communist Party for social cohesion and security both in urban and rural areas, economic growth has created a huge gap between the rich and poor and haves and have nots in the country. Once the communist regime should be overthrown, any kind of support for the Communist Party may be viewed as unfriendly acts against the people. The Japanese government should start considering whether security cooperation with communist China should contribute to its good relations with post-communist China.

In 1959, former Japanese prime minister Tanzan Ishibashi visited China and proposed regional collective security with China, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the US. Since 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has been fostering security dialogue in the region including North Korea. In 2007, the Six-Party Talks set up a working group for a joint Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism. In addition, there have been several attempts to create a multilateral security framework in East Asia, which may be impractical as long as the most powerful country in the region finds no interest there. However, once China overcomes its problems with Taiwan and democratic legitimacy, there may be room for multilateral security cooperation, which would allow China and other countries in the region to economize most of the budget they are spending now on military equipment. Japan should find a better place in such a framework than in the New Cold War between Beijing and Washington.

Conclusions

There is no single right answer to Japan's security conundrum. It is all about China, but it gives a complicated set of questions as Japan's relationship with China takes different shapes in different time frameworks and is very uncertain in the long term. The arguments we have developed above are just a reconfirmation of government policies in the short term and maybe mere speculations in the mid and long terms. But the policy in the short term makes full sense when it is put

in a longer historical context, and the policies in the mid and long terms can be better discussed in the extension of the current policy.

Japan's national security has been dependent on the US for nearly seventy years since the end of the post-WWII occupation in 1952. The alliance has stood the test of time and proved very successful. However, its validity cannot last forever. With the accelerated rise of China in the post-COVID-19 era, the Japanese government should explore its security options in consultation with the governments in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific and democratic discussion with its citizens.

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Research article / Научная статья

History and prospects of cooperation between Russia, India and Bangladesh in the field of nuclear energy

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Abstract. This article attempts to analyze the cooperation of the Russian Federation (RF) with India and the People's Republic of Bangladesh (PRB) in the field of nuclear energy in the light of its history, current state and near-term prospects. The author states that recently (since 2009–2014) the sectoral interaction has significantly strengthened and implementation of the main joint nuclear projects has intensified which gives a positive effect for the bilateral relations. Mutually beneficial and successful economic projects provide consensus and mutual understanding in the context of the rapid changes in the global geopolitical situation in 2022. The Ukrainian crisis and the large-scale economic sanctions against Russia led to a negative impact on the economies of most countries of the world. The issues of energy security in this situation have become one of the key factors. The continuation and development of contacts in the nuclear field becomes fundamentally important providing the new opportunities for the countries of South Asia (SA) to strengthen their own security and independence. The gathered partnership experience of the relevant cooperation between RF and SA in the nuclear field can contribute to the intensification of political ties between countries which are quite important in the light of fundamental changes in the world order. The relevance of the study implies studying the possibilities of the practical application of the gathered experience and potential of interaction between RF, India and Bangladesh aimed at determination of the optimal ways and directions of cooperation in the nuclear field and its further intensification.

Keywords: Russian Federation, India, People's Republic of Bangladesh, South Asia, nuclear energy, interaction and cooperation, potential and prospects, geopolitical changes, unipolar and multipolar world

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История и перспективы сотрудничества России с Индией и Бангладеш в сфере атомной энергетики

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Аннотация. Исследуется сотрудничество Российской Федерации с Индией и Народной Республикой Бангладеш в сфере атомной энергетики, в контексте ее истории, существующего уровня и ближайших перспектив. Автор констатирует, что за последнее время (начиная с 2009–2014 гг.) отраслевое взаимодействие существенно укрепилось, а реализация ключевых совместных атомных проектов интенсифицировалась, что, безусловно, положительно сказывается на двусторонних отношениях. Взаимовыгодные и успешные экономические проекты являются залогом консенсуса и взаимопонимания в условиях стремительных изменений геополитической ситуации в мире в 2022 г. Украинский кризис и последовавшие в связи с ним масштабные экономические санкции в отношении России негативно сказались на экономиках большинства стран мира. Вопросы энергетической безопасности в этой ситуации стали одними из ключевых. Продолжение и развитие контактов в атомной сфере приобретает принципиально иную значимость, открывая перед странами Южной Азии новые возможности для укрепления собственной безопасности и независимости. Накопленный партнерский опыт релевантного сотрудничества РФ и ЮА в атомной области может способствовать интенсификации контактов между странами, довольно важных в нынешнее время коренных изменений мирового порядка. Актуальность исследования заключается в изучении возможностей практического применения накопленного опыта и потенциала взаимодействия РФ с Индией и Бангладеш с целью определения оптимальных путей и направлений сотрудничества в атомной сфере и его дальнейшей интенсификации.

Ключевые слова: Российская Федерация, Индия, Народная Республика Бангладеш, Южная Азия, атомная энергетика, взаимодействие и сотрудничество, потенциал и перспективы, геополитические изменения, однополярный и многополярный мир

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Introduction

The Russian Federation (and the USSR as its predecessor), India and Bangladesh have traditionally had and still have friendly relations in a great number of cooperation areas. Civil nuclear power is a kind of symbol of this process. It should be noted that all three countries (albeit to the different extent) have accumulated creations, competencies and technologies that can be mutually beneficial for the development of new technologies in the usage of the peaceful atom. Industry interaction without politicization and the current conditions is a purely pragmatic and mutually beneficial project. This is proved by the energetic and strategically balanced activity of the political leaders of these countries including not only the economic dimension but also creation of the political partnership.

The events of 2022 (the Ukrainian conflict and the unprecedented sanctions against Russia related to this which however affected almost the rest of the world) demonstrated and revealed global problems associated with a global crisis of common interaction in a unipolar world, the imposition of opinions on the world community that are contrary to the political and economic interests of most countries. The political independent position of India, Bangladesh demonstrates to the global community the absolute priority should be firstly the national interests of the state and its own citizens not belonging to the so-called “Golden Billion”.

A large number of the population of these two countries are below the poverty line and curtailment of the vital economic projects under the pressure of the “world hegemon” would inevitably lead to a sharp and even catastrophic decline in their level of economic activity and the population quality of life. On the example of the progressive and prospective strategic course of India and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh it can be seen that the strategic actions and course of developing countries are driven by desire of achieving of the mutual benefit and equality. They are gained by the multilateral, economically and politically balanced steps aimed at building of a new and just world order.

The long-term cooperation of the RF, India and PRB in the field of nuclear energy periodically encountered the certain problems, misunderstandings and outside pressure. Despite these difficult moments it still demonstrates resistance to the external negative influence, retaining the possibility of continuing of active interaction in such an important area for humanity.

Case study

There is no particular doubt that at the moment (and in the foreseeable future) the RF and the State Corporation “Rosatom” which represents it in the nuclear sphere are the key players in the global industry market.

Moreover, our leadership is based not only by the factor of our own merits and achievements, but also by factor of the relative “weakness” of the key competitors (the USA, France, South Korea, Japan). They quite unreasonably reduce the share of nuclear energy in their energy balance under a pretext of “energy transition” and promotion of renewable energy. And only in the last months of 2021 and at the beginning of 2022 they admitted that it was simply impossible to solve the problem of the growing energy crisis without the atom. But a lot of things have already been lost and it is quite difficult to restore the forfeit potential and restart nuclear power plants that have been closed earlier.

Meanwhile, Rosatom continued to develop the innovative and prospective aspect of its activities and now the safe, efficient and breakthrough technologies and developments are used in the widest range of industries (tool engineering, IT, electrical engineering, iron and steel industry, oil and gas, shipbuilding and rocket and space industry etc.). Also are actively developing areas related to biofuels and low-carbon energy, projects of floating power plants and small modular reactors and so on. Hereby even a preliminary review of this Corporation’s activity shows us that it has all chances to expand prospective areas of interaction including with the friendly South Asian partners [1].

Russia’s cooperation with India and Bangladesh in the field of nuclear energy traditionally remains (and obviously will remain in the future) one of the key areas of their interaction. This process has been especially strengthened since the 2010s, in particular after the coming to power in the PRB in 2009 of the Awami League party, AL / “People’s League” and its long-term leader Sheikh Hasina. For India the starting point for the activation of projects in the field of nuclear energy can be dated to the election victory in 2014 of the Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP / Indian People’s Party and Narendra Modi. At the same time it should be noted that the interest in intensifying energy interaction between our countries is caused by both the objective and subjective factors.

Among the first points can be attributed quite obvious and significant mutual economic benefits received by the parties from this cooperation. In particular, this is the supply of various qualified Russian energy resources, industry technologies and competencies to these South Asian countries which are increasingly in need of them due to the rapidly growing population.

On the other hand, India can also offer its partners a rather serious list of the prospective areas in the nuclear industry. This is facilitated by the experience, competencies and technologies accumulated by the Indians during the implementation of their nuclear program which started in the 1950s. In particular, the country produces high-tech heavy water nuclear reactors outright thanks to its own technologies and is ready to export them

to the various countries of the world (in 2020, these were China, Great Britain, France, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and a number of others). In this context cooperation with the Russian Federation seems to be quite promising [2].

Besides this, India together with Russia is taking part in the most complex and responsible stage of assembling a cryostat for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor which is being built in France. The country has a significant (9%) contribution to the implementation of this global project aimed at making fusion energy available for the practical use and solving the problems of the energy crisis on Earth. The fact that India was chosen to carry out these works on the project witnesses the recognition of its authoritative role in the global nuclear energy. The Russian Federation and India have the opportunity to establish cooperation in this strategic aspect of the industry [2].

Significant potential and competencies accumulated as a part of the development of Indian alternative energy (solar, wind, biofuels and so on) can bring certain benefits to the RF where renewable energy continues to be not the main focus of business and government departments. At the same time, it cannot be denied that recently the situation in this area of the Russian energy industry has changed radically. However, it is necessary to mention here that for the RF having huge reserves of traditional fuel resources and developed areas of the energy industry, the issue of a quick transition to the renewable energy sources (RES) should not be so acute as for India and Bangladesh.

These countries are simply forced to use their capabilities and strengths of their simultaneous large reserves and development potential of RES because of the serious limitation of organic energy resources (oil, gas, coal, uranium and so on). They are striving for a faster “energy transition” and creating the so-called “carbon-free energy” which was announced at the end of the Paris climate conference in November 2015 [3].

If we talk about the subjective factors that led our countries to a sharp intensification of the bilateral cooperation in the energy sector we can name a very peculiar and even contested, but not less than significant aspect as “the role of the individual in history”. It is not an occasional coincidence that intensification of the transfer into practice of two key and strategic projects of joint sectoral cooperation between Russia, India and Bangladesh (NPP “Kudankulam”, Tamilnadu, South India, and “Rooppur”, Ishwardi, Northwestern Bangladesh) has occurred namely after the arrival of to power of Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina.

The fact that both of these leaders are friendly to Russia and its President Vladimir Putin, it seems to me, has played an important role in the development of these important projects. At the same time, the author

by no means underestimates the importance of such objective factors as the severe energy crisis in the countries of South Asia, the rapid growth of the local population, the need of energy resources for growing economies and their interest in efficient, reliable and modern nuclear power plants being built with the participation of “Rosatom”.

For understanding of the importance of this factor it is enough to look at the amount of work (preparatory and practical) that was carried out in the context of these nuclear power plants before and after the coming to power of Prime Ministers Narendra Modi (2014) and Sheikh Hasina (2009). If we talk about the Indian project “Kudankulam”, it was originally signed back in 1988. However, by 2014, the work was practically not carried out in the sufficient volume. In 1998 it was signed a final agreement to build the station; in 2002 it started the construction of power unit (PU); in 2004 it was built a small seaport next to the future station; only in 2013 PU № 1 was connected to the power grid and the full commissioning of the facility took place after BJP and Narendra Modi came to power. This is all success for 26 years [4].

Of course, in this context one can refer to a number of subjective and objective circumstances (the collapse of the USSR and the actual loss of economic contacts with India in the 1990s and early 2000s, the US political pressure, lack of technology and experience in working with light water reactors VVER–1000, mass protests in the country against Kudankulam NPP in 2011–2013 and a number of other points). The considerable amount of work was realized during the period when the current Prime Minister of India (Narendra Modi) was in power. To understand the fundamental changes in the project occurring during this time it is enough to list the most important practical results and achievements of the last eight years.

2014 — signing of an agreement on the construction of PU № 3 and № 4; 2015 — start of design work for the construction of these PU; 2016 — connection to the power grid and commissioning of PU № 2; 2017 — signing of an agreement on the construction of PU № 5 and № 6; 2019 — installation of a molten core catcher of PU № 3; 2021 — a similar installation on PU № 4 and so on. And these are just the key points and achievements in the process of implementing the project for the period 2014–2021 [4].

A similar situation (and even the most dynamic) has developed with regard to the implementation of the Bangladeshi project for the construction of the Rooppur NPP. The history of nuclear energy in Bangladesh is rather long–suffering and colored by the tragic events of the formation of independence in this country. Thus, proposals on the need to build a nuclear power plant in this area were made back in the 1960s by representatives of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. That took place at a time when independent Bangladesh did not exist and this region was called East Pakistan [5].

The central government, representing West Pakistan, did not consider it necessary to invest heavily in a large-scale project in that part of the country, which was actually considered as a colony. In the late 1960s the Pakistani state found itself in a difficult, crisis situation, which ended in 1971 with an uprising and genocide of the people of East Pakistan. It was followed by the Bangladeshi War for independence, which ended (with the support of Indian troops) successfully for the latter. However, the country laid in ruins, and in such a situation even the thought of a possible construction of a NPP might seem mad [5].

Nevertheless, the first president of the PRB Mujibur Rahman (from 1972 to 1975) planned to develop the civilian nuclear energy after the restoration of the country from the devastating war of 1971. He understood the prospects and the need for promotion of this industry which could help to solve the acute problem of electricity shortages. In 1973, in order to achieve these goals as well as prepare for the future implementation of RNPP, the first president of the country signed a decree establishing the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission. For that time (taking into account the factor of colossal devastation and poverty observed in the first years of the independent PRB) this was a very far-sighted and non-standard step on the part of Mujibur Rahman. It caused misunderstanding and even rejection not only among a significant part of the local residents, but also among specialists and experts [6].

To carry out the practical implementation of the “Rooppur” project, the first president turned to a number of countries that had the necessary competencies (France, Canada, South Korea). But at the end only the USSR, the most friendly state at that time the country in relation to Bangladesh (along with India), expressed a prior consent to help with the construction of the station. The Soviet Union took an active part in supporting the independence and post-war reconstruction of the country, including contributing to the construction of a number of thermal power plants. Therefore one more benevolent step in favor of the PRB absolutely did not look unexpected [5].

And only in 2009, when Sheikh Hasina became the leader of Bangladesh for the second time, they really returned to the Rooppur project. The government of the PRB analyzed the capabilities of the leading nuclear powers of that time (Russia, the USA, France, Japan and a number of others). After that it was made an unambiguous decision that Rosatom and its competencies (as well as the “price-quality” ratio) are the most suitable option for Bangladesh [5].

Of course, not only economic preferences, but also Sheikh Hasina’s geopolitical sympathies (oriented towards friendly ties with both India and Russia) played a role in choosing the contractor for the station construction. As a result after more than thirty years of neglect “Rooppur” project began

to be put into practice becoming a symbol of the rapid development of the PRB under the current Prime Minister as well as economic cooperation and friendship between the RF and the PRB.

The most significant stages of the project implementation include the following: 2011 — signing of the Intergovernmental Agreement between the Russian Federation and the NRB on the construction of RNPP; 2013 — laying the foundation stone for the construction of the future station; 2015 — signing of the General Contract for the construction of this NPP. Moreover, in this context it should be emphasized that from the Bangladeshi side the responsible organization became just BAEC which creation in 1973 was not entirely clear not only for ordinary residents of the PRB but even for many specialists and experts; 2017 — pouring the “first concrete” under the foundation of the future PU № 1; 2018 — a similar procedure for PU № 2; 2019 — concreting the foundation of the turbine island of PU № 1; 2021 — installation in the design position of the reactor vessel of PU № 1 and so on. And these are just the key moments and achievements of the project for the period 2011–2021 [6].

Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina have repeatedly emphasized that the joint nuclear projects with the RF (Kudankulam and Rooppur) have strategic importance for them. The success and the highest competitiveness of modern Russian nuclear technologies as well as the systematic and stable practical progress of these projects lead the leaders of these South Asian countries to an idea that nuclear cooperation should be continued after the completion of the current projects [7].

And in this context it is not surprising that for quite a long time the countries have been negotiating the construction of new nuclear power plants and power units in India and Bangladesh, the opportunity to exchange industry competencies and practical experience. Like any major technological project the construction of nuclear power plants has a significant multiplier effect solving a number of the most acute problems of the region such as overcoming the energy crisis, economic growth, raising the level of education of the population of South Asia and improving the quality of life of the multibillion population.

The cooperation between Russia and Bangladesh within the framework of the RNPP project (and since 2018 with the participation of India) provides the PRB with an excellent opportunity to improve the situation with the quality of education and training of its own highly qualified personnel and specialists not only in the field of construction and maintenance of such high-tech projects as nuclear power units. The entire process of creating a national nuclear industry (from the start of preparatory work to the moment of launching and operating a nuclear power plant) is a complex scientific and technological enterprise, and it is simply impossible to cope with industry problems and challenges

without the presence of trained and experienced specialists. Russian and Indian competencies, experience and technologies make possible to solve a difficult situation for the PRB related to the lack of highly qualified personnel [6].

Despite not so high PRB level of competence in the nuclear field, it should be noted that back in 1961 (when the region was part of Pakistan) it was established Bangladesh Institute of Atomic Agriculture; in 1973 — Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission; in 2013 — Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority. Naturally, they have a certain potential for development, research and achievements especially in the academic aspect of the industry [6].

Bangladeshi industry experts also highlight the factor of increasing the level of education and skills of the local society. Nuclear specialists are the intellectual elite of the state and in the case of the NRB it gets even more importance because of not solved the problems of poverty, unemployment and the lack of education of a certain part of society. It is increasing the number of qualified personnel receiving higher education in Russia and India for taking part in the implementation of the RNPP project. It is already being assessed as “the heritage of the country” in the local press [9].

Thus, a serious problem of NPP management and operation in the future is solving since all project participants are interested in operational safety. In accordance with the Tripartite Agreement — 2018, the RF and India participate in an educational project for training Bangladeshi specialists in their countries [10].

What advantages do Bangladeshi industry experts see from the implementation of the RNPP project? Oddly enough, the most important factor is a certain status of the project since it is part of a program to increase the authority and image of the country in the world. According to experts, joining the so-called “Atomic Club” (which includes a little more than 30 countries of the world) and the presence of its own “unique brand” named Rooppur will allow the state to become more recognizable on the world stage. RNPP is a real symbol of friendship between Russia and Bangladesh as well as Rosatom is one of the most important conductors of this process. The importance of Rooppur is becoming even more important for our states if we take into account that for a number of reasons trade turnover between our countries is limited (at the moment) and amounted to only 76 product categories and a little more than \$600 million in the 2020–2021 financial year (for the PRB side) [11].

Among other advantages of the implementation of the station construction program are indicated such aspects as the radical and positive changes that have taken place in Rooppur itself and Ishwardi and the Pabna district on the whole. Of course, this would not have been possible without the investments made by Rosatom and the RF. Social tensions are reduced, the level of crime

and drug addiction is decreasing. More than 30 thousand citizens of the PRB and a number of local subcontractors are employed at the sites of the facility which objectively improves the living standards of the local population reducing the critical attitude to the construction of nuclear facilities on their territories [12].

However, the main thing is the possibility of reliable and long-term (up to 80 years) access of the population of the NRB to an ecological source of energy supply. In the context of a severe energy crisis this thing has a particular importance. Nuclear energy will allow the country to create a reliable and modern energy supply system, reduce dependence on imported energy raw materials and fuels and solve environmental problems by reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

A separate and extremely promising aspect of Russian–Bangladesh cooperation (as well as Russian–Indian cooperation) in the field of civil nuclear energy is the possibility of promoting innovative areas in the form of the development of small modular reactors (SMRs), which use is now being actively developed by such industry powers as the Russia, the USA and China. This direction received a certain impetus after the UN Climate Conference in Glasgow, Scotland (October–November 2021).

Experts from the PRB believe that use of Russian developments in SMR could provide a very significant contribution to solving the energy problems of the country and the development of the country's nuclear industry. The obvious advantages of these reactors include the following points: 1) The possibility of their wide application since they do not require the withdrawal of large land for the construction, which given the lack of agricultural land in the PRB causes mass protests of the local population, most often not satisfied with small compensations for the loss of land; 2) The volume of investments and costs for SMRs is lower than for conventional nuclear power plants; 3) The possibility of participating in the construction of such reactors with the participation of private companies and organizations and so on. The RF and the PRB are significantly intensifying their bilateral dialogue in the framework of the possible implementation of similar promising projects at the territory of the PRB in the future [13].

And here it is necessary to note the healthy pragmatism of the state leaders Vladimir Putin and the government of Sheikh Hasina when bilateral relations take into account firstly national interests not the political calculations. We can cite an opposite example of our previously friendly state Finland which abandoned a mutually beneficial project in favor of the political situation (despite the complete lack of rationality of that decision).

Of course, there are a number of difficulties in the field of nuclear cooperation between the RF and SA, and this cannot be denied. Among the potential disadvantages and problems are named its high cost (more than 13 billion

dollars), even in the conditions of providing the most favorable lending conditions for the PRB government. Rooppur's opponents among the local opposition believe the project should be replaced with renewable energy program (seen as a safer and cheaper alternative). The population is intimidated by the possible negative consequences of the impact of radiation and radioactive waste on the environment of the region (including in relation to the unique local mangrove forests of the Sundarbans, water resources and climate), public health and so on. A possible radiation incident (according to critics) could be caused by an earthquake, typhoon or flood (like Fukushima), a terrorist and hacker attack and so forth [14].

Representatives of the Bangladesh National Committee for the Protection of Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Energy and Ports are particularly dissatisfied with the project. They are constantly trying to draw the attention of the local and world community with the above mentioned negative consequences of Sheikh Hasina's energy projects for the ecology and health of the PRB citizens. In this sense, the opposition of Bangladesh follows the path of Indian colleagues who organized mass demonstrations in the Indian state of Tamilnadu in 2011–2013 in the context of the KKNPP project [15].

However, all these fears are unfounded since VVER–1200 reactors of the new generation 3+ which currently under construction in Rooppur have an ultra–reliable protection system (active and passive, as well as a molten core catcher). They are able to bear a blow of an earthquake with a magnitude of up to 9 on the Richter scale as well as hit of an aircraft, missile or terrorist attack. It can be quite confidently asserted that a repetition of the tragedies of the Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986) or Fukushima (2011) NPPs is impossible. The task of Rosatom in Bangladesh and India is to inform the local population as much as possible about the real advantages and imaginary lacks of nuclear energy [7].

Atomic Energy Information Centre has been set up in Ishwardi (a city adjacent to the RNPP site). Among the key tasks of this Centre is to neutralize the criticism of Rooppur from local activists, environmentalists and political opposition to the current government of Sheikh Hasina. A large program is being implemented: lectures, seminars, open discussions, competitions explaining and informing the PRB citizens (including the local residents of Ishwardi and Pabna) about the advantages of nuclear energy [16].

Due to the activity of the Centre the following conspicuous facts became known to the Bangladeshi public (information for September 2021): 1) Electricity generation at Rooppur will provide 1,8 million families in the country with electricity; 2) 2,5 thousand qualified local specialists will be able to apply and improve their skills in the process of project implementation; 3) About 50 thousand Bangladeshi families are directly or indirectly involved in the construction of the station; 4) Nearly

1,500 Bangladeshi citizens will be trained in Russia and the PRB itself and after the completion of the training process they will be sent to the project site to ensure proper operation and maintenance of the plant; 5) The Russian government annually provides special scholarships to several dozen Bangladeshi students for getting a higher education in the field of nuclear engineering at the main Russian nuclear university (NRNU MEPhI, Moscow) and so on [16].

In its turn, such facts as corruption (sadly, a typical phenomenon for the countries of South Asia) and the inability of Bangladeshis to independently and on time carry out a number of necessary works within the framework of the project (in particular, the construction of infrastructure for power transmission lines / power lines for energy transmission, which will be produced by RNPP) [17].

Conclusion

The geopolitical realities of the “post–February 24, 2022 world” orientate the RF towards a greater intensification of cooperation (including energy) with South Asia. The rapid refocusing of the Russian economy and energy resources to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America (which in the very near future should take a completely different place in world geopolitics) also depends on the successful implementation of existing projects in India and Bangladesh. The world must understand that in the person of the Russian Federation it has a reliable partner that has practically unlimited opportunities for the supply of oil, gas, coal and other energy resources and fulfills all its obligations to partners.

Ultimately this should allow the Russian energy industry to maintain its level of development and neutralize the damage from the loss of the European and North American markets. It can be reached through the development of the markets of those countries that previously absolutely did not appear in the list of importers of Russian energy products, services and raw materials.

On the other hand, the Indian, Bangladeshi and other South Asian economies are getting a unique opportunity to receive cheap energy resources from the RF, thus maintaining high rates of development of their industry, agriculture and so forth. Maintaining neutrality by the key countries of the subcontinent (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) during the current uncompromising conflict between Russia and the West has once again demonstrated the desire of the parties to form a just, truly democratic and multipolar world. This is a world order where energy resources and industry technologies are not an instrument of confrontation and mutual accusations of “blackmail” and “energy wars”, but a means of mutually beneficial pooling of efforts and exchange, taking into account the interests and opinions of all participants.

Another most important consequence of the global split of the world and the fact that the Russian Federation and the key countries of South Asia are in the “one boat” (which is one of the symbols of the policy of Sheikh Hasina and Bangladesh itself) that those transport and infrastructure corridors which were so much talked about before (“North–South” / “St. Petersburg — Mumbai”, “Russia — Central Asia — Afghanistan — Pakistan”, “Northern Sea Route (NSR) — Vladivostok” and “Sakhalin — India” and others) are gaining their reality right now in conditions of the new world that is taking shape here and now.

Taking into account that Russian energy resources and industry technologies are one of the most important areas of mutual cooperation, the intensification of their movement along the above transport corridors provides fundamentally new and truly breakthrough opportunities for the parties. This also applies to a serious increase in the mutual levels of trade, which until recently left much to be desired. However, events taking place since 2019 (Asia–Pacific Cooperation / APEC Summit in Vladivostok) and even more so after the start of the Russian military operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, inspires hope that the situation in this aspect will change radically for the better.

In addition, the following areas may become promising aspects of the mutually beneficial cooperation: 1) Expansion of existing and search for new sites for the implementation of joint industry projects; 2) Encouragement of foreign direct investment in the industry; 3) Mutual promotion of prospective thorium energy; 4) India’s interest in the Russian program for the construction of floating nuclear power plants and the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Arctic; 5) Cooperation in the field of nuclear cyber security; 6) The RF support of the Indian full entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and so on [18].

The RF and the key SA countries are indeed in the same boat now. Tries to balance between the two key opposing centers of power is counterproductive. Only a multipolar world can give both Russia and India the opportunities they truly deserve. The importance of “small countries” should also increase. The unipolar world (if it persists), most likely, will not even recognize the status of a “regional power” for India and will try to reduce Russia to the “extremely small values”.

Our states have only one choice to achieve a new and just world since there is a real danger of “sinking” within the old world of one hegemon, dictate and decision–making center. And the fact that our countries have accumulated a rich and favorable experience of the mutually beneficial cooperation in such a key and strategic industry as nuclear energy gives reason to hope that the Russian Federation and South Asia will be able to solve the economic difficulties associated with sanctions and solve political problems facing our countries.

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Russia's Evolving Military Strategy in Response to NATO Expansion: Continuity and Changes

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Abstract. This article analyses the changes and continuities in the Russian Military Strategy in response to NATO's expansionist policies. The methodology used is interdisciplinary in nature as the discourse is based and conceptualized in the historical context with social insights into the contemporary development of events. The paper is divided into two sections: the first concerns NATO's expansion, both during and after the Cold War period; and the second examines the proposed Russian Military Strategy in response to NATO's increasing eastward expansion. It is concluded that Russia's national security concepts and evolving expressions of military doctrine closely follow the process of NATO's expansion. The nature of forward deployment, defense concept and military strategy that NATO adopts are decisive in formulating and influencing not only Kremlin's perception but also its reaction, especially in the military field to alliance enlargement.

Keywords: Russian military strategy, NATO, Cold War, security, alliance

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Эволюция военной стратегии России в ответ на расширение НАТО

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Аннотация. Рассматриваются изменения и преемственность в российской военной стратегии по сравнению с периодом Холодной войны в ответ на политику расширения НАТО. Используемая методология носит междисциплинарный характер, поскольку дискурс основан на историческом контексте с учетом современного развития событий. Исследуются расширение НАТО как во время, так и после периода Холодной войны; и военная стратегия России в ответ на расширение НАТО на Восток. Сделан вывод о том, что концепции национальной безопасности России и меняющиеся формулировки ее военной доктрины тесно связаны с процессом расширения НАТО. Характер передового развертывания сил НАТО, ее концепция обороны и военная стратегия играют решающую роль в формировании не только восприятия Россией НАТО, но и напрямую влияют на реакцию Кремля, особенно в военной области, на расширение альянса на Восток.

Ключевые слова: военная стратегия России, НАТО, Холодная война, безопасность, альянс

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Introduction

Throughout its history, NATO has been a major security concern that made the rules of Moscow expand in diverse directions. From an alliance which was originally devoted to the mutual defense of its members, NATO has extended its borders to enclose and encircle the entirety of Europe and has expanded military alliances throughout the world. Russia and NATO have led a long and complicated relationship characterized by mistrust and competition. The evolution of their troubled relationship can be traced back to the beginning of Cold War period. In fact, the evolution of the Soviet military strategy is intrinsically linked to the expansionist tendencies of the NATO forces. NATO with the United States has acted as the principal determinant of the Soviet military modernization — characterized by the use of modern warfare, technologically advanced conventional arms and information warfare; rise in the use of airspace and outer space for military operations — especially in the post-Cold War era.

Two distinct periods of NATO enlargement have occurred in history: the first expansion took place during the Cold War phase and the other after the Soviet disintegration. Russia has opposed every round of NATO's increasing proliferation in its neighborhood so far and is still hostile to any future eastward enlargement of NATO. The early 1990s was characterized by a short span of positive association between Russia and NATO but this emerging partnership was soon deteriorated by adversity in relations due to NATO's military action against Yugoslavia (1999) which was accompanied by NATO's extension to encompass Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Georgia and Ukraine. The crisis of the 1990s was the upshot of two distinct perceptions of self-identity and prospect of security in Europe. With NATO's post-Cold War military enlargement, its border with Russia has moved much closer to the main heartland. These fears have prompted Kremlin to launch a military reform and modernization program combined with a significant increase in the defense spending to thwart what it perceives as a direct Western threat to Russian security.

In this context, the study seeks to shed light on NATO's expansionist tendencies and also endeavors to conduct a comprehensive appraisal of the evolving relationship between the Russian military strategy and modernization with regard to NATO's expansion. The chapter is divided into following two sections: the first part deals with NATO enlargement, both during the Cold War and the post-Cold War period; and the second section deals with the proposed Russian military strategy in response to NATO's increasing eastward proliferations.

NATO Enlargement

NATO, a Western-led geopolitical project traces its origin to the North Atlantic Treaty (also called the Washington Treaty) of April 4, 1949. The treaty was signed by the foreign ministers of “Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the U.K. and the USA” [1]. It was a major step towards the establishment of a counterbalance to Soviet defense troops positioned in Central and Eastern Europe after the Second World War. NATO was primarily a security pact, and two core components of NATO include — “Article 2, which commits the member states to work towards strengthening security by strengthening their free institutions” and “the famous Article 5, which promises security support for any member state which comes under attack” [2]. These two fundamental articles constitute the very heart and soul of NATO's concept of collective defense. The treaty reflected a fundamental revision in the foreign policy of USA. It was for the first time since the XVIII century, that the USA had officially bound its security with the European countries. In addition to focusing on the establishment of a collective defense system, NATO also sought to establish a mutually beneficial East-West relationship through dialogue and cooperation.

Cold-War Expansion

The first expansion of NATO allowed Greece and Turkey to join as new members in 1952. Their inclusion was justified mainly on security, economic and foreign policy grounds. The security reasons were connected with the distress that Greece had to encounter after the Second World War in suppressing a communist uprising and the orders by the Soviet Union for the establishment of defense bases in the Turkish Straits. The Economic reasons related to the US Marshall plan, directed to help a ruined and shattered Europe to get back on its economic feet. The Foreign reasons were connected with the Truman doctrine which not only assured the safety of Turkey and Greece but also ensure that they were on the right side of the Iron Curtain. The addition of these two countries “enabled the alliance to shore up its southern flank to forestall Communist military action in Europe at the height of the Korean war” [3. P. 16]. Turkey’s strategic position has been of great significance for the NATO forces, as “it serves as a vital eastern anchor, controlling the straits leading from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean along with sharing its border with Syria, Iraq and Iran” [4].

The primary adversary of World War II — The Federal Republic of Germany — was the next to join the Western alliance in 1955, despite early opposition by France and the Soviet Union. Membership of NATO was seen as a major step in the post-war rehabilitation of Germany, as it returned much of its sovereignty which was suspended during the post-World War II occupation and carved a new course for Germany to play a notable role in the security and surveillance of Western Europe during the Cold War era. Germany’s acquisition was based on NATO’s new Forward Strategy, adopted in 1950, which called for “rearmament of the German military forces and emphasized on defending Europe as far to the east as possible, and no further West than the Rhine river” [5. P. 5].

Spain joined NATO in 1982. The British, French and the United States were keen on Spain’s admission to NATO but its troubled political history with its neighbors under the ruler Francisco Franco (who governed from 1936 until 1975), hindered Spain from being politically accepted by the other Western Europe countries. Both Spain and the USA signed the Madrid Pacts in 1953, which allowed Spain to obtain economic relief in return for authorizing the USA to operate its naval and air bases.

The actual process of Spanish accession to NATO was initiated soon after the democratic transition of the government which took place in the aftermath of Franco’s death (1975). After Spain’s transition to a democratic country, it became very easy for the member states of NATO like the USA, Britain and France to justify their entry into the organization. However, some sort of disagreement still persisted among the socialist and the communist leaders of Spain, who were of the view that Spain’s entry to NATO will boost the scale of tension that existed between the two competing blocs and would make Spain a likely target of the Soviet Union in the case of a future conflict. They were also of the view that joining NATO would not assist Spain to reacquire lost Gibraltar, as the NATO members would favor Britain on this

issue. In the end, “the most important domestic support for the membership of NATO came from the Spanish prime minister Felipe Gonzalez who promised a national referendum on NATO’s membership. In the public poll of 1986, the Spaniards voted to stay in NATO, but Spain joined the integrated military structure of the alliance only in 1988” [4].

Post-Cold War Expansion

The discussion around NATO’s enlargement in the post-Cold War era was initiated by Henry Kissinger as early as 1991–92. But it was under the leadership of Bill Clinton that NATO’s enlargement program ultimately took the shape of a concrete policy. NATO’s expansionist tendencies have been apprehended by Kremlin as a “zero-sum game”, in which the member-states of the Euro-Atlantic region are expanding their domination at the expense of Russia. In the decades following the fall of the Berlin Wall and of the Soviet Union itself, NATO has been able to reshape its ‘raison d’être’ by shifting from “an organization solely providing collective defense to an organization proactive in the area of collective security” [6]. This strategic transformation is evident from the varied contemporary missions undertaken by NATO viz. “Operation Ocean Shield”, and “Operation Unified Protector in Libya” in 2011 along with the “nation-building efforts in Afghanistan”. NATO, therefore, “in the post-Cold War has emerged as a major military instrument for the member-states of the Euro-Atlantic community in dealing with major international crises usually based on a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate” [6].

Soon after “the end of the Cold War, Moscow seemed on the way to integrate with the Euro-Atlantic security community, sparking high hopes for a new peaceful order in the northern hemisphere” [7. P. 7]. But the establishment of Partnership for Peace program, which was aimed at creating trust between NATO and the Warsaw countries deteriorated this emerging partnership. Moscow perceived the Partnership for Peace as a tool to enhance USA power in Europe and to downgrade the influence of Russia. Another major pivotal point in the USA-Kremlin relationship came in 1994 due to NATO’s involvement in the Bosnia crisis followed by its decision to expand its membership. NATO forces conducted their first major intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina which was accompanied by the implementation of the ‘Dayton Peace Agreement’, which pronounced the end of the 1992–1995 war in the country. The ‘NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR)’ was stationed in December 1995 and was accompanied by the ‘NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR)’, which ended in December 2004. In December 2006, both Bosnia and Herzegovina became members of NATO.

An ambitious step towards the institutionalization of the Russia-NATO partnership was taken in 1997, with ‘the NATO-Russia Founding Act’ which was soon accompanied by the institution of the ‘NATO-Russia Permanent Joint

Council' in 1997. The Founding Act laid out “the mechanism to foster cooperation, coordination and joint decision-making between NATO and Russia. The Act underlined that “Proceeding from the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, NATO and Russia will work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behavior in the interests of all states” [8]. But this shared goal of building a strong and powerful safeguard in the Euro-Atlantic region could not last long because of NATO’s military interference in Kosovo.

The 1999 air campaign by the NATO forces in Kosovo without the approval of the UN Security Council, is perceived by the Russians as a part of NATO’s plan for unilateral security in Europe. Despite being accorded a special alliance with NATO under the Founding Act, Russia’s attempt to counter NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was not successful. This created a sense of mistrust and suspicion. Russia was apprehensive that this military campaign signaled not only USA and European hegemony in the existing world order, but also a violation of the rule of sovereignty in the international arena. This soured the relations between NATO and Russia. Nonetheless, Moscow still proved to be a very valuable ally in solving the Kosovo conflict as both the Russian and NATO soldiers fought together in order to restore peace.

In the Washington Summit of April 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted an open-door policy for the inclusion of new members. Under this policy, the first wave of NATO’s enlargement that encircled the former members of the Soviet Bloc in Eastern and Central Europe took place. “The first wave was called the ‘Visegrad Three’, which involved “the inclusion of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in NATO in 1999” [9]. The enlargement of NATO forces under the “Open-door” policy received a major push under the Bush administration (2000–2008). The central aspect of the Bush strategy was “ promotion of peace and stability in the European continent through the consolidation of the new Central and Eastern European democracies into a wider Euro-Atlantic community, in which the United States would remain deeply engaged” [4].

The second wave of “NATO’s enlargement under the Bush administration embraced seven countries namely Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia who joined NATO in 2004. These enlargements that took place in the post-Cold War era (1999 and 2004) were qualitatively and quantitatively different from the previous enlargements. Quantitatively, in the space of five years, the number of NATO members rose from 16 to 26. The enlargements significantly extended the Alliance border areas adjoining Russia and increased the size of the area under the collective security umbrella in Europe by nearly 30 per cent and contributed to increasing frictions between Russia and the members of the Euro-Atlantic community” [10]. Moreover, the war in Iraq further pushed the NATO-Russia relations to a new

low, and there were fears regarding, the return of the old Cold War suspicions and hostility. Russia, together with Germany and France, rejected and successfully limited via UN resolution, the use of military force against Saddam Hussein. This led to a tense stand-off between the forces of Russia and NATO.

Like the former Bush administration, the new Obama administration (2009) also promoted the open-door policy of NATO expansion. The policy emphasized the inclusion of new European states into the USA led military alliance to maintain the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. The United States strongly supported the entry of countries such as Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, Georgia and Ukraine and argued that they should be invited to join the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). At the April 2–4, 2008 “NATO summit in Bucharest, both Albania and Croatia were extended the membership invitations, which culminated with their formal admission in the NATO’s Strasbourg summit in April 2009” [11]. The invitation for Montenegro to become the 29th member of the military alliance is viewed by Russia as an open confrontational move.

Donald Trump, who succeeded President Obama as the 45th President of the United States, was a vocal critique of NATO, insisting that European countries should pay more for their collective defense and in return grant concessions to USA interests in trade. This is evident in his May 2017 speech in Brussels, where he asserts, “NATO members must finally contribute their fair share. Europe must do more” [12. P. 108]. This was followed by Montenegro’s addition as the 29th member of NATO’s alliance on 5 June 2017. Under the presidency of Donald Trump, the importance of NATO’s role in preventing and preserving peace in the Middle East was also highlighted. This decision was made amid high tensions between the United States and Iran in the wake of the assassination of the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani by an American strike in Baghdad on January 3, 2020. The action indicated that President Trump wanted to extend the NATO alliance to those countries in the region that share his cautious stance towards Iran, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). By 2020, North Macedonia completed its military integration with NATO and became its 30th member.

Russian Military Strategy (Cold War period)

The period after the end of the Second World War represented an exceedingly turbulent period in the development of the Soviet military in many respects. On one hand, by 1948, “Joseph V. Stalin had reduced USSR armed forces to about 2.8 million men and had given priority to the reconstruction of the domestic economy, with the objective of reaching the pre-war level by 1950” [13. P. 10]. On the other, the Soviet leader also emphasized the development of those military technologies in which the Soviet Union had been most deficient: nuclear weapons,

radar, missiles, and jet engines. He also undertook the construction of a large, essentially conventional navy.

Under Stalin, the Soviet military adopted an expansionist strategy and successfully extended its influence on Poland, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Albania, outer Mongolia and North Korea. In fact, the whole of Eastern Europe except Finland and Greece came under the Soviet influence. The Communist Governments in these countries pursued policies which were subservient to the Soviet Policy and soon came to be known as the Soviet Satellites. Moscow also restored the Communist International by forging an alliance with all the anti-imperialist forces. In September 1947 the Communist Information Bureau, also known as the ‘Cominform’ was established to co-ordinate the work of the communist parties of various countries and to publish propaganda to encourage international communist solidarity. With a view to further promoting greater economic cooperation among the communist countries, Joseph Stalin introduced the ‘Molotov plan’ (a counterpart of the Marshall plan). He further consolidated the relationship between the USSR and Eastern Europe through the establishment of ‘Comecon’ (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) in January 1949. Comecon was established to provide economic assistance to the countries of Eastern Europe under Soviet command.

After the Second World War, USSR had signed bilateral agreements with all the countries of Eastern Europe excluding East Germany. But with the admission of West Germany to NATO (May 1955), the Soviets were concerned about the repercussions of a powerful NATO and a rearmed West Germany. Moreover, the Soviets were greatly alarmed by the remarkable speed with which NATO was expanding its influence over central and Eastern Europe. Kremlin viewed these expansionist tendencies of NATO as an instrument of American intervention in Europe. As a result, the Soviet Union under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev retaliated with the creation of the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955. The “Warsaw Treaty Organization (also known as the Warsaw Pact) was a political and military alliance between the Soviet Union and seven Soviet satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War era. It acted as a counterbalance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces” [14].

Under Nikita Khrushchev, the military thought of the Soviet Union began its adaptation to the nuclear era and a discussion on the implication of nuclear weapons for the Soviet Military Strategy was initiated. At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev making political use of the Soviet nuclear capability declared that war between the two opposed world social systems was no longer a fatal inevitability and the formidable means for deterrence between the socialist and the capitalist blocs was the nuclear weapons. Thus, he emphasized on the theory of peaceful co-existence. During Khrushchev’s initial years of ascendancy (1955–58), “the Soviet defense outlays were reduced by about one billion rubles by cutting manpower, scrapping Stalin’s conventional navy plans and shifting the USSR’s defense effort towards missiles, electronics

and nuclear weapons” [15. P. 21]. In January 1960, speaking before the Supreme Soviet Khrushchev emphasized the adoption of a minimum deterrence strategy. In the Soviet view, deterrence relied heavily on the military balances of forces and upon the retaliatory capacity of nuclear-armed strategic missiles as the foundation of its security rather than relying upon the powerful ground troops and their massive offensive operations.

The Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 was an important catalyst in this regard, which exposed the internal weakness of Moscow’s nuclear posture. It was after this event that a major revolution in the military affairs of the Soviet Union through the formulation of a new military doctrine and strategy for the nuclear age began. The Soviets associated this revolution with the large-scale production of both fission and fusion weapons; the deployment of large-scale strategic ballistic missiles for the formation of a new branch of service known as the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and the introduction of nuclear weapons into the arsenals of all other services of Soviet armed forces, thus forcing internal reorganization.

The development of Soviet military policies under Brezhnev (from the mid-1960s to mid-1980) was guided by two main ideologies: “First, the notion of International system organized along the class line; second, belief in the fundamental irreconcilability of interests of world socialism and world capitalism” [16. P.14]. Under Brezhnev, “the total expenditure and the procurement of military outlays grew faster than other components. By 1970 defenses accounted for about 12 to 13 per cent of GNP, as compared to about 9 per cent only one decade earlier” [15. P. 75]. This increase in expenditure can be attributed to the Soviet weapons procurement policies. In addition to this, a major qualitative up-gradation through the introduction of advanced technologies such as — Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), mobile missile launchers and sophisticated stellar navigational systems also took place.

By the early 1970s, USSR reached the zenith of its political and strategic strength in comparison to the United States. The signing of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) in May 1972 led to the establishment of equality regarding the possession of nuclear weapons between the two superpowers. This was followed by further negotiations on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which culminated in 1972. During the mid-1970s, “the Soviets developed three essential Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) technologies that were completely lacking at the beginning of the SALT I: (1) a small and movable phased array radar for local defenses; (2) two new ABM missiles, including one comparable to the USA sprint designed for atmospheric interceptors; (3) the Ryad computer, reportedly similar to the USA IBM 260/370 series” [17. P. 92]. Thus, by the time, “the SALT II agreement was signed between President Carter and Brezhnev in June 1979, Moscow’s arsenal of long-range silo-based missiles had grown to some 1,400 (down from a high of 1,618

in 1975), outfitted with roughly 6,000 warheads” [18. P. 32]. But Moscow’s global ambitions under Brezhnev, accompanied by its preference for guns over butter, bankrupted the whole country and left the Soviet people materially worse off in comparison to their counterparts living in neighboring capitalist countries during the Brezhnev’s tenure.

Yuri Andropov who took over from Brezhnev on 12 November 1982 initially promised to attend to the considerable needs of the Soviet armed forces. But by late 1983, he began to hedge a bit on his support for the military. Konstantin Chernenko who acceded Andropov on 13 February 1984 represented a return to the policies of the late Brezhnev period.

The new leadership that came to power in 1985 under Mikhail Gorbachev criticized the heavy Soviet dependence on the military as an instrument of policy. Gorbachev alleged that rather than facilitating and securing Soviet interests, the previous regime’s excessive dependence on the military as an instrument of policy had done irretrievable harm to the country, by aggravating tensions with the opponents, straining ties with allies and intimidating virtually everyone else. Therefore, the political leadership sought to redefine security in terms of emphasizing defensive themes and war prevention. Gorbachev’s ideology enshrined in the Twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party, reflected his pragmatic thinking as he emphasized the philosophy of ensuring security in the nuclear age with an overall agenda for action aimed at creating a peaceful world order. This new security thinking was also reflected under the ‘Perestroika’ policy of Gorbachev which stressed the establishment of a New World Economic Order, guaranteeing economic security to all.

The main contribution of Mikhail Gorbachev in the security policy was the three arms control negotiations that the Soviet Union concluded with the United States between 1987 and 1991: ‘The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)’ of December 1987; ‘The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)’ of November 1990 and ‘the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START Treaty)’ of July 1991. These agreements revolutionized the security relations between the two superpowers and emphasized the reduction of hundreds of missiles and thousands of warheads on both sides.

At the London Summit of July 1990, NATO invited “Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union to establish regular diplomatic relations with the alliance. This led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991” [19]. The Council was seen as a major step toward the evolution of the relationship between the NATO countries and the former Soviet bloc. But Gorbachev’s further endeavors like the de-Sovietisation and de-communisation of Eastern Europe accompanied by the unification of Germany in 1990 yielded major shifts in the geopolitics and were marked by an end of the Warsaw pact, failure of the NACC council and dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Russian Military Strategy (Post-Cold War period)

The discussion around NATO's enlargement in the post-Cold War era was initiated by Henry Kissinger as early as 1991–92. But it was under the leadership of Bill Clinton that NATO's enlargement program ultimately took the shape of a concrete policy. NATO's expansionist tendencies have been apprehended by Kremlin as a "zero-sum game", in which the member-states of the Euro-Atlantic region are expanding their domination at the expense of Russia.

NATO as an alliance has pursued to evolve throughout its existence. The identity and principles of NATO had undergone a great transformation in accordance with the newly emerging security threats and the changing balance of power. "The decades following the fall of the Berlin Wall and of the Soviet Union itself, NATO has been able to reshape its 'raison d'être' by shifting from an organization solely providing a collective defense to an organization proactive in the area of collective security" [20]. This strategic transformation is evident from the varied contemporary missions undertaken by NATO viz. 'Operation Ocean Shield', 'Operation Unified Protector in Libya' in 2011 along with the 'nation-building efforts in Afghanistan'. Thus, in the post-Cold War era, NATO has become a major military tool for member states of the Euro-Atlantic community in dealing with major international crises, following a UNSC directive.

The "end of the Cold War redefined the relationship between NATO and Russia. NATO, which was initially established to protect the Euro-Atlantic region from Soviet attack, gradually evolved into an alliance promoting security not only in Europe but also beyond. On the other hand, Russia has been seeking a new identity since 1991" [21]. The distinct phases in NATO-Russia relations during the 1990s have been, "First, a fragile honeymoon which lasted from the end of 1991 to the late summer of 1993. This was accompanied by deterioration over 1994 and 1995 and then attempts to construct a new 'special relationship'. These efforts were again seriously challenged, but not permanently ruptured, during the Kosovo crisis of 1998–99" [22. P.2]. The "fragile honeymoon period began following the 1991 declaration of Russian President Yeltsin in which he emphasized on the creation of good relations with NATO and its members as a key foreign policy priority. This did not mean that "Russian leaders were ready to accept everything that NATO might consider doing. Enlargement was a potential bone of contention from an early stage, even for supposed liberals in the Russian leadership" [23. P.3]. However, this period of peaceful negotiations did not last long and the question of NATO enlargement to Central Europe states became a critical issue. Under the fear of an expanding NATO, in May 1992, the RF General Staff published the first draft of the Russian Military Doctrine. This draft seemed to be "the beginning of a movement towards a more assertive confrontational Russian security policy, different from the defensive and peaceful tone of the last Soviet doctrine. In March 1993, the draft Doctrine of 1992 was submitted to the Supreme Soviet and after

approval by the Parliament, the doctrine was finally ratified by a Presidential decree on November 2, 1993” [24. P. 4].

The Russian Military Doctrine of 1993 thus constitutes, “a document of the transitional period — the period of establishing Russian statehood, implementing democratic reforms and shaping a new system of international relations. The document defines the major sources of military dangers ranging from territorial claims of other states on the Russian Federation and its allies, the suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states and the deployment of foreign troops on the territory of states adjacent to the Russian Federation” [25].

Since 1993, Russian attitudes toward NATO became more apprehensive. The major reason was that “Russia had been duped about the true nature and aims of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) scheme, which NATO members had unveiled at a January 1994 summit meeting. Russia believed — the PfP’s motive force was made up primarily of the anti-Russia sentiments; the PfP was a subterfuge designed to ensure a US military presence in Poland and Hungary and since the emphasis within PfP is on bringing former Soviet and Central European armed forces up to NATO standards, the program would work to the detriment of Russian arms manufacturers who had traditionally dominated the market in these regions” [26. P. 5]. The other prominent reasons that contributed to the increasing Russian suspicion were — NATO’s use of force in the Balkans, the bombing of Bosnia in 1994 and 1995, and attempts to diminish Russia’s influence in the Caucasus.

Despite the misperceptions of both sides, a summit meeting between NATO members and President Yeltsin was held in Paris in May 1997 to sign the Russian Federation — NATO Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security. Initially, Russia mistook it as a fair deal as NATO stated that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of new members. A new ‘NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC)’ was also created to build increasing levels of trust, the unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia. But the council failed in placing NATO-Russia relations on a significantly more cooperative and institutionalized footing. The final blow in the NATO-Russia relations was the Kosovo crisis. Many viewed, the Kosovo conflict as the major turning point in NATO-Russia relations post-Soviet disintegration. Following the Kosovo crisis, Russia’s hypothetical security concerns of the past decade became real as NATO came close to Russian borders and bombed non-NATO states. Thus, the Kosovo crisis, followed by the expansion of NATO to incorporate Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had a major impact on the drafting of the military doctrine of 2000. It was regarded as the last straw in uniting major military and political elements of threat.

The presidential election of March 2000 triggered a major revision in the ‘National Security Concept (January 2000)’ and ‘Military Doctrine (April 2000)’. With the rise to power of President Vladimir Putin in 1999–2000,

reshaping the military structures became the top political priority of the Russian government. The Military Doctrine of 2000, “outlines the role of the country’s authorities in ensuring defense and, if necessary, preparing for and waging war. The document emphasizes Russia’s readiness to wage war and take part in armed conflicts exclusively with a view to preventing and repulsing aggression, protecting the integrity and inviolability of its territory and safeguarding its military security as well as that of its allies in accordance with international treaties” [27]. Putin, therefore, prioritized from the very outset the necessity to reform the military, both for operational and social reasons, taking into consideration the obsolete nature of military equipment, shortage of qualified officers, ill-discipline, low morale, high levels of corruption and the traditional large size of the conscription army. To initiate the reform agenda, Vladimir Putin in 2001 appointed the former KGB general Sergei Ivanov as defense minister.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a reset in Russia — USA relations was witnessed under the leadership of Putin. Soon after the attacks, the presidents of both countries met, and Russia under Putin agreed to assist the USA in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is considered to be “NATO’s first out of area operation and its biggest in terms of military capabilities and force deployment. Some major points of Russia’s contribution in this mission were: allowing the USA to operate in the Central Asian air space which Russia considered to be in its territory of influence, supporting the Afghan Armed Forces, co-training of Afghan counter-narcotics forces etc. Putin used this opportunity to further upgrade Russia’s relations with the West, counter the threat of terrorism, and for branding the separatist rebels in Chechnya as terrorists. This thaw in the Russia-NATO relationship was further enhanced with the establishment in 2002 of ‘the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)’ at the Rome Summit. NRC replaced NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which served to improve coordination between NATO and Russian Federation and to address international security issues and joint projects between the two sides.

But the prospects of this emerging partnership again crumbled when NATO adopted the Open-door policy under the Bush administration (2000 to 2008). The colour revolutions (2003–2005) in ‘Central Eastern Europe’, the ‘Caucasus’ and ‘Central Asia’ led NATO to expand its membership to include Ukraine and Georgia within the alliance, despite Moscow’s strong disapproval. These events were further accompanied by the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia. Although the real conflict lasted only about five days, the political consequences were fatal and long-lasting. The Georgian conflict was initiated by the Ossetian separatists, who initially revolted by bombing Georgian villages. Russia’s role in this conflict was confined to sending army and air troops to support Ossetia rebels¹.

All sides — Russia, Georgia and South Ossetia were held accountable for war crimes by the Human Rights Watch. Russia was accused of conquering a sovereign

¹ Editorial Board's note: The author's opinion does not coincide with the official Russian position.

state and threatening democracy. This negatively impacted the Russia — NATO relationship. In response, the Western countries suspended cooperation with Russia and imposed sanctions and both sides started accusing each other of returning to the Cold War tactics.

In the aftermath of the military shortcomings that were exposed by the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, President Medvedev and defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov initiated a radical Russian military reform program in October 2008. The “reforms were intended to switch from a mass mobilization army for vast land, sea, and air wars to a performance-capable, mobile, and maximally armed army and navy ready to participate in three regional and local conflicts, at a minimum” [28]. These reforms were further strengthened by the adoption of a new military doctrine on February 5, 2010. The doctrine “adopted the 2009 National security strategy which highlights NATO as a danger because of its gradual and continuous enlargement to states bordering Russia and its assumption of out of area missions” [27].

Towards the end of 2010, President Medvedev adopted the new State Armament Program or “*Gosudarstvennaya Programma Razvitiya Vooruzheniy*” (GPRV), which expounded the military priorities of the Kremlin for the year 2007–2015. Under this program — “the armed forces were allocated about 3,000 new weapons and components and more than 5,000 modernized weapons units; Air Force and Air Defense Forces received over 1,000 new aircraft, for the most part, modernized Sukhoi Su-34 bombers; land and airborne forces were allocated 300 battalions and several missile brigades were rearmed. The Navy received several dozen surface ships and submarines, including five Project 955 Borey nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines equipped with new Bulava-30 ballistic missiles, two Project 885 Yasen nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines, six Project 677 Lada diesel-electric submarines, three Project 22350 multipurpose frigates and five Project 20380 corvettes” [28].

With the return of Vladimir Putin (2012), preserving Russia’s great power stature and eminence in the post-Soviet space became a major priority. In “strategic terms, this contemplates Russia’s entrenched desire to surround itself with buffer zones as a protection from invasions and external instabilities” [31]. Under the leadership of Putin, the State rearmament program and the defense industry received strong support. SIPRI has traced the unsustainable increase in Russian military expenditure since 2012. Defense Expenditure as a percentage of GDP rose from “4 % in 2012 to above 4.5 % in 2014” [32]. In 2014, amid a new economic crisis in Russia, “defense expenditures exploded to \$91.6 billion, placing Russia ahead of any European power. The World Bank assesses these defense expenditures amount to 4.2 % of Russia’s GDP” [29. P. 1–18].

Russian rearmament and competitive military strategy under Putin, allowed it to execute the swift occupation of Crimea (March 2014). Russian military operation in Crimea marked the emergence of ‘Hybrid warfare’. The introductory phase of the hybrid warfare does not differ much from the conventional tools

of Russian diplomacy. In line with contemporary Russian military thinking on ‘new generation warfare’, hybrid war is built on “the combined use of military and non-military means, including diplomatic, economic, political, social, information and also military means. It is aimed at “defeating the target country by breaking its ability to resist without actually launching a full-scale military attack” [30. P.86].

Russia’s successful hybrid war against Ukraine was bounded to a number of important pre-requisites — To begin with, the target country must be weak and divided, with corrupt officials; As a second requirement, the attacker must be militarily stronger than the target country in order to limit the effectiveness of the defense; Third, for a hybrid offensive to be successful it must have a large presence of ethnic minorities of the attacking state in the target country who do not fully trust the central government’s treatment of them; Fourth, hybrid warfare is also dependent upon a strong media presence, both within the target country as well as overseas and Fifth, the attacked area must share a long, uncontrolled border with the attacker, allowing uninterrupted supplies to pass, as in Ukraine. As a result, the Kyiv government and Western nations were anxious about the speedy and effective Russian intervention in Ukraine.

Russia’s successful campaign in Crimea was soon followed by the promulgation of a new Military Doctrine which was implemented on 25 December 2014, replacing the version of February 2010. The doctrine “addresses broader changes in both Russia’s domestic and foreign policy environment. The document explicitly points out NATO and implicitly to the United States as the major external threats to Russia” [31]. The document also underlines two major domestic dangers faced by the Russian Federation that can damage the internal cohesion of this multi-ethnic state — First, is the erosion of ethnic and religious harmony in the North Caucasus, as demonstrated by the growth of Islamist movements in the region followed by the rise in Russian nationalism; and Second, the threat of constitutional change in the Russian Federation.

The Ukrainian crisis was soon followed by Russia’s intervention in the Syrian conflict in 2015, at the invitation of the Assad regime. The crisis provided Russia with an opportunity to showcase its new inventory of hypersonic weapons with devastating consequences to a global audience. Troianovski A., Schwirtz M., Kramer A. (2022) argue that during the Syrian intervention, Russia under Putin acquired more than 1,000 new aircraft, including the country’s most advanced fighters, the SU-35S. Syria, therefore, served as a laboratory for Russian tactics and weaponry refinement, and for gaining combat experience for most of its soldiers [36]. Russia’s operations in Syria strengthened its expeditionary capabilities through investment in rapidly deployable ground forces and long-range strikes. Russia also used Kalibr missiles and Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to strike ground targets in Syria. Even though the strikes were intended primarily as a training exercise and demonstration of Russian capability for external signaling rather than for direct military effect in Syria, they do demonstrate how developments in these areas support Russia’s expeditionary capabilities.

Under Putin's leadership, Russia's 2011–20 State Armament Program became significantly more effective. Under this program, Russia modernised its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), replacing older Soviet-era systems with the RS-12 M1 and M2 Topol-M (also known as SS-27 Mod 1 by NATO) and then with the RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2). A total of 102 of the latter system were in service by early 2018 [32]. The naval component of Russia's nuclear triad was further modernized under this program with the purchase of Project 955/955A Borei class vessels armed with the RSM-56 Bulava (SS-N-32) missile. The airborne component of the triad was mainly modernized by the TU-95 MS (Bear) — a large, four-engine turboprop-powered strategic bomber and missile platform.

Another major milestone achieved in the defense industry was the approval of Russia's new 10-year State Armament Program (from 2018 to 2027), also known as 'GPV 2027', on 22 December 2017. It is expected that GPV 2027 will build on the progress made under GPV 2020 and further strengthen the Russian armed forces. Under this new defense procurement program, the modernization of Russia's strategic nuclear triad remains a priority. Therefore, attempts are being made to create a new Sarmat Multiple-Warhead Heavy ICBM, a replacement for the R-36 M2 Voevoda ICBM (called the SS-18 by NATO) deployed currently.

The Russian Federation under Putin's leadership released its latest military document in early June 2020 titled, "On Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence". It outlines the threats and circumstances that may lead to the use of nuclear weapons by Russia. The document specifically states that Russia views nuclear weapons as a solely deterrent measure. It states that Russia's nuclear deterrence policy "is defensive by nature, it is aimed at maintaining the nuclear forces potential at the level sufficient for nuclear deterrence and guarantees protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, and deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies" [33. P.8]. The document indicates that Russia could respond with nuclear weapons when it has received reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies and in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies. The threat perceptions have hardened with regard to the United States and NATO, and the Russian government appears to be in the process of updating several national security strategy documents.

Conclusion

Thus, NATO was a major component of the development of the Russian military strategy during and after the Cold War, as the Soviet Union progressed from a nuclear-armed hollow shell in the 1940s into a modern, sophisticated military force capable of rapid deployment and lethal effects in conventional

warfare. The modernization program encompassed all parts of the Russian military, including “strategic nuclear, non-strategic nuclear and conventional forces. It included precision-guided weaponry, a newly streamlined command structure, well-fed and professional soldiers” [31]. This military and nuclear modernization during the post-Cold War period was driven by President Putin’s ambition to restore Russia’s hard power and to help regain the global relevance it lost after the Cold War. Through the years, Moscow has made it clear that NATO’s ongoing incursions into Russia’s security zone will be viewed as an act of aggression against the Russian Federation. The contemporary Ukraine crisis provides a definitive confirmation of it.

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ИЗ ИСТОРИИ ВОСТОКА ORIENTAL STUDIES


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Research article / Научная статья

Cambodia's Decline and the Fall of Angkor as Pictured in the Chinese Sources during the Yuan and Early-Middle Ming dynasties (Late XIII — Early XV cc.)

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Abstract. The fall of Angkor in the 15th century marked a turning point in the Cambodian history leading to the downfall of the Khmer civilization and the start of the so-called “post-Angkor period” which is also often referred to as the “Dark Age of Cambodia”. Local epigraphical sources almost completely disappear from the 13th up to the 16th centuries while the Royal Chronicles dealing with this timeframe were compiled much later, mostly in the 18th and 19th centuries. Therefore, primary sources of this era are very scarce. While it is commonly accepted among the modern researchers that the fall of Angkor was a continuous process and was not a result of a single Siamese attack or a natural calamity (moreover, various reasons for this gradual downfall have been outlined), the perception of this process by other political powers in the region, especially China, has been significantly understudied. In this work the author made an attempt to trace the transformation of depiction of Cambodia in the Chinese sources of the Yuan and early Ming dynasties (both official and private).

Keywords: Cambodia, Angkor, Zhenla, Chenla, China, Yuan dynasty, Ming dynasty, Zhou Daguan, Zheng He

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Упадок Камбоджи и падение Ангкора в китайских источниках эпохи Юань и ранней Мин (поздний XIII — ранний XV вв.)

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Аннотация. Падение Ангкора в XV в. обозначило поворотную точку в истории Камбоджи и привело к упадку кхмерской цивилизации и началу так называемого «пост-Ангкорского периода», который также зачастую именуют как «Темные века Камбоджи». Местные эпиграфические источники почти полностью исчезают в промежутке с XIII по XVI вв., в то же время Королевские хроники, в которых описывается этот временной период, были созданы значительно позднее, в большинстве своем в XVIII и XIX вв. Таким образом, первоисточники этой эпохи крайне малочисленны. В то время как среди современных исследователей общепринято, что упадок Ангкора был продолжительным процессом и не был результатом одного набега со стороны Сиам или же природной катастрофы (более того, было обозначено много причин этого постепенного упадка), восприятие этого процесса другими политическими силами в регионе, в особенности Китаем, не было достаточно изучено. В данной работе автор прослеживает трансформацию описания Камбоджи в китайских источниках эпохи Юань и ранней Мин, как в официальных, так и частных.

Ключевые слова: Камбоджа, Ангкор, Чжэньла, Чэнла, Ченла, Китай, империя Юань, империя Мин, Чжоу Дагуань, Чжэн Хэ

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Introduction

The earliest toponym associated with the Khmer people in the Chinese sources is Funan 扶南 which originally appears in the official history of the Three Kingdoms period (220–280 AD). There is no consensus among the researchers about the origin of the Funan people whether they were Austronesian or Austroasiatic although the recent archeological finds seem to point to the Mon-Khmer roots¹. What is known for sure, however, is that Funan was a prosperous polity with multiple protourban centers located around present-day Southern Cambodia and Southern Vietnam

¹ For modern studies on early history of Funan from the archaeological and epigraphical perspective, see: [1, 2].

and that it was actively involved in the maritime network whereby Hinduism and Buddhism came to it [3. P. 148–152]².

Hereinafter the Chinese narrative directly connects Funan with the Cambodian realm. In the middle of the 6th century a new polity named Zhenla 真臘 (also commonly referred to as Chenla) appears in the Chinese sources. They speak of Zhenla as originally being a subordinate of Funan which managed to break free and at some point even absorbed it. M. Vickery, A.O. Zakharov and other modern scholars believe that Zhenla's political center was originally to the north of Funan and gradually expanded to the south absorbing Funan's land [5, 6]. Through the careful analysis of the all the available Chinese records I was able to determine the more precise dates for this process: the inclusion of Funan into Zhenla started during Datong 大同 reign (535–546) and finished in the beginning of Zhenguan 貞觀 reign (around 627–628) [16. P. 43, 47, 50; 9. P. 111–123].

On the one hand, the Chinese official histories tended to underline Funan's richness speaking of its luxurious dwellings and palaces as well as the people's involvement in agriculture at the same time stating that the Funannese were peace-loving and did not like fighting. On the other hand, in the image of Zhenla a more warlike nature was shown: the people's character was changed to vigorous and rigid, a detailed account of the usage of war elephants was provided as well as mentions of fighting with the neighboring countries. Another noteworthy point is the transition from favoring Buddhism in Funan to favoring Hinduist cults in Zhenla³.

A brief period of division of Zhenla from the early 8th to the early 9th century into two parts named “Land Zhenla” 陸真臘 (also referred to as Wendan 文單) and “Water Zhenla” 水真臘 is only articulated in the Chinese tradition. None of the local epigraphical sources as well as other foreign records mark this separation. Similarly to “Funan-Zhenla” narrative, “Land Zhenla” was in the north and had many mountains and hills while “Water Zhenla” was in the south near the sea and had many reservoirs and pools. The specialists in Southeast Asian history have already previously outlined the inconsistency of the breakup of the “unified” Zhenla into “Land Zhenla” and “Water Zhenla” [5. P. 204–206]. What I would like to add to this discourse is that there seems to be a connection between the portrayal of the “Funan-Zhenla” transition and “Land Zhenla”–“Water Zhenla” narrative in the Chinese sources: firstly, there is a period of the simultaneous tributary missions from several Khmer polities (Funan and Zhenla; Wendan and Zhenla); secondly, one of the polities seizes the right to engage in tributary relations with China (Zhenla in the second half of the 7th century and Wendan in the 8th); finally, another period of the political disturbance erupts. Therefore, to my mind, the “unified Zhenla” after the fall of Funan and before the division into “Water Zhenla” and “Land Zhenla”

² For the old French translation of the descriptions of Funan in the Chinese official histories, see [4].

³ Modern English translations of Zhenla's accounts in the Sui and Tang dynasty official histories. [7,8].

is in fact an artificial construct, there was rather a northern Khmer polity which managed to achieve sole dominance in the tributary relations with China. It follows that from the Chinese point of view it was considered a unified kingdom⁴.

All in all, it can be summarized that the portrayal of the early proto–Khmer polities in the Chinese sources up to the end of the Tang dynasty can be characterized by a number of persistent characteristics such as significant wealth, a number of subordinate countries, abundance of gold and silver, numerous palaces and pagodas etc. Funan seems to have been perceived by the Chinese as the hegemonic state in the region of “Mainland Southeast Asia” with its power surpassing that of Linyi 林邑 (most probably a proto–Cham polity)⁵. This “hegemonic” period was followed by a struggle between the northern and southern political centers throughout the 6th and up to the 9th century. Therefore, in order to determine what kind of image of Zhenla persisted in the Chinese narrative up to the Yuan dynasty, first of all, the available Song dynasty sources have to be particularly analyzed.

The second point reviewed in this paper is the downfall of Zhenla and the reasons behind it (in the Chinese perception). Old and modern scholars have outlined the following main reasons which could potentially lead to the decline of Angkor: the deterioration of the irrigation system and systemic environmental degradation; possible economic and social distress caused by the Jayavarman VII’s (1120–1218) “building overindulgence”; the torpor associated with the rise of Theravada Buddhism; growing importance of the maritime trade; climate change; epidemic disease [13, 14, 15. P. 4871]. Recent archeological excavations as well as radiocarbon analyses have partially proven that the multiple factors such as burgeoning territorial ambitions of neighboring states, better access to the profitable maritime trade networks closer to the South China Sea and an increasingly unwieldy and restrictive urban fabric at Angkor encouraged the Cambodian elite to relocate closer to the Mekong and Tonle Sap River [15. P. 4874]. The present study aims at comparing the results of these findings with the data collected from the Chinese sources in order to see if similar processes have been recorded in the Chinese annals and personal works⁶. It should be noted that in the present work only those references to the toponym of Zhenla and the ones related to it are analyzed.

Portrayal of Zhenla up to the End of the Song Dynasty

The Chinese records are silent about Cambodia and its relations with China up to the middle of the 11th century. This could be explained by the turmoil within China at the end of the Tang dynasty and the period of split until 960. During

⁴ For a more detailed evaluation of this complex period of Khmer history from the position of the Chinese sources, see the author’s unpublished MA thesis: [9].

⁵ For the recent studies on Champa and Linyi in particular, see [10–12].

⁶ For references to Cambodian polities in the Chinese sources of the first and second millennium AD the following two annotated and commented editions have been used: [16, 17].

the Northern Song the main focus of the Chinese Court must have been on the northern borders and the land routes rather than maritime ones, therefore, there was no information about Zhenla from this time frame is extant. Luckily, the Southern Song sources contain significant amount of data.

The earliest evidence about Zhenla preserved in the private sources of the later 12th century the mainly historical geographical treatises. The first one of them is *Guihai yuheng zhi* 桂海虞衡志 (“Well-Balanced Records of Guihai”; 1175) written by Fan Chengda 范成大 (1126–1193), a famous poet and geographer who served in present-day Guangxi province⁷. *Guihai yuheng zhi* makes several mentions of Zhenla: firstly, it is noted together with Zhancheng 占城 (Champa) as one of the main suppliers of aromatics to China, specifically mentioning incenses from Dengliumei 登流眉 (Tambralinga), which (according to Fan Chengda) are worse than those of Hainan. Secondly, a place Xinzhou 新州 which used to be Zhenla’s land but then was invaded by Annam is recorded. Thirdly, a border between Zhancheng and Zhenla by the river is noted [18. P. 38–39, 203, 230].

A close friend of Fan Chengda, Zhou Qufei 周去非 (1135–1189), who also worked in Guangxi as an imperial official, and wrote a historical geographical work entitled *Lingwai daida* 嶺外代答 (“Representative Answers from the Region beyond the Mountains”; 1178)⁸. *Lingwai daida* includes a separate account of Zhenla. It starts with stating that Zhenla is further than Zhancheng but closer than all other barbarians 諸蕃. A list of countries is then given for which Zhenla is called a *douhui* 都會 which probably refers to a political or trading center: Wali 窠里國⁹, Xipeng 西棚國¹⁰, Sanpo 三泊國¹¹, Malan 麻蘭國¹², Dengliumei, Dilata 第辣撻國¹³. The account then speaks of the local incenses as the main trading items, highlighting the Dengliumei ones which are better than those from other foreign countries. The next passage about the monks has been misunderstood by both V. Almonte and M. Ulyanov: the characters *seng* 僧 and *dao* 道 here are used to oppose one another pointing at the Hindu and Buddhist monks respectively. Hence it should be understood as follows: “*Their Buddhist and Hindu monks are exceptionally good at incantations. Buddhist monks with yellow garments have families; [Buddhist monks] with red garments live in monasteries strictly following religious discipline. Hindu monks use tree leaves as clothes*”¹⁴. An interesting

⁷ For English and Russian translations, see: [18, 19]. Modern Chinese edition: [20].

⁸ For English, German and Russian translations see: [19–22].

⁹ Unidentified, could be Myeik in present-day Myanmar.

¹⁰ Probably Supan 素攀 district northwest of Bangkok.

¹¹ Near Lopburi or Nakhon Pathom.

¹² Unidentified, somewhere on Malay Peninsula; also could be the Kraburi River.

¹³ Trat on the southeast coast of Thailand or Kelantan on the Malay Peninsula. Different views on identifications of the aforementioned toponyms are provided in: [21. P. 126–127]. For other identifications the following book is of use: [24].

¹⁴ Edited in comparison with: [21. P. 127].

reference to the ancient Chinese goddess Nüwa 女媧 is provided afterwards: “*In this country if one looks at one side of the sky there are often small “scars on it. Their people say that these are [the spots] which in ancient times Nüwa did not reach”* [21. P. 127].

The next works which contains information about Zhenla is a *biji*-style 筆記 (“brush notes”) book *Yunlu manchao* 雲麓漫鈔 (“Loose Notes of the Cloud-Covered Foothill”; around 1206) by a scholar Zhao Yanwei 趙彥衛. It claims that Zhenla is also called Zhenlifu after which the following sentence is present: “*Sanpo, Lüiyang 綠洋¹⁵, Dengliumei, Xipeng, Luohu 羅斛¹⁶, Pugan 蒲甘¹⁷ have jinyan incense 金顏香 and others*” [17. P. 112].

The most detailed description of Zhenla was contained in another private work *Zhufan zhi* 諸蕃志 (“Records of Foreign Peoples”, 1225) written by an official Zhao Rugua 趙汝适 (1170–1231) who served as a Maritime Superintendent in Quanzhou¹⁸. In the depiction of Zhenla *Zhufan zhi* has significantly relied on the previous sources, namely *Sui shu* 隨書 (“Official History of the Sui dynasty”), but at the same time added a lot of new material.

New geographical positioning is presented: To the east it extends to the sea, to the west it extends to Pagan (Pagan), and to the south it extends to Jialoxi 加羅希 (Chaiya, Thailand), the overall size is approximately 7000 li, the capital is called Lugu 祿兀 (Angkor).

At the same time it was stated that the king’s clothing and the country’s administrative division are the same as in Zhancheng. The people’s dwellings are the same as described in the preceding sources, while the king is said to live in a dwelling out of carved stone: “*It has a beautiful granite-sided pond filled with lotuses and spanned by a golden bridge over three hundred feet long. The palace is magnificent and extremely opulent*”. The king’s throne’s description is taken from *Sui shu*, while Baphuon is described in the following manner: “*In the southwestern corner of the city is a bronze terrace on which stand twenty-four bronze towers and eight bronze elephants, each weighing four thousand catties*” [27]. This seems to be the first detailed description of the pompous temples and other constructions. The timeframe of the material for *Zhufan zhi* coincides with the rule of Jayavarman VII, therefore, the Chinese were aware of his building project.

The number of the war elephants of Zhenla was stated as 200000, small horses were also mentioned.

¹⁵ Could be Cape Liant to the southeast from Satahip, Thailand.

¹⁶ Lavo kingdom.

¹⁷ Pagan kingdom.

¹⁸ On Zhao Rugua’s biography, see [25]. For old and new English translations of *Zhufan zhi* as well as a Russian one, see: [26–28]. Two modern Chinese critical editions of the text were used: [29, 30].

Buddhist rituals are described in more details: “*They are very devout Buddhists and use daily shifts of more than 300 women to dance and present rice offerings to the Buddha. They call these women A’nan, which means “courtesan”* [27]. Interestingly, no mentions of Hinduism is present nor in *Zhufan zhi* nor in other Song dynasty sources.

Some information on the criminal law is also provided: “*Their custom is to be sexually promiscuous. Adultery is not punished, while theft is punished by cutting off a hand or a foot or by branding the chest with fire*” [27]. Cambodian epigraphy of the 10th century also records similar ways of punishment which correlate with the ones in Champa [31. P. 418].

Finally, a big list of local products and trading items is given together with some useful information on the soil and crops: “*The soil is fertile and the fields are not divided by boundary markers. Each family simply farms as much land as it can manage. Rice and other grains are cheap; one can buy two bushels of rice with just a tael of lead*” [27].

The list of vassal countries here includes Dengliumei, Bosilan 波斯蘭¹⁹, Luohu, Sanpo, Zhenlifu 真里富²⁰, Maluowen 麻羅問²¹, Lüyang, Tunlifu 吞里富²², Pugan, Wali, Xipeng, Duhuai 杜懷²³, Xunfan 潯番²⁴.

Then follows a rather long summary of the Khmer–Cham war in the 1170–1190s and an evaluation of China relations with Zhenla: first contact in 618–626 and the sole tribute mission in 1120.

As for Zhenla’s image in official sources, the history of the Song dynasty, *Song shi* 宋史, mostly copies *Zhufan zhi* only adding data on tributary missions from Zhenla. Some other useful data is preserved in *Song huiyao jigao* 宋會要輯稿 (“Draft to an Institutional History of the Song Dynasty”; 12th century). According to *Song shi*, the first mention of Zhenla took place in 1062 where it was said that Zhenla traditionally was not used to war and that it often suffered from the sudden attacks of Jiaozhi 交趾 (a term in the Chinese records used to refer to the Vietnamese state) which was its neighbor. Simultaneously, Zhancheng also was training in arms to resist Jiaozhi. *Song huiyao jigao* also has this entry, moreover, it states that in 1064 that Zhancheng and Zhenla from the old times were attacked and terrorized by Jiaozhi. No other confrontations with Jiaozhi were recorded. However, in 1171 a conflict between Zhenla and Zhancheng was ongoing and a local Fujianese sailing to Hainan to take an official post was blown away to Zhancheng and advised the king of Zhancheng to use horses and archers; in 1177 Zhancheng launched a naval

¹⁹ Most common localizations include Sóc Trăng, Bansala in Cambodia and Basilan island.

²⁰ Chanthaburi.

²¹ Probably another transcription of Malan.

²² Unidentified, could be an erroneous writing of Zhenlifu.

²³ Possibly Dawei in Myanmar.

²⁴ Possibly Chumphon, Thailand.

attack on Zhenla and did not listen to Zhenla's pledges. Later on this turned into a big rivalry; in 1199 Zhenla invaded Zhancheng and put their person as the ruler.

Tribute missions to China from Zhenla were recorded as follows:

1116, 1155 (together with Luohu) (*Song huiyao jigao*)

1116, 1120, 1129 (*Song shi*)

1120 (*Zhufan zhi*) [17. P. 90–98].

Xu zizhi tongjian changbian 續資治通鑑長編 (“Extended Continuation to *Zizhi Tongjian*”; 1183) adds to this chronology that in 1008 three Zhenla merchants were pursued by Jiaozhi and occasionally reached Gaozhou's 高州 (a county in Guangzhou province) borders and wanted to stay there [16. P. 117].

If one compares this data on Jiaozhi pressing Zhenla and Zhancheng with the Vietnamese sources, there are mentions in *Việt sử lược* 越史略 (“Abridged Chronicles of Viet”; 1337) of Zhenla coming to the Vietnamese Court in 1012, 1014, 1025, 1039, 1056, 1072, 1086, 1095, 1118, 1120, 1123, 1134, 1153, 1191, 1194, 1195. The envoys in 1095, 1118, 1120, 1134 and 1194 came together with Zhancheng. At the same time plundering of the Vietnamese territory by Zhenla were recorded in 1128, 1132 (together with Zhancheng); 1136, 1148 (solely) [17. P. 118–121].

Song huiyao jigao also includes a separate long account of Zhenlifu which was fully translated into English by O.W. Wolters [32]. The most significant parts of this account concern the administrative division and some customs: Zhenlifu is said to administer more than 60 settlements each of which its own administrator 主管, their monarch is called “the ruler” 主 and lives in a “Buddhist palace” 佛殿, the people are also said to follow the laws of Buddha. It is worth noting that unlike *Song huiyao jigao* and *Zhufan zhi*, *Song shi* refers to Zhenlifu not as a “dependent kingdom” 屬國, but as a “dependent city” 屬邑.

The only Song dynasty map survives which pictures Zhenla among the very few Southeast Asian countries on it (apart from Zhenla only Annam 安南 and Nanzhao 南詔 are present). The map is called *Tang yixing shanhe fenye tu* 唐一行山河分野圖 (“Map of the Joint Territories and Boundaries of the Tang [Empire]”) and was probably printed around 1195–1200. It does not contain any islands and places Zhenla in the southeastern corner of the map²⁵. Another peculiar feature of this map is that Zhancheng is not pictured anywhere on it. To my mind, this might relate to the fact that during the time of the probable complication of the map (late 1190s — early 1200s) Zhenla managed to plunder Zhancheng and put their person on Zhancheng's throne which was definitely known to the Chinese as has been noted above. Another point which serves as a proof to this presumption is the fact that on the map Zhenla is located in the close proximity to Huan[zhou] 驩州 (Hoan Châu, i.e. Hà Tĩnh and Nghệ An, Vinh city) which Zhancheng bordered to the north (according to *Jiu Tang shu* and *Song shi*).

²⁵ The full version of the map is present in: [33. P. 17].




Fig. 1. The southeastern corner of the map *Tang yixing shanhe fenye tu*

All in all, it can be witnessed that the foreign political situation in the 11 and 12th centuries seems to have been rather difficult for Zhenla, and the Chinese sources had clearly pictured this: from the beginning of the 11th onwards Zhenla was in conflict with Jiaozhi, later on, during the 12th century confrontations with Zhancheng are recorded with Zhenla plundering Zhancheng in the end. Due to the fact that the material for *Zhufan zhi* was probably gathered before Zhancheng regained its independence in the 1220s, the image of Zhenla in both the private sources and the official history of the Song dynasty (which was simulated after *Zhufan zhi*) is given as a prosperous and hegemonic state with the false claims that even Pagan was its dependent state. This mistake was probably transmitted into *Zhufan zhi* from *Yunlu manchao* (which was written prior to the former) because all the countries which are simply mentioned in *Yunlu manchao* after Zhenla as exporters of one of the incenses are present in *Zhufan zhi* as “dependencies” of Zhenla. Thus, Zhao Rugua must have misunderstood this statement. Therefore, Song dynasty sources describe Zhenla at the peak of its strength which took place in the beginning of the 13th century. However, some of these characteristics such as the dependencies might have been attributed to Zhenla incorrectly or their political relations with Zhenla could have been misunderstood. This image has even been documented on the map presented above which lacks Zhancheng and has Zhenla occupying its traditional place in the cartographical tradition of China.

The Beginning of Zhenla’s Decline as Described in the Yuan Dynasty Sources

The official history of the Yuan dynasty, *Yuan shi* 元史, lacks a separate description of Zhenla and only records tributes and other few interactions with this polity. All these extracts have been translated and are present in the appendix to the present paper.

Wenxian tongkao 文獻通考 (“Comprehensive Investigation of Literary Sources”; compiled in 1317), a Yuan dynasty encyclopedia (*leishu* 類書) type of work, simply collects and copies the information from the preceding sources

including both a description of Funan and Zhenla, therefore, this source has no significant value.

Yuan shi only mentions a few embassies from Angkor, namely in 1281, 1285 and 1329 [16. P. 122–123, 17. P. 122–125]. The first embassy came to submit, interestingly the name of the country is recorded as Ganbuxi 干不昔. The embassy of 1285 came together with Zhancheng and presented musicians, medical materials and crocodile skins. The mission of 1329 brought camphor wood, elephants, leopards, white monkeys, the country that time was called Zhanla 占臘. The items presented in the third tribute mission are quite typical for the Khmer polities. However, in the second case medical materials are a rather peculiar article for a tributary mission. Such a choice of a tribute item might have been a request from the Mongol court which was interested in the foreign medical practices and cures²⁶. From other three mentions of Cambodia two are connected with the tamed elephants (together with Zhancheng) and one — with summoning troops from Cambodia and Champa for a naval expedition to Java. This notice is also of particular interest since as far as it is known, foreign troops were not used in the expedition to Java in 1293. Therefore, they must have refused or somehow evaded the participation in this conflict. In this entry the country is referred to as Ganbucha 甘不察. How can the interest in the tamed elephants be explained? It is known from the sources that the Yuan did not employ the war elephants, however, Qublai Khan did mount one to the direct battles. Apart from that, they were widely used in civilian tasks. But most importantly they were religiously symbolic creatures for the Buddhists, especially in case of Qublai Khan who converted to the Tibetan Buddhism and wanted to set up himself as “the universal ruler” not only through conquest, but through ideology as well²⁷. Interestingly, however, no mentions of war elephants of Zhenla are present nor in the Yuan nor in the early Ming accounts²⁸.

The earliest private source written on Zhenla after the establishment of the Yuan dynasty was *Zhenla fengtu ji* 真臘風土記 (“The Customs of Cambodia”) by Zhou Dagan 周達觀 who was a part of envoy sent to Angkor in 1296–1297²⁹. Unfortunately, the original version is lost and a much shorter one is only currently available. It is interesting to note that Zhou Dagan’s mission to Zhenla is not recorded in *Yuan shi* nor anywhere else. However, the account itself is believed to be quite authentic, depicting the realities of that time and showing the degradation of Zhenla in comparison with the Song dynasty records. Moreover, only a small part of the account survived which made the original version of Zhou Dagan’s record even more valuable for his contemporaries.

²⁶ On this topic see, for example: [34].

²⁷ On the role of elephants in the Mongol society during the Yuan dynasty, see: [35. P. 257–259]

²⁸ Daoyi zhilüe 島夷誌略 (“A Brief Description of the Barbarians of the Isles”; 1349/1350) does record 400000 war elephants but this most probably is an even further exaggeration based on Zhufan zhi.

²⁹ Modern English translations: [36, 37]. The following Chinese commented edition was used: [38]

Similarly to *Yuan shi*, Zhou Dagan also records some other names which were used to refer to Cambodia during the Yuan time, moreover, he provides an explanation for them: “It is also called Zhanla, it calls itself Ganbeizhi 甘孛智. During the Yuan dynasty according to Xifang jing 西番經 they called this country Ganpuzhi 澈浦只, this is probably [another] transcription close to Ganbeizhi” [36. P. 45].

Zhou Dagan calls many of the local customs “laughable” and in general does not show much respect to the described country. Several other factors which point to the decline of Zhenla are also present: he approves of the general description of the “southern barbarians” as being coarse, ugly and black [36. P. 54].

Agricultural sector is described in a typical way, speaking of 3–4 crops a year. Interestingly, however, no water-conservation devices or irrigational systems are mentioned. Moreover, it is said that they do not use feces for manuring the land [36. P. 67].

Besides that the new peculiar features are added: Zhou Dagan presumes that they do not produce gold and silver and so they hold Chinese gold and silver at high regard. This is rather strange since gold and silver have been traditionally used as a trading value which is evident from the previous Chinese texts and which Zhou Dagan also notes in another part of his treatise [36. P. 70–71]. To my mind, such interest towards the Chinese gold and silver as well as absence of Zhenla’s production of these metals (in Zhou Dagan’s view) could be the outcome of Jayavarman VII extensive building of luxurious temples and other religious constructions³⁰.

Regarding the definite signs of weakening of Zhenla, Zhou Dagan records the following information: primitive construction of boats (though “very large” ones are mentioned); repeated wars with the Siamese during which “the land has been completely laid to waste” (there is also a mention of people from Siam coming to live in Cambodia in the recent years, they also engage in silk production unlike the Khmers); weak army with naked and barefoot soldiers, no bows and arrows, body armor, helmets etc.; usage of ordinary people in wars with the Siamese; war elephants are also not mentioned (it is only said that elephants are used to protect the king when he goes out); collecting gall for the Cham king in the recent past (indication of political dependency to Champa) [36. P. 76, 78–80, 82].

Thus, two main problems of Zhenla are evident through Zhou Dagan’s account: inferior military and probable lack of irrigational system and complex devices for storage of water. There were tanks near large temples, and from the Chinese sources it is also known that wealthy families often had a pond. However, this was definitely not enough to support paddy fields, hence Angkor had to rely on the naturally flooded land [40. P. 973]. Zhou Dagan mentions that for six months throughout a year there was no rain at all and there also was uncultivated land where rice grew by itself but only thanks to the water reserves which the

³⁰ An evaluation of Jayavarman VII reign is present in: [39].

soil accumulated [36. P. 67]. During the Little Ice Age which began in the 14th century these downsides of the Angkor agricultural system must have been most problematic³¹.

A local gazetteer of the Guangdong province *Dade Nanhai zhi* 大德南海志 (“Records of the Southern Seas during the Dade Reign”; 1304) also provides a small bit of information on Zhenla: it states that Zhenla governs Zhenlifu, Dengliumei, Pugan and Rongli 葺里 (probably another variant of Wali). All the toponyms are simply repeated from the Song dynasty sources and do not reflect the real political relations between these polities and Zhenla. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the number of polities under Zhenla’s “control” has significantly decreased in comparison with *Zhufan zhi* which could also be viewed as a sign of weakening of Zhenla. Moreover, this is the only Yuan dynasty source which speaks of Zhenla’s dependencies at all.

The latest Yuan dynasty source is *Daoyi zhilüe* 島夷誌略 (“A Brief Description of the Barbarians of the Isles”; 1349/1350). It was written by Wang Dayuan 汪大淵 (1311 or earlier — 1349 or later), an experienced Yuan dynasty merchant who set sail to the Southern Seas at least two times in his life. *Daoyi zhilüe* also contains a separate description of Zhenla, however, it is exceptionally repetitive of *Zhenla fengtu ji* and other previous sources and practically does contain almost no new information. This is very strange since Wang Dayuan claims to have visited all the described countries and his account almost always contains some new information on each of the polities. The only relatively new additions are a broader description of punishments and a list of several new trading items including buckram from the Fujian province which implies that maritime connections between Zhenla and China were still functioning at that time. In general, however, this account of Zhenla casts certain doubts to whether actually Wang Dayuan did visit Zhenla (or, if formulated differently, was it a significant enough maritime hub for Wang Dayuan to stop over there during his trading activities). Nevertheless, this account also indirectly proves the slow demise of Zhenla since most of its references to the richness and fertile soil of Zhenla are classical clichés of the description of this polity from the previous Chinese records³². In Zhancheng’s regard it is also mentioned that Zhancheng is situated at the “maritime crossroads” 海衝, thus, together with the other facts it could be interpreted that Zhancheng got the upper hand in the maritime trade within the region.

The following conclusions can be made after analyzing these few sources. The newly established Mongol administration seems to have been interested in acquiring real knowledge about the foreign lands to the South from China (especially after

³¹ For the impact of the Little Ice Age on the transition of power among the states of Southeast Asia, see [41].

³² An old English translation of the account is present in: [42. P. 105–107]. The following Chinese edition was used: [43].

their unsuccessful naval expeditions to Japan, Champa and Java). After this the Yuan dynasty turned to a more diplomatic way of dealing with foreigners and in case of Zhenla sent an envoy with Zhou Dagan to it in order to record the information about this land. Zhenla might have been of such special interest for the Yuan court for several reasons: first of all, it was for a long time considered as one of the most prosperous polities of the “Mainland Southeast Asia” simultaneously being an important trading partner of China. Secondly, this was one of the few countries which was not directly affected by the Mongol raids, hence, not much was known about it.

Zhou Dagan’s account was very influential on future works dealing with Cambodia. For the first time it pictured a noticeable downgrade within the Khmer state. At the same time Zhenla’s importance as a maritime hub also seems to have decreased since Wang Dayuan did not provide any significantly new information on the trading activities in the region.

The Early-mid Ming Stagnation of Perception of Zhenla

The political relations between early Ming and Zhenla are only described in the official works, hence, they are to be analyzed in the first place.

As in case of Zhancheng and other Southeast Asian polities, the Ming dynasty immediately tried to establish relations with Zhenla. An envoy to Zhenla was sent in 1370 and an emissary from Zhenla came to the Ming court straight away in 1371. Thereon, stable tributary missions from Zhenla (according to the official history of the Ming dynasty *Ming shi* 明史 and *Ming shilu* 明實錄 (“Veritable Records of the Ming dynasty”)) continued up to 1419, near the end of Zhu Di 朱棣 (1402–1424) reign.

The envoys to China in 1371 and 1373 require special attention since they were sent by a certain Huerna 忽兒那 who was called “Bashan king of Zhenla” 真臘國巴山王. O.W. Wolters (one of the first historians to analyze the depiction of Cambodia in the Ming sources) suggested that Huerna was the king of Zhenla who had to flee to Bashan after a Siamese attack on Angkor [44. P. 47–48], whereas M. Vickery proposed that Huerna was more likely a local ruler [45. P. 41–42]. As for Bashan, M. Vickery claimed that it could be either Ba Phnom or a local name still known in the 19th century across the river in the province of Treang (now in Takeo) [45. P. 41–42].

While the exact localization of Bashan still remains problematic, there is one significant question which was not addressed and which I would like to turn the attention of the previous scholars to: how did the Chinese emissary know where to go to find the “king” of Zhenla if he was not stationed in Angkor at that time, especially taking into consideration that this was the first mission to this country? Moreover, why was this “king/prince” as G. Wade refers to him initially

recognized as the king of Zhenla by the Ming court³³? While I cannot properly answer either of these two questions, to my mind, there is a small hint which might provide some ground for speculations. The embassy from Zhenla in 1473 is recorded to have come together with an embassy from Siam which could mean that at that time Siam exercised its political power over Zhenla and that Huerna could be a nominal king appointed by the Siamese authorities. However, it is rather strange that this presumed attack on Angkor is not anyhow referred to in the Chinese sources nor was anything else said about the Siamese, therefore, this is just a presumption³⁴. Nevertheless, G. Wade also seems to have come to a similar conclusion stating that there was likely a “fairly major and long-term Ayutthayan occupation of the Khmer capital prior to 1378” [48]. At the same time it occurs that during the early Ming the Chinese put Cambodia in higher esteem than Siam: for example, in 1387 the king of Cambodia was given 40 bolts of silk as opposed to the 20 bolts given to the ruler of Siam.

Several other noteworthy instances of Cambodia mentions in the late 14th in *Ming shilu* are worth paying attention to it [49]. In an entry dated 1380 a memorial addressed to the king of Champa was presented accusing him of fighting with Annam and taking advantage of their defeat. This is compared to how during the Song dynasty Cambodia plundered Champa and it was a great humiliation for the latter³⁵. In 1383 a tally-slip book was conferred upon Cambodia together with Champa and Siam to verify the embassies coming from these countries³⁶. In 1388 the Chams seized one in four of 52 elephants from the Chinese envoy which was returning from Cambodia and bringing these elephants as a tribute³⁷. A joint tribute mission from Zhenla and Siam is recorded in 1389³⁸. A prohibition for the Chinese people to use the barbarian aromatics and goods was imposed in 1394 stating that many barbarians are deceitful and they are now prohibited from having relations with China with only Ryukyu, Siam and Cambodia being allowed to continue bringing tribute³⁹. In 1397 a similar memorandum from the Emperor was repeated stating that there has been a continuous disconnection between the foreign countries and China

³³ The recognition is evident through the fact that in 1371 the envoy from Huerna was presented with the calendar to confer it to the king.

³⁴ L.P. Briggs wrote a special article on the probable Siamese attacks on Angkor, however, it is relatively outdated, see: [46]. See also a recent work: [47].

³⁵ Wade G. Southeast Asia in the Ming Shi-lu. An Open Access Resource. URL: <https://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/reign/hong-wu/year-13-month-9-day> (Accessed: 14.05.2022).

³⁶ Ibid. URL: <https://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/reign/hong-wu/year-16-month-4-day-22> (Accessed: 14.05.2022).

³⁷ Ibid. URL: <https://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/reign/hong-wu/year-21-month-4-day-8> (Accessed: 14.05.2022).

³⁸ Ibid. URL: <https://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/reign/hong-wu/year-22-month-6-day-14> (Accessed: 14.05.2022).

³⁹ Ibid. URL: <https://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/reign/hong-wu/year-27-month-1-day-14> (Accessed: 14.05.2022).

with only Annam, Champa, Cambodia, Siam and Greater Ryukyu have continued to come to the Court and offer tribute as before⁴⁰.

In general, several conclusions can be made through the analysis of these entries. A rather positive image of Cambodia in the official circles was formed due to the fact that in the beginning of the Ming dynasty Zhenla has continuously been engaged in the tribute system and fulfilled all the obligations of a tributary state from the Chinese perspective. Moreover, Zhenla does not seem to have been involved in private trading activities as well as “fake” tributary missions when the traders would try to disguise themselves as the representatives of the king. Nor was Zhenla associated with plundering activities and the like. Therefore, it is quite clear why it was included in the 1394 list of three countries which were allowed to engage in a tribute exchange. A reference to Zhenla’s plunder of Champa during the Song dynasty was probably just an example of humiliation to encourage Champa to end hostilities with Annam, alternatively, this could also be a symbol of the past glory of Zhenla but it does not seem to have been used to present Cambodia in a bad light.

At the same time, plundering of Cambodian tribute goods by the Cham is mentioned which could show that the Cambodians could not secure a maritime route to China properly and that the Cambodian military was inferior (which corresponds with the Yuan dynasty Zhou Daguan’s account). This claim is also mentioned in Zhancheng’s account of *Ming shi* where it is stated that the king of Zhancheng extracted one fourth of one of Zhenla’s tribute [50. P. 6].

As for the *Ming shi* account of Zhenla, it mostly copies the descriptions from the previous sources but also provides some new explanations for old processes, for example, it claims that the name Zhanla appeared during the Song dynasty after the Zhenla invasion of Zhancheng and in the Yuan dynasty the name returned back to Zhenla. However, in reality, the name Zhanla was already used in the Northern Song period and was still noted in the Ming dynasty records as well [16. P. 165]. This is probably just an attempt of the explanation of how this term emerged. In the end of the account, it is also stated that after Wanli 萬曆 reign (1573–1620) the country changed its name to Jianpuzhai 柬埔寨 which is the name that is still used for Cambodia in modern Chinese.

Another conclusion which was made by G. Wade through the analysis of the names of Cambodian kings recorded in *Ming shilu* is that there is also indirect evidence of Ayutthayan influence on Cambodia. Throughout the first 50 years of relations between the Ming China and Zhenla almost every envoy from Cambodia to Ming China bore the title *nāy* (translated from modern Thai as “master, owner”). Simultaneously (from 1372 to 1480) the majority of Siam’s envoys to Ming China also had the title *nāy* [48].

⁴⁰ Ibid. URL: <https://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/reign/hong-wu/year-30-month-8-day-27> (Accessed: 14.05.2022).

Other official sources within the timeframe under the study including descriptions of Cambodia are two imperial geographies *Huanyu tongzhi* 寰宇通志 (“Comprehensive Records of the Universe”; 1456) and *Da Ming yitong zhi* 大明一統志 (“Records of the Unified Great Ming”). *Da Ming yitong zhi* was written in between 1457 and 1464 and was basically a polished version of *Huangyu tongzhi*. Therefore, the information about the foreign countries is mostly identical in both of them. Both works are merely compiling the previous material on Zhenla without really adding anything to the narrative. They and other later encyclopedia-type of works would commonly start their description with stating that Zhenla used to be a dependency of Funan, during the Sui and the Tang dynasties it frequently communicated with China. During the Tang dynasty it split into “Water Zhenla” and “Land Zhenla”, during the Song dynasty it conquered Zhancheng. Under the Ming dynasty it started communication with China during Hongwu reign but later on their tribute missions were not regular 不常 [17. P. 176–180].

During the early Ming dynasty private works about the foreign lands were mainly inspired by Zheng He 鄭和 expeditions (1405–1433). Most of them were written either by his accompanies or based on the material gathered in these voyages. It is also noteworthy that although there was definitely evidence in *Ming shi* that Zheng He visited Cambodia, a description of this country is only present in one of the three works by his crewmembers, *Xingcha shenglan* 星槎勝覽 (“The Overall Survey of the Star Raft”; 1436), furthermore, it is almost an exact copy of Wang Dayuan’s account⁴¹. This is rather weird and hints at the fact that the Zheng He expeditions did not consider Cambodia as a sufficiently important country. *Xiyang chaogong dianlu* 西洋朝貢典錄 (“A Record of Tributes from the Western Ocean Countries”; 1520), another source mostly deriving from the Treasure Fleet voyages but putting more emphasis on the history of tributary relations with the countries visited by Zheng He, also does not add anything new to Zhenla’s depiction. However, the comment of the author in the end of the account is noteworthy⁴². Huan Shengzeng 黃省曾 (1496–1546) recalls that during the Song dynasty Zhenla captured Zhancheng, had an army of 200000 war elephants and its overall size was 7000 li, and he comes to the following conclusion: “*seems like [it was] a strong and prosperous country⁴³ of the Southern Seas*”.

All in all, it can be concluded that the new additional characteristics attributed to Zhenla seem to have formed only in the late Ming dynasty, during the second half of the 16th — early 17th centuries when a new wave of interest towards the foreign countries among the educated Chinese erupted⁴⁴. They were connected with

⁴¹ For the translation of the account into English, see: [51. P. 81–83]. The Chinese annotated edition: [52].

⁴² For an old English and a modern German translation of the segment on Zhenla, see: [53, 54]. Commented Chinese edition: [55].

⁴³ Also can be understood as “the most powerful...”.

⁴⁴ More about such sources and the general attitude towards the foreign during the late Ming: [56].

the historical perception of Zhenla rather than contemporary: for example, *Shuyu zhouzi lu* 殊域周咨錄 (“Informative Records on Countries Far Away”; 1583) by Yan Congjian 嚴從簡 claims that there is Lu Ban’s 魯般 (c. 507–444 BC; an Ancient Chinese inventor and engineer) tomb in Zhenla [16. P. 183].⁴⁵

The last source under investigation is *Yiyu zhi* 異域志 (Account of Foreign Lands) and its illustrated version *Yiyu tuzhi* 異域圖志 (“Illustrated Account of Foreign Lands”). This work became very popular during the Ming dynasty and was also known by its later name *Luochong lu* 羸蟲錄 (“Record of Naked Creatures”) ⁴⁶. The original version was written by Zhou Zhizhong 周致中 who has been on diplomatic missions abroad for six times. Nothing else is known about the author or the treatise apart from the fact that it was probably compiled during the early Ming. The work itself describes various mirabilia combining both real and fictional information about foreign countries and being most similar to *Shanhai jing* 山海經 (“Classic of Mountains and Seas”) in its structure. Hence, its contents should be approached cautiously. The illustrated version is extant in a sole copy preserved at the Cambridge University library [60]. It was translated into English by H.A. Giles (1845–1935) in the first half of the 20th century but never got published due to the lack of funding. The appendix to this paper includes my translation of the chapter on Zhenla from *Yiyu zhi*.

Yiyu zhi and *Yiyu tuzhi* accounts of Zhenla slightly differ from one another: *Yiyu zhi* starts by stating that Zhenla is southern *huihui* 回回, a general term referring to the Muslims. *Yiyu tuzhi* lacks this statement⁴⁷. Alternatively, *Yiyu tuzhi* speaks of a route from Guangzhou to Zhenla which took 10 days with the northern wind. *Zhufan zhi* spoke of 30 days to get to Zhenla from Quanzhou with the favorable wind. It is unlikely that there could be a 20–day difference between these two routes. After this both sources are nearly identical describing marriage customs and punishments which are taken from earlier private accounts. *Yiyu tuzhi* ends Zhenla’s description with retelling the story about Nüwa from *Lingwai daida*.

An image of a native of Zhenla is also present in *Yiyu tuzhi*. The person on the picture is most probably a Buddhist monk wearing robes and walking barefooted which perfectly corresponds to an image of the Zhenla monks. This portrayal was probably chosen in order to show the important religious background of Zhenla, moreover, it could symbolize the transition to favoring Buddhism which was spoken about above.

⁴⁵ The information about Lu Ban’s tomb first appears in *Zhenla fengtu ji* where it most probably refers to Angkor Wat [36. P. 48, 97]. Nevertheless, it is evident that the authors of *Shuyu zhouzi lu* and other later Ming dynasty sources copied this information without understanding the context, and for them Lu Ban’s tomb was definitely pointing to the Chinese person.

⁴⁶ On the history of these works, see: [57, 58]. The following edition of *Yiyu zhi* was used: [59].

⁴⁷ The only reference to the Muslim influence in regard to Zhenla is present in Zhou Dagan’s account where it is stated that the shape of their words is like that of Uighur and that the letters of the alphabet are pronounced in exactly the same way as in Mongolian, with two or three exceptions. See: [36. P. 62]. In general, this statement from *Yiyu zhi* is believed to be a mistake.



Fig. 2. Zhenla native as pictured in *Yiyu tuzhi*

None of the early and mid–Ming dynasty maps picture Zhenla on them either which could also be interpreted as a sign of Cambodia’s insignificance especially compared to the previously analyzed Song dynasty map where Zhenla occupies Zhancheng’s position.

Another important point to analyze is although the fall of Angkor is usually believed to have occurred in 1431 after a major Thai attack, the Chinese sources never refer to this date. However, another attack on Cambodia is mentioned in *Ming shi*’s account of Siam which happened during Wanli reign (supposedly around 1573–1578) during which they attacked and destroyed 攻破 Zhenla and subdued 降 their king. This seems to have been a decisive victory for Siam since it is said that year after year later on they used their troops and became a hegemon over all countries 霸諸國⁴⁸. This event is not recorded in any other Chinese sources. M. Vickery in his study on Cambodia in the 15th century also seems to have missed this entry, however, he comes to the conclusion that during this period Cambodia was once again divided into two competing regions, North and South, both led by Ayutthayan chiefs. Therefore, it was more of an internal conflict of no particular interest for the Chinese. M. Vickery also proposes that the second occupation of Angkor happened around the middle of the 16th century but the dates of the inscriptions provided in his study do not correspond with the date from the *Ming shi* [45. P. 48–49]. Therefore, one can presume that the turmoil within the Khmer lands continued up to the end of the 16th century and there also could have been a third occupation of Angkor.

⁴⁸ For the translation, see: [61. P. 10].

Conclusion

The Yuan dynasty sources speak very little of Zhenla with Zhou Dagan's account being the most informative and contemporary. Some of the characteristics attributed to the army, people and general situation within Angkor point to its degradation. *Daoyi zhilüe* also does not record any new data about trading with this country simultaneously stating that Zhancheng was at the crossroads of the maritime routes, indicating the transition of trade to the Cham polities instead of the Khmer ones.

The early and mid-Ming dynasty sources mostly reproduce the vision of Zhenla which remained from the Song dynasty at the same time incorporating the descriptions of the various palaces and temples of Angkor from Zhou Dagan's account, however, not hinting at any downfall in the general image of Zhenla. Nevertheless, sources such as *Ming shilu* and *Ming shi* do contain evidence of the constant pressure on Zhenla (first from Zhancheng and later on from Siam). Even among the records written during Zheng He's travels only one contains a description of Zhenla which once again has no new information. Nor is Zhenla pictured on any of the maps from this period of time. Some sources also mention that the tribute missions from Zhenla were not regular. All of this may serve as an indication that the Chinese official circles noticed that a downfall was ongoing in Zhenla although no understanding of the political situation within the Khmer lands seems to have been present.

Another general characteristic applicable to Funan/Zhenla throughout all the time of its relations with China in comparison with Linyi/Zhancheng is that it has never plundered the Chinese lands and in its tributary relations with China it never broke its "promises" to the Chinese Emperor and in general was perceived as a well-behaving polity which is especially evident in *Ming shilu*; on the contrary, Zhancheng was pictured as a "bully" not abiding the Chinese will and constantly engaging in fights with Annam. Moreover, the first conflicts between Linyi and Funan (from the Chinese point of view) were initiated by Linyi which is probably the reason why plunder of Zhancheng in 1190s did not ruin the overall reputation of Zhenla but was rather perceived as its peak of development.

As for the reasons of Angkor's gradual decline outlined by specialists in Southeast Asia and archeologists, most of them are indeed directly or indirectly mentioned in the Chinese sources (apart from the climate change and epidemic disease), therefore, this study has in some degree strengthened the arguments for the gradual decline of Angkor.

Recently (while the current work was in progress) a new article was published by Liam S. Kelley (an associate professor of Brunei Darussalam University) in which he claims that the toponym Sanfoqi 三佛齊 which is traditionally identified as Srivijaya was in fact referring to a northern Khmer polity and specifically Angkor during the Ming dynasty, while

Zhenla was a polity somewhere in the lower Mekong [62]. Although some ideas expressed in this article are indeed rather interesting and challenging the old concepts, in my opinion, the author has not yet presented enough evidence to back up his groundbreaking theory. Moreover, he seems to ignore some conflicting information from the Chinese sources which casts doubt to his conclusions. For example, while L.S. Kelly uses the information from *Lingwai daida*, he does not note that it is directly stated in there that Sanfoqi is located somewhere in the sea: the chapter on Sanfoqi specifically states that it is “*within (among) the Southern Seas*” 在南海之中 [23. P. 86]. Moreover, if Sanfoqi is indeed Angkor, how is it possible that Zhou Daguan never mentions this name in his account? Therefore, this discussion is to be continued.

Appendixes

Appendix 1

Translation of the Entries on Cambodia from Yuan shi

In the beginning of the Yuan it was ordered to Zhancheng, Jiaozhi and Zhenla to annually present elephants [to the Court]. [They were to be] brought up at the north of the lake at the Xijin lane 析津坊 [in Dadu] . During an Imperial Tour, foreign officials would ride [them] and escort [the Emperor] 行幸則蕃官騎引. [They are to be used] to guide the Imperial chariot and to pull huge carriages.

元初，既定占城、交趾、真臘，歲貢象，育於析津坊海子之陽。行幸則蕃官騎引，以導大駕，以駕巨輦。

[On the 18th year of Zhiyuan reign in winter on the 10th month] on Gengxu day 庚戌... (1281) [according to] an Imperial Degree the country of Ganbuxi 干不昔 came to submit [to the Yuan].

庚戌.....詔諭幹不昔國來歸附。

[On the 22nd year of Zhiyuan reign on the 9th month] on Bingzi day 丙子 (1285) Zhenla, Zhancheng presented 20 musicians together with medical materials, crocodile skins and the like.

丙子，真臘、占城貢樂工十人及藥材、鱷魚皮諸物。

[On the 29th year of Zhiyuan reign on the 9th month] on Yichou day 乙丑 (1292) Ali 阿里 wanted to prepare the fleet himself, together with Zhang Cun 張存 go on a military expedition against Zhaowa army, go (went?) to summon Zhancheng and Ganbucha 甘不察 [troops?] (往招占城.....). [By the Emperor's] edict Ali was awarded a three-pearl tiger tally 三珠虎符 and Zhang Cun — a one-pearl tiger tally.

乙丑，阿裏願自修船，同張存從征瓜哇軍，往招占城、甘不察，詔授阿裏三珠虎符，張存一珠虎符，仍蠲阿裏父布伯所負鞞脫鈔三千錠。

[On the 7th year of Yanyou 延祐 reign on the 9th month] on Jiachen day 甲辰 (1320)... emissary Matuoman 馬托蠻 and others were sent to Zhancheng, Zhanla 占臘, Longyamen 龍牙門 to search for tamed elephants.

甲辰.....遣馬紮蠻等使占城、占臘、龍牙門，索馴象。

[On the 2nd year of Tianli reign on the 4th month] on Bingwu day 丙午 (1329)... the country of Zhanla 占臘 came with tribute of camphor wood 羅香木 and elephants, leopards, white monkeys 白猿.

丙午.....占臘國來貢羅香木及象、豹、白猿。

Appendix 2.

Translation of the account of Zhenla from *Yiyu zhi*

Country of Zhenla 真臘國

This country is extremely hot, it is south *huihui* 回回. Commonly [when there is] a marriage, when the girls are 9 years old, they meet the relatives, the monk is ordered to perform Buddhist rituals, with his finger [he] breaks the girl's hymen, [with the girl's] blood puts a dot on the mother's forehead⁴⁹, this is considered good fortune 利市⁵⁰, in marriage the couple will be harmonious. In 10 years [girls] are married. When the people have intercourse with one's wife, her husband is happy. When a person of [this] country commits a theft, [they] chop [his] hands and cut [his] feet, or with a hot stamp burn a mark to brand [his] forehead, [as for] those [sentenced] to capital offense, a toon tree pierces their buttocks.

其國極熱，即南回回。凡嫁娶，女子九歲乃會親友，令僧作佛事，以指頭挑破女子童體，以血點於母額，以為利事，嫁人夫婦和。十歲即嫁。人與其妻通，其夫即喜。國人為盜，即斬手斷足，或以火印烙記黥額，死罪者以木椿穿其尻。

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⁴⁹ This seems to be an error, according to other sources (Daoyi zhilüe) it was done vice-versa: the girl's mother would put a dot on her daughter's forehead with the daughter's blood.

⁵⁰ Originally the second character was different: 利事 (“it is considered to help the deed”).

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