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The core of the Russian power reputation space: Expert assessment and public opinion*

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Abstract. The article is based on the data collected in the study of the Russian power reputation space. The study focused on both the Russian power in general (official state and municipal power) and the regional power including the state executive power of the region. The authors defined several levels (federal/regional/municipal) and branches (legislative/executive/judicial) of power as the coordinate system structuring the space of power; and for the regional executive power, also peculiarities of responsibilities carried by the subjects of power. The study aimed at identifying the core and periphery of the reputation space of the Russian power based on the results of the two-stage sociological study — expert assessments and mass survey. The authors argue that the reputation space of both the Russian power in general and the regional power is multi-component and formed by the reputation of different subjects of power with a high degree of mutual influence. The study revealed a significant difference in the definitions of the core of the reputation space by the population and experts. The federal power constitutes the core of the reputation space of the Russian power as structured by its levels, according to experts and public opinion. Experts believe that the executive branch constitutes the core of the reputation space as structured by its branches, while the influence of the reputation of different branches seems balanced for public opinion. The similar situation was identified in the reputation space of the regional power. The authors also identified the significant influence of the personification factor on the reputation space of both the Russian power in general and the regional authorities. This leads to a 'shift' of the reputational core, which becomes especially evident in public opinion on the role of the president's reputation: every third respondent identifies it with the reputation of the entire Russian power.

Keywords: reputational space of power; reputation of the Russian power; reputation of the regional power; core and periphery of the reputation space; value attitude to the power; expert assessments; public opinion

The study of the 'reputation of the Russian power' (with trust as its essential feature) is actualized by the tasks of strengthening the internal political consolidation of society and government under the growing international threats. Trust becomes a central indicator of public opinion about the state policy and a precondition for the viability of the political system [1. P. 175]; it allows us to estimate the margin of safety

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of the public administration institutions [28. P. 151]. Researchers note a growing gap between people's social-economic and political expectations and the fulfillment of the authorities' promises [9. P. 162–163], in addition to the clear alienation of the Russian society from the power [see, e.g.: 10. P. 40; 19. P. 78]. The low level of trust in state institutions is reflected in the demand for 'law and order' and social justice without which incentives for positive action are missing [12. P. 25].

Overcoming the political alienation of power (i.e., counter modernization) from society [39. P. 31] depends largely on how much the power (as a governing entity) is ready to develop a policy based on the coordination of the main actors' interests. At the same time, the state should be perceived as an integral part of the community, which is characterized not only by a coalition of interests but also by morality binding the society into a single organism [9. P. 169]. Russians relate any political authority with to 'common endeavor', i.e., certain moral values kept by the activities of the politician and power [30. P. 46]. The social being of contemporary politics distorts value bases, creates the autonomy of political subjects from society [31. P. 158]. The alienation can be overcome if there is mutual trust and political responsibility between the government and the population [16. P. 37]. Therefore, we need a further search for optimal conceptual schemes in the study of the power [17. P. 25], and the focus on its reputation is a promising field of research. In the study of the reputation of the Russian power we believe in the predominance of citizens' requests for moral authority, first of all, such reputation characteristics as honesty, responsibility, justice, care for the people, their protection. The power's reputation as a stable value perception is based on the assessment of its real actions, the system of citizens' expectations and ideas about proper power.

Provided the complexity of the 'power' phenomenon and its current multidimensional interpretation [17. P. 21], we combined the idea of "power as empowerment" [8. P. 33], the communication theory defining power as a coordinated action to implement collective goals (political power exists and functions only if citizens support it, interact with each other, society and the state in harmony), and the neoinstitutional approach (mainly sociological institutionalism) to consider the reputation of the public power — official state and municipal power (Articles 71, 80, 132 in the Constitution of the Russian Federation). Since the reputation reflects citizens' value attitude towards it, we can consider a triumvirate of the state and municipal power with the civil society [4] as reflecting an understanding of power as a genuine democracy (1). Such a perspective correlates with the social-cultural imperative significant for the understanding of the Russian national-state identity as associated with the specific image of the political power: generalized 'power' is not just a collective actor protecting national interests and representing Russia in the international arena, but also an expression of the social-cultural 'Russianness' ('a special path' of the country) in the global space [34. P. 15].

The study is based on the concept of space as a metaphor for describing the structure of a certain phenomenon [34. P. 64], in our case — power's reputation

as a series of power's images [15. P. 7–8]. The spatial paradigm provides the methodological foundations for the study of the communication space of power and society [11. P. 141]. The difference between the virtual (imaginary) social space and the physical space was defined by P. Bourdieu on the basis of various subspaces or fields, including a special political field that develops in the interaction of political actors [27. P. 69] such as the 'field of power' — the space of power relations between agents and institutions [2. P. 369]. The concept of political space has evolved towards the social one [26. P. 17], while power as a general social phenomenon is transforming into a political phenomenon forming a social space of political power and preserving social integrity and order [7. P. 7]. Bourdieu introduced the concept of 'symbolic power' as based on 'symbolic capital' distributed among agents of political relations) in accordance with their positions in the 'political field'. To hold their positions in the field of political activity, such agents need to have the trust of as many citizens as possible [18].

There is a variety of approaches to the study of the political space, in particular of the Russian power space [7; 13; 25; 27; 28; 32; 39]. Thus, the institutional approach defines the political field as a space of relations between political actors determined by the constantly (re)produced rules — we see interactions about significant issues within the existing and alternative projects, goals and strategic decisions. The common goals and values developed in the political field become the basis for societal integration and legitimization of the social order [21. P. 43]. In the reputation space of power, the relations of actors (subjects of power and citizens) are determined by the reputation of power (its content, features, sources, evaluation).

In the structure of the reputation space, we can distinguish the core — the reputation of the main subject of power, which is decisive for the reputation of other subjects of power — and the periphery — reputation of subjects that influence the reputation of the main subject to a greater (near periphery) or lesser extent. The core is the most stable structural part, which is expressed in the stability of society and social reality, in the immutable fundamental principles of its construction. The core of reputation is made up by the deep, irrational, subconscious mechanisms of critical opinion and trust [14. P. 65]. The identification of the core can be correlated with the status roles of subjects in the political field [6].

According to Bourdieu, the space of power distribution is represented in the circle, the center of which is located everywhere and nowhere; and M. Foucault's concept of power supports the idea of the dispersion of power throughout the field of political space [18. P. 189]. Therefore, as a coordinate system structuring the space of power [35. P. 64] for the reputation space of the Russian and regional power, we suggest levels (federal/regional/municipal) and branches (legislative/executive/judicial) of power; for the reputation space of the regional executive power, we add the power's specifics of such subjects as governor/supreme executive authority/executive authorities of the region.

The first survey of experts and population was conducted in 2021: experts explained the contribution of various levels and branches, of the highest bodies and officials to the general reputation of the Russian power. The respondents were asked to assess the contribution of each of the proposed factors (from 3 to 4 in each question) in such a way that the values in total would not exceed 100 %. 15 experts took part in the survey, they were selected by the ‘snowball’ sampling, their competence was confirmed by their qualifications, level of education and the wide practical experience in the studied fields. The high ($W = 0.76$ and 0.89) and average ($W = 0.66$, 0.55 and 0.61) degree of consistency of expert opinions (2) allowed to conduct the further research with the average estimates by ranking the initial data for the subsequent comparison with the average values of the respondents’ answers in the mass survey.

Residents of Central Russia participated in the second survey based on the questions similar to those presented for expert evaluation. The sample ($N=1500$) was multi-stage: first, the regions of Central Russia were selected (Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga, Lipetsk, Orel and Smolensk Regions) (3) as clusters [24. P. 51–77]; then the quota sample was used — by gender, age and place of residence (regional center/periphery). The sample size calculations were based on the official statistical data of January 1, 2021 [5; 20]. The volume and structure of the sample meet the requirements of representativeness, the sampling error does not exceed 2.53 % (high reliability).

Reputation space of the Russian power

The dependence of the reputation of the Russian power in general on the reputation of its levels in public opinion is presented in Table 1. The greatest contribution to the reputation of the Russian power is made by the reputation of the federal power (47 %); the reputation of the regional and municipal power is less significant and almost equivalent (35 % and 33 %). Experts also pointed to the dominance of the contribution of the reputation of the federal power to the reputation of the Russian power in general (55 %), while the reputation of the regional power takes the second place (32 %), and of the municipal power — the third (21 %).

Table 1

**Dependence of the reputation of the Russian power
on the reputation of its levels, %**

| How much does the reputation of the Russian power in general depend on the reputation of the authorities at different levels — federal, regional, municipal? | Average expert assessments | Average value of respondents’ answers |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Reputation of the federal power | 55 | 47 |
| Reputation of the regional power | 32 | 35 |
| Reputation of the municipal power | 21 | 33 |

In the Russian public opinion, the importance of the reputation of different levels of power for the general reputation of the Russian power does not depend on gender, age, education, financial status, occupation or place of residence (regional center/periphery): the Pearson correlation coefficient is equal to or close to zero. The relationship between the respondents' answers and their region is rather weak positive or negative.

Table 2 shows that the assessment of the contribution of the reputation of the federal power to the reputation of the Russian power does not depend on the respondents' region of residence (Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.02), while there is a weak negative relationship in the assessment of the contribution of the reputation of regional and municipal power (–0.10 and –0.12). In general, the range of respondents' opinions in different regions varies from 30 % to 40 %. Ranking of the data showed that the highest contribution of the reputation of the regional power is claimed in the Belgorod Region (39 %); the Orel (34 %) and Smolensk (34 %) Regions took the second place in terms of the importance of the contribution of the reputation of the regional power in public opinion; then comes the Bryansk Region (33 %), the Kaluga (32 %) and Lipetsk (30 %) Regions. The contribution of the reputation of the municipal power to the reputation of the Russian power is estimated by respondents in the range from 29 % to 37 %, the range of opinions here is also relatively low. By ranking the average values, we obtained the following results: the first place is given to the contribution of the reputation of the municipal power in the Belgorod Region (37 %), the second place — in the Bryansk Region (35 %), the third — in the Lipetsk Region (30 %).

Table 2

Dependence of the reputation of the Russian power on the reputation of its levels, %

| How much does the reputation of the Russian power in general depend on the reputation of the authorities at different levels — federal, regional, municipal? | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Region | Reputation of the federal power | Reputation of the regional power | Reputation of the municipal power |
| Belgorod Region | 48 | 39 | 37 |
| Bryansk Region | 43 | 33 | 35 |
| Kaluga Region | 50 | 32 | 28 |
| Lipetsk Region | 43 | 30 | 30 |
| Orel Region | 53 | 34 | 29 |
| Smolensk Region | 46 | 34 | 29 |

The dependence of the reputation of the Russian power on the reputation of the legislative, executive and judicial branches varies significantly according to both public opinion and expert assessments (Table 3).

**Dependence of the reputation
of the Russian power
on the reputation of its branches, %**

| How much does the reputation of the Russian power in general depend on the reputation of different branches of government — legislative, executive, judicial? | Average expert assessments | Average value of respondents' answers |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Reputation of the legislative power | 234 | 43 |
| Reputation of the executive branch of power | 68 | 39 |
| Reputation of the judicial power | 22 | 35 |

In particular, experts emphasize the primacy of the reputation of the executive branch (68 %), then with a large gap come the legislative and judicial powers (24 % and 22 %); the public puts the reputation of the legislative power in the first place (43 %), the differences between branches are much less: the contribution of the reputation of the executive and judicial powers is 39 % and 35 % respectively. The dependence of the reputation of the Russian power and the reputation of its branches on the place of residence is weakly negative (Pearson correlation coefficient is -0.1 for each branch). The range in assessing the contribution of the reputation of the legislative power to the reputation of the Russian power varies from 39 % to 45 %; its highest values are shown in the Belgorod and Bryansk Regions (the average value — 46 % and 44 %), then come the Lipetsk and Kaluga Regions (40 % and 39 %) followed by the Orel (43 %) and Smolensk (41 %) Regions. The contribution of the reputation of the executive power to the reputation of the Russian power in six regions in public opinion varies from 34 % to 43 %, which determines the following descending order: the Belgorod (43 %), Orel (40 %), Kaluga (38 %), Smolensk and Bryansk (36 %), Lipetsk (34 %) regions. The dependence of the reputation of the Russian power on the reputation of the judicial power by region is different: the first place, as with the reputation of the executive power, is occupied by the Belgorod Region (39 %), then come the Kaluga Region (34 %), three regions — Orel, Smolensk and Bryansk (34 %–33 %), and the Lipetsk Region (32 %).

Reputation space of the regional power

The reputation space of the regional power seems similar in the expert assessments and public opinion in the perspective of the various levels of power (Table 5). The reputation of the federal government makes the greatest contribution to the reputation of the regional power: experts — 51 %, public opinion — 42 %. The second place is taken by the contribution of the reputation of the regional power itself (43 % and 39 %), the third place — by the reputation of the municipal power (24 % and 35 %).

Table 4

**Dependence of the reputation of the Russian power
on the reputation of its branches, %**

| How much does the reputation of the Russian power in general depend on the reputation of different branches of government — legislative, executive, judicial? | | | |
|--|--|--|---|
| Region | Reputation of the legislative power | Reputation of the executive branch of power | Reputation of the judicial power |
| Belgorod Region | 46 | 43 | 39 |
| Bryansk Region | 44 | 36 | 33 |
| Kaluga Region | 39 | 38 | 34 |
| Lipetsk Region | 40 | 34 | 32 |
| Orel Region | 43 | 40 | 34 |
| Smolensk Region | 41 | 36 | 33 |

Table 5

**Dependence of the reputation of regional power
on the reputation of federal, regional and municipal power, %**

| How much does the reputation of the regional power depend on its own reputation and the reputation of the federal and municipal power? | Average expert assessments | Average value of respondents' answers |
|---|-----------------------------------|--|
| Reputation of the federal power | 51 | 42 |
| Reputation of the regional power | 43 | 39 |
| Reputation of the municipal government | 24 | 34 |

The relationship of the answers to the question of the dependence of the reputation of the regional power on the reputation of different levels of government with the respondents' place of residence is insignificant (Pearson coefficient -0.04) or weakly negative (-0.1).

Table 6

**Dependence of the reputation of regional power
on the reputation of levels of power, %**

| How much does the reputation of the regional power depend on its own reputation and the reputation of the federal and municipal power? | | | |
|---|--|---|--|
| Region | Reputation of the federal power | Reputation of the regional power | Reputation of the municipal power |
| Belgorod Region | 44 | 42 | 39 |
| Bryansk Region | 40 | 37 | 34 |
| Kaluga Region | 40 | 41 | 31 |
| Lipetsk Region | 40 | 33 | 32 |
| Orel Region | 43 | 43 | 33 |
| Smolensk Region | 39 | 38 | 31 |

The ranking of the dependence of the reputation of the regional power on the reputation of the municipal power by region varies from 30 % to 39 %: the highest contribution of the municipal power is claimed in the Belgorod Region (39 %), then come the Bryansk (34 %) and Orel (33 %), Lipetsk (32 %), Smolensk and Kaluga Regions (31 %).

The dependence of the reputation of the regional power on the reputation of its various branches (Table 7) seems similar to the general picture of the contribution of these branches to the reputation of the Russian power in general. According to experts, the reputation of the executive power plays a decisive role in the reputation of the regional power (61 %); according to public opinion, the reputation of the regional power depends primarily on the reputation of the legislative power (41 %). The respondents consider the reputation of the executive branch (39 %) as the second most important, while the experts consider it (29 %) twice less significant compared to the dominant factor. However, both groups believe that the reputation of the regional power depends on the reputation of the judicial power to the least extent (27 % and 34 %). As in the previous questions, the difference in the importance of factors is less in public opinion, while the expert assessments are more differentiated, which can be explained by both the varying degree of importance of different levels and branches, and the respondents' representations.

Table 7

Dependence of the reputation of the regional power on the reputation of different branches of power, %

| How much does the reputation of the regional power depend on the reputation of different branches of power — legislative, executive, judicial power of the subject of the Russian Federation? | Average expert assessments | Average value of respondents' answers |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Reputation of the legislative power | 29 | 41 |
| Reputation of the executive branch of power | 61 | 39 |
| Reputation of the judicial power | 27 | 34 |

The relationship between the reputations of the regional power and the branches of power by region is weakly negative (Pearson coefficient -0.1 for each position). In general, the majority of respondents put the contribution of the reputation of the regional legislative power in the first place, of the executive power — in the second, and of the judicial power — in the third place. The Kaluga Region makes an exception for the primary importance is given to the executive power, the legislative power takes the second position, and the reputation of the regional judicial power is less significant compared to the previous two.

The contribution of the reputation of the regional legislative power to the reputation of the regional power is estimated differently by region: it is rated the most highly in the Belgorod Region (44 %), then come the Bryansk (42 %), Orel and Lipetsk (41 %), and Smolensk Region (40 %). The population of the Kaluga Region

turned out to be the least optimistic in assessing the significance of the reputation of the regional legislative power (37%). The assessment of the contribution of the reputation of the executive power in descending order is as follows: the Orel and Belgorod (42%), Kaluga (40%), Smolensk (37%), Bryansk (36%) and Lipetsk (33%) Regions. The contribution of the reputation of the judicial power is mostly highly estimated in the Belgorod Region (38%) unlike the Lipetsk Region (31%).

Table 8

Dependence of the reputation of the regional power on the reputation of its branches, %

| How much does the reputation of the regional power depend on its own reputation and the reputation of the federal and municipal power? | | | |
|--|---|---|--|
| Region | Reputation of the legislative power of the region | Reputation of the executive power of the region | Reputation of the judicial power of the region |
| Belgorod Region | 43 | 42 | 38 |
| Bryansk Region | 42 | 36 | 34 |
| Kaluga Region | 37 | 40 | 33 |
| Lipetsk Region | 41 | 33 | 31 |
| Orel Region | 41 | 42 | 34 |
| Smolensk Region | 40 | 37 | 33 |

Personification of the power’s reputation

The influence of the personification factor in the reputation space of power was examined on the example of the top official of the state (President of the Russian Federation) and the region (governor). The experts were asked two different questions to assess the contribution of the reputation of the top official to the reputation of the authorities of different levels and branches (Table 9). The results of the expert survey showed that the reputation of the Russian power depends on the reputation of the President, and this contribution is more evident by levels (59%) than by branches (50%).

Table 9

Dependence of the power’s reputation on the reputation of the President (experts, %)

| How much does the reputation of the Russian government depend on the reputation of the President of the Russian Federation? | | | |
|---|----|-------------------------------------|----|
| Levels of power | | Branches of power | |
| Reputation of the President | 59 | Reputation of the President | 50 |
| Reputation of the federal power | 31 | Reputation of the legislative power | 16 |
| Reputation of the regional power | 17 | Reputation of the executive branch | 30 |
| Reputation of the municipal power | 11 | Reputation of the judicial power | 21 |

The data of the expert and mass surveys showed that the Russian power is perceived by the population as more personified: when answering the question “To what extent does the reputation of the Russian power depend on the reputation of the President of the Russian Federation”, the majority of respondents (85 %) noted that the reputation of the top official entirely or largely determines the reputation of the Russian power. Moreover, every third respondent (34 %) believes that the reputation of the Russian power is completely determined by the reputation of the President, and every second respondent considers such a contribution significant. The relationship between the personification of the Russian power in general and the respondents’ region of residence is weakly positive (Pearson coefficient –0.10). However, the distribution of average values by region shows differences in the personification of power: the highest personification rates were recorded in the Orel Region (90 % claim that the reputation of the Russian power entirely or largely depends on the reputation of the President), then come the Belgorod and Lipetsk (89 % and 87 %), Kaluga (85 %), Smolensk (83 %) and Bryansk (82 %) Regions, the population of which believes that the reputation of the President makes the most important contribution to the reputation of the Russian power in general (Table 10).

Similar results were obtained on the personification of the regional power. The majority of respondents think that the reputation of the regional power primarily depends on the reputation of the governor (84 %), almost a third (29 %) believes that the reputation of the regional power depends entirely on the reputation of the region’s top official, and a half considers the top official’s reputation contribution as important (55 %).

Table 10

Dependence of the reputation of the Russian power on the reputation of the President of the Russian Federation (public opinion, %)

| Region | How much does the reputation of the Russian government depend on the reputation of the President? | | | |
|-----------------|---|---------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | Totally depends | Depends to a large extent | Depends to some extent | Does not depend at all |
| Belgorod Region | 41 | 48 | 10 | 1 |
| Bryansk Region | 34 | 48 | 16 | 3 |
| Kaluga Region | 21 | 64 | 12 | 4 |
| Lipetsk Region | 35 | 52 | 10 | 2 |
| Orel Region | 33 | 57 | 7 | 3 |
| Smolensk Region | 33 | 49 | 14 | 3 |

According to the experts and public opinion, the reputation of the regional executive power is mostly determined by the reputation of the region’s top official: the contribution of the governor’s reputation is estimated by the experts higher than by the population (the average value is 66 % and 46 %); the contribution of the reputation of the administration/government and the executive power of the region is estimated by both groups as comparable (26 % and 20 % of experts, 35 % and 34 % of population); the higher overall assessment of the reputation of the region’s executive power was given by population (Table 11).

Table 11

**Dependence of the reputation of the regional executive authority
on the reputation of the governor,
the highest executive authority and executive power, %**

| To what extent does the reputation of the regional executive power depend on the reputation of the governor, administration/government, executive authorities of the region? | Average expert assessments | Average value of respondents' answers |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| The governor (top official) | 66 | 46 |
| Administration/government (the highest executive authority) | 26 | 35 |
| Executive authorities | 20 | 34 |

The connection of the personification of the regional executive power with the executive authorities and the respondents’ region of residence is weakly negative (Pearson coefficient –0.1 for each factor). The contribution of the reputation of the region’s top official, the highest executive authority and executive power to the reputation of the regional executive power is similarly assessed by region (Table 12). However, the personification of the regional power as expressed in the average values of contribution to its reputation varies from 40 % to 49 %. The contributions of the highest and other executive authorities have almost identical values by region, i.e., are considered by the population as equal to the governor’s position. The ranking of the data proves the highest degree of power personification in the Belgorod and Orel (49 %) and Kaluga (47 %) Regions, then come the Bryansk (44 %), Lipetsk (43 %) and Smolensk (41 %) Regions.

Thus, the reputation space of both the Russian power in general and the regional power (including the executive level) is determined by the reputation of different subjects of power with a high degree of their mutual influence. The core of the reputation of the entire Russian power is made up by the federal level, while the periphery — by the regional and municipal levels with almost equal degree of influence according to experts and the population; the decisive role of the executive power allows to name it the core according to experts, while the public opinion perceives the reputation space of the Russian power, structured by branches,

as more balanced (with a slightly less influence of the judicial power) and without a core. The Russian public opinion is quite unified and does not differ significantly by region.

Table 12

Dependence of the reputation of the regional executive power on the reputation of the governor, the highest executive authority and executive authorities (public opinion, %)

| To what extent does the reputation of the executive power depend on the reputation of the top official of the region, the highest executive authority and other executive authorities? | | | |
|--|---|--|-----------------------------------|
| Region | Reputation of the governor (top official) | Reputation of the administration/ government | Reputation of the executive power |
| Belgorod Region | 49 | 40 | 38 |
| Bryansk Region | 44 | 34 | 33 |
| Kaluga Region | 47 | 33 | 33 |
| Lipetsk Region | 43 | 32 | 32 |
| Orel Region | 49 | 36 | 35 |
| Smolensk Region | 41 | 35 | 32 |

In the reputation space of the regional power, we can distinguish external and internal spaces: in the external space, the leading role, according to experts, is played not by the reputation of the regional power itself, but by the reputation of the federal power; thus, to a certain extent we can talk about the dual-core nature of the external reputation space of the regional power, while the reputation of municipal authorities forms the periphery. According to the population, the influence of the reputation of different levels of power is quite similar (with a slightly smaller role of municipal authorities). In the internal reputation space of the region, structured by the reputation of the branches, the structure of the general reputation space of the Russian power persists, and the core is made up by the executive branch (experts), though there is no core as such, and the influence of the reputation of the branches is generally balanced with a slightly lower role of the judicial power (public opinion). In the internal reputation space of the region's executive branch, the decisive role belongs to the reputation of the governor (core), and the experts' opinion is much more clearly expressed; the influence of the reputation of the highest and other executive authorities (periphery) is generally balanced.

Our findings can be useful primarily for the authorities in order to develop a more targeted reputation policy which would make their social-political ideas and their actions get closer to the citizens' needs and value orientations [3. P. 42].

The better the peculiarities of the reputation formation and functioning in the political space are studied, the higher the potential for identifying the power and the population will be, following the thought of P. Sztompka: “‘We’ are those whom we give trust to, in respect of whom we act loyally and whose interests we worry about in accordance with the spirit of solidarity” [33. P. 44–45].

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Notes

- (1) The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation adopted Opinion No. 1-Z of 16.03.2020 that the category “unified system of public power” is derived from the fundamental concepts of ‘statehood’ and ‘state’ meaning a political union (unification) of the multinational Russian people.
- (2) The non-randomness of the concordance coefficient is confirmed by the value of the Pearson criterion for each of these values.
- (3) Two groups of regions were selected; they are comparable geographically within the same federal district and according to the main parameters of development: the Smolensk, Bryansk and Orel Regions (an average level of development; low dynamics) and the Belgorod, Kaluga and Lipetsk region (a high level of development; high dynamics).

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Ядро репутационного пространства российской власти: экспертная оценка и мнение населения*

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Аннотация. В статье представлены результаты изучения репутационного пространства российской власти. Предметом исследования выступала российская власть в целом (официальная государственная и муниципальная) и региональная власть, в том числе го-

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сударственная исполнительная власть региона. В качестве системы координат, структурирующих пространство власти, были определены уровни (федеральный/региональный/муниципальный) и ветви (законодательная/исполнительная/судебная); для региональной исполнительной власти — также особенности полномочий субъектов. Цель исследования состояла в выявлении ядра и периферии репутационного пространства российской власти по результатам двухэтапного социологического исследования — экспертной оценки и массового опроса населения. Согласно полученным данным, репутационное пространство российской власти в целом и ее регионального уровня является многосоставным и формируется репутацией разных субъектов, среди которых наблюдается высокая степень взаимовлияния. Выявлена существенная разница в особенностях выделения ядра репутационного пространства населением и экспертами. Ядром репутационного пространства власти, структурированного ее уровнями, в экспертном и общественном мнении, выступает федеральная власть. Ядром репутационного пространства, структурированного ветвями власти, по оценкам экспертов оказалась исполнительная власть, в то время как для населения влияние репутации разных ветвей власти сбалансировано. Аналогичная ситуация прослеживается в репутационном пространстве региональной власти. Также определено значимое влияние фактора персонификации на репутационное пространство как власти в целом, так и ее регионального уровня, что приводит к «сдвигу» репутационного ядра и особенно ярко проявляется в оценке роли репутации президента, с которой каждый третий опрошенный отождествляет репутацию всей российской власти.

Ключевые слова: репутационное пространство власти; репутация российской власти; репутация региональной власти; ядро и периферия репутационного пространства; ценностное отношение к власти; экспертная оценка; общественное мнение

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