ВОПРОСЫ ИСТОРИИ, ТЕОРИИ И МЕТОДОЛОГИИ

MEMORY AND HISTORY: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON ANTINOMIES AND PARADOXES*

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Collective memory does not retain the memories of the past as historical events really happened, but as they are remembered in the present. Memory includes only elements of the past, not the past as a whole. Theoretical thinking about memory has been shaped by opinions often arising from very different starting points. This article outlines ten antinomies characterised by the following terms: individual and collective memory, spirit and matter, saving and deleting, irrevocable and revocable history, spontaneous and purposeful memory, myth and science, rationality and irrationality. The text explains that memory works in a selective way and the contents which are stored in it have no permanent form, but change over time according to the needs of the specific present. Human memory does not work as a rational machine, but rather is prone to distortions and errors. An important role in shaping collective memory is played by ideological influence and deep-rooted historical myths.

Key words: sociology; history; memory; culture; systems theory; individualism; holism; complexity; archives; myth; trauma; places of memory.

Historia magistra vitae est — history is a life's teacher — Latin scholars used to say (1). Although this statement is still repeated today, the question is how it sustains its relevance in the present. It is generally held that from the past one can draw lessons for today, especially in the sense that it is possible to avoid errors that proved deadly in the past. On the other hand, it seems that we are not quite able to learn, so we have no choice but to reprise our mistakes. However, the problem is generally more complicated and is not dependent only on our willingness and tendency to be influenced by historical experience and memory.

THE ANTINOMIES OF MEMORY

The term memory is usually used for activities associated with the process of saving, storing and recalling information received in the past. Memory is undoubtedly one

of the essential characteristics of humanity and the basis for the continuity of our existence [13. P. 50—92]. It has been a subject of study and research in the humanities and social sciences for many decades, but a significant increase of interest was observable from the late 1970's. A welter of expert opinions and ideas relating to memory can be found in literature, so the situation is not entirely clear and is moreover complicated by the fact that such considerations often move between extreme positions in the form of antinomies, polarities, paradoxes and dilemmas.

Two opposing theoretical positions — individualism and holism — have existed in social sciences for many years. In the individualistic explanation, the acting individual (actor) is the starting point. According to holism, on the other hand, social units must be taken as the basis of social theory. This division is reflected in the theoretical approaches to the issue of memory. Individualism is typical for philosophical consideration (Kant, Bergson, Whitehead, Husserl), and it is by definition utilised by psychology and related disciplines. The holistic approach, by contrast, has been used in sociology, anthropology and history for decades.

Psychology approaches the study of memory in terms of the individual psyche. Memory, from the perspective of the discipline, can be defined as a complex set of mental processes which includes encoding (transfer of information into the form of representation that can be stored in memory), storage (retention of coded information) and retrieval of stored information [4. P. 267; 30. P. 267], applied in a certain way in all mental activity. Within the psychological approach, different types of memory can be distinguished. According to the length of storage of remembered information, memory is divided into: a) sensory, b) short-term and long-term [16. P. 199—200]. Within long-term memory, declarative memory and the procedural memory are differentiated [16. P. 211]. In addition, there exists a breakdown of memory with respect to forms of storing and sensory modality (semantic, emotional, kinetic, visual, auditory, gustatory, and olfactory). With regard to the intention to remember, there is the distinction between intentional and unintentional memory [27. P. 204]. In terms of ways of recalling, we may distinguish so-called mechanical memory (remembering without knowing the meaning and participation of logical processing) and logical memory (remembering supported by logical processing).

Psychology usually divides the process of memory into three phases. In the first, called encoding (or instilling), there is a perception of information stored in the system of short-term memory. In the second, known as retention (keeping), information is converted into long-term memory. The last phase represents recalling, in which information is specifically called up into the conscious mind. This may take the form of recall (reconstruction, reporting what is remembered) or recognition.

In contrast to psychology, sociological thinking about memory is dominated by the holistic (collectivist) approach, which has its roots in the sociology of Emile Durkheim and in his concept of collective consciousness. Durkheim's ideas were developed into the concept of collective memory by the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, in whose theoretical work an important role is played by the thesis of social conditionality of memory. Though Halbwachs [13. P. 50—92] differentiates between

individual and collective memory, individual memory is for him a social phenomenon. Individuals are, strictly speaking, only perceptions. Memories (even of a personal nature) have their origin in the thinking of a group, in the communication and interaction that take place within this group. The individual's memory allows him to participate in the content wealth of collective memory. This means that while we remember as individuals, we do so in the referential frames representing the organization of memories of a given society. The individual memory is a specific point of interconnection of collective memories of various social groups. On the other hand, in terms of the group, the whole thing seems to be a question of knowledge distribution among its individual members. Anyone who participates in the collective memory certifies this by group affiliation. The collective memory concept has been developed in recent decades mainly by French authors like Jacques Le Goff [19] and Pierre Nora [26], Gérard Namer [25], Danièle Hervieu-Léger [14], Paul Ricœur [28], etc.

Some experiences and situations are recorded in the memory spontaneously, so to speak automatically; by contrast, other information is included intentionally with a certain purpose. Psychology differentiates: a) the involuntary memory — meaning spontaneous and unintentional — that records what we can see or hear without having to make any effort; b) the deliberate memory, which means intentional, controlled by the will and oriented by the aim to remember [27. P. 204]. One often has to be made to remember something important, which one would not spontaneously recall, by learning it by heart (memorizing).

The deliberate formation and use of memory — on the rational and emotional level — is encountered widely on the level of collective memory, mainly through religion, nationalism, ideology and power. Manifestations of these efforts find visible expression in textbooks, significant calendar dates, art, music, fiction, journalism, propaganda, museum exhibitions, festivities, ceremonial speeches, memorials, statues and memorial plaques in public places. Experience with totalitarian, authoritarian and other regimes shows that collective memory often becomes subject to the power of coercion and manipulation, whose goal is to rewrite what was spontaneously adopted and deliberately modify its contents, controlling and dominating it.

In the period after World War II, as Douwe Draaisma shows, the computer metaphor made a significant impact on memory in scientific consideration [8. P. 169—173]. It was associated with the idea that to find out what architecture our memory has, we can turn for inspiration to computer systems and programs that we ourselves created to work with data. Initial enthusiasm for this way of thinking in the 1970's, however, was replaced by the knowledge that psychological processes are less direct and less rational than was assumed. It has been discovered that in comparison with the "perfect" computer memory, human memory is prone to distort and misrepresent information.

Research shows that the operation of memory processes has, in addition to a rational level, some aspects of the irrational. On the individual level the irrationality of memory can be documented by findings which show that through the storage of information in long-term memory there may gradually occur its re-filing and distortion in the process of reconstruction, and sometimes this can mean even the making of fiction. Psychiatry

in this context refers to 'false memory syndrome' [17. P. 113]. Mythomania, meanwhile, is denoted as lying in which the individual tells fictional stories that he/she has allegedly experienced, 'lies' that in some cases he/she may be aware of, but in others is convinced of their veracity.

The humanities tend to see memory as a phenomenon of a mainly spiritual nature; natural sciences, by contrast, hold a view closer to materialistic positions. Neurophysiology focuses its attention on the functioning of the brain and central nervous system — memory is an integral part of the nervous system, which is controlled by the brain.

In the history of the past decades, the concept of French historian Pierre Nora, "places of memory" [26] has gained a considerable popularity. Nora finds that memory needs, for particular reasons, external material support. It manifests itself in certain spaces — sites of memory — in topography, but also in a symbolic sense, and there it is materialized. Sites of memory embody a range of symbolic meanings, and the approach developed by Nora focuses on the mapping and analysis of processes around which national identity is gradually assembled.

The attention of historians and sociologists has been attracted recently by the memory of landscape. Interest in this topic was awakened by British historian Simon Schama in 1995 with his book *Landscape and Memory*, in which the author examines the relationship between landscape and culture [29]. While originally the focus of attention of researchers was on such sites as were intentionally designed for the purpose of commemoration, now their attention has turned to places where memory has been more spontaneously conserved, and the point is to discover this and bring it to light.

THE PAST IRREVOCABLE AND REVOCABLE

Everyone who deals with the past is confronted with the problem of how something that irrevocably happened in a certain way is not considered fixed by future generations, but malleable. Maurice Halbwachs attributes the ability of continuous reconstruction to collective memory. Thus, the social frameworks of memory do not have an unchanging character, but can be continually reactivated to accord with the present [12. P. 279].

Collective memory does not retain the memories of the past as historical events really happened, but as they are remembered in the present. If the collective memory is to function adequately, its contents must match the current needs of society. For this reason, images from the past are repeatedly transcribed to meet the requirements of the present. At the same time it is true that memory may include only elements of the past, not the past as a whole.

Memories are never a true reproduction of the past, but merely its reconstruction based on gathered fragments. In a somewhat different context this issue was encountered by the notable representative of symbolic interactionism, American philosopher and sociologist George Herbert Mead. The starting point of Mead's thinking is encapsulated in the title of one of his studies, "The Present as the Locus of Reality". Mead [24. P. 1—31] associates reality only with the present, not the past or future. People

are limited to life in the present. They can conceive things in the past or the future, but this takes place in the present. The past and the future are only the subject of thinking and their *locus* is in the mind. The true past as well as the real future is inaccessible, but can be accessed through the mind in the present, whereby we can exceed the present.

Mead is aware that we are used to understanding history as irrevocable. He thus explains how the past can be at once irrevocable and revocable. The past is irreversible in the sense that we cannot change or undo things that have occurred. However, in their importance and the way they are stored then plucked from memory, the past is revocable, and as hypothetical as is the future. It is instantly transformed and re-framed as another past according to the viewpoint of the present and we, as Mead says [23. P. 416], cannot know what Caesar or Charlemagne will look like in the next century.

In this context, there is a need to see the phenomenon of historical revisionism, about which it can be said — with regard to book production in recent years — that it is becoming almost a fad. It is difficult to determine to what extent the current historical literature review is focused on reinterpretation of the current views based on the real effort to bring a new and better understanding of historical events reflecting new discoveries, and to what degree it is the answer to an "ideological" order, or how much it is motivated by the individual efforts of particular scholars to draw attention to themselves from under inexhaustible amount of literature by provocative or shocking titles. Nevertheless the fact remains that in some cases the consequences of revisionist approaches (so-called negationism) are assessed as socially so serious and dangerous (in particular any questioning of the Holocaust), that it is considered necessary to defend against them through legislative measures and criminal penalties.

SAVING AND DELETING

Psychology devotes considerable attention to problems of remembering. Generally, it is considered that memory processes in individuals are influenced by their somatic status (fatigue, old age, disease); mental condition and ongoing mental processes; external circumstances, in which they are situated (including social relationships); frequency of occurrence of certain stimuli and, finally, even by the very nature of the information to be remembered. At the same time the subject of special interest became forgetting (it means loss or inaccessibility of information that were once available in the memory), which has been experimentally investigated since the late 19th century [16. P. 223]). Since ancient times people wanted to expand and improve the limited capacity of memory and abilities. This applies to individual memory (mnemonics, memory strategies) and group memory (written records, libraries, archives, museums) as well. Already hundreds of years ago special techniques were created with the ability to develop better and more efficient remembering.

While memory is commonly associated mostly with the storage of information, paradoxically it is true that the key operations of memory are selection and deleting. Our sense organs permanently capture a large number of impulses. Most of them are not significant for us, but the brain is capable of setting aside from this stream — of mostly

unimportant information — that deserving our attention to be stored in memory. In the subsequent retrieval of recollections from memory all information does not appear at once, but selectively [6], according to practicality and usefulness; remembrance is updated if it fits a situation where it may serve in dealing with current or future problems. Along similar lines, the French researcher Tzvetan Todorov points out that memory is by no means the opposite of oblivion. Memory is always the interaction of two poles that form the "delete" (i. e. forgetting) and "storage". Full restoration of the past is absolutely impossible because memory is necessarily a specific "choice" [32].

Systems theory, which includes among its leading representatives the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, allows to understand these mechanisms. According to Luhmann the basic life strategy of systems is reduction of complexity [21]. For every social and psychological system, the world is extremely complex and systems can exist only because they reduce this "complexity". From the perspective of systems theory complexity means mainly that there are always more options than can be realized. Systems, however, cannot use or process everything potentially possible, and they must, in order to maintain their existence, reduce the number of options. Complexity is therefore associated with a selection that admits and excludes at the same time. Memory cannot keep everything — on the contrary it must act selectively to reduce complexity and stabilize only what is selected.

From the perspective of the systems theory of social (or collective) memory applied in the contemporary sociology, it can be stated that the relationship between forgetting and remembering is historically evolving and corresponds to the development of society. The development of media extends the possibilities and range of communicated topics, and leads to a change in the structure of memory. Before the invention of writing, the themes of communication were limited and all had to be simply remembered. The invention of writing and later of the printing press, for example, required (but also triggered off) more discreteness and less contextually-bound themes. When reading a book, we are in a different context than the author, thus, we need more "redundancy" to understand the content. And, at the same time, because we already do not have to know exactly all the subjects (they are stored in books), we can forget more. We are able to discuss topics about which we know little, because we can look into books. Writing therefore conditioned the extension of the variety of topics [9. P. 32—35]. The more the capacity to save, the more can be forgotten. Moving on from writing and the printing press another milestone is the development of computer memory. At the present time, due to the computerization it is possible to trace anything, and so we can forget many things. Memory complexity is thus directly proportional to the extent of forgetting and the computer can be considered as a new form of memory [9. P. 30].

The relationship between media and memory was shown by Aleida and Jan Assmann in the 1990's. According to them evolution of media plays a key role in the development of social memory, being marked by phases of oral transmission, writing, and audiovisual media. Phased transformations of social memory in terms of media evolution are shown in Table, in which aspects of encoding, storing and circulation are differentiated.

Social memory in phases of media evolution [2. P.139]

		Oral	Writing	Electronic Media
Encoding		Symbolic codes	Alphabetic codes	Nonverbal codes, artificial languages
Storage		Bounded by the human memory	Transferred through the speech to text	Boundless documentation possibilities
Circulation		Celebrations	Books	Audiovisual media

Elena Esposito differentiates the development of four types of memory in connection with the media. However, her definition is less based on the phenomenological aspects of the problem and tries to look deeper into the transformation of memory from the perspective of its internal functioning. Esposito distinguishes four types of memory: divinatoric, rhetorical, memory as culture and memory as network.

Divinatoric memory — prophetic — is strongly tied to a context made possible by media of non-alphabetic writing. The organization of archaic societies would not have been possible without this writing. At the same time it is also true that the development of non-alphabetic writing was accelerated by the development of the given method of social organization. This type of writing does not differentiate between a subject and a symbol seen as identical. Non-alphabetic writing can express all that one knows, but not new and unknown things.

Rhetorical memory developed in Ancient Greece but reached its peak in the late Middle Ages. The medium of this memory is alphabetic writing, which offers the opportunity to learn from information previously unknown to the reader. Alphabetic writing can also express differences and nuances. Movement in memory is similar to procedure in rhetoric: memory is associated with a variety of techniques and rules for storage organized on the principle of mnemonics. The mnemonic method is usually based on the concept of the localization of memorized information in certain imaginary spaces of buildings with many rooms. In these rooms, whole memories are not stored, but just images. In the mnemonic culture, books do not serve as memory — only as a mnemonic support. To find the appropriate memory, we have to find its room. According to this idea, memory holds all the images, but they are sometimes misplaced [9. P. 156—159]. If we cannot remember something, it does not mean that we have forgotten it, but that there has been a saving error.

Culture memory, according to Esposito, refers to the next phase in the development of memory with the development of the letterpress. Printed books became available massively and used as a secondary memory. What we do not need — we can forget. Letterpress also changed communication, and there is an asymmetry: a source may not be available to one recipient that is available to another. However, there is also a standardization of communication, now the same for all recipients, intended also to standardize recipients. The recipient then becomes increasingly more actively participating in the text, because he interprets standardized text [9. P. 191—194]. The idea of memory moved from the ancient repository model to an archive model. The archive differs from the repository by the fact that we store material so that to be able to find it later.

It is about organization and accessibility (books are no longer arranged mnemonically as in the ancient times, their arrangement does not correspond to the principles of memory; they are arranged for example alphabetically). It also leads to a higher possibility of oblivion — if we can trace everything, we do not have to keep everything in our head.

Network memory is a new kind of memory that begins with the postmodernism. Memory abandons the idea of archive in which documents are stored, and along with that the idea of the document as an information carrier in general. The change also applies to the communication media: while the mass media were presented anonymously, in the new media re-personalization emerges. Now we can tune the information that we receive according to our needs. One can talk about mass customization, so that a medium even in mass production can be adapted to the customer [9. P. 300—301]. It is a time of virtual information. The best comparison for this kind of memory is a network — a non-hierarchical model that holds the individual nodes together. In this type of procedural memory connections mean more than content [9. P. 339—342]. This new type of memory allows forgetting completely. Memory is now a performative model; it is virtual memory in which it is not information stored, but individual decisions. A typical example is the so-called 'search engine', or rather *search machines* such as *Yahoo* or *Google,* which upon entering a query create a search and a memory structure according to user's command.

HISTORY, MYTH AND SCIENCE

Systems theory suggests that the assumption under which history is life's teacher is somewhat problematic for history has lost its character as a model [21. P. 107]. History can serve as a model for the future only if the past and future are ultimately the same [5. P. 474]. However, contemporary society is dynamic, escaping and increasingly differing from its past. Thus, the simple application of the idea that we should learn from the past becomes questionable. Some lessons undoubtedly are more durable, but others become outdated over longer or even shorter time-spans.

Historian Miroslav Hroch [15. P. 44] points out that the past can be a source of wisdom only if we believe that historical changes have causal links, which can be identified and analysed in a rational, causal way. With this in mind, he draws attention to the fact that our relationship to the past transforms within the societal context. It looked different in the 19th century dominated by "historicism", with the idea that history has a legitimate motion and direction, and it looks different today, when trust in the sense of history is missing.

In the functioning of collective memory, it is — as shown by some researchers — more important what the handed-down opinion is on historical events than what their interpretation is from the historical scientific point of view. We may recall in this context the well-known Thomas theorem. One of the key theses of symbolic interactionism and interpretive sociology is the definition of the situation, formulated by W.I. Thomas, that if people define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences [31. P. 114]. Interpretive sociology places great emphasis on understanding how people perceive the world

around them. What is important is not what reality is, but how actors themselves see and understand it, because they act accordingly, and their conduct produces real consequences. In our case it is possible to state that it can often be more important what people think about the past than what it really was, because this image of the past — no matter if partially or even completely false — can be a major motivating force in the present. This is also highlighted by Jan Assmann [3. P. 50], who claims that what is important for cultural memory is not factual, but remembered history. In this sense even the myth is real to the extent that it is remembered and celebrated — what is important is its normative and formative power.

In the national memory, myths that were created during the rise of nationalism played and still to some extent play an important role. During the 19th and 20th centuries, certain myths became a significant mobilizing force for some nations and social groups, sometimes lethally so. Many such myths survive in the collective memory to the present day. Against historical myths historical science used to be placed. As the highest form of cognitive and theoretical work, based on a systematic and rational way of understanding reality, science defines myths critically, but not only that; it tries to explore them scientifically, clarifying the reasons for their existence and the ways they operate. Many contemporary scholars, however, point out that maintaining the efforts to define in the spirit of Enlightenment Rationalism the demarcation line between the *logos* and the *myth* is not enough, because in history there are no discrete phenomena. After all even historical science cannot be sufficiently resistant to some myths; particularly when they become part of state ideology or political parties and from there influence the contemporary educational and scientific policy of the country.

HISTORY, MEMORY AND IDENTITY
(INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION)

In the processes taking place in Europe after the fall of Communist regimes, issues of conflicting interpretations of the past were to the fore; ways of reckoning the past were needed on which new regimes could build their legitimacy, including the detection of hidden history and its incorporation into the interpretation of the present [22. P. 11]. European integration has also piqued the interest of researchers and politicians concerning the divergent historical memories of peoples who have to live together in spite of what may have happened between them. They therefore seek means to reconcile ancient conflicts. It turns out that reminiscing can have two contradictory consequences: it can lead people either to narrow into group particularism, or open up to cultural and moral universalism.

Social memory in this sense has an ambivalent character. Needless to say, in no complex society there is a single collective memory, but always a plurality of collective memories. They are the basis of collective identity for groups and one of the key forces holding them together. However, what brings people together in this way can, in a different context and in other relations, be what divides them (2). This happens, for instance, when "old wounds" of injustice, injuries and sufferings are remembered and revived. Such historical revival usually has its deep moral justification and important

rationale, but can also be deliberately and purposefully instigated. In this context, let us recall that conflictualistic theory [7] points out that many groups or societies, needing to ensure their integrity, create an image of an enemy (external but sometimes even internal). At any rate, the memory is never just a thing of the past, but a very important co-author of the present, and as such represents a major political issue.

According to some theorists, historical science could and should play an important role in addressing the problems so far indicated. Paul Ricoeur, for example, considers that history, distanced from the past, without personal involvement, seeking objectivity on past events, removes the exclusivity of the memory of the groups, opening way for mutual dialogue. Its corrective function is its ability to revise, criticize or contradict the memory of a community when it closes in its suffering to such an extent that becomes blind and deaf to the sufferings of other communities [28. P. 650].

One of the themes to which great significance is ascribed is the problem of identity — personal and collective. Two fundamental questions usually are asked here: who are we (?) and where do we belong (?); these relate to two basic dimensions — time and space. Memory in both cases is a key, and it works with respect to identity as a kind of "reinforcement". Preserving memories is a prerequisite for the identity of individuals and unity of groups; forgetting, on the other hand, is a synonym for their loss. The recapturing of memory in this context represents an act of social emancipation or power dominance [18. P. 34].

Memory, which represents an essential, life-giving anticipation shaping our identity, is paradoxically shown by Todorov [33] as fragile, vulnerable and open to misuse. Criticism of power manipulation of memory is therefore associated with the liberating return of memory free from censorship, manipulation and erasure. However, in addition to this liberating memory there is another memory that brings pain. In short, memories may be not only supportive, but also unpleasant and traumatising. Attention is drawn to the concept of *cultural trauma* developed by Jeffrey C. Alexander [1] and Bernhard Giesen [10]. The sociological approach to the collective trauma is inspired by medicine and psychiatry: trauma is associated with the events that leave long-term destructive effects on the patient's body or mind, or on the consciousness of society. In sociological terms, such events are wars, occupation, and genocide, outbursts of violence, economic and social crises, natural disasters, epidemics and forced emigration.

A prerequisite for the formation of collective trauma is an event as a trigger, a traumatic experience shared, reproduced and penetrating the collective memory to transform the collective identity. As a result, there happen phenomena such as a disruption of the value system and cultural symbolic frames, an erosion of confidence, collapse of the universe of meaning, and growing concerns for the future. Giesen [11] characterizes cultural trauma as a rupture in a network of shared meanings, resulting in a disruption of order and its continuity. Theorists of cultural trauma believe that history loses the character of telling a story of the heroic deeds of the past, describing them and their famous battles. In its place, collective memory stresses the suffering of thousands and millions of human victims, becoming a source of persistent trauma and a warning for the future.

NOTES

(1) This statement was taken in an abbreviated version from the Cicero's treatise on the rhetoric *De Oratore*, in which the author says: *Historia est testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoria, magistra vitae, nuntia vetustatis*, i. e. *History is the witness of the times, the light of truth, the life of memory, the teacher*.

(2) Miroslav Hroch [15. P. 41] in this respect recalls the importance of historical arguments in conflicts that broke out on the ruins of Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, highlighting the importance which these arguments hold in various separatist movements.

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ПАМЯТЬ И ИСТОРИЯ: НЕСКОЛЬКО СЛОВ ОБ АНТИНОМИЯХ И ПАРАДОКСАХ КОЛЛЕКТИВНОЙ ПАМЯТИ И ОБЩЕЙ ИСТОРИИ

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В научном сообществе сегодня достигнут относительный консенсус в признании того факта, что коллективная память не сохраняет воспоминания о прошлом сообразно тому, как события произошли на самом деле (как было принято считать прежде), а воспроизводит их так, как нам удобно вспоминать о них в настоящий момент времени. Это связано с той особенностью памяти, что она сохраняет в себе лишь отдельные элементы прошлого, но не его целостный образ. Теоретические модели памяти разнообразны потому, что формируются под влиянием крайне противоречивых концептуальных позиций, а не по причине реальных различий разных типов памяти. В статье обозначены десять ключевых антиномий научного анализа проблем исторической и коллективной памяти, которые зафиксированы с помощью следующих понятий: индивидуальная и групповая память; дух и материя; сохранение и уничтожение воспоминаний; отменяемая (заменяемая) и неизменная память; спонтанное и целенаправленное запоминание; миф и наука; рациональность и иррациональность. Автор показывает, почему наша память функционирует столь избирательно, почему сохраняемые в ней воспоминания столь изменчивы и не имеют постоянного формата, легко трансформируясь с течением времени в соответствии с запросами текущего момента. Человеческая память не работает как некая рационально устроенная машина — она склонна порождать искажения и ошибки. Кроме того, в формировании коллективной памяти важную роль играют идеологическое давление и исторически устойчивые коллективные мифы (метанарративы).

Ключевые слова: социология; история; память; культура; теория систем; индивидуализм; холизм; комплексность; архивы; миф; травма; места памяти.