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The institution of hostages in Roman political practice at the end of the Republic and at the beginning of the Empire

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Abstract. The relevance of the research topic is due to the fact that even at the end of the first quarter of the 21st century the term "hostages", meaning persons unlawfully held to achieve some goal (military, political, economic, etc.), has by no means disappeared from the political vocabulary. Of course, between the political institution of hostages, which became widespread in the ancient world and was an important element of the diplomatic practice of that epoch, and hostages, who in modern times were repeatedly captured and forcibly held by terrorists and extremists of all stripes, who did not stop at killing or causing grave harm to the health of the captured people, a huge distance has passed. The purpose of this study is to identify the features of the institution of hostage in antiquity using the example of ancient Rome. Having analyzed the sources, the author came to the conclusion: if during the epoch of the Republic there were very few episodes associated with the stay of royal hostages in Rome and there was no well-thought-out policy in this direction in principle, then with the establishment of the Empire its founder, Augustus, began to pursue a political course aimed at creating an entire system of client states dependent on Rome, led by monarchs who, living in Rome as hostages, were raised, educated and subjected to Romanization in order to subsequently serve the emperor as loyal vassals and conductors of Roman influence in the periphery. For a number of reasons, this policy was not successful, and Augustus' successors gradually abandoned it.

Keywords: Roman Empire, client kings, vassal kingdoms, Augustus, "soft power", queen Erato, queen Musa, Archelaus I Philopator, Phraates IV, Herod I the Great

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Институт заложничества в римской политической практике в конце Республики и в начале Империи

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Аннотация. Актуальность темы исследования обусловлена тем обстоятельством, что даже на исходе первой четверти XXI в. термин «заложники», обозначающий лиц, противоправно удерживаемых для достижения какой-либо цели (военной, политической, экономической и т.п.), отнюдь не исчез из политического словаря. Безусловно, между политическим институтом заложничества, получившим широкое распространение в древнем мире и являвшимся важным элементом дипломатической практики той эпохи, и заложниками, которых в Новейшее время неоднократно захватывали и насильно удерживали террористы и экстремисты всех мастей, не останавливавшиеся перед убийством или нанесением тяжкого вреда здоровью захваченных ими людей, пролегла дистанция огромного размера. Цель исследования — выявить особенности института заложничества в античности на примере древнего Рима. Проанализировав источники, автор пришёл к выводу: если в эпоху Республики эпизодов, связанных с пребыванием в Риме царственных заложников, было крайне мало и хоть сколько-нибудь продуманная политика в этом направлении отсутствовала в принципе, то с установлением Империи её основатель, Август, начал проводить политический курс, направленный на создание целой системы зависимых от Рима клиентских государств во главе с монархами, которые, живя в Риме на положении заложников, воспитывались, получали образование и подвергались романизации с тем, чтобы в дальнейшем служить императору в качестве верных вассалов и проводников римского влияния на периферии. В силу ряда причин эта политика не увенчалась успехом, и преемники Августа постепенно от неё отказались.

Ключевые слова: Римская империя, клиентские цари, вассальные царства, Август, «мягкая сила», царица Эрато, царица Муза, Архелай I Филопатор, Фраат IV, Ирод I Великий

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Introduction

Since ancient times, the Romans gave to others and themselves took hostages — obsides — as guarantors of the fulfillment of the concluded agreement, as Livy repeatedly reports in his “History” (II. 13. 4–10; IX. 15. 7; XXXVI. 40. 3; XXXVII. 45. 16). Sometimes such an action was intended to demonstrate the superiority of the

Romans over their negotiating partners. The same Livy narrates about one such episode: having entered into negotiations with the Romans, the Macedonian king Perseus "accordingly sent as hostages Hippias and Pantaucus, two of his particular friends, and whom he had sent as ambassadors. The hostages were demanded not so much to get a pledge of good faith, as to make it apparent to the allies, that the king did not meet the ambassadors on a footing of equal dignity" (XLII. 39. 7. Here and further trans. by Rev. Canon Roberts). In this article we will focus on those hostages who represented the royal houses of the East in Rome.

First, let us note such an essential point: the meaning of the word obses ("hostage") in antiquity was very different from the modern one. This, in particular, is evidenced by the fact that those august obsides, which will be discussed further, as a rule, did not experience any special restrictions in terms of freedom of movement, moved in the highest circles of Roman society, making useful acquaintances that could be useful to them in the future [8. P. 9–10], attended schools together with representatives of the Roman nobility, studied Greek and Latin [15. P. 40]. Thus, staying in Rome, without a doubt, benefited these people. As Juvenal wrote at the beginning of the 2nd century in one of his satires, "look what foreign trade yields: he came here as a hostage, / We make them men of the world" (aspice quid faciant commercia: venerat obses, hic fiunt homines) (II. 166–167. Trans. by A.S. Kline).

Hostages — representatives of Hellenistic royal houses

One of these hostages was Demetrius, the youngest son of the Macedonian king Philip V (221–179 BC), sent to Rome after his father's defeat in the Second Macedonian War (Polyb. XVIII. 39. 5; Liv. XXXIII. 13. 14; 30. 10; XL. 15. 8; Plut. Flam. 9). In 191 BC, after spending five years in Rome, Demetrius, with the gracious permission of the Senate, returned to his homeland (Polyb. XXI. 2. 3; Liv. XXXV. 31. 5; XXXVI. 35. 13; App. Maced. 9. 5; Syr. 20). The years spent in the Eternal City did not pass without a trace for the prince: the senators who saw the future king of Macedonia in yesterday's hostage did not doubt Demetrius' devotion to the interests of Rome (Liv. XXXIX. 47. 10). Subsequently, the obvious signs of favor that the Senate showed to its protégé destroyed him (Liv. XXXIX. 48. 1) [for more details on this, see: 10].

In the case of Demetrius, the situation is more or less clear: his father lost the war and was forced to conclude an extremely unfavorable treaty with the Roman Republic, the observance of which was guaranteed by Demetrius' stay in Rome. It is not surprising that the Roman ruling elite tried to turn the Macedonian prince into a convinced Romanophile, who could eventually be made a vassal king of Macedonia. This scenario did not come true: the fate of Demetrius was sad (he was killed by order of his father: Just. XXXII. 2. 10); nevertheless, the very theme of the stay of royal obsides from the East in Rome had a continuation. From time to time, the Senate officially agreed to receive on the banks of the Tiber

a representative of one of those royal houses of the East with which the Roman civitas was in diplomatic relations. As a rule, we were talking about an allied and/or vassal state, the ruler of which, based on his own political interests, sent his son, nephew or other relative to Rome for a more or less long period, officially — for the purpose of obtaining an education, unofficially — the goals could be very different, from confirming loyalty to trying to get rid of a potential competitor in the struggle for power. A striking example of this is the episode with Prince Ariarathes, reported by Livy (XLII. 19. 3–6) and Diodorus (XXXI. 19. 7). According to Livy, in 172 BC the young (puer) Cappadocian prince Ariarathes, the eldest son of King Ariarathes IV Eusebus (220–163 BC) and Antiochida, daughter of Rome's sworn enemy Antiochus III (223–187 BC) arrived in Rome. As the Roman historian writes, the father "had sent his son to be educated at Rome, in order that he might even from childhood be acquainted with the manners and the persons of the Romans" (XLII. 19. 4). This was the official version. In fact, according to O.L. Gabelko, Ariarathes IV, intending to transfer the throne to his youngest son, Mithridates (the future Ariarathes V), sent his eldest son to Rome, thereby ridding his favorite of a potential competitor [3. P. 107–108]. The further fate of the eldest son of Ariarathes IV is unknown; what is beyond doubt is that he never became king of Cappadocia (Diod. XXXI. 19. 8).

Sometimes the stay in Rome of members of the Hellenistic dynasties dragged on for many years. Thus, after the defeat suffered by Antiochus III in the war with the Romans, his youngest son Antiochus went to Italy as a hostage (Liv. XLII. 6. 9; XLIV. 19. 8; Per. 41; 1 Macc 1. 10; Athen. X. 438 d), the future king Antiochus IV Epiphanes [for more information on this, see: 1]. He was in Rome in 189–178 BC. The years spent by Antiochus in the Eternal City, where he moved in high circles (Just. XXXIV. 3. 2), were not in vain, and, having become king (175 BC), he remained loyal to Rome [6. P. 128]. Antiochus IV undoubtedly experienced a strong influence of Roman everyday culture: it is known that he liked to dress in a toga and, sitting in the curule chair in the agora, administered court (Polyb. XXVI. 1. 3–5; Liv. XLI. 20. 1; Diod. XXIX. 32. 1), organized gladiator games in his spare time, attracting local youth to bloody spectacles (Liv. XLI. 20. 11–13), and in Antioch he even built the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus (ibid. 9; Per. 41).

In the role of hostage Antiochus in Rome was replaced by his nephew Demetrius — the son of Seleucus IV Philopator (187–175 BC), the future Demetrius I Soter (Just. XXXIV. 3. 6; App. Syr. 45). He spent 16 years in Rome (178–162 BC). Demetrius was satisfied with the conditions of his detention: already being a king, as a sign of his gratitude he sent a golden wreath to Rome (App. Syr. 47). He developed excellent personal relationships with many representatives of the Roman ruling elite, however, his candidacy for the Seleucid throne did not suit the Senate, which decided to support Demetrius' cousin, 9-year-old Antiochus V Eupator (Polyb. XXXI. 12. 37–38; App. 46). Demetrius, who did not accept this turn of events, in 162 BC with the help of his friend, the famous historian Polybius,

he fled from Rome and soon, having carried out a coup in his homeland, ascended the throne (Polyb. XXXI. 20. 61–22. 72; Athen. X. 440 b; Jos. Ant. Jud. XII. 10. 1; App. Syr. 47; Just. XXXIV. 3. 8–9). It is characteristic that the murder of the legitimate ruler, the 11-year-old king Antiochus V, and his regent Lysias, carried out by order of Demetrius I (Jos. Ant. Jud. XII. 10. 1; App. Syr. 47; Just. XXXIV. 3. 9), did not prevent the Senate from first recognizing the usurper as the legitimate king (Polyb. XXXII. 4. 8), and subsequently supporting the claims to power of the "children" of Antiochus IV — the princess Laodice and the impostor Alexander Balas (Polyb. XXXIII. 18. 12–14). Here, as in many other cases, the Senate followed its traditional policy of divide et impera ("divide and conquer"). In 150 BC Demetrius I Soter died in the fight against Alexander Balas (Jos. Ant. Jud. XIII. 2. 4).

"Augustus' project"

More than a hundred years passed, perhaps the most turbulent in the history of Rome, and now Augustus, having established himself as the ruler of a huge Mediterranean power, adopted the practice of Romanizing the offspring of foreign rulers. If in the republican era there were very few such cases and there was no need to talk about any well-thought-out policy in this direction, then Augustus began to pursue a political course aimed at creating a whole system of client or client monarchies dependent on Rome [8. P. 10]. Vassal rulers, whom Tacitus once called "servientes reges" (Hist. II. 81. 1), i.e. "servant kings", de jure were "friends and allies of the Roman people", and de facto — clients of the Roman civitas [7. P. 135]. The same Tacitus in Agricola (14. 2) contemptuously described them as "instruments of slavery" (instrumenta servitutis). Suetonius reports the following about the policy of Augustus in relation to all these servientes reges: "Except in a few instances he restored the kingdoms of which he gained possession by the right of conquest to those from whom he had taken them or joined them with other foreign nations. He also united the kings with whom he was in alliance by mutual ties, and was very ready to propose or favour intermarriages or friendships among them. He never failed to treat them all with consideration as integral parts of the empire, regularly appointing a guardian for such as were too young to rule or whose minds were affected, until they grew up or recovered; and he brought up the children of many of them and educated them with his own" (Aug. 48. Trans. by J.C. Rolfe). Augustus did not forget some of the vassal kings in his will (Dio Cass. LVI. 32. 2). It is characteristic that the emperor did not force parents in power to send their sons to Rome: the initiative always came from the kings themselves [8. P. 12]. Undoubtedly, Augustus hoped to make these people into conductors of the political and cultural influence of Rome in a number of neighboring and/or controlled countries [5. P. 145]. Thus, yesterday's hostages (obsides) became instruments of that "soft power" that the imperial administration sought to use with greater or lesser success on the periphery of the power.

Parthian hostages

In particular, Augustus tried to use this "soft power" in relation to neighboring Parthia, but he acted in this direction very carefully and delicately, avoiding any sudden movements. The emperor preferred diplomacy to military action in the East. Thus, he did not help the usurper Tiridates II (31–30, 26–25 BC), but provided him with asylum, considerable maintenance and refused to extradite him to the Parthians; however, counting on the continuation of a peaceful dialogue with King Phraates IV (38–2 BC), Augustus sent home his son, who was detained by him as a hostage (Dio Cass. LI. 18. 3; LIII. 33. 2; XLII. 5. 8–9). Two decades later, in 9 BC, Phraates IV, on his own initiative, sent four of his sons and four grandsons to Rome, a total of eight people [2. P. 164; 5. P. 136; 8. P. 12]. This Parthian action is reported by a number of sources (RGDA. 32. 2; Suet. Aug. 21. 3; 43. 4; Eutrop. VII. 9; Strabo. VI. 4. 2; XVI. 1. 28; Just. XLII. 5. 12; Vell. II. 94; Jos. Ant. Jud. XVIII. 2. 4; Oros. Hist. VI. 21. 29). Of course, the question arises about the king's motivation. Parthian sources are, for obvious reasons, silent on this matter. The official view of the Roman side is stated on behalf of Augustus in the RGDA. 32. 2: the king sent his children and grandchildren to Rome, seeking "our friendship" (amicitiam nostram… petens). Thus, Augustus "presented the very fact of sending the princes to Rome to the Roman public as another symbol of the Parthians' recognition of the superiority of Rome" [5. P. 146].

Cornelius Tacitus did not agree with this assessment. In his opinion, Phraates IV did this not so much out of fear of Rome, but out of distrust of his subjects (Ann. II. 1. 2). When almost six decades later, in 49 BC, another group of Parthian hostages (obsides) arrived at the court of Claudius, the same Tacitus explained the motivation of the Parthians as follows: "The object of giving the son of kings in hostage for their fathers was that, if the government at home became obnoxious, recourse could be had to the emperor and senate, and a more enlightened prince, imbued with their manners, be called to the throne" (Ann. XII. 10. 2. Trans. by J. Jackson). Josephus (Ant. Jud. XVIII. 2. 4) explains the decision of Phraates IV by the machinations of his wife Musa, an insidious intriguer of either Italian or Asia Minor origin [4. P. 62], who 7 years later poisoned her husband in order to place her son Phraatacus on the throne, who went down in history under the name Phraates V (2 BC — 4 AD). The above opinions of Tacitus and Flavius agree on the main thing: the sending of the royal offspring to Rome was one of the episodes in that cynical and merciless struggle for power, which, now intensifying, now subsiding, was waged at the royal court in Ctesiphon. Phraates IV himself at one time, in order to take the throne and sit on it, killed his father, King Orodes II, thirty brothers and even his eldest son (Plut. Crass. 33; Ant. 37; Just. XLII. 5. 1–2). According to A.R. Panov, "the transfer of the heirs was caused by a premonition of dynastic opposition, and the decision to send them to Rome had its advantages" [5. P. 144].

As for the sons of Phraates IV, their subsequent fates developed differently: Seraspadan and Rodaspes died in Rome (CIL VI. 1799), Vonones and Phraates

returned to Parthia (Jos. Ant. Jud. XVIII. 2. 4; Tac. Ann. II. 32). In 7 AD, the Parthians, having killed Orodes III (4–7 AD), themselves turned to Augustus with a request to give them Vonones as king. The Emperor agreed, and Vonones [see about him: 7. P. 68], who received a Greco-Roman upbringing and education in Rome, became king of Parthia (RGDA. 33; Jos. Ant. Jud. XVIII. 2. 4). The Parthian nobility soon became disillusioned with the new king: for them he was a "stranger" (externus) (Tac. Ann. II. 1. 1), "poisoned by enemy skills" (hostibus artium infectus) (Tac. Ann. II. 2. 3. Here and further trans. by V.O. Nikishin). Vonones I himself (7–12 AD) rashly did not consider it necessary to adjust his behavior in a cultural environment alien to him and thereby only aggravated his own already precarious position: according to Tacitus, "alien to the customs of his ancestors (diversus a maiorum institutis), he rarely hunted and was indifferent to horse fun; he appeared on the streets of cities only on a stretcher and neglected such feasts as they were in his homeland. His close Greeks also caused ridicule (inridebantur et Graeci comites)" (Ann. II. 2. 5–6). Accessibility and courtesy (prompti aditus, obvia comitas), instilled in Vonones by his Greco-Roman upbringing, looked in the eyes of the king's subjects not as virtues (virtutes), but as vices (vitia) (ibid. 6). "And since all this was dissimilar to their morals (quia ipsorum moribus aliena), they had equal hatred for both the bad and the good in him" (loc. cit.).

Very little time passed, and a representative of the younger branch of the Arsacid dynasty, Artabanus III (12–38 AD), whose youth was spent among the warlike nomadic Dagi, or Dahas (apud Dahas adultus) (Tac. Ann. II. 3. 1), spoke out against the Roman protege. In the fight against Artabanus, Vonones I is defeated and flees to Greater Armenia (ibid. 2). This outcome of the military-political confrontation was symbolic: the hapless Vonones I, "poisoned" by the Greco-Roman civilization, was defeated by the charismatic leader of the "national" opposition Artabanus III, who managed to recreate the power of the Parthian state [9. P. 48]. After reigning for several years in Greater Armenia (12–16 AD), Vonones left for Syria (Tac. Ann. II. 4. 3–4; Jos. Ant. Jud. XVIII. 2. 4), and in 19 AD he was killed by the Romans in Cilicia (Tac. Ann. II. 68. 3–4; Suet. Tib. 49).

The same Tacitus contrasts the cruelty of Artabanus III, "raised among the Scythians", with the "soft character" (ingenium) of another representative of the Arsacid dynasty, the grandson of Phraates IV, Tiridates, who received upbringing and education in Rome (Romanas per artes) (Ann. VI. 41. 2). It is characteristic that "pampered in a foreign land" (externa mollitia) (Ann. VI. 43. 4) the Roman protege Tiridates III (35–36 AD) lost the struggle for power to Artabanus III (Ann. VI. 44. 1–7). A year earlier, at the request of the rebellious Parthian nobility, Tiberius sent another Roman protege to Parthia — the elderly Phraates, the youngest son of Phraates IV, who had lived in Rome for more than 40 years (Ann. VI. 31. 4–32. 1). However, Phraates VI, having barely reached Syria and having replaced "the way of life acquired during his long years in Rome with the unusual Parthian way of life, fell ill and died (Phraates apud Syriam dum omisso cultu Romano, cui per tot annos

insueverat, instituta Parthorum sumit, patriis moribus impar morbo absumptus est)" (Ann. VI. 32. 4). Thus, once again the conflict between the cultus Romanus and the instituta Parthorum was resolved by the death of a man who became a "stranger among his own".

The son of the ill-fated Vonones I, Meherdat, like his father, was a "pupil of Rome" (alumnus Urbis) (Tac. Ann. XII. 11. 3. See: Ann. XI. 10. 4; XII. 10. 1–4). Meherdat's enemies from among his compatriots saw him as a "foreigner and a Roman" (alienigenam et Romanum) (Tac. Ann. XII. 14. 6). Meherdat was chosen for the role of the Roman protege in Parthia by Emperor Claudius in 48 AD. However, he fell victim to his own frivolity and the treachery of others: the contender for the Arsacid throne was defeated on the battlefield, treacherously captured and crippled (his ears were cut off) on the orders of his superior successful rival Gotarzes II (loc. cit.). Often, the vassal rulers of the border regions, who seemed to be in a vice between Rome and Parthia, tried to maneuver between powerful neighbors at their own peril and risk, trying, figuratively speaking, to sit on two chairs (Jos. Ant. Jud. XX. 2. 4; 3. 4). Thus, the king of Adiabene Izatus II (36–60 AD), fearing intrigues on the part of his relatives, sent them along with their families as hostages, some to Rome, others to Parthia (Jos. Ant. Jud. XX. 2. 4). However, he failed to sit on two chairs: when the Parthian king Vardanus I (39–47 AD) invited Izatus to enter into an alliance against Rome and he refused, Vardanus declared war on himself (Jos. Ant. Jud. XX. 3. 4).

Armenian hostages

Under the Julii-Claudii, future vassal Armenian kings lived and were raised in Rome — Tigranes III (20–8 BC), Tigranes V (6–12 AD) and Tigranes VI (60–63 AD). After the murder of the king of Greater Armenia, Artashes II, by the pro-Roman Armenian nobility, Augustus enthroned his younger brother Tigranes, who was then in Rome (Dio Cass. LIV. 9. 4–5; Suet. Tib. 9. 1; Jos. Ant. Jud. XV. 4. 3; Tac. Ann. II. 3. 4; RGDA. 27. 2). Juvenal writes in one of his satires about how rapidly Armenian youth became romanized in Rome (II. 164–170). According to A.G. Bokshchanin, Tigranes III was an "obedient agent" of the Romans [2. P. 157. See also: 16. P. 13 ff.; 17. P. 323 ff.]. Further, the grandson of the Cappadocian king Archelaus I Philopator (36 BC — 17 AD), Tigranes (his parents were Alexander, son of Herod I the Great, and Glaphyra, daughter of Archelaus I of Cappadocia: Jos. Ant. Jud. XVII. 1. 2; XVIII. 5. 4), born in Jerusalem, but raised in Rome, by the will of Augustus ascended the throne of Greater Armenia (RGDA. 27. 2), becoming Tigranes V, but a few months later, apparently, under pressure from the "nationally" oriented Armenian aristocracy, he was forced to share power with the daughter of Tigranes III, the sister and wife of Tigranes IV Queen Erato (6–12 AD) [11. P. 62]. In 12 AD Tigranes V was overthrown, and in 36 AD Tiberius ordered his execution (Tac. Ann. VI. 40. 2; Jos. Ant. Jud. XVIII. 5. 4).

Finally, in 60 AD, Nero placed on the Armenian throne the nephew of the ill-fated Tigranes V — King Tigranes VI (Tac. Ann. XIV. 26. 1; Jos. Ant. Jud. XVIII. 5. 4), who was the great-grandson of two vassal kings — Herod I the Great and Archelaus I Philopator. As Tacitus writes, "a long stay in Rome as a hostage instilled in him (Tigranes. — V.N.) slavish humiliation" (usque ad servilem patientiam demissus) (Ann. XIV. 26. 1). According to the historian, the proud Parthian nobility should have despised Tigranes as a Roman protege, who was not only a "foreigner" (alienigena), but also lived for many years in Rome as a hostage (obses), which for Tacitus was tantamount to living in slavery (in mancipia) (Tac. Ann. XV. 1. 2). Finally, in 60 AD, Nero placed on the Armenian throne the nephew of the ill-fated Tigranes V — King Tigranes VI (Tac. Ann. XIV. 26. 1; Jos. Ant. Jud. XVIII. 5. 4), who was the great-grandson of two vassal kings — Herod I the Great and Archelaus I Philopator. As Tacitus writes, "a long stay in Rome as a hostage instilled in him (Tigranes. — V.N.) slavish humiliation" (usque ad servilem patientiam demissus) (Ann. XIV. 26. 1). According to the historian, the proud Parthian nobility must have despised Tigranes as a Roman protege, who was not only a "foreigner" (alienigena), but also lived for many years in Rome as a hostage (obses), which for Tacitus was tantamount to life in slavery (In mancipia) (Tac. Ann. XV. 1. 2). It is characteristic that Tigranes VI retained power in Greater Armenia, relying on the Roman military contingent and the help of neighboring vassals of Rome (Tac. Ann. XIV. 26. 3). As soon as the Parthians inflicted a brutal defeat on the Roman legions, Tigranes VI had to cede the throne to the Parthian protege Tiridates I [2. P. 195 ff].

Descendants of Herod in Rome

During the time of Augustus, the offspring of the "ally and friend of the Roman people" Herod I the Great also lived in Rome, who, by introducing foreign customs, undermined the long-established way of life (Jos. Ant. Jud. XV. 8. 1. See: Jos. Ant. Jud. XV. 10. 1; XVII. 1. 3; 4. 3; Bell. Jud. I. 22. 2; 23. 1; 31. 1; 32. 2) [8. P. 10–11; 13. P. 14]. In total, eight sons of King Herod visited the court of Augustus at different times. One of his grandsons, the future vassal king of Judea Herod Agrippa I the Great (41–44 AD), was raised and studied in his youth with Tiberius' son, Drusus the Younger (Jos. Ant. Jud. XVIII. 6. 1). The close ties of the descendants of Herod the Great with the Roman imperial house are evidenced, in particular, by their names: Agrippa I received his name, apparently, in honor of the son-in-law of Augustus and personal friend of King Herod, Mark Agrippa [8. P. 77], the sons of Agrippa I received the names Agrippa and Drusus (Jos. Ant. Jud. XVIII. 5. 4). An intelligent and diplomatic man, Herod Agrippa enjoyed the favor of the emperors Caligula and Claudius, with whom he was friendly even in the days when he lived and was raised in Rome (Jos. Ant. Jud. XVIII. 6. 4–5): the first in 37 AD gave him the royal title and transferred the territories of the tetrarchies of Philip and Lysanias (ibid. 10), and in 39 AD he annexed the tetrarchy of Herod Antipas to his kingdom (Jos. Ant.

Jud. XVIII. 7. 2), the second gave Agrippa Judea and Samaria (Jos. Ant. Jud. XIX. 5. 1). As a result, in 41 AD, all the possessions of his grandfather Herod the Great were concentrated in the hands of Agrippa I. Ruling under the watchful supervision of the imperial procurators, Agrippa strictly observed all the religious precepts of Judaism and knew how to get along with both his subjects and foreigners (Jos. Ant. Jud. XIX. 6. 1; 7. 3).

Being a man of Greco-Roman culture, Agrippa I built a theater and amphitheater, baths and porticoes in Berit (modern Beirut), and organized gladiator fights (Jos. Ant. Jud. XIX. 7. 5). In 44 AD, in Caesarea Palestine, he organized games in honor of Claudius in Roman style (Jos. Ant. Jud. XIX. 8. 2). It is not surprising that the king had many opponents, dissatisfied not only with his passion for Greco-Roman culture, but also with his groveling before the Roman provincial authorities: the news of the death of Agrippa I was greeted with jubilation among the people (Jos. Ant. Jud. XIX. 9. 1). His son, Herod Agrippa II (48–92/93 AD), like his father, was raised in his youth in Rome, but already at the court of Claudius (ibid. 2). He did not inherit his father's throne immediately. In 48 AD, after the death of his uncle, King Herod II of Chalcis, Agrippa received from Claudius the title of King of Chalcis and caretaker of the Temple of Jerusalem (Jos. Ant. Jud. XX. 5. 2; 9. 7; Bell. Jud. II. 12. 1). In 53, Claudius took Chalcis from Agrippa, but in return gave him the lands of the former tetrarchy of Philip (Jos. Ant. Jud. XX. 7. 1; Bell. Jud. II. 12. 8). In 61 AD, Nero further expanded the possessions of Agrippa II, giving him Tiberias and the south of Perea (Jos. Ant. Jud. XX. 8. 4). Having become the king of Judea, Agrippa began minting coins with the image of the emperor, sometimes with his own profile and pagan symbols, thereby grossly offending the religious feelings of his subjects [about coins of Agrippa II see: 14. P. 139–169].

Agrippa II built a lot, decorating Caesarea Philippi, which he renamed Neroniada in honor of Nero (61 AD), but this activity did not at all add to his popularity among his subjects (Jos. Ant. Jud. XX. 9. 4). Despite all his efforts (Jos. Bell. Jud. II. 16. 3–4), the king, who did not enjoy the respect of his subjects, was unable to prevent the uprising of the Jews and was forced to flee Jerusalem under a hail of stones (Jos. Bell. Jud. II. 17. 1). Subsequently, Agrippa II actively helped the Romans suppress the rebellion (Tac. Hist. V. 1). In 75 AD, this Roman vassal received from Vespasian, as a reward for loyalty, the signs of praetorian dignity — ornamenta praetoria (Dio Cass. LXVI. 15. 4). In addition, Vespasian further expanded the domain of Agrippa (Phot. Bibl. Cod. 33), who died in Rome — exactly when is unknown, but clearly before 94 AD, when Josephus completed his work on the Antiquities of the Jews (Jos. Ant. Jud. XX. 11. 1). With the death of Agrippa II, the dynasty of Herod the Great came to an end, and the former possessions of the last Jewish king came under the direct control of the Roman provincial authorities.

Conclusion

Thus, if during the era of the Republic the stay in Rome as hostages of representatives of the eastern royal dynasties was of a random and unsystematic nature, and therefore did not have any significant political results, then with the coming to power of Augustus it became an important component of a purposeful political course oriented to create on the periphery of the Roman state a chain of vassal kingdoms headed by client monarchs, "friends and allies of the Roman people" (amici et socii populi Romani). Ultimately, the "Augustus project" did not justify itself (mainly due to the fact that the Roman proteges were often perceived by their subjects as strangers and collaborators, and therefore were unable not only to effectively govern, but even to retain power for more or less long period) and was rejected by the successors of the founder of the Principate, who gradually turned the client kingdoms into provinces under the control of Roman administrators.

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