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South Korean “Youth Culture” of the 1970s and State-Led Modernization

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Abstract. The article examines features of Park Chung-hee’s project of modernization and identifies socio-economic and cultural influence of such state-led modernization on the creation and development of South Korean “youth culture” of the 1970s. The authors highlight several specific policies and socio-economic trends that led the emergence of “youth culture”: rapid urbanization and drastic increase in urban population; increase in urban families’ incomes and consumption; changes in labor division; expansion of both school and university education and dissemination of mass media. Along with that, the article analyzes the influence of the policies of “managed westernization” and developmental discourse of the 1960s on the formation of values of this “youth culture”. The paper explains how these state-led policies paved the way for the creation of “youth culture” that paradoxically contained drastically different values compared to both official discourse of the “Yusin government” and values of parental generation. The new generation born after the Korean War, the so-called Hangeul generation, became the main driving force behind it, but faced repetitive misunderstanding and condemnation from both the older generation and the state. Eventually, due to state’s pressure, this “youth culture” experienced decline in the second half of the 1970s.

Keywords: Republic of Korea; Yusin; youth culture; modernization; westernization

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Южнокорейская «молодежная культура» 1970-х и государственная политика модернизации

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Аннотация. Рассматриваются особенности проекта модернизации Пак Чонхи и выясняется социально-экономическое и культурное влияние модернизации под руководством государства на возникновение и развитие южнокорейской «молодежной культуры» 1970-х годов. Авторы выделяют конкретные политические меры и общие социально-экономические тренды, вызвавшие появление «молодежной культуры»: быстрая урбанизация и резкий рост городского населения; увеличение доходов и уровня потребления домохозяйств; изменения в структуре разделении труда; расширение как школьного, так и университетского образования и распространение средств массовой информации. Наряду с этим анализируется влияние политики частичной и управляемой вестернизации и девелопменталистского дискурса 1960-х годов на формирование ценностей «молодежной культуры» 1970-х. Результаты исследования объясняют, как такая государственная политика способствовала возникновению «молодежной культуры» 1970-х, которая парадоксальным образом содержала в себе набор ценностей, отличных как от официальной идеологии периода Юсин, так и от ценностей старшего поколения. Поколение хангыля, родившееся после Корейской войны, стало главной движущей силой этой культуры, но столкнулось с непониманием и осуждением как со стороны старшего поколения, так и со стороны государства. В конце концов, под давлением государства, эта «молодежная культура» пришла в упадок во второй половине 1970-х годов.

Ключевые слова: Республика Корея, Юсин, молодежная культура, модернизация, вестернизация

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Introduction

The rule of Park Chung-hee (1961–1979) is considered to be a defining epoch in the history of the Republic of Korea when poor and half-agrarian nation devastated by the Korean War (1950–1953) and incompetent government of Syngman Rhee (1948–1960) was modernized and showed remarkable economic growth. Along with that Park Chung-hee's authoritarian rule became a dark time in terms of South Korean democratic movement history with civil liberties being violated and massive crackdowns on protests being unfolded. Two periods of his rule should be distinguished: relatively less authoritarian period from 1961 till 1972 (sometimes referred to as “soft authoritarianism” [1. P. 8]) and time after the implementation of “Yusin Constitution” under which he eliminated all political rivals and de-facto became a sole ruler of the Republic of Korea.

The modernization policies carried out by the Park Chung-hee government (known as “modernization of the Fatherland”, *Joguk geundaehwa*) had a huge impact on not only country's economy but on all spheres of life and profoundly influenced on the very fabric of the South Korean society. This policy, however, was controversial as it was carried out in an extremely condensed manner in respect to both time and space and in which “the dynamic coexistence of mutually disparate historical and social elements led to the construction and reconstruction of a highly complex and constantly changing social system” [2. P. 446]. Therefore, Park Chung-hee's rule is viewed as a key period in South Korean experience of “compressed modernization” or “compressed modernity”.

Under these conditions a new type of culture appeared back in the early 1970s, the so-called “youth culture” (*cheongnyen munhwa*)¹ — Westernized urban culture of young people who belonged to the generation born after the Korean War, sometimes referred to as “Hangeul generation” (*Hangeul sedae*)². This term reflects the impact of state's education policies on young people who for the most part wrote only in Hangeul and had a limited knowledge of the traditional Chinese characters. Speaking about this phenomenon, we should distinguish two main generations — parental one (that is often referred to as *giseong sedae*), the literal translation for which would be “long-standing

¹ Because “*cheongnyeon munhwa*” is a self-designation for this phenomenon (that is also actively used in academic and journalist articles in Korean language), this paper uses quotation marks in order to separate this phenomenon of the first half of the 1970s (“youth culture”) from youth cultures in general.

² However, it should be noticed that there are no strict boundaries between different generations, and sometimes people who were born in the late 1940s are also referred to as Hangeul generation.

generation” or “mature generation” (as opposed to the “unmature one”), and the younger generation, the aforementioned *Hangeul sedae*. “Youth culture” of the 1970s was, in fact, one of the first forms of popular culture in the Republic of Korea and was associated with the origin of mass society in this country.

People who belonged to Hangeul generation had a drastically different historical experience as they did not witness Japanese colonialism and World War II. They also did not have a direct experience of the brutalities of the Korean War, on the contrary, they saw their country developing and recovering from complete poverty and post-war destruction. Hence, this generation’s ethos was remarkably different from that of their parents. Being the direct recipients of such “compressed modernity”, these young people had a different set of core values (they were slightly more individualistic and hedonistic), behavior (their emotionality and sensitivity differed from parents and often was seen as deviant), aspirations and preferences in cultural consumption (both in terms of fashion, music, literature, leisure etc.).

The main thesis of this paper is that South Korean “youth culture” of the 1970s was, in fact, a byproduct of state-led modernization. This phenomenon can be fully understood only when placed in socio-political, economic and cultural contexts created by modernization policy of the Park Chung-hee government that also determined when this culture was born (early 1970s). Thus, the purpose of this article is to identify influence of the different aspects of state-led modernization on the creation and development of South Korean “youth culture” of the 1970s. Highlighting various policies that in many ways led to unintended results, this paper also seeks contributing to the discussions about consequences of state-led modernization in non-Western countries which was often conducted in an extremely condensed manner.

“Youth Culture” of the 1970s and Park Chung-hee’s Socio-Economic Policies

The question regarding why South Korean “youth culture” emerged in the 1970s should address Park Chung-hee’s project of “modernization of the Fatherland” in general. The 1970s indeed became its peak years when the state concentrated on the developing of heavy and chemical industries (HCI)³,

³ Park Chung-hee’s desire to pursue the development of heavy and chemical industry can be traced

as well as rural modernization under the framework of the New Village Movement⁴. However, though this time became defining not only in terms of economic development of the Republic of Korea but in ideological and discursive terms as well, the very basis for the emergence of “youth culture” was laid in the 1960s.

In regard to that, it should also be highlighted that Park Chung-hee’s modernization policies in general were not consistent and monolithic. John Lie notices that Park Chung-hee initially did not advocate for export-oriented economy and was more focused on simply establishing a self-reliant state exporting raw material, minerals and agricultural goods — and because of that “the received view that South Korean planners pursued an export-oriented industrialization strategy [from the start] is a retrospective construct” [5. P. 55]. Korean economic development strategy became as we know it only in the second half of the 1960s, and there still were some significant changes in it throughout late 1960s and 1970s [5. P. 55–117]. Hence, in order to understand the influence of modernization policies on “youth culture”, we should examine changes that happened during the entire period of Park Chung-hee’s rule.

First, starting from the early 1960s and throughout the 1970s the Republic of Korea experienced *rapid urbanization and migration of rural population to big cities* (mainly Seoul). According to data drawn by Park Myung-lim, between 1960 and 1966, a total of 1,409,000 people had migrated from countryside to the city, and the speed of such migration accelerated even more during the 1966–1970 period which resulted in the cumulative net migration of more than 2 million people to Seoul [6]. Consequently, by early 1970s big cities had already soaked massive influx of the population, which was acting as a foundation for the development of “youth culture”, and this migration pattern will continue throughout the decade.

Despite the fact that excessive migration led to oversupply of labor force and resulted in serious social inequalities within the city, it facilitated the formation of a new identity of city dwellers (as opposed to rural people). Moreover, though class divisions and unequal distribution of income within the city persisted, after the first two successful Five-Year Plans South Korean

back to the early 1960s but it was postponed till the 1970s “because of the lack of foreign capital and technology and the limited state capacity for forced saving” [3. P. 119].

⁴ The New Village Movement was launched in 1970, but its active implementation started after the enactment of the Yusin constitution [4. P. 133–147].

families' incomes considerably increased on average [7], which paved the way to *a rise in consumption*. For example, data collected by Kim Won indicates that national consumption in general increased from 245,7 billion won in 1961 to 10 trillion won in 1977 [8. P. 276]. In particular, this growth in consumption allowed young people (mostly from the middle class, but lower classes also got more opportunities to consume cultural goods) to become a distinct consumer group that could influence processes of cultural production.

Increased purchasing power and relative economic independence of young people had an economic foundation behind it: due to the *progress in the division of labor* and industrialization, middle-class youth got an opportunity to withdraw from established processes of production. Lee Hye-rim notices that in the traditional societies all young people have to become main agents of production once they reach a certain age, but by the 1970s part of urban youth “was exempted from the obligation of [participation in] labor and production” [9. P. 15]. Moreover, the number of part-time jobs for them (such as tutor, assistant at the institute or other organization, ushers etc.) expanded, and young people got various opportunities to save pocket money for themselves [9. P. 15]. Such increased financial independence allowed young people to individually decide what cultural goods to consume — which led to a slightly different consumption pattern and leisure behavior that could be easily distinguished from the parental generation.

One of the important factors that influenced the identity of the Hangeul generation, which was different from their parents, also were the government's policies aimed at *expanding primary, secondary and higher education* that were introduced since early 1960s. Expansion of education was necessary for producing skilled workers and executives that were essential for both effective state management and filling new workplaces created by further modernization. Furthermore, universal schooling also had additional political implications as it could be used for indoctrination and regimenting the population from an early age. However, expansion of primary education system not only gave young people more job opportunities but universalized their school experience making them a more united and distinguished social class.

Moreover, even though university students were still a relatively small privileged class during 1970s, the number of them was way more than a decade ago. It is also notable that Park Chung-hee's educational policies were controversial in a way that they resulted in several social issues, for instance the *jaesusaeng* problem

(Кор. 재수생)⁵ that was particularly serious until the second half of the 1970s [8. P. 356–363]. Paradoxically, at the same time these “retakers” constituted a big part of “youth culture” of the 1970s. For example, Lee Young-mi argues that “‘youth culture’ of the 1970s is often explained focusing on students, but this interpretation is only valid from the point that students led the direction of this culture. However, in quantitative terms, the culture of university students was rather small. Middle and high school students, “retakers” and teenagers who had given up admission to the university were much more numerous than students, and they were a solid foundation that supported this ‘youth culture’” [10].

Another condition that defined the subjectivity of young people since 1960s and throughout 1970s was the *dissemination of mass media* (radio, TV, newspapers etc.) and large-scale spread of popular culture through them. Since mid-1960s radio began expanding its presence in everyday life — the number of radios was only 180 000 in 1953, but in 1963, when commercial radio was introduced, it skyrocketed about 9 times to 1 666 000, and in 1973 it increased to 4 447 000 [11. P. 194]. Along with that, 1970s saw rapid rise in TV coverage, especially in big cities. According to the available statistic, the number of TV sets on a nationwide scale in 1970 was less than 400 000, but in 1979 their number reached almost 6 million [12].

The state also played a big role in supporting and distributing these media: it not only refrained from monopolizing new types of media, but also financially supported them; or, for instance, initiated a movement to send radios to the villages in the 1960s [13]. Both these types of media were supposed to function as an ideological tool that would uphold the military dictatorship. Lee Hye-rim emphasizes that “Mass media was distributed at the institutional level for political purposes. The military regime at that time needed a means to [...] establish legitimacy and spread the ideology of modernization of the Fatherland” [9. P. 18]. Nonetheless, these media were actively utilized by “youth culture” and contributed to its dissemination. For example, radio shows became important channels for distributing music made by young people. Several music DJ program were established, presumably in the form of late-night radio programs such as “Midnight Dial”, “To You, Who Forgot the Night”, and “Starry Night” that introduced newly recorded songs and stories from listeners, especially young

⁵ The *jaesusaeng* (“entrance exam retakers”) problem was related to the Preliminary College Entrance Examination required for admission to the university. Not getting the necessary scores or failing the exam, school graduates spent several years in *hagwons* (for-profit private cram schools) to additionally prepare for a successful pass.

listeners. Even TV (that was a medium more tightly controlled by the government) showed “youth culture” during early 1970s, a prime example of which was “The March of Youth”, a television show that featured young folk singers performing their songs which was aired on KBS-TV in early 1973 [14].

These socio-economic changes had a deep impact on the values and attitudes of the younger generation and drew a line between them and the parental generation. This fundamental intergenerational difference is best expressed by one of the articles, published in August 1970 in *Choong-ang Ilbo* and entitled “Hangeul Generation amidst Anxiety and Conflict”:

“Today’s Hangeul generation has not lived in the social conditions of suffering, poverty, anxiety and pressure like the mature generation did. In contrast to the older generation, they have not lived in the era, where you could not choose values, where you could not criticize values and where only obedience was allowed. As such, they live in a society that enjoys improved economic wealth that was formed in [more] open social conditions. These conditions of growth and development naturally created differences in their way of thinking and values” [15].

All in all, the socio-economic conditions of state-led modernization became the basis for the emergence of “youth culture” of the 1970s. Even though some early forms of youth cultures existed before that time, their scope and scale were rather small, and these phenomena did not exist in the context of a mass society. Thus, it was not until the 1970s that socio-economic conditions allowed a relatively wide-scale and grassroots youth culture to emerge.

“Youth Culture” and Discourses of Westernization and Tradition

However, not only general socio-economic policy influenced the emergence of “youth culture”, wider discursive aspects of the “modernization of the Fatherland” also had a decisive impact on it. Thus, in order to fully grasp this phenomenon, it is important to study its cultural and ideological dimensions, specifically targeting the intricate relationships between modernization and westernization within the framework of the project of *Joguk geundaehwa* as well as how these policies were changing in course of time.

Regardless inconsistencies in Park Chung-hee’s economic policy noticed in the previous section of this paper, it can be said that in the grand scheme of things the economic development was naturally prioritized over other spheres since Park Chung-hee came to power. In addition to it, at least in this field the final destination

(becoming an affluent country) was clear, even if the process of achieving such goal was not seen.

In this sense *hujinguk-seonjinguk* (underdeveloped, lagging-behind country — developed, advanced country) dichotomy was one of the most important ideological constructs during both 1960s and 1970s. This ideologeme divided the countries into two types: first, affluent Western (or at least westernized such as Japan) states with the developed industrialized economies; second, poor non-Western (and thus non-westernized) states that have not experienced modernization. In the book “Our Nation’s Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction” (released in the early 1960s soon after the military *coup d’etat*) Park Chung-hee himself wrote that “it goes without saying that the measure of civilization today is Western civilization” [16. P. 11]. Inside this dichotomy emphasis was placed on the quantitative criteria such as GDP, GDP per capita, production and export numbers (as specific aspects of advanced countries’ economies) [16. P. 12] or (in Kim Jong-tae’s words) “developmental terms” [17. P. 388].

Throughout the 1960s the Republic of Korea was constantly graded as a backward country, and in order to unchain of poverty and backwardness, the Korean people had to take great efforts for participation in the economy of modernization. Passing through that, the Republic of Korea would be able to finally become an “advanced state” in the future, so essentially this dichotomy was acting as an additional tool for political and economic mobilization. For South Korea the main image of the developed country was the US, providing close political and economic relations between them. Kang Myung-koo writes that “during the process of rapid modernization, the United States, by introducing Western systems and products into South Korea [...] became a model that South Korea should pursue in all sectors. [...] South Korea sought to resemble America in [...] politics, society, the economy, and culture” [18. P. 183].

In addition, the *seonjinguk* discourse was closely related to the perception of the Korean history, culture and even identity. Throughout the 1960s Park Chung-hee repeatedly condemned the Korean traditional culture (of which Confucianism or, to be more precise, neo-Confucianism was an indispensable part) as “the root cause of fractionalism, formalism, flunkeyism and impractical discourse, all of which he believed “deformed” political development, caused social stagnation and impeded progress in science and technology” [3. P. 124]. Before “Yusin” Park Chung-hee also defined the Korean history as “a history to be thrown away, a history of vassalage to the stronger, fractionalism and humiliation” (in books such as the aforementioned “Our Nation’s Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction”) [19].

Because of that during the 1960s the state's policy fluctuated between pursuit for the economic modernization and disdain for the traditional Korean values. However, since modernity itself was universalized based on the historical experience of the West, modernization was inevitably linked to westernization. Moreover, in the 1960s Park Chung-hee's government intentionally promoted westernization in some spheres of life, for example, fashion [20]. It is worth mentioning that the main imperatives behind it had the economic and pragmatic nature (for example, traditional hanbok was inconvenient for performing factory jobs and required a lot of cloth for making). However, it had its influence on the consciousness of the rising Hangeul generation.

Another notable example of westernization policy that directly affected the emerging "youth culture" (that tended to be more sexually open and emotional) was family policy. Paradoxically, government-led Family Planning Program was aimed at encouraging sexuality (especially female which was explicated in various magazines published under the name of that program), which went against the traditional Confucian ideas [21. P. 809]. Despite the fact that the main reason behind this policy had the economic nature (the government of the Republic of Korea sought to reduce birth rate because it was considered as an obstacle to the economic development), it had long-term consequences. As a result, the rigid link between sex and childbirth inherent to the Korean traditional culture was broken by adding the category of pleasure, which was quickly adopted by the younger generation.

One the most important part of westernization policy was the transformation of the educational system that was already westernized (or, to be more precise, Americanized) during 1960s and early 1970s, the time when Hangeul generation attended schools and got primary and secondary education. Lee Young-mi writes that:

"As a generation that has not experienced colonial rule or war, they learned Hangeul, Korean history and *American-style democracy* at school, they grew up *constantly seeing [people] yearning for American-style liberalism* and their elder brothers and sisters protesting. Moreover, these young people who were born in the post-war atmosphere constituted a 'majority', and the adults showed an amazing zeal for [their kids'] education to raise these 'children of the new country' well" [10].

Within the Westernized school system, Hangeul generation was introduced to Western culture, sometimes at the expense of the traditional Korean culture. Yang Hee-eun, an iconic folk musician during the 1970s, remembered that "even

during cleanups at school we listened to *minuets*” [22]. and while Responding to the criticism that “youth culture” is overtly westernized and “does not belong to the Korean tradition” she asked another question in response: “But is it our fault that we never had a chance to experience *p’ansori* or other Korean traditional music instruments and melodies through school education?” [22].

In the 1970s (and more specifically, after the “Yusin Constitution” got enacted) Park Chung-hee explicitly changed his policy towards westernization and modernization. Since that time he begun to actively assert and develop the traditional Korean culture which then was viewed as a key element for building a new society. Moreover, in order to implement this new ideology, the state’s management of culture was reorganized. Cultural sphere became more institutionalized (in case of, for example, cinema) and controlled by a strong censorship. To support this “wholesome” (i. e. ideologically correct) culture government implemented five-year plans for cultural development, and in the 1970s these plans were mostly devoted to the traditional culture [23. P. 40].

With the 1972 Constitution as a starting point, Park Chung-hee’s view of national history had also changed. After success of the Economic and Social Development Plans and the establishment of the “Yusin regime” Park Chung-hee redefined the Korean historical experience as “the history of overcoming many hardships and national crises” [23. P. 40]. Thus, only in the 1970s nationalism has fully evolved into a new form of national pride without inferiority complex as it was in the past.

Furthermore, from the early 1970s Park Chung-hee began pouring out exalt praises for farmers and rural areas in general. Before that the countryside and peasants who lived there were seen as the primary targets of modernization, a symbol of backwardness. However, in the 1970s, Park Chung-hee started emphasizing the importance of rural areas instead of cities. Elaborating on that, Hwang Byung-joo points out that Park Chung-hee “criticized a city as a place like Sodom and Gomorrah which was spoiled by westernization and belauded rural areas as a treasure trove of long-standing national traditions” [8. P. 192]. From this perspective, rural areas and peasants were placed at the forefront of the new strategy of “modernization without westernization”.

In this situation Park Chung-hee regime also began to emphasize criticism of westernization and advocate for non-Western modernization discourse, strong national identity and subjective national view. In addition, this was linked to the discourse strategy of “localization” of democracy at a political level [24. P. 103]. The state attempted to partially revive the traditional Korean values precisely in the 1970s,

when South Korea was trying to reclaim its national identity which was perceived as rapidly withering away from Korean society in the process of modernization, and some intellectuals were advocating for the “indigenization” of modernization. In this sense, this whole process might be partially understood as (in Kim Kyong–dong words) the “politicization of traditional values in general and Confucianism in particular, and as the ‘Confucianization of modernity’” [25. P. 134] as well.

All in all, the more accurate way to depict Park Chung–hee’s ideological and cultural policies in the 1960s would be marking them as an attempt of *partial and managed westernization*. In general, state’s strategy of that time involved westernization for the sake of modernization and the degree of such westernization was mainly dictated by the economic incentives that would allow country’s economy to grow. However, this relentless focus on the economy had far–reaching consequences that exceeded purely economic and pragmatic dimensions and spilled into other spheres of life, namely into the cultural and ideological sphere.

By the 1970s, when the reorientation of the state discourse happened, Hangeul generation already got its primary and secondary education in a different, more westernized environment (and the infusion of educational system or media with these “rediscovered” traditional values was not an instant and easy process). However, it would be an exaggeration to say that the state completely revoked its policy towards westernization — in some spheres westernization tendencies continued to prevail, for example, regarding family planning or sexual policy (though, again, that was almost completely dictated by the economic considerations) [21]. Nonetheless, this ideological shift occurred relatively late and by 1970s Hangeul generation was already detached from rigid traditional values that were inherent to the older generations.

That, in turn, influenced their perception of Korea, its social and cultural features and made young people, who grew up in the 1960s, more receptive to Western culture and less susceptible to Korean traditional culture and values. Officially designating the Republic of Korea as a country that lagged behind and the US, Japan and European countries as advanced countries, becoming which should become an object of nation’s desire, the state facilitated young people’s propensity for Western–type cultural products.

Growing up under these conditions, Hangeul generation saw that the most politically close *seonjingu* — the USA — was different not only economically, but culturally as well, and information about contemporary American culture in general and the US counterculture specifically could be easily found in the newspapers and

weekly magazines. Interestingly, such sentiment was directly expressed in some of the newspaper articles of that time — for example, elaborating on youth cultures in general, Kim Byoung-ik wrote in 1970 that “despite being an economically backward country (*gyeongjejeok hujinguk*), Republic of Korea is sensitive to the “advanced culture” (*seonjin munhwa*), and signs of youth culture are slowly but extensively emerging whether they arise naturally or are just a vogue” [26].

In other words, this discourse propagated by the government became an additional discursive premise for “youth culture”. Starting from 1960s the South Korean young people sought to mimic the US cultural trends associated with the burgeoning youth culture movement — for instance, in fashion (miniskirts, long hair) or music (psychedelic rock and folk music). Obviously, in this sense partial westernization inevitably began taking place straight after the Second World War when the American soldiers landed on the Korean peninsula, but the context of aspiring to become a developed nation facilitated this trend. By mid-to-late 1960s young South Koreans moved from simply mimicking American culture to creating localized and authentic version of it — for example, Korean rock or folk music had different cultural connotations and style compared to the US counterparts and played a particularly important role in “youth culture” of the 1970s. At this particular time this popular music changes its meaning and, as Roald Malliangkay points out, “rather than merely a form of entertainment [...] pop music increasingly came to be recognized as a way of expressing oneself socially and politically” [27. P. 31].

The South Korean “youth culture” being a consequence of state-led modernization was alien (or even hostile) to the “Yusin regime” that began marking it as “decadent” and introduced various measures aimed at its suppression (banning songs, prohibiting discos, securing curfews, carrying out long-hair and miniskirts inspections etc.). In the end, all this led to its dissipation after 1975 when the government enacted “Presidential Emergency Measures for Protection of National Safety and Public Order” that tightened ideological control over culture. The marijuana scandal broke out during which key figures of “youth culture” of the 1970s were placed under arrest [28. P. 298–302].

Conclusion

To sum up, modernization policy carried out by the Park Chung-hee government created a socio-economic basis for the emergence of “youth culture” in the early 1970s. It was an urban culture of the Hangeul generation that was influenced by Western cultural trends and became one of the first forms of pop

culture in the Republic of Korea. In this regard several specific policies and socio-economic trends should be highlighted: rapid urbanization and drastic increase in urban population, increase in urban families' incomes that led to rise of consumption, changes in labor division; expansion of both school and university education and dissemination of mass media. Regarding the ideological policy, the special attention should be paid to the Westernization of the 1960s that stemmed from the desire to become a developed nation (like the US) as well as changing policy in the context of traditional culture and values.

Ultimately, “youth culture” of the 1970s reached its scale and acquired its features because of these conditions. To a large extent, the Park Chung-hee's government sought to carry out modernization that would include only partial and managed westernization for the sake of the economic development. However, it was impossible to comprehensively control the influx of Western culture and new values, and young people who grew up during 1960s absorbed them and became less sensitive to both government's ideology and values of older generations.

The values of the Hangeul generation who grew up in the 1960s were at odds with the changes in the ideology of the project of modernization that took place after the adoption of the “Yusin constitution”. Thus, South Korean “youth culture” of the 1970s can be called both a *byproduct of state-led modernization* and a kind of response to it. In sum, it experienced decline in the second half of the 1970s because of the government's pressure. Further types of youth culture will be different from it as they appear in other the socio-economic and political conditions.

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