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US-Canada Relations in the 1950s – 1980s: Consensus or Disagreement?

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Abstract. The purpose of the article is to finalize the impact of the relationship between the USA and Canada on the Canadian foreign policy in 1957–1984. The author focuses the reader’s attention on analysis of trends in the relations between USA and Canada, as well as the identification of the patterns of their further development. Based on the use of an appropriate historical sources and scientific literature, the article gives an idea of the characteristic features of the relationship between the USA and Canada during the premierships of John Diefenbaker, Lester Pearson, Pierre Trudeau. When writing an article, the author uses a comparative historical method, as well as an interdisciplinary approach. The first allows us to compare the development of the relations between USA and Canada in 1957–1984. The latter shows the influence of the relationship between USA and Canada on the activities of political parties in Canada. The scientific contribution of the author of the article is that for the first time in Russian historiography, he considers not just the general directions of Canada’s foreign policy, but analyzes the key of them — the relationship between USA and Canada, its evolution and dynamics. The author comes to the conclusion that the periodization of the relationship between USA and Canada reflected the complexity of their development, and the anti-americanism of Diefenbaker and Trudeau had no deep foundation. Firstly, it was the result of Diefenbaker’s personal grievances against Kennedy. Secondly, Trudeau demonstrated that Canada’s foreign policy has an independent character. However, this did not mean his departure from the relationship between USA and Canada as a major.

Keywords: Canada, USA, relations, foreign policy, periodization, dynamics, consensus, disagreements

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Взаимоотношения США и Канады в 1950-1980-е гг.: консенсус или разногласия?

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Аннотация. Цель статьи — исследовать влияние канадско-американских отношений на внешнюю политику Канады в 1957–1984 гг. В центре внимания автора находится изучение и анализ тенденций канадско-американских отношений, а также выявление закономерностей их дальнейшего развития. На основе использования соответствующей источниковой и источниковедческой базы дается представление об особенностях канадско-американских отношений в премьерство Джона Дифенбейкера, Лестера Пирсона, Пьера Трюдо. При написании были использованы сравнительно-исторический метод, а также междисциплинарный подход. Первый позволяет сопоставить развитие канадско-американских отношений в 1957–1984 гг. Последний показывает влияние канадско-американских отношений на деятельность политических партий Канады. Научный вклад автора состоит в том, что впервые в отечественной историографии рассмотрены не просто общие направления внешней политики Канады, но анализируется их ключевое направление — канадско-американское, его эволюция и динамика. Автор приходит к выводам о том, что периодизация канадско-американских отношений отражала всю сложность их развития, а антиамериканизм Д. Дифенбейкера и П. Трюдо не имел под собой глубокой основы. В первом случае он явился следствием личных обид Д. Дифенбейкера. Во втором П. Трюдо демонстрировал, что внешняя политика Канады носит самостоятельный характер. Однако это не означало его отхода от канадско-американских отношений как кардинального направления внешней политики североамериканского государства.

Ключевые слова: Канада, США, отношения, внешняя политика, периодизация, динамика, консенсус, разногласия

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Introduction

Canadian foreign policy in the second half of the 20th century is a complex, complicated and multifaceted phenomenon, which is influenced by a number of factors. Obtaining of independence by Canada did not mean the beginning of the intended and smooth development of its foreign policy. In this regard, the Canadian political establishment was forced to take into account a number of circumstances that most directly influenced the foreign policy of the state. Among them, three of the most significant and fateful can be distinguished.

The first factor is the strength of Canadian-American ties. The serious geopolitical influence of the United States on Canada after the Second World War was difficult to dispute. Therefore, both conservatives and liberals in power were forced to take into account this most important circumstance for the country. However, they understood the supposed scale of Canadian-American relations in different ways. If the governments of J. Diefenbaker and P. Trudeau tried to a certain extent to demonstrate their independence from American geopolitical interests, then, on the contrary, Prime Minister L. Pearson proceeded from the opposite, and tried to follow the foreign policy proposed by the United States.

The second most important factor was related to the scale of building relations in view of the Commonwealth of Nations. Canada, as a former British colony, was interested in friendly relations with both Great Britain and other members of the Commonwealth of Nations.

The third factor, or circumstance, was dealt with the fact that, despite the existing American and British economic and geopolitical influence, Canada had to demonstrate its independent foreign policy. All these circumstances highly influenced Canada's strategy in the international arena, which was formed in a very difficult period — the second half of the 20th century. It is the 1950s-1980s. determine the chronological framework of this article — the time of building the priorities of Canadian foreign policy.

It necessary to note that in domestic and foreign historiography there is a number of studies on Canadian foreign policy during the period when the conservative cabinets of D. Diefenbaker, as well as the liberal cabinets of L. Pearson and P. Trudeau were in power. For example, the foreign policy aspects of D. Diefenbaker, L. Pearson and P. Trudeau policy are described in the work of O.S. Soroko-Cyupa [1]. A great contribution to the study of this issue was also made by S.F. Molochkov [2. P. 7–19]. The analysis of the French-Canadian issue in the context of Canada's entire foreign and domestic policy strategy was carried out by V.A. Koleneko [3]. A significant contribution to the consideration of foreign policy aspects of Canada's development during the premiership of D. Diefenbaker and L. Pearson was made by the Canadian historian D. Morton [4. P. 222–233]. The monograph by L. LeDuc and J. Pammett also deserves attention, covering a significant part of Canadian history, including the period of interest to us [5]. Therefore, the author of the article does not consider it necessary, following the above-mentioned researchers, to repeat

the main directions of Canada's foreign policy in the indicated periods of time. The author of this article sees his goal in a different field. It consists of analyzing and researching the impact of Canadian-American relations on Canadian foreign policy from 1957 to 1984 in general. The chronological framework of the study covers the period from the premiership of J. Diefenbaker from 1957 to 1984. I see no reason to analyze the period after 1984, since, firstly, it was repeatedly considered in my early works, and, secondly, after 1984 the dynamics of Canadian-American relations was formed exclusively in favour of the improvement of the latter [6]. Consequently, there is no subject for critical analysis in this period, and that is why it is beyond the scope of this study. In turn, the era of 1957–1984 was interesting for various attempts to turn in Canada's foreign policy, characteristic of the premierships of J. Diefenbaker and P. Trudeau. Consensus or contradiction — what was the basis of Canadian-American relations of this era? The above goal involves solving a number of tasks:

Firstly, to define a periodization and characterize the dynamics of Canadian-American relations in the indicated period of time, from 1957 to 1984;

Secondly, to show the difference in the development of Canadian-American relations during the premierships of D. Diefenbaker and P. Trudeau, on the one hand, and L. Pearson, on the other;

Thirdly, to determine whether a deep anti-Americanism was inherent in D. Diefenbaker and P. Trudeau, or whether this, most likely, was a phenomenon of populism.

The scientific novelty of the research lies in the fact that, for the first time in Russian historiography, not only the general directions of Canada's foreign policy in the defined period are considered, but it is the key one — the Canadian-American, its evolution and dynamics that is analyzed. The latter was the key to the existence of Canada as an independent state and its future in the international arena. In addition, this topic is fundamentally important in the study of the contemporary history of the United States and Canada as a whole.

In the developing this theme, the author touched upon the necessary layer of sources and scientific literature. In addition to the previously mentioned historiography, one can name the work of the Canadian scientist J. Saywell, devoted to the parliamentary elections of 1963 [7]. No less interesting was B. Robinson's monograph devoted to D. Diefenbaker's foreign policy [8].

In terms of the source base in the process of working on the article, the author used the memoirs of P. Trudeau [9]. Besides, the author considered the memoirs of J. Diefenbaker, media materials, election programs of the Canadian political parties etc. [10]. The methodology of this scientific article involves the use of a comparative historical method, as well as an interdisciplinary approach. The use of the comparative-historical method makes it possible to undertake an analysis of the development of Canadian-American relations during the period of three premierships — D. Diefenbaker, L.B. Pearson and P. Trudeau. Based

on an interdisciplinary approach, the author shows the impact of Canadian-American relations on the activities of political parties in Canada, i.e. touches the sphere of political science. In its turn, using an interdisciplinary approach in the analysis of Canadian-American relations, the author thereby shows the connection of world history with international relations.

Canadian-American relations under D. Diefenbaker and L. Pearson (1957–1968)

Canadian-American relations within 1957–1968 developed ambiguously, from an ascending to a descending trend.

At the same time, within the framework of this period, it is possible to offer a more detailed periodization that characterises the whole essence of Canadian-American relations in this period of time.

From 1957 to 1961, during the first tenure of Prime Minister George Diefenbaker, Canadian-American relations developed progressively and were characterised by proper mutual understanding between the two states. Since J. Diefenbaker had good relations with US President D. Eisenhower, there were no special excesses in bilateral relations during that period. On the contrary, in 1958, the NORAD agreement was concluded between the two countries, that meant the aerospace defense of North America from a possible nuclear strike from the USSR. Even when, in 1959, J. Diefenbaker decided to cancel the project for the assembly and production of the Avro-Arrow CF-105 supersonic fighter, this did not shake Canadian-American relations at that stage. In his turn, D. Eisenhower refrained from a negative reaction to this decision of D. Diefenbaker, because, firstly, he did not want to damage Canadian-American relations, and, secondly, he did not want to overshadow the last years of his presidency. Nevertheless, in this regard, one can agree with the opinion of Canadian scientist J. Murray Beck, who interpreted this decision of D. Diefenbaker only as an arbitrary unilateral cancellation by Canada of its obligations under the NORAD agreement [11. P. 265–271]. Moreover, it was fundamentally important in light of the fact that the assembly and production of the Avro-Arrow CF-105 supersonic fighter was an important addition to the NORAD agreement.

From 1961 to 1963, during the second stage of J. Diefenbaker's tenure in power, Canadian-American relations were marked by rapid degradation. The global reason for all this was, first of all, the personal hostility of US President John F. Kennedy and Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker towards each other. At one time, I already wrote about what aroused mutual antipathy between the leaders of the two countries, so here I will limit myself to only a few facts. The destructive relationship between J. Kennedy and J. Diefenbaker began in May 1961 during their meeting in Canada. Jacqueline Kennedy, who was present at this meeting, recalled the negative

impression that she had after her husband's conversation with J. Diefenbaker. In addition, a number of reasons and circumstances in 1961 contributed to discord and misunderstanding between J. Diefenbaker and J. Kennedy. In particular, the Canadian political scientist J. Boyko named several reasons that initially determined the negative background of all subsequent negotiations between J. Kennedy and J. Diefenbaker [12]. Particularly J. Kennedy did not respond in a timely manner to J. Diefenbaker's congratulations regarding the inauguration of 1961. Besides, J. Diefenbaker was especially annoyed by a note that he had found in his office. In it, US President J. Kennedy pointed out to his advisers the need for permanent pressure on J. Diefenbaker in order to sharply increase military cooperation between the two states.

In 1961–1963 there was a correspondence between J. Kennedy and J. Diefenbaker, which, actually, led to nothing. Neither side achieved its goals. The events of the Caribbean Crisis were a kind of echo of this correspondence. In October 1961, J. Kennedy, in his letter to J. Diefenbaker, informed the latter of the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, and called for joint concerted action. J. Diefenbaker, on the contrary, not only did not make an official statement that he supported J. Kennedy, but also expressed the point of view that the information received from the US President about the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba should be further verified [13. P. 58–70].

Thus, US President J. Kennedy did not receive the necessary support from his closest ally, J. Diefenbaker, during the Caribbean crisis. Moreover, relations between J. Kennedy and J. Diefenbaker became even more aggravated after the end of the Caribbean crisis. There was an earlier agreement between the United States and Canada that instead of assembling and manufacturing the Avro-Arrow CF-105 supersonic fighter, Canada would deploy Bomark long-range surface-to-air missiles on its territory, which could be used with atomic warheads. However, Prime Minister J. Diefenbaker, who at first promised to deploy nuclear warheads in Canada, in 1963 refused to do it. This decision, which caused a split in the country's public opinion, cost J. Diefenbaker the loss of the parliamentary elections in 1963. The latter, realizing his possible loss in the upcoming elections, tried to play the anti-American trump card during his election campaign. However, J. Diefenbaker's anti-American sentiments were rather the result of his grievances and misunderstandings with US President J. Kennedy, rather than a serious thought-out concept.

Либеральная партия во главе с Л.Пирсоном (1963–1968 гг.), напротив, на контрасте с взглядами Дж.Дифенбейкера, выступала за размещение ядерных боеголовок в Канаде, и последние в итоге были ввезены в Канаду в 1964 г. Однако это не принесло Лестеру Пирсону политической удачи.

The liberal party headed by L. Pearson (1963–1968), on the contrary, in contrast to the views of J. Diefenbaker, advocated the deployment of nuclear warheads in Canada, and they were eventually imported into Canada in 1964. However, this did not bring political success to Lester Pearson.

In hope to make profit on the latest scandals connected with J. Diefenbaker, L.B. Pearson, however, failed on two fronts. First, criticizing J. Diefenbaker for the discord in Canadian-American relations and advocating the importation of Bo-Mark nuclear warheads into Canada contrary to the opinion of J. Diefenbaker, L.B. Pearson hoped that his Liberal Party would receive a parliamentary majority in the 1963 elections. However, this did not happen. In the 1963 parliamentary elections held in April, the Liberal Party, led by L.B. Pearson, received 128 seats in the House of Commons, which was a parliamentary minority. Moreover, the parliamentary elections of 1965 brought new disappointment to the leader of the Liberal Party, since again the liberals received a parliamentary minority — 131 seats [14].

Second, Canadian-American relations, contrary to the hopes of L. Pearson, have evolved for the worse. The consensus reached between Canadian Prime Minister L. Pearson and US President John F. Kennedy disappeared after the death of the latter. A significant deterioration in Canadian-American relations was observed after the meeting between US President L. Johnson and L. Pearson in April 1965. During the meeting, L. Johnson criticized L. Pearson's anti-war views. L. Pearson, in his turn, reflected the broad sentiment of the Canadians who opposed American military intervention to Vietnam. L.B. Johnson's answer to L. Pearson was extremely unpleasant and harsh, and its meaning was expressed in the fact that the Canadian Prime Minister should not interfere in the affairs of other nations. Therefore, the remaining period of L.B. Pearson in power from 1965 to 1968 was marked by a cooling of Canadian-American relations. In this regard, Canadian-American relations during the period when J. Diefenbaker and L.B. Pearson were in power have a common feature, despite the fact that Canada during this period was ruled by different parties — first the Progressive Conservative, and then the Liberal. During the period 1957–1968 they evolved for the worse, from the emerging consensus to the plane of mutual misunderstanding. In the case of J. Diefenbaker, the reason for this was the latter's bad personal relationship with US President J. Kennedy. On the contrary, the motive for the deterioration of Canadian-American relations under L.B. Pearson was the latter's rejection of the decision of US President L.B. Johnson to send American contingent to Vietnam.

Canadian-American relations in P. Trudeau's era (1968–1984)

Canadian-American relations during P. Trudeau's tenure (1968–1984), in its turn, were particularly complex. I do not share the views of those historians who characterized P. Trudeau's anti-Americanism as a deep, essential phenomenon [15]. From my point of view, it would be wrong to write about P. Trudeau's anti-Americanism as a cardinal turn in Canada's entire foreign policy. In my opinion, anti-Americanism involves an ideological confrontation with the United States

at the geopolitical, economic, ideological and other levels. In the era of P. Trudeau, this phenomenon did not exist. Despite the fact that P. Trudeau reiterated the idea that excessive geopolitical and military rapprochement with the United States has a negative impact on the national interests of Canada, his foreign policy was not directed against his closest ally, the United States of America. Despite the reduction in the presence of the Canadian contingent in the countries of Western Europe from 10 to 5 thousand people, the leadership of the North American state did not take measures to withdraw the country from the NATO, as well as from the NORAD agreement. This meant adherence to the former allied obligations that Canada fulfilled, both in relation to the United States and to other states of the NATO alliance. How can one characterize, in this case, the foreign policy of P. Trudeau? As diverse in several areas, meeting the national interests of Canada as an independent state. I do not adhere to the point of view of Soviet historiography about the third alternative of P. Trudeau's foreign policy [16]. I see no reason to speak about one clearly defined direction of foreign policy. In this regard, we can rather speak about an attempt to diversify Canada's foreign policy, in which Canadian-American relations occupied one of the main places.

It should be noted that Canada, during Trudeau's premiership, took a number of measures that demonstrated to the American establishment the independence Canada's foreign policy. In particular, P. Trudeau ended a long-term dispute whether nuclear warheads should be located on Canadian territory. In 1972, Bomark nuclear warheads were removed from Canada's territory.

Program foreign policy documents issued under the liberals P. Trudeau cause discussion. On the one hand, they outlined future new features in Canada's foreign policy; on the other hand, there was no deep reorganization in terms of moving away from close military cooperation with the United States [17]. Moreover, at the meeting in 1981 P. Trudeau and US President R. the two states confirmed their commitment to further cooperation within the framework of NORAD and NATO. The existence of a military alliance between the United States and Canada was supplemented by the fact that the government of P. Trudeau gave its consent to testing American cruise missiles in the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta.

In general, regarding the development of Canadian-American relations during the period when P. Trudeau was in power in 1968–1984 one can note all the controversial character of their development. On the one hand, P. Trudeau tried to demonstrate the independence of Canada's foreign policy by advocating diversity or diversification of its foreign economic relations. The Canadian Prime Minister advocated the development of trade and economic ties with the USSR and Western European states, thereby pointing to the independence of Canada's foreign policy. On the other hand, P. Trudeau still emphasized the intensive development of Canadian-American relations, realizing that Canada would not be able to develop without a close military and economic union with

the United States in the near future. Therefore, in my opinion, in this regard, it makes no sense to consider Trudeau's foreign policy as a shift from traditional Canadian-American relations. There was no revision of the whole essence of Canadian foreign policy under P. Trudeau.

Conclusion

Thus, summing up, one should note that Canadian-American relations in 1957–1984 passed a long way of development and developed both on the ascending and descending directions. In this regard, a number of conclusions can be drawn.

Firstly, the periodization of Canadian-American relations reflected the complexity of their development. In 1957–1961 they developed with positive dynamics, which was associated with good relations between Canadian Prime Minister J. Diefenbaker and US President Dwight Eisenhower. The result was the conclusion of the NORAD agreement between the two states. On the the other side, the period 1961–1963 became one of the worst in the history of Canadian-American relations. Unable to overcome personal hostility towards each other, Canadian Prime Minister J. Diefenbaker and US President J. Kennedy behaved incorrectly at a critical moment for both states — the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. J. Diefenbaker, being the closest ally of the United States, did not make a public statement in October 1962 supporting J. Kennedy's position on the settlement of the Caribbean crisis. In his turn, the US President tried to put pressure on J. Diefenbaker in order to deploy nuclear warheads in Canada, both before the Caribbean crisis and in the post-crisis period. It is worth noting that under L.B. Pearson, Canadian-American relations developed extremely unevenly. Trying to win the parliamentary elections against the backdrop of the failures of J. Diefenbaker, L.B. Pearson ensured the favorable development of Canadian-American relations only in 1963–1965 by allowing the transportation of Bomark nuclear warheads into Canada. Though in 1965–1968. Canadian-American relations cooled significantly, which was due to the negative reaction of US President L.B. Johnson to the anti-war sentiments of both L.B. Pearson and a significant part of Canadian society who opposed the American military intervention to Vietnam. In 1968–1984 P. Trudeau pursued a balanced policy, on the one hand, avoiding the revision of traditional Canadian-American relations, and in general, strengthening the military alliance with the United States within the framework of NATO and NORAD, on the other hand, trying to pursue a diverse foreign policy. In any case, P. Trudeau managed to avoid the scandalous development of Canadian-American relations, as it was in 1961–1963.

Secondly, there was a difference in the development of Canadian-American relations during the premierships of D. Diefenbaker, P. Trudeau,

and L.B. Pearson. P. Trudeau, despite his foreign policy, managed to avoid the scandalous development of Canadian-American relations, as it was in 1961–1963 under J. Diefenbaker. Aimed at the unconditional improvement of Canadian-American relations, Lester B. Pearson, in his turn, became a hostage to the political situation in Canadian society associated with anti-war sentiments. Bringing this point of view to US President L.B. Johnson led to deterioration in Canadian-American relations.

Thirdly, the anti-Americanism of D. Diefenbaker and P. Trudeau had no deep foundation. In the first case, it was the result of D. Diefenbaker's personal grievances against J. Kennedy. The Prime Minister of Canada could not forgive the President of the United States of those unfortunate circumstances and coincidences with which their first meeting began in 1961. P. Trudeau, during the preparation of the constitutional reform, on the eve of the adoption of the Constitution Act of 1982, had to demonstrate that Canada's foreign policy is independent. However, this did not mean a shift from Canadian-American relations as the main direction of the state's foreign policy. Therefore, we should not idealize Trudeau's foreign policy course and assume that it has an anti-American component.

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