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ВОСТОК-ЗАПАД: КОНТАКТЫ И ПРОТИВОРЕЧИЯ

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The Idea of Caliphate in the Context of the World War I: Dialogue and Confrontation between East and West

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Abstract. The significance of the research topic is predetermined by the importance of Caliphatism as a phenomenon of social thought in the history of Islam. The purpose of this study is to analyze the regional specifics of the perception of the institution of Caliphal power in the center and on the periphery of the Islamic world during the First World War (1914–1918). The military failures of the Ottoman Empire and the triumph of the Western colonial powers forced Muslim thinkers to redefine the idea of the community (ummah) as a form of spiritual and political unification of the adherents of Islam. The authors focused on the ongoing discussions about the opportunities for Islamic unity and the prospects of the Caliphate in the changing conditions of world geopolitics. The original models of the "Arab Caliphate" and the "Ottoman Caliphate", later opposed by the Caliphatists to the ideas of secular statehood, manifested themselves in the meaningful ideological dialogue between the defenders and opponents of the Ottoman government. Based on historical sources, the authors analyzed the intellectual work and political positions of Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935), Ali Bash Hamba (1876–1918), Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958) and identified the eclectic nature of their ideological and political reactions to the weakening of the power of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph. It is proved that the specific features of the traditional political culture of the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia have become a decisive factor that led

to a different interpretation of the tasks of the Caliphate in the main areas of Islam. In addition, the nature and mechanisms of the influence of the Ottoman intelligence services on the development of the philosophical and ideological justification of the Caliphal power among Muslim intellectuals have been clarified.

Keywords: Caliphate, Young Turks, World War I, Middle East, North Africa, South Asia

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Идея халифата в контексте Первой мировой войны: диалог и противостояние Востока и Запада

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Аннотация. Значимость темы исследования предопределяется актуальностью халифатизма как феномена общественной мысли в истории ислама. Цель данного исследования — анализ региональной специфики восприятия института халифской власти в центре и на периферии исламского мира в ходе Первой мировой войны (1914–1918 гг.). Военные неудачи Османской империи и торжество западных колониальных держав по-новому поставили перед мусульманскими мыслителями вопрос о контурах идеи общины-*уммы* как формы духовного и политического объединения правоверных. Авторы сосредоточили внимание на развернувшихся в этой связи дискуссиях о самой возможности единства уммы и перспективах халифата в изменившихся условиях мировой геополитики. В содержательном идейном диалоге защитников и противников османской власти проявились оригинальные модели «арабского халифата» и «османского халифата», позже противопоставленные халифатистами идеям секулярной государственности. Опираясь на материалы исторических источников, авторы проанализировали интеллектуальное творчество и политические позиции Мухаммада Рашида Риды (1865–1935), Али Баш Хамбы (1876–1918), Абул Калам Азада (1888–1958) и выявили эклектический характер их идеологических и политических реакций на ослабление власти османского султана-халифа. Доказано, что особенности традиционной политической культуры Ближнего Востока, Северной Африки, Южной Азии стали решающим фактором, обусловившим различную трактовку задач халифата в основных ареалах распространения ислама. Кроме того, уточнены характер и механизмы влияния османских разведывательных служб на развитие философско-идеологического оправдания халифской власти в среде мусульманских интеллектуалов.

Ключевые слова: халифат, младотурки, Первая мировая война, Ближний Восток, Северная Африка, Южная Азия

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Introduction

In the first decades of the 20th century, at the dawn of the formation of the contours of the modern Islamic world,[1] the Caliphate as a political-ideological construct faced two challenges from colonial European powers. During the First World War, the French government attempted to design a "Maghreb Caliphate" under its control in the west of the Arab world, while in the Middle East the British colonial elite planned to realize the idea of creating an "Arab Caliphate" using the works of Arab ideologists of a reformist or nationalist and anti-Ottoman orientation. For their part, the Ottoman authorities, in resisting the British onslaught, focused on building a line of defense by protecting the legitimacy and authority of the "Ottoman Caliphate," whose age was inevitably coming to an end.[2]

The colonial challenge of the pre-war and war years posed a difficult choice for the inhabitants of the eastern wing of the Muslim oikumene — Indian Muslims. Pan-Islamic ideas, which spread in the South Asian region in the last quarter of the 19th century, had a significant impact on the formation of their identity. They helped to overcome the complex of remoteness from the traditional centers of Muslim culture in the Near and Middle East and the loss of the once high status in South Asia itself during the time of the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire [1].

Political "game of words": national and religious content of ideas about the Caliphate

Sultan Abdul-Hamid II (1842–1918), who throughout his long reign (1876–1909) consistently emphasized the enduring importance of the institution of the Caliphate, used all possible means to legitimize his authority as Padishah

[1] Caliphate (Arabic: *al-khilafa)* — a state headed by a caliph. Caliph (Arabic: *khalifa*) — originally the title of the secular and spiritual head of the Arab state, later — the title of the ruler who claimed to be the head of the Muslim world.

[2] The last Caliph of the Ottoman dynasty, Abdul-Mejid II (1868–1944), took office in 1922, becoming, after the abolition of the sultanate, the only Caliph in the history of the Ottoman Empire who did not simultaneously bear the title of sultan. In 1924, however, the Caliphate was abolished by a decree of the Grand National Assembly of republican Turkey, and Abdul-Mejid went into exile.

and Caliph, including a powerful state-wide propaganda machine, loyal Islamic institutions, including the ulama corps[3] and Sufi brotherhoods, and influential intellectuals. The Caliphate served as the basis for his general strategic orientation towards the realization of the idea of the unity of Islam (*ittihad-i Islam*), based on the Pan-Islamic platform and aimed at the political and cultural integration of Muslims — both Ottoman subjects and those who lived outside the Ottoman state [2. P. 9–12; 3]. No less important element of Abdul-Hamid II's strategy in the direction of uniting *dar al-Islam*[4], legitimizing his leadership in the Muslim world and strengthening the status of "guardian of the two holy forbidden cities" *(hadim al-kharamayn al-sharifayn*) of Mecca and Medina, which is key to the Caliph's title, was his tireless efforts to protect the holy land of Islam in Western Arabia. This was expressed in the construction of the Hijaz Railway (1900–1908), a megaproject that embodied the sultan's Pan-Islamic ambitions and was aimed at expanding the hajj, as well as in increasing investment in the economy of the Arabian "cradle of Islam" (for more details, see [4; 5]).

The fact that Abdul-Hamid II, using the institution of the Caliphate and skillfully maneuvering between European powers, persistently promoted the idea of Islamic unity, caused increasing concern in Europe. The main opponent of the Ottoman sultan-caliph was Great Britain, which, along with France, saw the Caliphate as a real threat to her colonial presence in the Muslim world.

In 1908, the Young Turk Revolution was triumphant in the Ottoman Empire. In April 1909, Abdul-Hamid II was deposed and deprived of the Caliph's dignity, and he was replaced by the weak-willed and apathetic Mehmed V Reshad (1844–1918; dates of rule: 1909–1918), who had no influence on the political situation in the metropolis. However, after the overthrow of the autocracy, the Young Turks, realizing the weight of the figure of the Caliph in international politics, preferred not to abandon the use of the Caliph's title at least when concluding international treaties. The last attempt of the Young Turks to emphasize the ideological value of the status of the Caliph was their sanction to Mehmed V Reshad to issue at the beginning of the First World War *a fatwa*[5] on the declaration of holy war (*jihad*) to the Entente powers (11.11.1914). In it he, as the Caliph, called on all Muslims to fulfill their sacred religious duty and fight against the Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance. However, this fatwa, announced in the mosques and circulated through

[3] Arabic. *'ulama'* (sing. *'alim*) — Muslim theologians, guardians of religious tradition, guardians of canonical law.

[4] *Dar al-Islam* ("the abode of Islam") is the territory where, according to the norms of Muslim law, the supremacy of the Shariah as a legal system is realized.

[5] *Fatwa* (Arabic fatwa — "explanation") is a theological and legal opinion on various legal issues, issued on the basis of the Shariah.

dar al-Islam, was met with apparent indifference. Thus, in the Arab world, Muslims felt no desire to participate in World War I and sacrifice themselves for European and Turkish interests that were alien to them.

Nevertheless, the Entente allies, alarmed by the fact that the Ottoman Caliph continued to be an authority in the eyes of the followers of Islam, agreed in general terms that the Caliphate in its Ottoman version should go into oblivion and that the status of Caliph should be "returned" to the Arabs. As an intermediate option, in 1915 the British and Russian embassies in Istanbul even discussed a utopian project of transforming the Caliphate into a Vatican-like ministate entity devoid of secular power, based either in Istanbul or Damascus [6. P. 343].

Among the Allies, it was Britain that showed the greatest enthusiasm for the project of establishing an "Arab Caliphate" under its direct supervision. It controlled gigantic territories with Muslim populations in the Indian subcontinent and North Africa, namely Egypt, which on the eve of the British occupation in 1882 was one of the richest and most extensive Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In the last quarter of the 19th century and the first quarter of the 20th century, British government officials, their foreign policy advisers, as well as the intelligence services, representatives of the academic Orientalist community working for the Foreign Office, and journalists launched a campaign to discredit the "Ottoman Caliphate" as an institution "illegal" from the point of view of Muslim law. They emphasized that the Ottomans had "seized" the Caliphate by force, making it hereditary rather than elective, and that the Caliph must necessarily be an Arab-Qurayshite, a native of the Prophet Muhammad's tribe, and not a member of the House of Ottomans.

According to the anti-Ottoman and pro-Arab paradigm of action, Great Britain took a course to support separatist aspirations in the Arab world, patronizing primarily the Meccan Sharif Hussein ibn Ali[6], and the Saudis, whose leader Abd al-Aziz (Ibn Saud)[7] with the active assistance of London became the most powerful leader in post-war Arabia[8].

Even on the eve of the "Great Arab Revolt" of 1916–1918, Hussein ibn Ali, whom Britain relied on as an ally to undermine the "Ottoman Caliphate", was making secret plans to secede Western Arabia from the Ottoman Empire. In 1916 he proclaimed himself "King of the Hijaz", also declaring himself

[6] Hussein ibn Ali al-Hashimi (1853–1931), Sharif of Mecca (1908–1916), founder and first king of Hijaz from 1916 to 1924 of the Hashemite dynasty.

[7] Abd al-Aziz (Ibn Saud) (1875–1953) — Emir of Najd from 1902–1926; King of Najd and Hijaz from 1926–1932; first King of Saudi Arabia in 1932–1953

[8] On Ibn Saud's claims to be the leader of all Sunni Muslims and the steps he took after World War I aimed at "depoliticizing" the movement for the Caliphate, see [7].

"hereditary guardian of the holy cities (Mecca and Medina)". Although Hussein made no mention of the restoration of the "Arab Caliphate" until the end of his time in power, it was clear to his contemporaries that the title he adopted, "guardian of the holy cities" (*khadim al-kharamayn al-sharifayn*), was nothing less than an important prerogative of the Caliph. In 1924, in the last year of his rule, after the Ottoman Caliphate had been abolished, he still called himself "Caliph of the Muslims". It, however, did not resonate in the Arab world. The Saudi forces that drove Hussein out of Mecca put an end to the Hashemite claim to the Caliphate.

In the years before the war, the "Arab Caliphate" as a political and ideological construct was a product of British colonial policy in the Arab periphery of the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, and nascent Arab nationalism, on the other. The Young Turks' policy of preserving the integrity of the empire, which was based on the doctrine of Ottomanism with Turkish nationalist overtones and the prospect of Turkification of the empire's peoples, alienated Arab intellectuals in Syria and later Egypt, strengthening their nationalist mindset. After the coup d'état of 1913 and the transfer of power in Turkey into the hands of the Young Turk "triumvirate" — Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha and Cemal Pasha — Arab nationalists became completely disillusioned with the "good intentions" of the Young Turk regime. In the same year, at the first Arab Congress held in Paris, they adopted the political program of the Arab national movement and spoke in favour of administrative autonomy of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire [8. P. 283–284].

At the same time, prominent Arab ideologists living in the more censorship-free Egypt, whose views represented an amalgam of Islamic reformist and nationalist ideas, actively promoted the thesis that only an Arab leader could be elected as a Caliph, and that the Caliphate itself was primarily a political institution. The Egyptian alim Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935), a fierce opponent of the Ottoman interpretation of the Caliphate, stood out among them. Having summarized and systematized his Caliphatist preferences, in 1922 he published his programmatic treatise*, Al-Khilafa au al-'imamah al-'uzma* (The Caliphate, or Supreme Imamate) [9], which became a veritable Caliphatist manifesto. In it, Rida called for the restoration of the "true" concept of the Caliphate, which, as he believed, had no equal among other forms of government [10. P. 153–186; 11. P. 69–83], and emphasized the undeniable advantages of the Arabs over the Turks in reviving it [12]. According to his belief, the Ottomans, not being Qurayshites, usurped the Caliphal title and turned the Caliphate

into an institution of repression and violence. The Egyptian theologian considered the Wahhabi leader Abd al-Aziz (Ibn Saud), the Yemeni Imam Yahya[9] and the Meccan Sharif Hussein as possible candidates for the post of Caliph, whom he personally met as a member of the Egyptian delegation that arrived in Western Arabia in 1916 to express solidarity with his decisive step — the declaration of independence of Hijaz [13. P. 198].

As a result of the turbulent events of World War I, despite the concerted efforts of the Arab Caliphatists, the success of the Great Arab Revolt, the British forced declaration of Egyptian independence in 1922, and the Saudis' achievements in uniting Arabia, the project of an "Arab Caliphate" was never realized. This, however, did not finally remove the question of the Caliphate from the international agenda, both in the East and in the West.

The idea of a Caliphate in the Maghreb: a secret war between the Ottoman intelligence service and French diplomacy

In the Maghreb, the question of the necessity and legitimacy of the Caliphate from the early years of the First World War took on the character of a confrontation between the intelligence and political and diplomatic structures of France and the Ottoman state.

Here the concept of "Arab Caliphate" was used by the French colonial circles to discredit Ottoman opponents and improve the image of France in the opinion of Muslims in North Africa and the Sahel. Sultan of the Far Maghreb (Morocco) Moulay Yusuf ibn Hassan (1912–1927) was considered in Paris the most successful candidate for the post of Caliph. This ruler, according to the terms of the Treaty of Fes (1912) on French protectorate, retained his formal prerogatives and belonged to the Alaouite Sharifian dynasty[10]. There were ambiguous relations between the Alaouites and the Ottomans in the XVII-XIX centuries, leading to diplomatic rivalry and contestation of each other's sovereignty [14]. The relative failure of Ottoman calls for jihad against the Entente forces, the turbulent twists and turns of the battle between the British and the Turks over the Dardanelles, and the prospect of the soon, as it seemed at the time, capture of Istanbul by the Entente armies encouraged Paris to form an alternative Caliphate under its patronage. This idea was promoted in 1914 and early 1915 by the French Marshal and founder of the protectorate

[9] Yahya bin Muhammad Hamid al-Din (1869–1948) — from 1904 Imam of the Zaydites of Yemen, from 1918 — ruler of the independent Kingdom of Yemen.

[10] Sharifs (Arabic pl. *ashraf*, *shurafa'*) are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, who are especially honoured in the Arab-Muslim world.

in Morocco, L.-H. Lyautey,[11] with the support of Foreign Minister T. Delcassé[12]. The British government's active political relations with Hussein ibn Ali and the Saudis in the Middle East were also in favour of such a decision.

However, the project of creating an "Arab Caliphate" on the western borders of the Muslim world could not be realized. The failure of the Entente's Dardanelles operation in the winter of 1915–1916, the cautious policy of Moulay Yusuf, who did not want to associate his caliphal claims with the patronage of French colonizers, the weak reaction to the propaganda of the "Moroccan Caliphate" among the population of Algeria and Tunisia, and even the terminological ambiguity of the concept of Caliph/khalifa in the Maghribi dialects of the Arabic language, led to this failure[13]. The indirect evidence of the refusal of L.-H. Lyautey and the French government to declare a Caliphate in the Maghreb became the secret Sykes-Picot agreement (1916), which gave France control over Syria and Lebanon in exchange for giving Britain freedom of maneuver (including in the implementation of plans to create an "Arab Caliphate") in Egypt, Arabia, Iraq and other eastern Arab territories.

Nevertheless, Paris's attempt to give spiritual leadership to the millions of Muslims in the Maghreb and Sahel was taken seriously by the Young Turk leadership in Istanbul. In 1914, the Unity and Progress Committee established a "Special Organisation" (*Teşkılıat-i Mahsusa*) under the overall leadership of one of the triumvirs — Enver Pasha. Agents of this intelligence and propaganda structure disseminated Mehmet V's proclamations both in the Ottoman provinces and in Muslim countries under the control of the Entente. Ottoman military missions from the 70s of the XIX century closely cooperated with Sanusiyya — founded by Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanusi (1787–1859) revivalist religious brotherhood, which enjoyed influence in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Saharan territories (Chad, Bornu, etc.) [16. P. 264]. Enver Pasha, who commanded the Ottoman troops in Libya during the Tripolitan War (1911–1912), and Sanusi leader Ahmad al-Sharif maintained friendly relations. More than 300 Sanusi "brothers" were trained in Ottoman military schools and led attacks on the British forces in Egypt from the

[11] Louis-Hubert Lyautey (1854–1934) was a French military commander, Marshal of France (1921), a major ideologue and practitioner of colonialism, and the first French Resident General in Morocco (1912–1925).

[12] Théophile Delcassé (1852–1923) was a French statesman, diplomat, minister of the colonies 1893–1895, minister of foreign affairs 1898–1905 and 1914–1915, and naval minister 1911–1913.

[13] In the Maghreb, the title of Caliph or khalifa was often belonging to the representatives of tribal and urban upper classes. However, in the North African context it referred not so much to the spiritual-political successor of the Prophet as to the sultan's viceroys in the provinces [15. P. 28]. In traditional Morocco, it was especially often used to refer to the official representatives of sultan in the capitals of the country — Marrakesh, Fes and Meknes, and later in the port city of Tangier, where European diplomatic missions were located.

Libyan desert [17. P. 321–322; 18. P. 55]. The staff of the Ottoman mission, secretly stationed in southern Spain, assisted the Moroccan guerrillas of Ahmad al-Raisuni[14] in their armed resistance to French colonization [19. P. 457–461].

In its operations against the "Arab Caliphate" conceived in Paris, Ottoman intelligence relied on the sympathy for the Sultan-Caliph of Istanbul on the part of the people of North Africa. In the Algerian and Tunisian societies of the early twentieth century, the image of the Ottoman Empire as a global defender of the cause of Islam was far from fading. This is evidenced by a remarkable event that took place in Algeria in 1911. Here, due to tax abuses by the colonial administration, thousands of residents of Tlemcen town, as well as peasants (*fellahs*) from the regions of Tebessa and Ain Beida, repeated the route of the last Algerian Janissaries of the 19th century and the hero of the anti-French resistance, Abd al-Qadir of Algiers (1808–1883). They voluntarily evicted to Asia Minor and Syria [20. P. 435]. Another cadre reserve of Teshkilyat-i Mahsusa for subversive work in the Maghreb were those local Muslim intellectuals who held nationalist and pro-Ottoman views. Among them, the leaders of the Young Turk movement, who were akin to the Young Turks in their values and aspirations, stood out for their knowledge and political culture.

The most famous opponent of the "Arab Caliphate" in Maghreb was Ali Bash Hamba (1876–1918), a Tunisian lawyer and Young Tunisian activist, who actively opposed the French rule. In March 1912,the Protectorate administration succeeded in having him arrested and expelled from Tunisia. Ali left for Istanbul, where he was joined by his younger brother Muhammad. Their property in Tunisia was confiscated by the police of the Bey. Initially, the brothers refused contact with their homeland, stating that "there are plants that can be broken but will not bent" (quoted in: [21. P. 139]), and published articles of anti-colonial content in the Turkish press. However, with the outbreak of the World War, Ali put forward the slogan of armed struggle and the establishment of the North African Republic [22. P. 31]. In 1915, the Young Turk leadership appointed Ali Bash Hamba as the head of Teşkılıat-i Mahsusa, and the number of agents and employees from North Africa increased in the Ottoman intelligence service. Some of them, led by Muhammad Bash Hamba, settled in Geneva, where they published the pro-Ottoman "Maghreb Journal" (La Revue du Maghreb) between 1916 and 1918. Another part of the Maghrebis in the Ottoman service worked in Berlin. There they worked for the benefit of German intelligence, which developed plans for the "revolutionization" of the Islamic world and anti-colonial jihad [23. P. 39–40; 24. P. 98–99].

[14] Ahmad al-Raysouni (al-Raysouli) (1871–1925) was a leader of the tribal confederation of the Jjalala in Rifa (Northern Morocco), an organizer of the guerrilla struggle against the Franco-Spanish colonial presence and sultan's authority.

Tunisian theologians, teachers at the al-Zeytouna Islamic University in the capital, Sheikhs Isma'il al-Safayihi (1856–1918) and Salih Sharif al-Tunisi (1869–1920), as well as the Egyptian journalist and publicist of Tunisian-Turkish origin, Abd al-Aziz Jawish (Shawish) (1876–1929), enjoyed authority in the Berlin diaspora. Their proclamations, pamphlets, and treatises were propagandistic in nature and praised the Ottoman Caliphate, seeing criminal intent in any attempt to challenge its leadership of Muslims. Thus, al-Tunisi in his pamphlet "The Truth about the Holy War", published in Bern in 1916, called the leaders of the Entente powers "true barbarians, servants of Satan" and urged the Muslims of North Africa "to rise up as one and follow the banner of the Caliph from the brilliant family of Othman together with his faithful allies-Germans" (quoted from: [25. P. 158–159]). In September 1916, Maghribi employees of Teşkılıyat-i Mahsusa took part in the Berlin gathering of Pan-Islamists. Here, under the patronage of German orientalists, Islamic scholars from Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan and North Africa collectively "republished" the fatwa of the Ottoman Sheikh-ul-Islam Kheiri-effendi of November 11, 1914, which called on Muslims to fight for the cause of the Ottoman Caliph [26].

At the same time the Bash Hamba brothers organized several tribal revolts in the southern provinces of Tunisia under the auspices of the Sanusiyya sheikhs and with the technical assistance of the Kaiser's agents (autumn 1915 and spring 1916). In 1917 Ali Bash Hamba began forming a "North African Brigade" of jihadists in Istanbul and took diplomatic steps to recognize a future North African republic in the future. However, the military and political collapse of the "Central Powers" devalued all his efforts.

The clash between the "Arab Caliphate" of the French colonizers and the "Ottoman Caliphate" in the service of the Ottoman and German military did not lead to significant military successes in Northwest Africa. Both France and the Ottoman state sought to exploit the mobilization potential of the Caliphal conscription to rally the Maghribis and coordinate their opposition. However, the success of Hussein's rebellion (1916–1918) and the de facto partition of Ottoman Middle Eastern provinces under the Sykes-Picot Agreement predetermined the marginal character and low effectiveness of the Caliphatist draft on both sides.

South Asian Caliphate proponents in their choice of landmarks: between the Ottoman and British Empires

The search for the historical and cultural identity of the South Asian Muslim community was shaped by two circumstances: the fall of the Mughal Empire and the transformation of India into a British colony following the

suppression of the Sepoy rebellion of 1857–1859. The loss of the supreme state power sanctified by Islam made it urgent for South Asian Muslims to turn to the ideological heritage and social thought of the Middle and Near East. The ideas of Caliphate served as a source of inspiration for Islamic thinkers in India, played a significant role in the formation of Muslim socio-political movements and the development of principles of community consolidation. As in the Middle East, the Islamic community of South Asia was ethnically heterogeneous and regionally divided, politically diverse and confessionally not unified. It included Sunnis and Shiis, as well as representatives of the mystical-ascetic current in Islam (Sufis), which predetermined the ideological spectrum of Islamic movements in Hindustan. Sunnis were in the majority [27; 28].

Since the last quarter of the 19th century, the political development of the Ottoman Empire has been of keen interest in British India. Various Muslim movements and organizations were oriented to support the Ottomans [29]. Their desire for integration with the Muslim world was strengthened as a result of the Tripolitanian and Balkan wars (1911–1913) against the background of British involvement in the anti-Ottoman activities of the Entente on the eve and during the First World War (1914–1918). Subsequently, the dismemberment of Ottoman territories under the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) raised fears in India about the fate of the Caliph as the head of the Sunnis and the guardian of Muslim holy places. The idea of recognizing the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphs' rights to supremacy in the Sunni community became widespread among the Muslims of British India. It combined Pan-Islamic and anti-British motives and became an integral part of the struggle of Indian Muslims for the establishment of independent statehood [30; 31].

The orientation of Indian Muslims towards the Ottoman Padishah as the spiritual head was due to historical and political reasons and contained internal contradictions. On the one hand, it predetermined the attitude of the Islamic leaders of South Asia in favour of Caliphatism on an "Ottoman" rather than on an "Arab" cultural basis. On the other hand, the prioritization of the Indian Islamic community's ties with the Ottomans carried an anti-British bias, but the fate of Indian Muslims was in the hands of the British colonial authorities. For many members of the community, dialogue with Great Britain and loyalty to the crown promised real benefits and appeared to be a guarantee of prosperity for the Muslims of British India.

Consequently, Indian Muslims belonging to different ideological movements in Islam took different positions on the question of the rights of the Ottoman sultans to the title of Caliph and spiritual supremacy in the Sunni world. The followers

of the Barelvi School[15] and the Aligarh Movement[16] were against recognizing these rights. Opinions in the Deoband movement were divided: a significant part of Deobanders were skeptical of the Turks' claims, while the "Society of Ulama of India" (*Jamiat ul-Ulama-i Hind*) and "Assembly of Scholars" (*Nadwat ul-Ulama*), close to Deoband, took a pro-Ottoman stance and joined the Caliphate movement [32]. The Muslim League[17] and other Muslim circles on the eve and during the First World War were dominated by a radical left wing represented by its leading figures, such as Abul Kalam Azad[18], Muhammad Ali Jauhar[19] and Shaukat Ali[20], which led to a significant spread of Pan-Islamic ideas, especially through the print media they created or supported, such as the "Muslim Gazette", "Komrad", "Zamindar", and the journal "Al-Hilal" (The Crescent).

Taking advantage of the Indian Muslims involvement in the affairs of the Ottoman state, the British authorities enlisted Indian Islamic figures to prevent the Ottomans from joining the war on the side of Germany. Thus, the leader of Ismaili Muslims and founder of the Muslim League Agha Khan III (1877–1957) was invited as a mediator to negotiate with the Turkish ambassador in London Tewfik Pasha [33. P. 132–133]. The president of the Muslim organization "Servants of Kaaba" Abdul Bari sent a telegram to Sultan Mehmed V Reshad on August 31, 1914, which stated: "Given the faith and devotion of Indian Muslims to the Caliphate, we respectfully ask Your Majesty either to support Britain or to remain neutral in this war" (quoted from: [34. P. 51]). When the Ottoman Empire did enter the war on the side of Germany, the Pan-Islamic organizations in British India criticized the Young Turk government and positioned their loyalty to the British crown.

Soon the radical Deoband Pan-Islamists, led by its head Mahmud al-Hasan (1851–1920) and his closest associate and disciple Ubaidullah Sindhi (1872–1944), began preparing an armed anti-English uprising among the Pashtun tribes. They received support from Germany and Afghanistan in this

[15] The Barelvi school is a religious and political movement that emerged in India in the 1920s under the influence of the ideas of Sayyid Ahmed Barelvi, similar to the views of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in Arabia.

[16] The Aligarh movement originated from the Aligarh College (1875), which epitomized the idea of modern Muslim education.

[17] All India Muslim League — a political party founded in 1906 to protect the interests of Muslims in South Asia, which later called for the separation of a Muslim state from British India.

[18] Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958) — an Indian politician, journalist, writer and scholar, a leader of the Indian independence movement, and a proponent of Hindu-Muslim unity.

[19] Muhammad Ali Jauhar (1878–1931) — an Indian Muslim activist, journalist and poet, one of the leaders of the Caliphate movement.

[20] Shaukat Ali (1873–1938) — an Indian Muslim politician, Caliphate activist, and the elder brother of Muhammad Ali Jauhar. .

endeavor. In August 1915 Ubaidullah Sindhi traveled to Kabul on behalf of Mahmud al-Hasan to persuade the Afghan emir Habibullah to support the Ottomans in the war. Caliphatists Muhammad and Shaukat Ali provided financial support to the leaders of the conspiracy. It is known from the memoirs of the Muslim League activist Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman that after Istanbul's entry into the war, the Ali brothers traveled to the area of Pashtun tribes in northwest Hindustan and spoke there calling for an armed struggle against the British [35. P. 30–32].

Pan-Islamism found supporters not only among the Muslim leaders of the provinces of British India, but also among the rulers of the Muslim princely states in South Asia. The Muslim princes, who (like the vast majority of their subjects) were Sunnis, considered the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph as the supreme religious authority after the disappearance of the Mughal Empire. The Muslim rulers of the princely states of Hindustan (nawabs, sultans, khans, walis, mekhtars, jams) made rich annual donations to maintain the sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina, and regularly performed the hajj. The ideas of Pan-Islamism enjoyed special support in the largest Indian princely state of Hyderabad, followed by Rampur, Bhopal, Navanagar, Kalat and a number of other principalities oriented to the policy of the ruler (*nizam*) of Hyderabad. Nizam Osman Ali Khan (1886–1967, ruled 1911–1948) was committed to the defense of the rights of the Caliph and the Ottoman statehood. He sought to emulate Ottoman rule and followed the cultural stereotypes of of the Abdulhamidian era.

The Nizam of Hyderabad de facto was the Sunni community head in India, and it was him that the Viceroy Lord C. Harding (1858–1944, Viceroy 1910–1916) appealed to in 1914 to urge his co-religionists to ignore the Ottoman Caliph's call to jihad and side with Britain. The Nizam, like other Muslim princes, found himself in a difficult position. "World War I was a testing period for Muslims because Turkey was on the other side. They felt helpless and could not do anything about it", — noted Jawaharlal Nehru [36. P. 104]. An interesting comment on this subject is given by the American historian S. Wolpert in his biographical essay on M.A. Jinnah[21]: "In November 1914, when the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire decided to link the fate and power of his country with the powers opposing Great Britain, the loyalty of the Muslims of India was seriously tested. The Sultan, regarded as the head of the Islamic world …was revered far beyond the Ottoman Empire. British intelligence feared that the Nizam of Hyderabad, India's leading prince, would soon attempt to purchase Turkish rifles for possible use

[21] Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) was a Muslim politician of British India. He is revered in Pakistan as the founding father of Pakistani statehood and a great leader (qaid-i a'zam).

in a " Pan-Islamic uprising" in South Asia. However, such rumors turned out to be baseless" [37. P. 37].

Nizam, interested in maintaining close and confidential relations with the British royal house, on the one hand, and dissatisfied with the changes in the internal policy of the Ottoman Empire with the Young Turks coming to power, on the other hand, took a pro-British position, which won the special favour of King George V [38. P. 35]. He issued a manifesto that oriented the Muslims of India to fully support the British crown in the war, and ensured the success of the recruitment campaign among the Muslim part of the population. The manifesto said in particular, "In view of the war that has begun in Europe, let it be known to all that the Muslims of India are prepared to give their full support to the efforts of the British Crown, which has always provided them with stability and prosperity. The British government has always been and will always be the most reliable friend of Islam, protecting the interests of its Muslim subjects" [39. P. 6].

Ultimately, South Asian Muslims, who cherished the memory of their former greatness when they controlled the vast spaces of the subcontinent and dictated their will to the numerically superior Hindus and other faith groups in the region, transformed this ancestral experience into concepts of revitalizing the power of Muslim dynasties and increasing their participation in the governance of the Muslim world.

Conclusion

The turbulent twists and turns and multilayered intrigues of the World War I era contributed to the conceptualization of two opposing versions of the idea of Caliphate. Even as the Ottoman Empire faced its last days, the Istanbul court and Young Turk leaders kept the relentless attacks on the "Ottoman Caliphate" in view. Ottoman elites in 1914–1918 regarded the proponents of the "Arab Caliphate" as stooges of the European secret services, unreliable subjects, if not conspirators. Istanbul believed that Arab nationalism not only undermined the foundations of the empire or aimed at its dismemberment and destruction, but also deliberately hindered integration processes in Dar al-Islam as a whole. In fact, as occured in the Maghreb, the opposite also happened — for example, the Young Tunisians' rejection of the excesses of French domination led them to join the ranks of Ottoman intelligence, with whom they quickly found common ground.

As if meeting the spiritual and political challenges of the war years, South Asia produced Islamic thinkers who got a response beyond the borders of their subcontinent. Their ideological legacy acquired cross-border relevance after the

war and proved to be in demand both during their lifetime and up to the present. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there was a growing dissociation between the Pan-Islamist Caliphatists, who adhered to the idea of a world Caliphate, and the supporters of "Muslim nationalism", who advocated the creation of a separate statehood for South Asian Muslims.

Pro-Ottoman intellectuals who advocated the "Ottoman Caliphate" have devoted much energy and efforts to challenging their opponents' arguments and using extracts from sacred Islamic texts to prove their weakness or inconsistency. Their calls for reliance on the Ottoman Caliphate as the only institution capable of uniting the diverse Muslim peoples into a single Ummah faded as soon as the Ottoman Caliphate itself sunk into oblivion. But even in the "dark hour of history," when Europeans were entering Istanbul, colonialism was at its zenith, and the weak-willed Sultans-Caliphs were preparing to give way to the leaders of republican secularism, the idea of the Caliphate remained a sore point of Muslim identity. The universalism of the ideas about the Caliphate and the multivalence of sacred texts enabled the new Islamic ideologues to express their aspirations in their Middle Eastern, North African, and South Asian variants.

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