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СЕРИЯ: ПСИХОЛОГИЯ И ПЕДАГОГИКА**

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Editorial

Introduction: The Heuristic Value of Social Representations Theory

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By publishing his famous book “Psychoanalysis: Its image and its public” sixty years ago, Serge Moscovici initiated one of the most important research currents in social psychology. This current has gradually brought together researchers from many countries around a complex question that can nevertheless be stated quite simply: how do people make sense of the world around them? Inspired by Durkheim (1898), but also by Lévy-Bruhl (1922), Moscovici proposed a way to answer this question. People make sense of the world around them by constructing social representations. But this answer, apparently as simple in its formulation as the question that motivates it, requires several explanations. The first one obviously concerns the very notion of “social representation”. According to Moscovici (1961. P. 66), social representations are “universes of opinions” relating to objects in the social environment. This rather broad definition of the notion has been supplemented regularly by different authors. Moscovici himself suggested that these social representations could also consist of information or beliefs. But today, in the light of all the studies that have been carried out on this subject, it seems important to us to note that the distinctions between “opinion”, “information”, and “belief” are unnecessary. It is true that opinions are more in the realm of position-taking, information is more in the realm of knowledge and beliefs are more in the realm of conviction. However, experience shows that individuals regularly confuse these three domains, especially when they concern a socially invested object. In this case, we can observe beliefs that take on the status of attested information or opinions that are strangely similar to beliefs. Thus, the boundary between “I think”, “I know” and “I believe” is often fuzzy. Consequently, the contents of a representation can be qualified indifferently as opinions, information or beliefs and we can retain that a social representation is concretely presented as a set of cognitive elements (opinions, information, beliefs) relating to an object of the social environment.

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To ask how “people make sense of the world around them” implies that we can specify which people we are concerned about? From the point of view of the social sciences in general and social psychology in particular, these people are obviously social beings. In other words, individuals concretely and/or symbolically inserted into human collectives. As a result, the phenomenon of social representation has an eminently interindividual, intergroup and ultimately collective character.

An interindividual character because representations are born, transmitted and evolve through close interactions. They have been referred to as “common sense” knowledge (Jodelet, 1984) and it is indeed in ordinary conversations that this knowledge, shared by the greatest number of people, is expressed best of all. An intergroup character because the objects of representation are at the heart of social interaction. They structure it or threaten it and, in doing so, they constitute issues for the different groups that make up a society¹. In this way, everyone is led to take a position on them not as an isolated individual, but as a member of a given group. A collective character because social representations are first and foremost instruments to understand the social environment. As such, the guarantee of their efficiency lies in their shared nature. How useful could be a system of the social world interpretation if we did not share it with others ?

What is said above leads us to believe that the study of social representations can reasonably dispense with the exploration of the personal dispositions of individuals (personality, intelligence, etc.). Social representations have very little to do with individual psychology. Basically what matters here is the social facet of identity and not its personal facet (Deschamps, Moliner, 2012).

However, we must also give several clarifications concerning the phrase “making sense”.

First by noting that social representations are always inscribed in conceptual or ideological landscapes that pre-exist them. This is necessary because knowledge cannot be useful if it appears incoherent. Social representations are one of the forms of knowledge that we can have about our social environment. Thus, from their emergence to their transmission, we constantly adjust them to the other knowledge we have about the world around us. These adjustments have an important consequence. They lead to correspondences between social groups (defined by sociodemographic, socioeconomic, socio-practical or ideological affiliations) and distinct contents of representation.

Then by questioning the status of social representations in the eyes of those who share them. Today in the light of the thousands of studies that have been carried out, we know that social representations are never perceived as elaborate intellectual constructions about reality. They are not perceived as “universes of opinions” or particular points of view. For sharing them individuals they appear as objective reflections of an obvious and indisputable reality. To convince oneself about the reality of such a phenomenon, the historical perspective gives rich lessons. Works of Robert Mandroux (1968) on the judicial treatment of witchcraft between the 17th and 18th centuries, or of Georges Vigarello (1985) on personal

¹ It should be noted here that in this perspective, it is not enough for an object to be present in the social space for a social representation to emerge. It is also necessary for this object to have a stake value for a social group which will then need to elaborate a representation of this object.

hygiene since the Middle Ages, teach us that conceptions that we consider to be completely erroneous today were perceived as unavoidable truths at certain time. Thus, unlike other systems of knowledge of the world (e.g. scientific representations), social representations leave little room for doubt insofar as they provide us with a sense of self-evidence which is ultimately the basis of what we all recognise as “common sense”.

One final point should be done about the phrase “make sense”. Since social representations are produced and carried by social groups, since they are adjusted to the norms, values and prior knowledge of these groups, the knowledge that they provide us with about the world is always socially useful knowledge. Unlike the sciences which are intended to provide us with universal knowledge with the sole aim to understand the world, social representations are intended to provide social groups with knowledge that is closely interwoven with the logic of social relations. In other words, they do not simply allow us to understand the world. They allow groups to understand it in a way that also allows the justification or rationalisation of their practices, social differentiation and the identification of individuals.

In the context of this special issue devoted to social representations, our introduction cannot provide an exhaustive presentation of the theory proposed by Serge Moscovici. Readers who are insufficiently informed about this theory can refer to two texts published in English (Moliner, Bovina, 2020; Rateau et al., 2011) where they will find the necessary complements. However, we would like to make two remarks about the social representations theory. In our view, these are two important remarks because they have inspired the philosophy of this special issue.

The first strength of the social representations theory lies in the fact that it addresses almost all major issues of social psychology, from the question of identity to the role of the media. This eclecticism of the theory was perhaps a part of Serge Moscovici's initial intentions when he made his proposal 60 years ago. But it can also be seen as a response to the need to embrace all the facets of an eminently complex phenomenon – that of social representations – which lies at the heart of the functioning of our societies. In any case, the inclusive nature of the social representations theory has variously been interpreted by the scientific community. For some, it is the undeniable sign of a relative vagueness of the concepts that constitute this theory. In this sense they tend to think that a theory that deals with so many issues cannot be a good theory as far as, by touching on everything, it ultimately explains nothing precisely. For others, the eclecticism of the theory is seen as a threat. They see in it a hegemonic, even imperialist, desire to reduce certain issues in social psychology to the bare minimum. Finally, others, including ourselves, have seen in the inclusive nature of the social representation theory an opportunity to try to begin a work of unification of our discipline (Augoustinos, Walker, Donaghue, 1995; Rateau, Moliner, 2009). We believe we can say today that it is the latter who were right. Since 1991, more than 7000 articles have been published on social representations (see Moliner, Bovina, 2020) and among these numerous works, many highlight the links between the phenomenon of social representation and other psychosocial phenomena. The cartography of the scientific publications, recently undertaken by A. De Rosa convincingly demonstrates that the social representations theory has found its supporters and followers on all continents (De Rosa, 2016).

But Serge Moscovici's theory has another peculiarity which has contributed to its success. Perhaps because of its initial position, which placed it slightly outside the main stream of social psychology research. Or perhaps precisely because of the relative flexibility of its concepts, this theory has had, and we will see in this special issue, a formidable capacity to inspire new reflections, new depths, new research avenues and new ideas. One of the most flagrant demonstrations of this reality is provided by the work of the "School of Aix" (Abric, 1987; Flament, 2003) and the "School of Geneva" (Doise, 1990; Doise, Clémence, Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1992). In both cases these works proposed a new theory of the structuring of social representations; that of the "Central Core" in Aix and that of the "Organising Principles" in Geneva. In each case, these theories have in turn given rise to a great deal of research and publications. But this is not the most remarkable thing, because what is striking about these two theories is that they are both in the exact continuity of Moscovici's initial propositions. Thus, although these two theories consider the question of the structuring of social representations from radically different angles, neither of them challenges the basic postulates of the initial theory. On the contrary, they are inspired by them, develop them and draw all the conclusions from them. And if we need to be convinced of the reality of this state of affairs, it would suffice to turn to a more recent proposal which, although it does not exactly deal with the structuring of social representations, has followed the same epistemic path as the theory of the nucleus or that of the organising principles. We are referring here, of course, to the "dialogical approach" proposed by Ivana Markova (2003). Being passionate about the dialogical communication proposed by M. Bakhtin, she puts in the focus of analysis the notion of dialogicality defined as "a fundamental capacity of the human mind to conceive, create and communicate about social realities in terms of the Ego-Alter" (Markova, 2003. P. 93). This capacity is a result of phylogenesis and of the socio-cultural history of humans. Developing the idea of dialogicality Markova underlines the importance of dialogical communication in relation to intersubjectivity formation.

We could multiply the examples of such developments that can be found in the articulation between the social representations theory and Tajfel's theory of Social Identity (Doise, 1973; Deschamps, 1973) or between the attitudinal dimension of representations and the classical approach of attitudes (Moliner, Tafani, 1997). All these examples show us the work of researchers who, in order to explore new territories, were inspired by the bricks of the social representations theory without having to question the initial structure. The heuristic value of Serge Moscovici's theory appears to us through these examples.

This special issue is a further illustration of what has been said above. It brings together articles written by researchers from different countries, all of whom propose developments or deepening of the social representations theory. Although these nine articles selected for this special issue do not represent the full spectrum of the social representations theory, however they nicely illustrate some key points of the theory and demonstrate its utility for the challenge of the modern society.

The first reflections in this special issue concern the question of the individual and the collective. **Denise Jodelet** (School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, Paris, France) proposes a reflection on the notion of "common". By exploring

the different extensions of this notion, as they have been discussed by the social sciences, she points out their coincidences with the axes of development traced by Moscovici for the social representations theory. **Saadi Lalhou** (London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK; Paris Institute for Advanced Study, Paris, France) questions the reasons behind the similarity of individual representations. To answer this question, he mobilises his installation theory to explain that individual representations are necessarily representations of a given object in a given population. Individual representations are therefore interconnected because of the social practices of the object in the population in question and because of the process of social construction of the object in this population. In another direction, by developing the notion of “meta-representation”, **Wolfgang Wagner** (University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia) and **Maaris Raudsepp** (Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia) explain that in order to be able to found the social, social groups need to have reciprocal visions of the world, independently of the nature of their relations. To interact with others, even if it is to oppose them, it is necessary to understand their representations.

Serge Moscovici’s seminal work is full of ideas that have only been partially explored to this day. Among these, the hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia is undoubtedly one of the most attractive because it refers to a phenomenon that many researchers have been able to observe: the same person can think about an object in different ways and hold different discourses about it. In a work on mental illness, **Tatiana Emelyanova** (Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia) and **Tatiana Israelian** (Center for Psychological Assistance, Insurance Company “RESO-Garantia”, Moscow, Russia) suggest that the emotion aroused by an object of representation and the ideological anchoring of the representation could be determining factors in the phenomenon of polyphasia. With the hypothesis of a “re-anchoring” process, **Dorra Ben Alaya** (Tunis El Manar University, Tunis, Tunisia) enriches this reflection by proposing the idea that in certain cases, the appearance of a new ideological framework could contribute to the modification of words and objects meaning that are nevertheless familiar to us. Finally, **Patrick Rateau** (Paul Valéry University Montpellier 3, Montpellier, France) and **Grégory Lo Monaco** (Aix-Marseille University, Marseille, France) address the issue of the differentiated expression of social representations through the notion of “mute zone”. They present the main debates and results of 20 years of research on this phenomenon and propose several avenues for the future.

As we have already mentioned the eclectic nature of the social representations theory is probably stems from the complexity of the phenomenon that it addresses. As we know, it is an inter-individual and inter-group phenomenon which contrasts with many psychological problems which often refer to intra-individual phenomena. But it is also a phenomenon intimately linked to communication between people and between social groups. The question of communication had been considered by Serge Moscovici from the beginning of his reflections on social representations and this question is probably the one which could give rise to the greatest number of developments today. **Alexander Dontsov** (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia), **Olga Zotova** and **Lyudmila Tarasova** (Liberal Arts University – University for Humanities, Yekaterinburg, Russia)

introduce this issue by going back over the role played by the media in the formation of representations of coronavirus. But nowadays, addressing the issue of communication around representations implies thinking about the links they have with images. The first of these links is undoubtedly the one concerning the capacity of images to express representations, which should attract the attention of researchers. **Elena Volodarskya** (S.I. Vavilov Institute for the History of Science and Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia) demonstrates this phenomenon in relation to representations of science, while **Ida Galli** and **Roberto Fasanelli** (University of Naples Federico II, Naples, Italy) present two techniques for integrating images in the study of social representations.

The researchers who developed the Brain Storming technique (Osborn, 1953) understood that creativity has a mortal enemy and a faithful ally. The enemy is called the censorship of ideas and the ally is called the profusion of ideas. This is why they had the intuition to dissociate what most of us do spontaneously: produce an idea and then criticise it. As we all know, with the Brain Storming technique, the first thing to do is to generate as many ideas as possible without criticizing them, and only when all the ideas have been expressed the criticizing and selection phase takes place. With this special issue we have tried to encourage a stage of idea production around the social representations theory. It remains for the readers to take charge of the criticism stage. We shall see what ideas will remain from all those presented here. Let's simply hope that they are as numerous as possible.

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Редакционная статья

Введение: эвристический потенциал теории социальных представлений


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Theoretical article

The Notion of Common and Social Representations

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Abstract. The recent emergence of social and political movements calling for “common sense” and the use of the notion of “common” in philosophy and social sciences has led to the opening of a reflection on the social and scientific representations concerning them. After having mentioned some political uses of the notions of “common sense” and “common”, we examine a notion that is closely associated with them: that of “community” on which S. Moscovici expresses a reserved position but introduces a new perspective on cyber-communities and the importance attached to affectivity in community groups. The ways of dealing with “common sense”, identified over time, from antiquity to the present day, highlight certain recurrences from a double perspective. From a typological point of view, several characterizations are distinguished: through simple sharing, through the sameness of moral values and emotional dimensions, through rooting in daily experience, through its devaluation as a form of knowledge in relation to science, through rationality, through its potential for revolt or on the contrary through conformity. From a conceptual point of view, common sense is analyzed as an epistemic characteristic of a group, in its content, formation, transmission, and role in social cohesion. The latest developments in the reflection highlight its link with democracy and populism. The term “common” of recent appearance is situated opposite the notion of common goods which, after having focused on material realities, now integrates the facts and practices of knowledge, being the subject of a specific domain: the commons of knowledge. The common appears as a new way of approaching social relationships and responds to the desire to introduce a relational, ethical and political dimension into the analysis of social and change processes. In this respect, the call to the common presents affinities with the approach of social representations. The examination of the different scientific and secular representations regarding the notions of community, common sense and common makes it possible to establish connections with the perspective of the study of social representations and to open the way for new investigations.

Key words: social representations, common, common sense, community

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“Terms circulate, but their meanings vary”.

Gramsci

“Human history is the long succession of synonyms for the same word; contradicting it is a duty”.

René Char

Introduction

The notion of “common” and those associated with it, “common sense” and “community”, are currently receiving, in various currents of philosophical, scientific and political thought, meanings that could feed into epistemological reflection. To the point that the shifts in meaning linked to their use offer themselves as an interesting space to undertake a study of social representation that covers both the field of scientific knowledge and that of current knowledge.

After having made a conceptual and historical review of the treatment of the terms “community” and “common sense”, this article will aim to identify the social representations that underlie discourses on the “common”, particularly in the field of politics. On this occasion, reference will be made mainly to the French situation. Indeed, given the importance of the place that should be given to the context for a detailed analysis of social representation, it seemed preferable to refer to a national space familiar to the author, one where it is easy to find material relevant to the research. This option is all the more justified since the material used includes references to international literature, particularly in English, and reflect the current state of thinking. Nevertheless, given the challenges involved in using these terms, and particularly the term “common”, there is no doubt that similar research can be undertaken in other national or political contexts.

Why study “common”?

A political phenomenon lies at the starting point of this question: the emergence of movements claiming to be “common” or taking a form of common practice, e.g. gathering in public places.

First there was the emergence of a new right-wing political movement called “common sense” (“sens commun”), formally claiming to be in the line of “*Gramsci, theorist of cultural warfare*”. This political association, affiliated to the right-wing UMP party that became “Les Républicains”, was created in 2013 following the “Manif pour tous” (“March for all”), which mobilized several hundred thousand people against abortion, homosexual unions, homoparentality, medically assisted procreation, gestational surrogacy, gender theory and school-based learning of traditional languages with communautarist risk. Transformed into a party in 2015, “common sense” aims to *bring back to the forefront the notion of the common good, by reconciling politics with reality*, to overcome *the cleavage between the elites and the people who have simple values* as one of its leaders says.

Another movement, “Les Veilleurs”, also stemming from the “Manif pour tous”, brought right-wing Catholics together, from 2013, around the “*common in-*

tuition that unjust orders are in place”, adopting a non-violent posture, with literary text readings and songs, in public places.

More recently, a conservative and sovereignist current of thought has been organized into a political force, calling on Orwell, his “*new language*”, his “*new-speak*”, and his analysis of the “*thought police – thinkpol*” as well as his concept of “*ordinary decency*”, another name for common sense (Bégout, 2008). The call to common sense rises up against the power of the “*Big Brother*”, assimilated to the “*media pack, showbiztics, art, human rights, fearsome phalanx from within our own nation, and yet entirely committed to the voluntary service of the Other*” (Raspail, 2011).

On the left, the “*Nuit debout*” (Standing up night) movement, launched in 2016, in the wake of the “*Indignados*” movement in Spain, claims to be part of the Paris Commune. It differs from previous left-wing movements in the call for civil disobedience and non-violence. The first post-Marxist rally, held in 140 French cities, it would then be echoed in other European and Asian countries that are protesting against the dictatorship of the markets and its consequences, against the political class, and defending the right to freedom, equality and a dignified life.

It is striking that, in these movements, the reference to “*common sense*” or “*common*” is used to serve both right-wing and left-wing ideologies. This raises questions about the semantic roots of these notions and their historical uses in philosophy and social sciences. The notion of “*common sense*” has a long history that goes back to Greek philosophy and has continued to attract the attention of researchers interested in social thought. On the other hand, the notion of “*common*” (in singular) is very recent in France, at least in the use made of it in scientific and social fields. Both refer incidentally to the term “*community*” which has been the subject of numerous publications since the second half of the 20th century and corresponds to a clearly identified term or even field of research in the social sciences and in particular in psychology, with community psychology (Jodelet, 2011).

However, there is something striking about the emergence of today's sustained interest in these notions: its extreme recency. We see the emergence of the “*common*” theme from 2000, but it is remarkable that 9 out of 10 of the sixty or so references to articles or books were published only between 2010 and 2017. Similarly, the number of publications on the notion of “*common sense*” has increased considerably over the past 30 years. A review of the references used in a historical inventory of publications, from the 18th century to 2007 (Rosenfeld, 2014) shows that 60% of the theoretical texts identified were published after 1990¹.

This appears to be an important area to explore, especially considering Moscovici's injunction to focus on emerging phenomena. Especially since this recommendation was implemented by Moscovici himself in a text in line with this specific issue and where he comments on the notion of “*community*” in relation to the use of digital networks, which will see that they constitute, with the domain of environment, the privileged places for a reflection on the “*common*”.

¹ This count only concerns the introduction of the cited book containing 37 references, incorporating the first texts published from the 18th century up to 2007.

Moscovici's position on communities

In a dialogue with the Italian sociologist Casalegno published in Italian in 2001², Moscovici is led to discuss the notion of “community”. He does not speak of “common”, a term which, to my knowledge, is not in his usual vocabulary, at least not as a noun. This transformation of the adjective form retained by Moscovici, into the substantive form observed today with regard to the grouping of actors, is an illustration of the objectification process, specific to social representations, and of the pragmatic incarnation of an idea or phenomenon resulting from social interaction.

On the other hand, in the face of that phenomenon of “community”, Moscovici adopts a position marked by two important features: scepticism towards the epistemic reality of communities; and the specification of the basis of what is termed “virtual community”. “*Theoretically,*” he says, “*we don't know what a ‘community’ is.*” However, he makes an exception for traditional societies and “religious or cultural groups”, characterized by strong stability, forms of living together, of co-acting, which are based on emotional ties and on the unity of place and time. In such cases, cohesion is ensured both by rituals, emotional ties that do not always imply harmony and by direct word-of-mouth communication, which has an institutive function. Otherwise, the idea of community would be a “*fantasy*” or “*myth*” and “*one should rather speak of unstable forms of aggregation or association*”.

This last remark applies especially to exchanges within digital networks, “*cyberspace*”, where participants are unaware of each other, having only one link between them: that of the representations they exchange. Moscovici uses William Gibson's description of cyberspace as a “*consensual hallucination*” where “*information, images, sounds, texts and masks circulate*”, forming a new culture: cyberculture. It conveys representations that can be instantly communicated and shared, resulting in a “*virtual community*”.

While a “real” community implies a contract, an institution, or a specific function, participation in the virtual community is expressed in a new way. Moscovici concludes that: “*The cyber is in itself the root of a new social representation that spreads in the flow of life, and perhaps, a new way of representing, or another kind of representation that can reach the depths of the common reality*”. Through this representation, “*shared language and feelings*” are built. As a result, the virtual community is demanding a new concept because “*we are dealing with a very recent phenomenon for which we do not know how it will evolve*”. A “*phenomenon in an embryonic state*”. It would be a type of “*representational sociability*” based on something fundamentally new characterized by links that are totally different from those of other sociabilities. We are confronted with a “*collective solipsism*” insofar as there is no real interaction. In addition, the Internet can be seen as a kind of “*mystical drug*”, creating something that is similar to a second state, a “*community in a trance*”. The “*magical*” aspect of this novelty lies in the fact that the use of technology is dissociated from knowledge.

² Text translated into French in 2005 and Portuguese in 2006.

The presentation of this text by Moscovici, retaining only what is in consonance with the problematics of this chapter, allows us to point out an original contribution of his thought and his way of proceeding to approach novelty. The innovations I will discuss here concern the notions of “common sense” and “common”. Regarding that of “community”, uses of the term that could be considered new, referring to religious communitarianism, do not fall within the scope of our inquiry. However, the fact that it has been widely studied in the social sciences deserves to be examined, especially to see if the emotional dimension that Moscovici detects in it is represented.

The notion of community in the social sciences

Indeed, in social science approaches to the notion of “community”, attention is focused on the norms that govern situations, social actions and social relationships. The latter are defined either in terms of power relations between dominant and politically or professionally dominated, or in terms of exclusion-inclusion relations between the same and the different. But the way of conceptualizing community, characterized by the sharing of a material or symbolic commodity, of the same origin, fate or activity, is very diverse and has evolved over time. Two main trends can be identified, one empirical and the other theoretical.

In some cases, communities are referred to as concrete social groups to which observation and intervention relate. These areas are then defined either by their territorial extension, or by the sharing of the same life-form, the same activity or the same culture, or by local and neighbouring relations that contribute to mold, through exchanges, a collective spirit. They may also be institutional organizations such as the family, school, hospital. The reference to the cultural and social norms that organize transactions within the community in question is therefore essential. An example can be found in the ecological model of Behavior setting, proposed by Barker (1968).

Other authors use the notion as a theoretical construct to provide a framework for objectifying social relations. The community is then treated as a symbolic and material space, with a memory loading, where social identity is molded and a sense of belonging and positive or conflictual interactions with members of its group and those of other groups are developed. This construct would promote an analysis of the link between the individual and society and would constitute an optimal approach to psychosocial phenomena, in particular those related to the development of knowledge through dialogical exchange in the public space (Jovchelovitch, 2006).

On the other hand, the theoretical construct refers to the utopian character or ideological operator status of the notion of community. Nisbet (1966/1984) showed that there is a correspondence between the advances of individualism and the revival of community utopias, and vice versa. The community then becomes a space of reference referring to past forms of socialization that can be negative or ideal. Thus, in the Enlightenment era, when the idea of a contract between free men and the struggle against injustice and exploitation was advocated, the idea of community was rejected because of its association with feudalism and medieval civilization. In the 19th century, forms of life based on tradition were opposed in the name

of economic rationality and administrative reform. At the same time, proponents of social conservatism defended the communitarian model threatened by individualism and rationalism. In recent modernity, community has become the subject of debate between those who support social progress and those who oppose modernization. In the second modernity, community life forms are nowadays sought in response to negative assessments of pessimistic observations about the evolution of the contemporary world. This perspective has been criticized as a comfortable but illusory refuge attitude in the face of the upheavals caused by globalization (Bauman, 2001).

Beyond this multiplicity of perspectives, it can be seen that, since Tonnies (1887/1977), the idea of “community” (*Gemeinschaft*), as organic solidarity, has been opposed to that of “society” (*Gesellschaft*), as mechanical solidarity. This opposition has been taken up and commented on by many thinkers from European and Anglo-Saxon countries. Moscovici himself draws inspiration from it in the commentary discussed above. More recently, the phenomenon of “community” or “communitarian” has been seen as a sign of a retreat into ethnic, cultural or religious particularities that isolates from the citizen community and universal values, republican or otherwise. This particularist indexation, particularly opposed in France, had already been stigmatized by sociologist Simmel (1908/2013) who saw in communities a danger preventing the individual from joining the values of universality.

Nevertheless, in the human sciences today, this term has a positive meaning associated with multiculturalism and the identity claims assumed by subjects enjoying freedom of choice. We can see (Wieviorka, 2008) the emergence of a new modernity where the opposition between the legacy of the Enlightenment and the attachment to traditions is diluted and where any national, cultural, linguistic or religious hegemony is challenged. This is where “community” and “common sense” and “common sense” connect.

To understand these connections, it is useful to examine how disciplines that use the notion of community specify it. In history, we will speak of a community for groups that have been formed over time, in a given place, and share the same culture and language. This global perspective is echoed in other human sciences (sociology or anthropology) when they refer to groups of people who live and act in the same space, such as the family, school, etc. or to groups sharing the same culture or history. Sociology adds extensions that are relevant to our purpose. On the one hand, the gathering behind shared values or interests, as is the case for communities that defend specific beliefs (religious or spiritual communities), identity or rights such as movements defending gender identities (e.g. LGBTI³ or feminist movements), or conditions (e.g. user groups in public institutions).

Finally, new conceptualizations regard scientific and technological research and innovation activities, from “scientific communities”, analysed today in terms of networks of actors (Latour, 1989) to “knowledge communities” (Dupouët et al., 2006), informal groupings around a question, a shared objective, based on volun-

³ Today, in addition to the acronym LGBT, I am added to designate Intersex people whose anatomical differences do not allow them to fall within the traditional definition of a man or a woman. This category would concern one person in 2000.

tary action and aimed at creating and maintaining knowledge in organizations or within virtual networks. These communities, also known as “knowledge” or “cognitive” communities, make it possible to exchange and transform know-how, to make tacit knowledge explicit in order to operationalize it to respond to specific requests. These relations of exchange will gradually create a common “identity” and be consolidated by the creation of shared social norms. The recent developments of a sociological approach to communities (ecological, identity defence or knowledge) as networks of relationships, make it possible to grasp how exchanges that engage between actors sharing the same activity, the same interest, the same objective can produce creative and autonomous collectives designated as “common”, and, consequently, develop new social representations.

To conclude this quick overview, it can be said that Moscovici's comments were pioneering, proposing to give importance to the affectivity neglected by the social sciences and engaging in the study of a new and specific type of community, the cyber communities. This calls for an incidental remark. In Moscovici's latest writings, we see the avenues for broadening the approach to social representations. With his texts on victimization, as underlines Jodelet (2015), he introduces a historical and ethical dimension into the analysis of social representations, advocating a “historical-ethical” approach. In his reflections on the community, he emphasizes the need to reintroduce an emotional dimension into his analysis. This is the marking of a field of exploration of social representations whose novelty is of great relevance for our time.

Novelty of a thematization

This novelty is confirmed by the examination of the concepts of common sense and common. As products of interaction, social representations have a “common” character of which it would be interesting to identify all the implications. Moreover, to the extent that the notions of “common sense” and “common” are thematized in a variable way according to periods or research trends, they prove to be an interesting object for a study of social representation.

The renewed interest in social reflection that these concepts are experiencing today has a direct impact on the scientific and political fields. Interestingly in these fields both concepts share a rare particularity: they receive antithetical meanings. There are positive and negative interpretations given, both in the scientific and social fields. Judgments made on common sense, based either on epistemological or moral reflection, exemplify this polarity.

Common sense knowledge and scientific knowledge are inseparable concepts whose boundaries often appear to be blurred. As a type of knowledge the validity of the former has been challenged by positivism with regard to scientific knowledge, while retaining its legitimacy as an object of scientific knowledge. Thus Durkheim, who denied any interest in common sense as a set of “pre-concepts”, makes collective representations a central object for sociology. The whole tradition of comprehensive sociology, since Weber, values common sense as an object of study, as Schütz states: “*the objects of thought constructed by the social scientist, in order to grasp social reality, must be based on objects of thought constructed by the common sense of men living daily in the social world. In this way,*

the constructions of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructions of the second degree, i.e. constructions of constructions made by actors on the social scene, whose behaviour the researcher must observe and explain according to the procedural rules of his science” (Schütz, 1998). Regarding the “common” we see opposing conceptions based on sharing and “living together” and the refutation of the existence of a “common world” in the name of pluralism of cultures and natures, relations with living worlds and spiritual worlds, the existence of pluriverses (Latour, 2011).

Could it be these two terms are controversial because they refer to realities relating to human modes of doing or being, spontaneous and shared, whether cognitive or practical? In any case, they favour the projection of representative constructs that may be interesting to examine in their genesis and contemporary use. Working together on the notions of “common” and “common sense” is a way of studying a representational system, whether in terms of its construction in the scientific world, among groups of researchers, or in terms of its political uses in public debates and within political parties.

About common sense

The notion of common sense has a long history (Guenancia, Sylvestre, 2006) that goes back to Aristotle. The latter considered it a sensitive capacity enabling to synthesize the various sensations that a subject receives from an object and, and classified it within practical wisdom, “phronesis”. This conception crossed time, to be found in H. Arendt (1991, 1995) who considers it a “*sixth sense that adjusts the other five to a common world*”. She socializes common sense, by posing that the reality of the perceived world is conditioned by the recognition that it appears in a similar way in others. Thus, the subject would exert his or her judgment as a member of a community, making common sense a general quality of the citizen (Gadamer, 1996).

In connection with this revival, common sense is today the object of sustained interest on the part of philosophers, sociologists and politicians who refer to some classical theorizations in philosophy, in particular: in Italy, Vico (1744); in France, Descartes (1637), Buffier (1704); in England, Paine (1776), or Reid (1785) who founded the Scottish School of Common Sense, Moore (1925); in Germany, Kant (1790). In the various theoretical texts, common sense receives contents, meanings, uses, and obeys principles that vary with times and cultures. It has been approached either from a typological point of view or from the point of view of its epistemic characteristics.

From a typological point of view, it can be:

- reduced to the simple fact of sharing;
- located at the origin of the social bond in that it is related to identical moral values, feelings, similar emotional dimensions;
- rooted in daily experience, and not ideological and thus valued in terms of expertise knowledge, and partisan spirit;
- referred, on the contrary, to current, vulgar knowledge, as opposed to scientific knowledge;
- underlined in its rationality, its universality, “the first degree of reason” as Reid wrote in the 18th century, and, as Boudon (2006) now defends it, as the em-

bodiment of a spontaneous rationality against the relativist current in the social sciences;

- representing the promise of an ideal of humanity and civility;
- associated with the idea of revolt, with the projection of a rational plan for the future calling into question the established authorities, as theorized by Paine who, in the 18th century, adopted a revolutionary posture both in the political field and in the field of religious beliefs and institutions;
- inducing conformity, to the point of constituting according to Bourdieu (1980) a “spectacular instrument” of domination.

Conceptually, common sense is distinguished from common knowledge in that it refers to “*social dispositions acquired to think, feel, move, and not to explicit mental states*” (Paternotte, 2017). Several variants have been distinguished as an epistemic characteristic of a group:

- “propositional” in that it refers to the beliefs of a group;
- “procedural”, in that we study how it is formed;
- “communicative”, in that we consider the way it is transmitted;
- “communautary” in that it refers to one's role within a group.

The diversity of these approaches, as well as the recent orientations of the reflections on common sense, nowadays leads to the fact that “*the very idea of common sense occupies a central place in political life and in particular in democracy*” to which it “*gives its popular face*” (Rosenfeld, 2014). As the pillar of democracy, in that it is “*the most political faculty of man*” (Arendt, 1991), common sense also provides the foundation and justification for the defence of the status quo and traditional values by the conservative and sovereignist right. It will also serve as a referent for populism, which Lanclau (2008) has shown to be characterized by the absence of a foundation on doctrinal principles. These shifts in meaning are due to the fact that notions of common and common sense are embedded in different and conflicting ideological references. This observation is an invitation to deepen their study as a space for meeting different types of scientific, political and social representation.

Commons and common goods

The emergence of the term “common”, and its use as a category of social and political analysis, came later and evolved. Initially, this term was used in the ecological movement and economic reflection of the 1980s. It was first used in the plural, the “commons”, in conjunction with that of “common goods”. It was then extended to digital media, new forms of induced communication, within social networks, via the Internet and virtual media. Recently it entered the political and ethical sphere, under the form of “common” in the singular.

The “common goods” refers to material, natural and cultural resources that are accessible to all, shared in common, not susceptible to private ownership. But unlike the latter, “commons” are not understood as pre-existing things to be managed by a community or a group of users. They refer to social relationships subject to rules of use, sharing or co-production that structure a common management (Dardot, Laval, 2010, 2014). To this extent, the “commons” are distinguished from the “common”, as a “social product” as currently developed by philosophy and the social sciences.

Although the first uses of the term “commons” date back to Roman antiquity and the English Middle Ages, the problems concerning it are of recent appearance in the social sciences. They spread from 1968 onwards, following an article by Harding entitled “The tragedy of commons”, which warned of the harmful consequences of a collective use of natural common goods, leading to an in-depth reflection on the governance of common goods (Ostrom, 2010). Moreover, these issues have been extended to the cultural sphere with the inclusion of the various arts, audiovisual and digital information and since 2007 to the “knowledge commons” to which I have already alluded. It is in this respect that I will focus on this subject before addressing the notion of common, as it is used in the social sciences and social philosophy in France.

The “commons of knowledge” (Hess, Ostrom, 2007) refer first and foremost to the digital forms of storage, sharing and collective access to knowledge and the social practice they generate. Moscovici referred to them in the text quoted above. But this text, dating from 2001 and centred on the form of communication implied by digital resources, could not take into account the contributions of the stream of study on knowledge commons, covering their supports (the different types of human collectives), their forms (scientific or profane) and their functions (scientific, cognitive or political). The field of study for which he called development now has contributions that enrich the problem.

While other common goods imply scarcity and are classified into four categories according to whether their use is exclusive or not, implies or not rivalry, the commons of knowledge are abundant, accessible to all, do not imply competition or constraining management, and can give rise to collective actions. This has led to alternative models of knowledge production in both the scientific and social spheres. This area is too vast to be explored here and would deserve special treatment, which may be of interest in the future.

Through this process, the treatment of the notion of common has become autonomous, integrating new connotations, broadening its use, with regard to objects (libraries, for example), practices of open collaboration (the “crowdsourcing” specific to cyberspace, for example), or social organizations related to knowledge and representations (communities of scholars or social movements, for example). This investment of the common by political and scientific discourses will be matched by a revival of references to the “popular”, conceived in original terms where economism and law are replaced by ethics and communication.

Of political and ethical uses of “common”

One of the particularities of the current use of the notion of common lies in its political and ethical dimensions. On the one hand, it is differentiated from the notion of the common good in that it is neither a good nor an object, but a “mobilization”, a political practice of actors who want to organize common social life (Douce, 2017). On the other hand, it is identified with the ordinary, the everyday, as it is experienced, thought of in the social environment. Emerson already said in 1837: “*I embrace the common, I explore the familiar, I am at their feet*”. Since 2010, the word “*ordinary*” has appeared more and more in the writings of political scientists (Larivière, Weisbein, 2017). With the identification of

the common in these terms, the “*popular*” returns as distinct from, and in opposition to, order emanating from state and entrepreneurial power, political parties or dominant groups. It will inspire contemporary social movements such as Occupy in the United States, Los indignados in Spain, Nuit Debout and Les gilets jaunes in France, the Arab Spring, the occupation of Taksim Square in Turkey, claiming to be part of a common mobilization against political and capitalist oppression. The common goes so far as to encourage citizen practices, mobilizing skills to achieve what is good and fair for the community, in a new form of governance. Thus, some municipalities, such as Barcelona in Spain and Bologna in Italy, are seeking to lay the foundations for a collaborative city. This movement tends to expand with the creation in 2016 of a “European Assembly of Commons”.

Finally, the idea of a common approach involves a new vision of the social (Collomb, 2011). Individuals are no longer thought of as isolated entities that connect. We no longer talk about interaction but of “intra-action”, according to the neologism coined by Barad (2007). While interaction presupposes separate entities before they interact, the concept of intra-action refers to the idea that individualities emerge through relationships and from being in relation. There is no longer a static social state, social relations governed by objective necessity, but relations in the making. This leads to the proposal of a new psychosociological perspective “methodological relationalism” making social relations the primary entities characterizing individuals and institutions (Corcuff, 2011).

Everything happens as if, in an ideological space where reflection in terms of class and class struggle, inspired by Marxism, has lost its hold, and where the alterglobalization movement is losing momentum, the common offered a new way of talking about social relations and establishing an approach that escaped liberalism and its avatars – commodification (linked to mercantilism), the power of multinationals (corporatization) and the expansion of private property (pro-pertization) – by introducing rules of use, sharing and co-production (Sauvêtre, 2014). The call to the common would open a “new age”, with the transition from critical analysis to the construction of alternative proposals.

It should be noted, however, that for some thinkers (Négri, Hardt, 2009), reflection on the common reconnects with a Marxist tradition. With the return of economic questions (work, poverty, crisis, etc.) would end a “sort of post-marxist cycle” (Haber, 2010), centred on gender and race relations, involving recognition. But it should be stressed that this reintroduction of the importance of work gives way to intersubjectivity. This is based on communication. This new orientation is particularly represented in the professions of care, maintenance and education, which are considered as an “*expansion of the common*” and are classified as immaterial work, or as “*production of the common*” (Laugier, 2011).

An illustrative example of this process is the “care” which is “*the basis of the concrete manufacture of the common*”, conceived as a “*city of words*”. This implies a “*democratic conversation*” giving voice to those in subordinate or marginalized positions, demanding attention to others, a sensitivity to vulnerability and responsibility. All these proposals lead to a new conception of relationships and the social as an organization that unleashes the power of the common, through communication. Thus, the common, arising with environmental concerns,

in the void left by the great stories heralding progress, in the bitterness caused by the failures of liberal democracy, offers itself as a recourse for political consciousness. While it can serve as a mask to cover, in the spirit of the times, the populist currents of the right and left, it is recognized by the social sciences as a new form of sociality that brings hope.

Conclusion

Regarding the schools of thought of which a picture has just been sketched, certainly a very limited and non-exhaustive one, but targeting the pivotal points in the development of the idea of common, we can only be struck by the coincidence with the lines drawn by Moscovici for the development of our field of research. The rehabilitation of everyday thought, the role of exchange and social communication, intersubjectivity, reliance of the subject on the Other, etc., meet central themes in the approach to social representations. Of course, it is regrettable that no reference is made to the contribution of our field of study, as I had the opportunity to do with the latest sociological contributions on social thought (Jodelet, 2018).

But we can only be pleased to note the centrality of our perspective in the most recent developments in scientific thought on social issues. It remains for us to contribute to this debate by adjusting the themes of our research to the hottest questions of our contemporaneity. More specifically, one could focus on the place and role of social representations seen both as a product and as a process of the common. In examining the social representations of collective social practices or produced by them, one could examine in greater depth the criteria according to which groups are conceived or conceived themselves as common or communities, the substrate provided by belief systems and ideological options for the construction of a common vision of social and political reality, the models of thought and the representations of socio-political practice that result from them.

A final remark concerning the community of study of social representations. One of the possible side effects of looking at the common issue is to think about our scientific community. At Moscovici's request, the Serge Moscovici World Network (Réseau Mondial Serge Moscovici: REMOSCO) was created to replace the European Laboratory of Social Psychology at the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme. Would it not be useful to use this institutional framework to share our knowledge scattered across different countries? In other words, through our collective collaboration, we can build one of these “knowledge commons” that would allow us to share our knowledge and encourage exchanges between researchers who often work, in different contexts, on similar problems and would benefit from the mutual contributions of their colleagues? This spin-off of our community collaboration could produce innovative scientific effects, as the symposium from which this book is derived illustrates.

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Понятие «общее» и социальные представления

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Аннотация. Недавнее появление социальных и политических движений, которые призывают к «здравому смыслу» (*common sense*), и использование понятия «общее» (*common*) в философии и социальных науках инициировали интерес автора к размышлениям о социальных и научных представлениях, касающихся этих понятий. Вслед за обсуждением ряда политических коннотаций понятий «здравый смысл» и «общее» будет рассмотрено понятие, которое тесно связано с ними, – «сообщество» (*community*). В отношении этого понятия С. Московиси выражает сдержанную позицию, однако предлагает новый взгляд на киберсообщества и важность, придаваемую аффективности в группах сообщества. Рассматриваются два основных способа трактовки понятия «здравый смысл» в исторической перспективе от античности до наших дней. С типологической точки зрения принято различать ряд очень разных характеристик, присущих и объясняющих «здравый смысл»: через сведение его к факту простого разделения мнений в обществе; через исходную социальную близость, связанную с идентичностью моральных ценностей и эмоциональных измерений; через укорененность в повседневном опыте; через его девальвацию как формы знания по отношению к науке; через подчеркивание его рациональности; через акцентирование его потенциала для восстания и революционных взглядов или, наоборот, через трактовку его как индустрирующего конформность в обществе. С концептуальной точки зрения «здравый смысл» анализируется как эпистемологическая характеристика группы в ее содержании, формировании, передаче опыта и роли в социальной сплоченности. Современные воззрения подчеркивают его связь с демократией и популизмом. Понятие «общее», появившееся в последнее время, все чаще встречается в сочетании с понятием «общие блага» (*common goods*), изначально фокусирувавшимся на материальных реалиях, теперь же – объединяющим факты и практики знания, являясь предметом определенной области – общего знания. Таким образом, «общее» появляется как новый способ подхода к социальным отношениям, что соответствует стремлению ввести отношенческое, этическое и политическое измерения в анализ социальных процессов и процессов изменения. В этом отношении призыв к исследованию «общего» имеет сходство с подходом социальных представлений. Изучение различных научных и обыденных представлений о понятиях общности, здравого смысла и общего позволяет установить связи с перспективами изучения социальных представлений и обозначить пути для новых исследований.

Ключевые слова: социальные представления, общее, здравый смысл, общность

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Сведения об авторе:

Жоделе Денис, Ph.D., почетный руководитель исследований Высшей школы социальных наук (Париж, Франция). Как социальный психолог, специализирующийся на изучении социальных представлений, она руководила многими исследовательскими проектами и докторскими диссертациями (прежде всего, связанными с проблематикой социальных представлений относительно окружающей среды, здоровья, памяти, религии и искусства), выполняемыми в лаборатории социальной психологии Высшей школы социальных наук. Сменила на посту ее основателя Сержа Московиси. За долгие годы работы она установила тесное научное сотрудничество с коллегами из различных университетов Европы, Латинской и Южной Америк, Азии и Африки. Денис Жоделе опубликовала много книг и научных статей теоретического и эмпирического характера, посвященных исследованиям социальных представлений относительно психического здоровья и безумия, телесности и физического здоровья, памяти, окружающей среды и др. В настоящее время она занимается проблемами конструирования смысла, уделяя особое внимание иконической составляющей социальных представлений. E-mail: denise.jodelet@wanadoo.fr



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Theoretical article

Social Representations and Individual Representations: What is the Difference? And Why are Individual Representations Similar?

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Abstract. This paper clarifies a long-standing ambiguity in the notion of social representations; it provides a clear operational definition of the relation between social representation and individual representation. This definition, grounded in the theory of sets, supports most current empirical investigation methods of social representations. In short, a social representation of an object in a population is the mathematical set of individual representations the individuals of that population have for this object. The components of the representation are the components used to describe this set, *in intension* in the mathematical sense of the term (in contrast with a definition *in extension*). Statistical techniques, as well as content analysis techniques, can construct such components by comparison of individual representations to extract commonalities, and that is what classic investigations on social representations indeed do. We then answer the question: how come that, in a given culture, individuals hold individual representations that are so similar to one another?

Key words: social representations, individual representations, installation theory, intersubjective understanding of objects

The intersubjective understanding of objects

Experience shows that members of a population each hold similar individual representations of many “objects” of their culture. By “objects”, I mean material objects (chairs, bottles...), material compounds of “things that move together” (a suit, a fleet ...), conceptual objects (space, time, democracy...) and even heterogeneous compounds that “go together” (city, hospital, dinner...). This can be easily checked: people are able to name objects properly (“this is a chair”), cooperate locally using indexicals (“pass me the salt please”) or even communicate complicated arrangements of complex objects (e.g. “discharge this patient from the hospital tomorrow”).

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So, (1) we are able to connect a phenomenon external to our mind (the “object”) to a mental structure internal to our mind (the “representation”) that matches the object in some structural or functional manner, such that the representation will enable recognition of the object and acting upon it in a relevant manner, and (2) for a given object, different individuals in each culture appear to each hold similar representations, to the effect they can communicate and act in a relevant manner about that object.

Let us call this phenomenon (empirical facts 1+2 above) *the intersubjective understanding of objects* as we need a shorthand to discuss the nature of social representations. That Intersubjective Understanding of Objects (IUO) is not merely about communication. It comes with the constructivist assumption that participants refer to “the same Object”. When I say “pass me the salt” to my neighbor at the dinner table, we *both* assume that we talk about *this* little container of white powder on the table. That seems obvious. Now if I tell my neighbor in the voting line “please vote for the best candidate for democracy” we realize that the agreement on “What You Think is What I Think” is not so trivial, since my predicate “best candidate for democracy” can refer to different objects of the world for me and my fellow citizen in the voting line. Still, intersubjective understanding works well enough for most everyday objects; and therefore this” psycho-social pact” that “What you See is What I See” (“the implicit agreement by which the Participants agree that their respective individual views refer to a single object” (Lahlou, 2006)) is at the root of our social construction of reality, and of the naïve realism that is the implicit assumption behind our everyday life interactions.

While the above IUO may appear obvious as an empirical fact, in practice that means members of a culture each individually house “similar” mental representations for thousands of “objects”; that is remarkable and *a priori* improbable. This improbable fact nevertheless grounds our capacity to act as members of a culture, grounds the IUO. How come we different individuals have similar representations? This problem of “common knowledge” and “common sense” has been theorized extensively by Serge Moscovici and his school, with the concept of “social representations” since his seminal work (Abric, 1994; Doise, Palmonari, 1986; Duveen, Lloyd, 1990; Farr, 1987; Flament, 1994; Herzlich, 1969; Jodelet, 1989b, 1991; Moscovici, 1961, 1976).

Social representations are:

- “a form of practical knowledge linking a subject to an object” (Jodelet, 1989a; my translation. – *S.A.*);
- “it is a form of knowledge, socially elaborated and shared, with a practical aim and contributing to the construction of a reality common to a social set” (Jodelet, 1989a; my translation. – *S.A.*).

These definitions highlight that a social representation has an object, and a population of subjects using this representation in intentional manner regarding that object.

To facilitate the discussion below, let us fix a few definitions:

- the *Object* of representation is what the representation “is a representation of”: in practice what the representation *stands for* in thought or communication. E.g., the Object of “the representation of psychoanalysis” is: psychoanalysis;
- the *Population* is the set of individual subjects who use this representation.

The representation appears “social” in two aspects: in its genesis, as it is *socially constructed*, and also in that IUO property described above, that it seems, empirically, to be “*common*” to all members of a Population who can identify it as such in practice (“*this is the Object!*”). In practice, IUO can be built into an empirical test that members of a Population refer to the same Object (Moliner, 1993).

The phenomenon that members of a culture apparently give the same name to the same “thing”, or connect the same Object to their individual representation, has often been described as members of a culture “sharing” representations. In fact, individuals do not “share” the representations, they each merely host similar individual representations, just as two people wearing the same model of shoes do not “share” their shoes: they merely each own similar shoes.

Alas the seminal texts on social representations failed to address the ontological issue clearly: there seemed to be no ontological difference between social representations and individual (mental) representations. In fact, reading them one could assume that social representations were a specific type of individual, mental, representation: the ones that were “shared”, and by this we should understand that each individual would house his or her own exemplar of “the” social representation, just like at some point in history each good Chinese citizen would have his/her own copy of Mao’s little red book. This seems acceptable if every individual would hold *the exact same representation*. Then there would be no need to distinguish individual representation from social representation.

But this it does not fit with the empirical evidence. Different persons do hold slightly different individual representations of the Object. This seems at first a detail, but the devil is in the detail. Because what is not *exactly* identical is *ontologically* different. So, would there be as many social representations as there are individuals in the Population? Henceforth we do not know what “social representation” we talk about if there are many different ones. Researchers using the social representations concept have all, including from the very start Moscovici himself, been confronted to that problem.

Individual differences in representation

To clarify, let us look more closely at the empirical process of studying social representations. To analyze social representations (SR) of the Object, what we collect are individual representations (IR) of the Object. Typically, members of the Population are asked to describe the Object, through interviews, questionnaires or some other device. The social representation is then usually considered what is “common” to those discourses collected. Indeed, usually there are many similarities between the material collected on the various individuals. There are also some differences. The empirical finding that individual versions of a social representations are somewhat different must be accounted for since individuals are supposed to have “the same” social representation. This generated a series of theoretical responses which were operational in practice but, as I argue below, are epistemically inappropriate.

Moscovici was the first to encounter the problem of differences in IR. He addressed that issue by considering there are different types of social representations, depending on their stage of development. The representations can be Hegemonic,

Emancipated or Polemical (Moscovici, 1988), depending on the degree of consensus (in practice: of similarity) of individual representations of the Object among the Population. Remember the theory initially addressed unfamiliar Objects that would be made familiar through the construction of a social representation. For example, when a new Object enters the social field (e.g. Psychoanalysis, AIDS) there might be some conflicting views in different segments of the Population, hence several competing versions of the (“polemical”) social representation. But in the end, when the social group has reached some consensual view, the representation may become hegemonic (everybody has the same IR). So, the differences would simply account for SR in the making, fully bloomed SRs would be hegemonic: everyone hosts the same.

But in fact, there always remain some differences in a Population regarding an Object, especially according to socio-economic status. Willem Doise came up with the notion of position taking (Doise, 1986) regarding the Object (“prises de position”): this may account for the fact that in practice we collect different versions from different subjects, even for Objects that have been around for a long time. In other words, for the problem at hand here (but of course that is a caricatural interpretation of Doise’s excellent work which sheds important light on the nature of representations) there would be different representations because there are different Populations, each having its own perspective. Still, as in the detail everyone hosts a slightly different representation, there would be in full rigor as many Populations as individuals?

Another empirical issue occurred. It turns out that even the same person can mobilize different IR of the Object in different circumstances. For example, one might exhibit a scientifically correct representation but, in some cases, use another one (e.g., magical, religious, traditional, etc.) To address this issue, Moscovici, in his seminal book on social representations, came up with the notion of “cognitive polyphasia” (Moscovici, 1976. P. 282): the idea that different kinds of knowledge, possessing different rationalities can coexist in an individual or a population. That notion, while locally dealing with the empirical facts, raises serious epistemic issues: if there is polyphasia, which of the various versions “is” the social representation? Or are there different objects? Interestingly, Moscovici writes a series of caveats about the limitations of theories in general¹ and suggests that much research remains to be done on social representations.

Finally, it was noted empirically that the representations that are given explicitly by people are in some cases not exactly what they think. Respondents tend to give investigators “politically correct” versions of the representation – a case of the desirability bias, and more generally of the responses bias where respondents tend to tell the researcher what they think the researcher wants to hear (Rosenthal, 1966). For example, respondents would not make explicit that their representation of the unemployed people includes laziness. Abric and collaborators described this as the “mute zone” of social representations (Abric, 2003a). This draws our attention to the idea that what we observe empirically are IR *expressed* by indi-

¹ “Une théorie ne recouvre jamais les données empiriques. Elle est débordée et les déborde” (Moscovici, 1976. P. 289).

vidual subjects, while “social representations” are a research construct, designed to address the phenomenon of mutual social understanding (IUO).

In short, the assumption has usually been made that the observables (subjects’ discourse) are of the same nature as the construct (social representation). This assumption is not explicit in the literature; but it is clear, from the way the empirical material (usually discourse, or items of discourse) is collected, analyzed, and directly used into the description of the social representation, that we act as if these two entities (IR expressed by subjects, and SR constructed by the researcher) were made of the same epistemic fabric. I will argue here that it is not the case.

A formal definition of social representations, and two ways they can be described

As noted above, there is ambiguity in the core texts regarding the epistemic status of social representations; this has been noted many times, right from the early days of the theory’s success (Billig, 1988; Jahoda, 1988; McKinlay, Potter, 1987; Potter, Edwards, 1999; Potter, Litton, 1985; Potter, Wetherell, 1987). The lack or formalism in the definitions allows looseness in the discussion. The confusion between individual and social representation has been detrimental to the advancement of the theory. So let us clarify here.

An Individual representation (IR) of an Object *O* is a symbolic structure that an individual subject uses to deal cognitively with the Object. This structure “stands for” the Object in thought, communication and action. A representation can be embodied (in the form of neural network); it can be projected onto some medium or support (speech, writing, drawing), etc.

A Social representation (SR) of an object O in the population P is the set of individual representations of O in the population P. E.g., the social representation of “Contraception” in the UK will be the full set of all IR of what contraception is for the members of the British population (a set of more than 60 million IR).

IR and SR are different *in nature and logical type*. IRs are included in the SR, but the SR is *not* an IR. A set cannot be an element of itself. So, no individual can “have” a SR, *individuals can only have IRs*.

Still, as IRs of a given Object in a Population tend to be similar, each individual usually does hold an IR that has characteristics similar to the modal or the mean IRs in the population. I. e. the components of that specific individual’s IR will usually be similar to those of the other individuals in the population. E.g. most individuals in the population will know that “contraception” has something to do with avoiding reproduction when having intercourse, and most people will be aware of the usual means for this (pill, condoms etc.) But there will be individual variations in knowledge and attitude, and variations in practice, between individuals and even for a given individual according to circumstances; there will also be variations in what people say about it and likely there will be some mute zones (e.g. depending who subjects talk to); etc.

So how can we describe social representations properly? Mathematically, in the theory of sets (Cantor, 1874; Halmos, 1974; Runde, 2005) a set can be described in *intension* or in *extension*. An *intensional* description defines a set by

some properties (predicates) of its elements (usually a rule or semantic description; necessary and sufficient conditions). E.g. an *intensional* definition of “Birds” could be “Animals with wings”: $\{x \mid x \in \text{Animals}: x \text{ has wings}\}$. An *intensional* definition of the clients of a Bank B would be the list of holders of an account in that bank $\{x \mid x \text{ has an account in Bank B}\}$.

An *extensional* definition explicitly lists all the individual elements of the set. An *extensional* definition of the clients of a bank would be the listing of all the names of these clients. Extensional definitions are accurate and explicit, nevertheless they usually (unlike for the Bank B case above) become impractical for large sets. E.g., an *extensional* definition of birds would be the (very long) list of all the individual birds on the planet (millions of individuals).

The problem with describing social representations

Social representations, as any set, can be defined in *intension* or in *extension*. In practice, because of the huge size of the sets of human Populations, SRs are defined in *intension*. This definition is empirically obtained through statistical techniques, by inferring the properties of the social representation from a sample of the set.

Individual mental representations are observable empirically, for instance by asking a sample of individuals to talk about the object (e.g., “If I tell you ‘Democracy’, what comes to your mind?”). From this sample one extracts (through content analysis) a description of the elements of the set of IRs. Then one infers statistically the *intensional* definition of the set. For example, the SR of “Studying” is found by (Lheureux et al., 2008) to contain the following cognitive components: *Knowledge, Investment, Diploma, Culture, Future, Work, Job, Long term, University*; this is obtained through questionnaires filled in by a sample of students. The set (SR) can then be described in *intension* by these components which are characteristic of the elements (IRs) of the set.

What is tricky is that, when we describe the SR, we use words to refer to content traits, just as we do use words when we describe IRs. For example: “Knowledge”, “Diploma”, “Culture”, “University” are typical components of *individual* representations of “Studying”; and it is the same words we use to describe the components of the *social* representation of Studying. This is dangerous because there is a difference in *logical type* (Russell, 1908; Whitehead, Russell, 1962) between IR and SR; and making confusions between logical types brings errors and paradoxes.

If we do not distinguish properly, with the right formalism, between the element (IR) and the set (SR), we may attribute to the SR (the set) properties that lay in the element (IR), and vice-versa. While for some properties that is not problematic, for others that is a recipe for disaster. Rom Harré aptly spotted the issue in a critic of social representation theory (Harré, 1984):

“The weight of an army is a distributive property, while its organization is a property of the collective. As far as I can see, the concept of *représentation sociale* is used by the French school as a distributive property of groups”.

Let us illustrate with the analogous problem of the biological species. We could account for the fact that in the species of Dogs there are small and big

dogs by saying that the species is Polemical and not Hegemonic, or account for the fact that not all dogs bark when observed by calling “barking” a mute zone of the species, etc. But describing the Dog species as a population is a more rigorous approach because it acknowledges the various factors of diversity in the population. We do not need to invent names of properties for the Dog species (the set) to account for the distribution of some *individual* characteristics (e.g., size) across elements of the species (individual dogs).

Defining social representations as the set of individual social representations is a clean epistemic solution to the problem of the relation between IR and SR. Interestingly, this theoretical clean-up has little practical implication on the way social representations research is done, because researchers have in their empirical practice always acted as if the SR is a set of IR.

Indeed, as said above, when a set is described, it is done so usually *in intension* as the list of common properties of the elements of the set (“a Mammal”, “that barks”, etc.). And *in practice* social representation specialists do indeed extract these common properties by comparing individual representations. That is precisely extracting a representative sample of the set of individual representations – implicitly acting as if the social representation was that set- and then finding commonalities of the elements of that set, to infer an intensional definition of the set based on these commonalities.

Nevertheless, this clarification has theoretical implications, and considering SR as sets it is necessary to take an evolutionary perspective (Lahlou, 2015). Indeed it is through the variation of individual representations that the social representation evolves, just as a natural biological species (e.g. Finches) evolves as a population through the variation of individuals. That is why this new definition, which is operational in practice *and* epistemically appropriate, should be used. It is also, as we’ll hint below with the theory of the medium (Bachimont, 2004), essential to understand how the characteristics of the individual influence the operation of the representation and its processing into action.

In passing, our definition clarifies in terms of statistical distribution what are the different types of social representation – hegemonic vs polemical etc. In hegemonic representation the set has little variance, while in polemical representations there will be subsets of the population that are homogeneous as a subset but differ markedly from the other subsets. And for “cognitive polyphasia”: a given individual can have several IRs of the “same” Object, which they use alternatively according to the circumstances in which the Object appears (e.g., the same person might use different contraception methods depending on the situation).

A social representation is more than a set of similar representations

The theory of sets brings us useful formalism to distinguish the nature and logical type of social vs individual representations. Nevertheless it does not do justice to what a SR is: a SR is more than a set of similar IR. It gathers IR that are linked both functionally (to their Object) and socially (to their Population).

The IRs that constitute an SR emerged to facilitate action and communication about an Object of the life-world, among a specific population (e.g. how British people should deal with contraception, how students and teachers should deal

with education, etc.) That is the *intersubjective understanding of objects* (IUO) alluded to in introduction. Therefore, those IR of the same SR all point to the same empirical phenomenon “out there” and their content is designed for operational effectiveness of the representation, for practice and communication. Simply said, representations must “match” reality well enough to enable the Population to deal efficiently with the Object.

IRs are not independent of each other within the Population. In practice, as members of the population communicate and cooperate, their IRs crossbreed: there is discussion, controversy, influence, education. That stirring facilitates homogeneity of the set of IRs.

These two aspects (functional and social) are intertwined because practice is a social process. In society, people communicate-and-act all-together-in-the-same-movement.

To sum up, a SR is a set of IRs which are linked together because they refer to the same Object in a given Population. They are connected together by the social practice of that Object in that Population, and they are linked to the Object and the Population by the process of social construction of the Object, by which practice continuously reconstructs the Object.

There is inevitably variability between the IRs, within individuals and across individuals. The variability reflects the different practices which different members of the population have with the object, across time and space. Still this variability is limited by the functional constraints of practice and communication, as those who actually co-interact with the object must have a minimum of common ground to interact. These functional restrictions ensure the coherence of the SR into more than a random set of similar IRs. That is why SR differ from “memes” (Dawkins, 1976), and more generally why Social Representations theory is different from the naïve approach of “shared” representations, which considers a set of multiple replicated occurrences of a single representation, “copies” distributed over a population.

That was a clarification of what has for too long being ambiguity in the theory. Defining social representations as sets of IRs is consistent with the very spirit of the concept. In fact, as noted above, all the empirical work on social representation is implicitly based on the idea that a social representation is a set, of which the characteristics are obtained by sampling elements (individual representations) from that set, and describing their characteristics based on what traits they have in common, which is typically the process of describing a set *in intension*. Retrospectively, the definition of SR as sets of IRs provides solid epistemological ground for all techniques that describe SR based on surveys on samples of IR – in fact the immense majority of the studies in the field. So, we do not have to throw out the baby with the bathwater: most empirical work on social representations lays on solid epistemic ground – even though the theory was ambiguous.

Why individual representations are similar?

Now we have a proper definition of a SR, we can address the question behind the intersubjective understanding of objects: how come that, in a given culture, individuals all hold individual representations that are so similar to one another?

Individual representations can be learned by education, by communication and by practice. In the two first cases, it is obvious that representations are in some way replicated from one individual to another, and therefore will be similar, albeit minor losses in translation. Diffusion of IR through these mechanisms accounts for similarity between individual representations among members of the same culture (Lahlou, 1996; Sperber, 1996).

But that does not cover all cases. Individuals who have never communicated may have similar representations. Furthermore, mere communication only provides theoretical knowledge of the object; but in many cases direct experience is necessary to support actual practice, as is well known in instruction and training. Let us now look at construction of representations through practice.

The relation of representation to practice is (under various names and guises) a major topic in social science. Let us try to summarize in a paragraph what we know. In society, practices and representations reproduce each other (Berger, Luckmann, 1966; Bourdieu, Passeron, 1977; Giddens, 1984). During social interaction, individuals learn to behave properly (Goffman, 1974; Mead, 1972; Rogoff, 2003; Schütz, 1944). They acquire a common knowledge and skills, about local practices, typical of a culture (Abric, 1994; Bruner, 1999; Durkheim, 1898; Foucault, 1978; Jodelet, 1989b; Moscovici, 1961; Vygotsky, 1986). This knowledge is embodied in individuals and expressed in symbolic form (Barsalou, 2003; Freud, 1895; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Lashley, 1951). Then, once embodied, in situation knowledge and skills, combined with mediating structures distributed in context, produce practices (Barker, 1968; Cicourel, 1992; Hutchins, 1995; Maturana, Varela, 1980; Pea, 1993; Suchman, 1987).

As we see, the (re)production of representations involves the context and action in context; so that is where we must look for an explanation beyond education and communication.

The short answer to our question is that members of a given Population hold similar representations because they interact with similar objects (those objects that make the life-world of that Population). But furthermore there are mechanisms that *channel* individuals to learn, through similar practice, similar representations.

Indeed, we could assume that, by trial and error, every individual would gradually construct, of a given Object, its own IR of that Object. Then, as all members of the Population interact with the same object, they would in the end converge. But trial and error is a slow process, and convergence is not guaranteed. Anyway, investigation shows that is not how things are done. There are socially constructed devices, “installations”, which channel behavior of members of a given population into predictable, typical, sequences. These installations include material affordances that guide action and social mechanisms of feed-back that reward those who use “proper” representations vs “improper” ones.

Installation theory

In society, individual behavior is predictable. Full grown members of a Population know how to behave in standard social situations such as “a dinner”, “at the dentist”, “a flea market”, “a shower”, “an election”, “a tribunal”, “a wed-

ding”, “a conference”, etc. Sometimes we only know approximately, but when in situation the context and other people give us enough scaffolding and feed-back to channel us into the proper behavior. Let us call *installations the specific, local, societal settings where humans are expected to behave in a predictable way* (a dinner, an election, etc.)

Installations consist of a set of components that simultaneously support and control individual behavior. The components are distributed in three layers: a) over the material environment (affordances²), b) the subject (embodied competences) and c) the social space (institutions³, enacted and enforced by other subjects). These components assemble at the time and place the activity is performed.

Installations channel individual behavior. The affordances provide feed-forward and feedback. Representations and other embodied skills allow the subject to interpret the objects and the situation. Finally social feed-back funnels behavior into what is expected: proper behavior is reinforced by positive feed-back while improper behavior is extinguished by negative feed-back. Through the social feed-back (and also the outcome of behavior), operant conditioning takes place which facilitates embodiment of “what should be done in such situations”. For a detailed description, see (Lahlou, 2017).

Let us take a simple example: when you take the train, from the moment you enter the station to the moment you step out of your destination station on arrival, you take very few personal decisions: your behavior is channeled by a series of successive installations that guide and constrain your actions. You follow the flow. You still have some choices (which train, which car, which seat), but they are socially constructed. Affordances limit your options: you can only use the doors, tracks and seats provided. Then again you are limited by conventions (you must sit on your assigned seat, otherwise someone will ask you to do so). You have some freedom of action as you seat, but you are mostly supposed to seat quietly. Etc. In the end, you behave “properly” as a train passenger. Installations channel behaviors by two complementary mechanisms: constructive and restrictive. In a constructive manner, they offer, suggest and support specific behaviors. In a restrictive manner, they prevent some behaviors and repress those considered inappropriate. This ensures that everyone behaves as expected, a condition for cooperation. Cooperation is essential in a society, and social representations are a major instrument for cooperation (Lahlou, 2001). Most peculiar is this installation makes *everyone* behave properly, in a similar fashion that fits the cultural script of travelling by train”, whatever their age, gender, nationality, religion, social status, personality etc. Therefore, we can see installations can supersede all classic social, psychological, or economic variables. That is how installations manage to homogenize representations in a population.

² “Roughly, the affordances of things are what they furnish, for good or bad, which is what they afford the observer. ...they are ecological, in the sense that they are properties of the environment relative to an animal. <...> Affordances do not cause behavior but constrain or control it” (Gibson, 1982).

³ “[An institution is] a cluster of social usages. It connotes a way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people. ...The function of each is to set a pattern of behavior and to fix a zone of tolerance for an activity or a complement of activities” (Hamilton, 1932).

Note that IRs are embodied competences about a specific Object. Therefore, they are part of installations, they are a component of the embodied layer.

The three layers of installations (affordances of the material environment, embodied competences in the subject, and social regulation by institutions) each limit and constrain behavior and leave open only some pathways. As the three layers act simultaneously, the paths that behavior can take are the ones that are compatible with each of the three layers (what is possible, what is thinkable, and what is allowed), which leaves only a rather narrow set of possibilities. Furthermore, the redundancy of the layers of determination makes installations very resilient. The resilience comes from the redundant combination of the constraining power of the three layers of their components. Where one layer of determination fails to scaffold and control, others may repair. For example, if in the train you sit by error in the wrong car, someone will likely tell you and point you to the right seat, as also indicated on your ticket. This means that where the embodied layer fails, the physical layer (affordances) and the social layer (social feed-back) may kick-in and repair.

There are many types of social regulation that produce embodiment of skills that are conform to social expectation: Role and status, Imitation, Conformity and zeal, Seeking guidance, Instruction and guidance, Influence and persuasion, Vigilante effect, Force and threat (Lahlou, 2017. Pp. 132–159). For a detailed description of how installations construct and reconstruct through practice embodied competences in general and representations in particular, refer to (Lahlou, 2017. Pp. 175–289). In short, installations produce similar individual experience, and hence similar IRs. This similarity is reinforced by communication, often prepared by education and training. And in return, the representations contribute to rebuild the installation and the Object, in a chicken-and-egg manner. I have no space to discuss further that point here.

Individuals learn their IRs through practice. The IR of an Object is built by the various types of experiences connected to that Object (e.g. one will learn about Democracy through experiences of votes, collegial discussions, elections etc.) For many aspects of social life, practice is channeled by installations. So most these experiences about the Object tend to be channeled by installations; hence the IR of an Object tends to be constructed by the series of relevant installations present in a culture. Because installations are resilient, they induce similar behavior in all individuals that use them (e.g. all students will get similar experience of Studying because schools are similar). Of course, education and communication, through vicariant experience and stories, contribute to organize individual experience into similar frameworks and to enshrine them into common language and discourse; but the connection between representation and practice is usually formatted by installations and within practice inside in installations. In this perspective, *installations are a distributed formatting system for representation and practice that imprints similar IR into the members of a given Population.*

So, in large scale societies, installations are similar across a society (schools, airports, etc. are similar across the territory used by the Population). By using these installations, members of a Population are channeled into standard behaviors,

and therefore they get similar experience, *embodied* through operant conditioning, and hence they embody similar IR.

The embodied aspect of representations is essential for practice because practice is the articulation of the individual representation in situation, and this articulation combines components of the bodily support with components of the context (Lahlou, 1998. Pp. 69–83). In this movement, the subject extracts from the environment components that match her motives and enacts a behavior stemming from her representations but adapted to the affordances of the situation. E.g., a hungry European subject will eat an apple or a sandwich, depending on what is available; but not a live slug, even though that may be comestible, because a slug does not match the social representation of “food” in that Culture. The reaction of disgust coming from the bodily medium, as well as the sensation of hunger, coming from the same, are essential in such process.

More generally the consideration of the support medium of the representation is essential to the understanding of the functioning of the representation because the nature of the medium does condition the transformation of the structure into a process.

For such considerations, the theory of the medium (“*théorie du support*”) by Bachimont comes handy. It states that (Bachimont, 2004):

- knowledge is the ability to carry out an action for a given purpose (p. 65);
- all knowledge is in its genesis the interpretation and manipulation of a material medium (p. 63);
- the material properties of the inscription medium condition the intelligibility of the inscription (p. 78);
- a thought is a reformulation carried out by the consciousness on the bodily medium which is the body-subject (p. 77).

For example, the notion of “mute zone” of representations comes from the fact that there are, in the same bodily medium that hosts the IR of concern, other IR and cognitive processes that condition and filter the expression of the representation in each situation. As actions are executed by individuals, and not by a population, the relevant unit of analysis for the transformation of representations into action and vice-versa is the individual, as that is the unit inscription of representation and ascription of agency, rather than the Population. And at this point, using epistemically correct definitions of representations, whether IR or SR, is essential.

Conclusion

A social representation (SR) is a set of individual representations (IRs) of an Object by members of a Population of subjects who deal with this Object. These IRs are similar, and that similarity supports *the intersubjective understanding of objects* that characterizes a culture. SR are usually described in intension by listing commonalities of the elements of the set (IRs).

What makes the set a social representation is not merely the similarity of IRs, but rather the relation of the Population to the Object of the SR, for which the SR is a functional, constructive instrument.

The similarity of IRs in a population is constructed by education and communication, which homogenize IRs, but also by individual practice in relation to the Object. In large scale societies, practice is channeled by “installations”, local combinations of components that scaffold and control behavior and experience into standard paths of action. Members of a culture behave through similar installations. This generalized channeling of practice constructs similar experiences across the members of a Population, and therefore contributes to members of a given culture having similar IRs.

This epistemic clarification has minor implication on the classic methods of investigation of SRs, which in practice operate by extracting similarities from a sample of IRs to construct definitions in intension of the SR. That is fortunate because it means we do not need to throw away the thousands of empirical papers using social representations theory.

But this clarification has major theoretical implications for the study of the relation between representation and action. That is because the locus of interpretation of situations and of agency is the individual subject, not the Population. Therefore embodiment of an IR in a human body, with the physiological and emotional aspects of that medium must be taken into account, as well as the coexistence and combination within the body of that specific IR with other IRs and more generally with a vast array of cognitive processes. This issue of the nature of the location of the representation will become more and more relevant as representations get inscribed in more media empowered with agency, such as robots and other artificial agents.

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Теоретическая статья

Социальные представления и индивидуальные представления: в чем разница? И почему индивидуальные представления похожи?

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Аннотация. Проясняется давняя двусмысленность в толковании понятия социальных представлений и дается четкое операциональное определение отношения между «социальным представлением» и «индивидуальным представлением». Это определение, основанное на теории множеств, поддерживает большинство современных эм-

пирических методов исследования социальных представлений. Другими словами, социальное представление объекта в популяции – это математический набор индивидуальных представлений, которые индивиды данной популяции имеют относительно этого объекта. Компоненты представления трактуются как компоненты, используемые для описания этого множества в математическом смысле данного термина. Статистические методы, как и метод контент-анализа, могут создавать такие компоненты путем сравнения индивидуальных представлений для извлечения общих черт, и именно этому посвящены классические исследования социальных представлений. Предлагается ответ на вопрос: как получилось, что в конкретной культуре индивиды имеют индивидуальные представления, похожие друг на друга?

Ключевые слова: социальные представления, индивидуальные представления, теория инсталляции, интерсубъективное понимание объекта

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Theoretical article

Representations in Intergroup Relations: Reflexivity, Meta-Representations, and Interobjectivity

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Abstract. Social and cultural groups are characterised by shared systems of social objects and issues that constitute their objective reality and their members' identity. It is argued that interpersonal interactions within such groups require a system of comprehensive representations to enable concerted interaction between individuals. Comprehensive representations include bits and pieces of the interactant's representational constitution and potential values and behaviours to reduce possible friction in interactions. On a larger scale, the same is true in encounters, communication, and interaction between members of different cultural groups where interactants need to dispose of a rough knowledge of the other culture's relevant characteristics. This mutual knowledge is called meta-representations that complement the actors' own values and ways of thinking. This concept complements Social Representation Theory when applied to cross-cultural and inter-ethnic interactions.

Key words: social representation theory, intergroup behaviour, cooperation, meta-representation, interobjectivity, comprehensive representations

Universes of discourse

It is easy to see that two persons speaking different languages and being from different cultures will not understand each other. Not even speaking the same language will guarantee that two individuals will be able to converse. If, for example, one asked “Can you tell me whether you are the fifth reincarnation of the holy dog or not?” in English language and the partner understood English, but not the meaning of 'being the reincarnation of a holy dog', the only rationally available response to this question would be “I am sorry, but I don't understand”. In other words the conversation partner would need to reject the question in its entirety instead of saying ‘yes I am’ or ‘no I'm not’. By rejecting the question as a whole, the conversation partner refers to the content of the question, that violates the necessary agreement in any communication to establish a shared space of



representations. In the present example it would mean to agree on what a number of reincarnations means, what a holy dog is, and what these have to do with persons (Wagner, Hayes, 2005).

Something to that effect may a German secondary school teacher have had in mind, when she discussed the case of Samuel Paty who was murdered by a Muslim student after having staged a discussion about caricatures of the prophet Mohammad in class. After the discussion of the Paty murder case a ninth-grade girl started to weep. When asked why she wept, the teacher may have been left incredulous, because the pupil did neither weep for the victim, nor for the murderer, who had been shot by police while fleeing, but for the offended prophet (MENA Research and Studies Center, 2021). This example illustrates a cultural divide that was not easily bridged despite the shared language of teacher and pupil. Hence, discursive understanding presupposes a shared system of representations and attached feelings. This prerequisite of any communication is a truism and sometimes addressed by the simplified concept of ‘grounding’ (Clark, Brennan, 1991).

In the present text we will discuss the processes that unfold when members of different groups or cultures attempt to bootstrap communication across their differences, that is processes that go beyond sharing a language.

Reflexive groups: it takes at least two to tango

It is clear that groups do not live in isolation and in fact, it would be nearly impossible to imagine an aggregate of people living in a completely isolated place. Groups usually have neighbours with whom they cultivate economic and social relations even in places that are as far from each other as Pacific islands. Such social groups are characterized by their specific group identity, their representational system defining their symbolic world, customary behaviours, and social objects. The concept of a ‘social group’, hence, is co-extensive with an aggregate of people who are aware that there are people outside and beyond their own group's confines and who maintain a system of identity, social objects, and a symbolic world that is different or even opposite to their own. The awareness of others being different to a certain degree from one's own compatriots justifies, indeed necessitates constructing and accentuating an ingroup identity that marks the aggregate of people as a unity. In other words, these people form a reflexive group.

An aggregate of people who identify each other as belonging together and who engage in attempts to differ from others falls squarely under the epistemological term ‘group’. Hence, conceptually a bunch of people to be called a group presupposes a neighbouring bunch of people, who contrast with certain elements of their local customs and representational system: Groups only exist in multiples. As a corollary, the whole of humankind on earth does not constitute a group by themselves. Humankind could conceptually only be called a group if humans were confronting some extraterrestrials or interacting with non-human species.

The truism of at least two groups constituting each other is often disregarded in social psychology. A consequence of omitting this precondition is that social representations are not recognized as being intimately linked to social identities. Hence, talking about the identity of one group needs mention of the counterpart group from which it differentiates itself (Tajfel, 1978). ‘Reflexive group’,

hence, refers to the collective whose individual members' identities are the result of self-categorization (Turner, Reynolds, 2012). If people categorize themselves and others as being part of a specific social unit, this unit constitutes a reflexive group. That is, a group results from the identity processes of its members and its reflexive character denotes the fact that members can point out to which collective they feel belonging emotionally and cognitively (Breakwell, 2015). Reflexive groups are characterized by regular social discourse that enables them to create, maintain and change their shared social reality, that is the representations, practices, and social objects. Nominal and therefore non-reflexive groups do not have this capacity (Wagner, Hayes, 2005).

Groups do not only differ from each other by their name and attached affect and meaning but also by the way they elaborate the social objects that populate their social world. This concerns the way they interact with compatriotes and objects and by the way they represent these objects, which is a social achievement (Moscovici, 2000; Wagner et al., 2018; Jovchelovitch, 2019). The theory of social representations is interested in understanding how conversations, mass media, and contemporary internet media make the members of groups converge in understanding a novel and sometimes threatening object or issue (cf. Moliner, Bovina, 2020). This collective activity resembles a process of symbolic coping with a novelty that threatens the customary way of life (Ben-Asher et al., 2006; Wagner et al., 2002). Naturally, just as individuals think, chat about, and form an impression of their neighbours, groups also converse and deliberate over other groups that figure in their local universe. In doing so, they will develop a social representation of the other group's appearance and of what they believe that the other group's members believe.

We argue that any theoretical approach or research dealing with aspects of how one group perceives, stereotypes, and treats another group in a friendly or unfriendly way, needs to be complemented by theorizing and researching the counterpart group's reverse perceptions, stereotyping, and treatment of the first group. A research perspective on relations between groups is utterly incomplete if it does not encompass both poles of the intergroup relationship, that is at least the two reflexive groups confronting each other (Sen & Wagner, 2005; Putra, Wagner, 2017). Besides the dialogical approach in social representation theory (Marková, 2016) this necessity of mutual foundations in intergroup relations has been frequently neglected in the past and resulted in often biased and lopsided research. Taking the intergroup perspective seriously implies a discussion of social identities and the group members' awareness of the limits of their representations' space of validity.

Concerted interaction and the public

As shown in the introductory remarks, group members identify in relation to other groups and develop their specific local world and its social objects that may be more or less different from those of others. The difference from others circumscribes the space of where a person's social representations, that is their understanding of social objects is valid and where co-members of the group will be able to engage in effortless communication. That is, notwithstanding the fact that many human affairs take place in private, the understanding of what commonly tran-

spires between people in private spheres is potentially accessible to most others; that is, the potential for *understanding* is part of the public common-sense even though the details of a specific private affair between particular persons are not. Privacy, hence, is not the opposite of the public because both converge in the symbolic representations that define a group's world. This is also illustrated by the fact that persons can effortlessly converse about public and private issues, be that dreams, troubles in personal relationships, or other issues. This is nicely illustrated in the smooth workings of interactions in the public space (Jovchevitch, 2001). As a consequence, social objects, issues, and institutions are the objectified instances of a group's system of social representations and one can say that in smooth interactions the intersubjective is coextensive with the objective world of a group.

Clearly societies and groups are not homogeneous aggregates of people, but characterized by hierarchies and divisions that depend on the specific activities individuals are engaged in. Consequently, not all members of a reflexive group do, or need to dispose of the same set of representational knowledge. There is only a subset of socially relevant representations that are required to allow common interactions between people pertaining to any of the many different factions and classes of a group or society. For enabling such concerted interactions the interactants need the repertoire of general social representations and related courses of action that shape the behavioural fabric of public encounters, but also a rough impression of the behavioural and representational elements of others who belong to different societal sub-groups and factions together with their attached repertoire of background knowledge (Wagner, 1995). Conversations, for example, will only be successful, if each speaker takes account of their counterparts' 'alternative' ideas (Gillespie, 2008).

Encounters may require symmetric or complementary actions by the interactants and each of them must have at their disposal a rough impression of the interaction-relevant elements of the other's actions. These are comprehensive representations of one's own and another person's interaction space. Such group-specific representations have been called 'holomorphic' to characterise their comprehensive character embracing own and others' representations (Wagner, 1995. P. 128). It must be noted that such comprehensive representations are formed in a public discourse where everybody is free to participate either as actor or incidentally. If individuals are prevented from participation, for example as the result of imprisonment or other condition, it means a significant burden for their reintegration into the group.

The importance of comprehensive representations is shown by research about professional and organizational socialization. Vocational training only partly consists of imparting functional skills. An equally large part of the training effort consists of teaching comprehensive representations and behaviours, informal codes, jargon, role status, and the unwritten standards of performance. These processes take place at all levels of an organization and convey to new members of an institution not only their professional representations and habits, but also those of their potential interaction partners. The result of such trainings is expected to be a high level of cultural competence (e.g. Levine, Moreland, 1991; Page, 2005; Cornelissen, Van Wyk, 2008; Berry et al., 2010).

Intergroup meta-representations and interobjectivity

Knowing something about the other: meta-representations

Cultural groups may live relatively far from each other, if they, for example inhabit separate regions, which do not promote everyday contact. Conversely, such groups may also live in close vicinity, as is the case with ethnic groups living as a minority in a larger ethnically different majority. This is the frequent situation in Western countries where people from different cultures, for example in the wake of colonialism or during more recent migratory movements, settle within European countries. In this case minorities and majority populations are separated by physical as well as symbolic boundaries. They are physical when it comes to the buildings, practices and behaviours a group maintains to shape its environment and they are symbolic with regard to the representational system spanning the beliefs, values and norms that structure the discourse among members. In other words, the set of objects and issues that define a group exist side by side with the set of objects and issues that define other groups. In this situation the groups in contact are hard pressed to find an arrangement that deflects conflict-prone conditions, that allows mutual co-existence, and that furthers collaborative exchange across groups and across their objectified representational systems.

The situation of establishing a more or less frictionless collaboration requires a certain amount of mutual understanding. That is a kind of knowledge that allows to anticipate the likely actions of the culturally distinct member and what to expect from the other in such everyday situations. Hence we are looking at a situation where interaction requires to construct a cooperational meaning that comprises a person's own action-relevant rules, as well as the rules underlying the actions of potential co-actors. This is what we call a meta-representation (Raudsepp, 2005; Wagner, Hayes, 2005; Wagner, 2021).

Meta-representations allow flexible responses to action moves of an interactant that is not intimately known as is often the case in cross-cultural encounters. Interactants need to reconstruct the socially relevant objects, issues and institutions that relate to the situation. They orient both actors' social behaviour towards each other so that concerted co-operation preserves and reproduces the social conditions. If meaningful interchange and practice is to be established ideally both interactants would maintain mutual meta-representations that reflect the essential aspects of the entire situation including the respective groups. Without mutual meta-representations the actors cannot meaningfully enact the encounter. Representations and meta-representation are a functional necessity for members of groups in contact; they are a prerequisite of meaningful interaction.

More often than not groups in contact will take different positions on the ladder of status. When there are majority and minority populations where the latter often take a subordinate and less powerful position than the former. For even, but particularly for encounters of group members with unequal status meta-representations are crucial. Interactions will involve either similar or complementary behaviours depending on whether the interactants are facing each other as equals or act from different hierarchical positions. For example, interaction within a hierarchy conditions involves complementary behaviour patterns with the superior and with the subordinate actor. Although different, the patterns of action of those

involved in the hierarchy complement each other in such a way that they create, or rather confirm, the social reality of dominance.

Moscovici (1988. P. 221) distinguishes between hegemonic, emancipated and polemical representations where hegemonic representations are those that prevail in large parts of a 'thinking society' and that are undisputed and emancipated representations exist side by side being shared among groups. Polemical representations belong to different factions in conflict and are brought to bear in disputes. Now, even polemical representations arising in conflict and not being shared among the antagonistic parties need to embrace knowledge from the others worldview to some degree. The respective meta-representations in a polemic setting are required for debate and argument in antagonistic discourse. Meta-representations allow to anticipate what can be said and to which effect it can be said in conflict situations. If parties in conflict did not share a certain degree of mutual knowledge, even dispute would not work.

The importance of meta-representations that members of one cultural group construct about another ethnic group is highlighted in the preconditions of violent conflict. For politicians with an interest in stoking conflict between cultural groups it is crucial to gain influence on what members of one group think about the members of the other group. In other words, intergroup conflict crucially depends on the meta-representations that members of a reflexive group construct about an opposite group. In most of the cases where ethnic groups live side by side encounters of members of different groups in everyday life are rarely conflictual in an ethnic sense. Such encounters are governed by rational considerations from both sides, be it in a situation of conversation, gossip, and small talk, in a situation of commercial exchange in shopping, or collaboration at a workplace.

The situation changes once overarching political interests are at stake. In India, the relationship between Hindus and minority Muslims usually does not play a role in the walks of everyday life. People follow their daily chores that may lead them to regularly interact with members of the other ethnic group. However, as it happened repeatedly during the last seventy years, a rising ethno-nationalism stoked by politicians from, e.g. the Hindutva side, lead people to reconstruct their image and meta-representation of the outgroup not as fellow humans but as adversaries in a struggle for symbolic power and religious dominance (Sen & Wagner, 2005; Sen & Wagner, 2009).

Similar processes are at work in interreligious conflict in Indonesia, where Sunni-Muslims can develop toxic meta-representations about Ahmadiya-Muslims that may erupt in violence (Putra, Wagner, 2017) and Gagnon's (2004) study of the Yugoslav war in the nineteen-nineties is a particularly clear example of an elite's political interests in shaping inter-ethnic meta-representations. During most of the time that Yugoslavia existed as a multi-ethnic country, inter-ethnic relations were friendly and supportive. This is illustrated by the high number of inter-ethnic marriages before the war that started in 1991. In 2006, however, a survey showed a significant decline of willingness to marry members of an opposing ethnic group in most of the new states that emerged (Elcheroth, Reicher, 2017. P. 185). Driven by power interests of the dominant Serb elite, who needed to shake the mostly peaceful – with the exception of Kosovo – mixed existence of

ethnic groups in order to secure their power within the Serbian political ranks. Their way of planting distrust between groups was to create the impression of others as a source of danger and enmity, partly by staged violence. Which family father could remain relaxed once the neighbours with their marked ethnic difference became represented as potential aggressors (Gagnon, 2004)? Another example of such a top-down escalation of conflict by promoting negative mutual meta-representations and incompatible views on the WWII was the so called Bronze soldier event in Tallinn (Raudsepp, Wagner, 2012).

However, toxic meta-representations can sometimes be defused. Media campaigns have been successful in post-conflict countries in changing perceived social norms (Paluck, Green, 2009a, 2009b). Extensive media campaigns which were designed as social experiments in Rwanda (Paluck, 2009) and Burundi (Bilali, 2014; Bilali & Staub, 2017) were targeted at the whole population, aiming at healing post-conflict trauma and improving intergroup relations. In Rwanda a radio soap opera script was written in collaboration with local experts and psychologists and tested on different target groups. Then a weekly radio serial depicted the development of conflict between two fictional communities, with vivid outcomes of the conflict and paths of reconciliation. By showing various widespread representations, the program aimed to change beliefs using didactic messages and to influence perceived norms and metarepresentations through realistic radio characters who could speak to audience experiences and function as positive role models.

Establishing commonality: interobjectivity

Social Representation Theory belongs to the class of theories of social construction. Social representations are constructed in the communications, conversations, and discourses occurring in groups, be it on a personal basis, through mass media, or via electronic and social media. The result of such discursive constructions is an organised set of social objects that defines the living world of a group and its members. The objects populating this local world are characterised by shared meaning and attached symbolism and they are also represented by the ways how group members communicate about the social object and how they behave and interact with regard to the object (Wagner, 2015). In the case of imaginary issues such as deities and other abstract ideas, it is the interaction of group members that 'materially' enacts the object as a particular pattern of interrelationships. Social objects can be holy places of worship, a wheelchair for a handicapped person, the new facts of global warming being the issue in debates and media reporting, and even large scale social identities that define and delimit the boundaries of ethnic and other groups (Wagner et al., 2018).

Given the constitutive character of such a system of social objects for the identity and emotional stability of groups, such systems can rightly be regarded the objective reality of the respective group. Intergroup situations, hence, can be understood as encounters of two different objectivities, particularly if we consider ethnic groups and cultures that are prime examples of divergent realities. The task in intergroup encounters then is to establish a communicative bridge of mutual understanding between the two objectivities that exceeds mere language barriers. If the communicative bridging by the help of meta-representations and

open communication is successful, one can say that the shared understanding constitutes an interobjective space between the respective groups (Moghaddam, 2003; Harré & Sammut, 2013).

A theoretical analysis of these processes shows that the success of establishing a true interobjective space that allows fruitful interaction and collaboration is not guaranteed if the value systems of the groups grossly contradict each other. Establishing interobjectivity requires an openness, a positive and accepting attitude of the opposing group's value system. Contradictive values and norms pose an ethical obstacle that one or both interactants may not be able to cross. Imagine a European who upholds the historical values of the enlightenment and of human rights, who meets a proponent of a slave holder society (e.g. Global Slavery Index, 2018). Accepting the slave holder values of the unequal value of human beings would utterly collide with the European's understanding of human equality and in fact constitute an identity threat. A similar contradiction applies to the slave holder person who may be incredulous of ascribing black people the same moral value as white people (Wagner, 2021).

There are many processes that unfold when members of different groups or cultures attempt to bootstrap communication across their differences. Bridging the representational gap between divergent subjects is possible by using two kinds of resources: metarepresentations, that is obtaining an impression of the other's identity and representational system as described above, and suitable communicative arrangements such as ritualized interaction, a phatic communication style, and fitting non-verbal signals (Padilla Cruz, 2010; Krys et al., 2016). Mutual metarepresentations of others' beliefs are necessary to regulate the content of contact – either avoiding sensitive issues or negotiating an inter-objective space that is accessible to both partners. Consequently, the logical chain of interaction between representatives of divergent objectivities consists of: 1) meta-representations that are basis for mutual expectations, 2) ritualized communication and phatic communications for initiating and preserving bootstrapping the contact, 3) co-constructing a joint inter-objective field (Wagner, 2021).

Besides logical and conceptual incompatibilities between representational systems, a successful interaction may be hindered by affective reasons when threat to one's identity is felt due to perceived incommensurability of values or moral axioms. Sometimes apparent incommensurabilities may be overcome by certain strategies leading to successful bootstrapping and benevolent contact, and vice versa – irrespective of the compatibility of representational systems, it is of course possible to turn intergroup relations into hostility. That is, if interactants do not intend to establish interobjectivity, any minimal difference in representations can serve to rationalise conflict, and highlight ethical or affective incommensurability.

Tentatively we can enumerate conditions of negative contact: First, exclusive metarepresentations, second, constructing alternative representations as 'straw men' and evoke negative affects, third, a disagreeable style of communication and lack of respect, fourth, focusing on polemical/controversial social objects and thereby devaluing any interobjectivity. For example, the rhetorical devices of right wing populists aim at undermining trust between groups and break liberal consensus. They deny politeness by using a low style rhetorics. They construct malevo-

lent meta-representations as antithetical construction of the enemy, they generate mirror-projections, positioning oneself as a moral victim, presenting minorities as aggressive and as powerful adversaries (Kasekamp et al., 2019).

Discussion and outlook

In the foregoing sections we presented an extension of social representation theory that appears to be necessary if we apply Moscovici's approach to intergroup situations. Moscovici himself was not very outspoken about intergroup behaviours and to my knowledge did not extensively consider the dynamics of social representations in the context of group interactions. One such example is his research on active or victim-centred minorities and majority relations (Moscovici et al., 1994; Moscovici, Pérez, 2007), which in our opinion must be viewed as the kernel for any intergroup approach in the sense elaborated in our section on 'it takes two to tango'. We are convinced that applying social representation theory to reflexive groups makes an intergroup perspective unavoidable and, if we envisage encounters and interactions between members of different cultural groups, there must be a process that allows each individual to develop and build upon an understanding of the other for successful communication and cooperation. This process is the formation of meta-representations.

Now, given that meta-representations are crude images of another person's socio-cultural constitution, their expected behaviour tendencies, and relevant characteristics, is a meta-representation not simply a stereotype? The so-called stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002) postulates two dimensions, functional competence (competent – incompetent) and interpersonal warmth (warm – cold). On an abstract level these dimensions may capture the majority of intergroup stereotyping that can be expected, but it would not be sufficient for basing one's real interactive behaviour with an opponent on it. Equally, stereotypes are frequently considered largely wrong and prejudiced with regard to the target group (e.g. Yzerbyt, 2016). In fact, a largely biased outgroup image constructed primarily according to ingroup interests is not a useful guide for establishing a productive intergroup relationship. This role is taken by meta-representations where the interactants maintain an interest in concerted interaction, communication, cooperation and where, of course, the opposite and conflictual positions are also possible.

A metarepresentation may be built upon culturally shared fixed stereotypes about an outgroup and constantly elaborated according to new intergroup experiences including conflicts and agreeableness. Metarepresentations are flexible, they contain resources both for confrontation and for reconciliation and they can be intentionally manipulated by the authorities. Intentional formation of metarepresentational knowledge occurs in social and transcultural competence training necessary for individual pre-adaptation in a non-familiar context, and, for example, also in the professional training of secret service agents or executives in transnational companies. Knowledge about the outgroup in different communicative situations, skills of perspective taking, motivation to establish and maintain contact with members of other groups; these are elements of metarepresentations that can be deliberately acquired. It should be clear that the workings of meta-representations are intimately linked to the concept of interobjectivity as well as to

the communication processes required for bridging the gap between the objective worlds of two groups. Then there are the ethical pitfalls in meeting members of other ethnic and religious groups that can easily amount to blocking cooperation when each other's identity would be threatened by openly accepting the opposite person's values.

Coming back to the examples presented in the beginning of the article: discursive non-understanding of a question about reincarnation may be overcome by a response: What do you mean? Please explain. On a superficial level of non-understanding on the part of the recipient there is a gap in the cultural knowledge about a particular belief system of the partner. Perhaps there are representational barriers that prevent them to ask clarification in the particular communicative situation? On a deeper level of non-understanding, the partners may be not able to define the communicative situation; was it a joke? An insult? A rhetorical question? Should I understand the question literally or allegorically? What was the context of the encounter, i.e. a joint activity, an inter-personal situation, on the basis of which a shared reality could be built?

The second initial example concerns misunderstanding the feelings of a person who relies on a non-familiar matrix of affective meanings. It demonstrates the necessity of intercultural empathy and affective component in metarepresentations for smooth interaction. These are potentially constructive events (Wagner, 1996. P. 110) that reveal gaps or failures in metarepresentations. Given the wide field of intergroup relationships we are convinced that besides our present approach there are still other conceptual developments possible and necessary in the context of Social Representation Theory.

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Теоретическая статья

**Представления в межгрупповых отношениях:
рефлексивность, метапредставления и интеробъективность**

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Аннотация. Социальные и культурные группы характеризуются общими системами социальных объектов и проблем, которые составляют их объективную реальность и идентичность их членов. Межличностное взаимодействие внутри таких групп требует системы всеобъемлющих представлений, обеспечивающих согласованное взаимодействие между индивидами. Для того чтобы уменьшить возможные разногласия при взаимодействии, всеобъемлющие представления включают в себя фрагменты репрезентативной структуры взаимодействующего, а также его потенциальные ценности и пове-

дение. В более широком масштабе то же самое относится к общению и взаимодействию между членами различных культурных групп, где взаимодействующие должны располагать приблизительным знанием соответствующих характеристик другой культуры. Это взаимное знание называется метапредставлениями, которые дополняют собственные ценности и способы мышления субъектов. Концепция метапредставлений дополняет теорию социальных представлений применительно к межкультурному и межэтническому взаимодействию.

Ключевые слова: теория социальных представлений, межгрупповое поведение, сотрудничество, метапредставление, интеробъективность, всеобъемлющие представления

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Исследовательская статья

Феномен когнитивной полифазии в социальных представлениях о душевнобольных

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Аннотация. Феномен когнитивной полифазии рассматривается в контексте репрезентации психически больных людей разными группами общества. Поднимается проблема обнаружения условий актуализации когнитивной полифазии. Целью исследования стали проявления когнитивной полифазии в структуре социальных представлений (СП) о душевнобольном в группах православных респондентов и неверующих. Выборку составили последователи православного христианства – $N = 114$ (мужчины – 49 чел., женщины – 65 чел.) и неверующие респонденты – $N = 113$ (мужчины – 76 чел., женщины – 37 чел.) в возрасте 18–23, 40–45, 60–65 лет, постоянно проживающие в Москве. На основном этапе исследования использовались авторский опросник, разработанный на базе результатов поискового этапа и включающий 29 утверждений, шкала самооценки степени религиозности, модифицированная шкала «Психологической дистанции» Фелдеса, модифицированный вариант методики «Незавершенные предложения», проективная методика Bubbles и блок для получения социально-демографической информации. Результаты исследования показали, что эмоциональный компонент СП о душевнобольных при разных методиках опроса менял свою модальность. При оценивании респондентами утверждений опросника ядро СП обеих групп содержало исключительно сочувственные в отношении больных элементы, а утверждения, раскрывающие негативные эмоции (возможность заражения психическим заболеванием или необходимость изоляции психически больных от общества), оказались на периферии СП. В то же время данные проективных методик показывают, что негативный фон восприятия душевнобольных значимо преобладает (по сравнению с позитивным) как у верующих, так и у неверующих респондентов. Негативная репрезентация душевнобольного наиболее выражена в группе неверующих респондентов и достигает самых высоких показателей в группе 60–65-летних. Подобная амбивалентность рассматривается как проявление когнитивной полифазии и конкретно ее разновидности – селективного преобладания.

Ключевые слова: социальные представления, когнитивная полифазия, душевнобольные, большие группы общества, православные верующие, неверующие

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Введение

Многообразие точек зрения на одно и то же социальное явление или процесс в обществе требует не только понимания и принятия, но и самого пристального научного внимания. Один из подходов к этому феномену был предложен С. Московиси в его диссертации *Etude de la représentations sociales de la psychoanalyse. Thèse de Doctorat ès Lettres*, опубликованной в 1961 г. Анализируя обстоятельства, согласно которым люди, принадлежащие к разным слоям общества, по-разному представляют себе суть психоаналитической теории и практики, Московиси приходит к гипотезе о том, что «динамическое сосуществование – вмешательство или специализация – особых модальностей знания, соответствующих определенным отношениям между человеком и его окружением, определяет состояние когнитивной полифазии. Эта гипотеза, – указывает Московиси, – побуждает нас к более объемному видению. Когнитивные системы должны пониматься как системы подвижные, а не находящиеся в состоянии равновесия» (Moscovici, 1976. P. 286). Даже «...одна и та же группа и, *mutatis mutandis*, один и тот же индивид, способны использовать различные логические регистры в тех областях, к которым они подходят с разных точек зрения, с разной информацией и ценностями» (Moscovici, 1976. P. 286).

Спустя несколько десятилетий понятие когнитивной полифазии обретает новую жизнь в контексте изучения социальных представлений (СП) о здоровье в традиционных обществах (Gervais, Jovchelovitch, 1998; Wagner et al., 2000; Falade, Bauer, 2018), возобновляемых источниках энергии (Upham, Johansen, 2020) и др. Так, в исследовании Вагнера с коллегами изучались противоречия, существующие у жителей Северно-Индийского города Патна, между традиционным и западным пониманием ментального нездоровья, его этиологии и лечения. В СП жителей сосуществуют современные психиатрические знания и традиционные верования, которые преобладают в рамках семейного дискурса (Wagner et al., 2000). В последние годы происходит теоретическое осмысление феномена «когнитивная полифазия» (Jovchelovitch, 2008; Provencher, 2011; Jovchelovitch, Priego-Hernández, 2015; Kumagai, 2015; Guimelli, Lo Monaco, 2016; Martinez, 2018; Panagiotou, Kadianaki, 2019; Sammut, 2016; Paez D. et al., 2016 и др.), публикуются исследования конкретных проявлений когнитивной полифазии (Falade, Bauer, 2018; Renedo, Jovchelovitch, 2007; Upham, Johansen, 2020; Wagner et al., 2000 и др.), ее связи с коллективной памятью (Paez D. et al., 2016).

К феномену когнитивной полифазии был предпринят ряд подходов. Трансформационными процессами, которым подвергаются социальные представления, объясняли этот феномен В. Вагнер с соавт.: «Концептуализация когнитивной полифазии возможна посредством рассуждений и дискурса, детерминированных социальной ситуацией, или изучения трансформационных процессов репрезентативных систем» (Wagner et al., 2000. С. 308). Заявлялся и подход к этому феномену как к позволяющему решать возникающие гносеологические проблемы (Provencher, 2011. P. 390), а именно, для понимания когнитивной полифазии как активного и эффективного способа решения людьми насущных жизненных вопросов.

Этот феномен изучался в контексте особенностей современных информационных процессов, связанных с глобализацией современного общества и ведущих к возникновению принципиально новых каналов для обмена информацией, что приводит к неизбежному сосуществованию различных типов знаний (Renedo, Jovchelovitch, 2007. С. 786). Развивая этот подход, С. Йовчелович с соавторами в более поздних работах говорят о том, что «когнитивная полифазия – это ресурс, когнитивный актив для управления вариативностью и сложностью межгрупповых отношений, контекстов и культур» (Jovchelovitch, Priego-Hernández, 2015. С. 171). Кроме того, этими авторами развиваются идеи о структурных элементах когнитивной полифазии. Полагая, что содержание, процесс и эмоция – неотделимые аспекты социального познания и состояния когнитивной полифазии, авторы допускают факт сосуществования противоположных и противоречащих друг другу элементов всех этих измерений» (Там же. С. 172).

Авторы высказывают предположение существованию типов когнитивной полифазии в соответствии со способами взаимодействия различных видов знания. Это «селективное преобладание», когда отдельные системы знания сосуществуют и извлекаются по отдельности в разных пунктах времени/пространства; как реакции в зависимости от требований контекста и для выполнения разных функций. «Гибридизация», при которой несколько систем знания используются одновременно и проникают друг в друга, порождая единое смешанное репрезентативное поле. «Замещение», когда одна система знания предпочитается другим параллельным системам, что ведет к замещению альтернативных представлений репрезентативного поля. (Jovchelovitch, Priego-Hernandez, 2015. С. 174). Опираясь на эту классификацию, мы предположили, что изучаемые нами социальные представления о душевнобольных могут проявлять эффект когнитивной полифазии типа селективного преобладания, то есть использования разных систем знания в зависимости от контекста.

В нашем исследовании феномен когнитивной полифазии рассматривается в контексте репрезентации психически больных разными группами общества. На протяжении веков отношение к психически больным радикально менялось от дискриминации и неприятия до провозглашения Филиппом Пинелем принципов их гуманного содержания, с предоставлением свободы и жизненных удобств. В XIX–XX веках развивается особый подход к реабилитации таких больных – создание больниц по системе «открытых дверей», и психиатрических колоний-поселений или общин в Бельгии, Британии, Франции, Германии и России. В таких учреждениях небуйные пациенты получали определенную свободу, жили в приютивших их семьях, и выполняли посильные работы.

Изучая подобную практику, Д. Жодле (Jodelet, 1991) обнаружила и описала факт сосуществования в репрезентациях душевных болезней у представителей «приемных семей», опекавших больных, архаичного и современного знания относительно душевного нездоровья. Немного позднее В. Вагнер с соавторами, изучая представления жителей Северно-Индийского города Патна и возникшие противоречия между традиционными и западными психиатрическими понятиями ментального нездоровья, их этиологию и

лечение, показали, что каждый из двух способов понимания применим в специфических социальных условиях. Авторы определили этот феномен как «полифазию конкурирующих представлений и их привязанность к различным социальным средам» (Wagner et al., 2000. С. 312).

Душевное нездоровье одно из непонятных, пугающих явлений человеческого существования. Эта тревожащая людей сфера жизни создает почву для стигматизации, накладывает на больного социальное клеймо и приводит к отторжению его обществом. Между тем успешность социальной адаптации душевнобольных коррелирует с их семейным положением, наличием жилья, работы и возможностью социальных контактов (Wagner et al., 1999; Melle et al., 2000; Gureje et al., 2005). У пациентов, имеющих работу, в отличие от безработных больных, как правило, симптомы менее выражены (особенно расстройство мышления, аффективные расстройства), выше уровень самооценки и показатели качества жизни (Eklund et al., 2001). Однако трудность подобной интеграции явно прослеживается в современном обществе, приводя к изоляции больных.

В литературе активно обсуждаются социальные истоки и последствия психических заболеваний (например, Leavey et al., 2016). Душевное заболевание, в понимании обывателя, делает человека склонным к девиантному или делинквентному поведению. Именно такой образ освещается в СМИ, интернете и в киноискусстве (Roberts et al., 2013; Rohm et al., 2017; Антипкин, Антонов, 2013; Емельянова, Израелян, 2018), приводя к дальнейшей стигматизации больных (Duckworth et al., 2003). Можно предположить, что «изолирующее» представление снижает тревожность, повышает чувство контроля в группах здоровых людей (Smith et al., 2017) и может быть связано со страхом перед болезнью, неминуемо приводя к дискриминации душевнобольных (Jodelet, 1991).

В этой связи правомерно поставить проблему существования факторов, снижающих отторжение душевнобольных в обществе. Обсуждаются вопросы о том, не является ли религиозность одним из таких факторов? Традиционные религии, включая христианство, по праву считаются проводниками гуманистических морально-этических норм для своих последователей (Donahue, Nielsen, 2005), что, возможно, предопределяет специфический тип отношения верующего к группам, отторгаемым обществом. Христианство, основанное на идее самопожертвования, альтруизма, способно обуславливать у своих приверженцев просоциальное поведение (Братусь и др., 1995). Это утверждение некоторыми авторами считается дискуссионным, обсуждаются вопросы: действительно ли вера в Бога является предпосылкой нравственной жизни (Evans, Lane, 2011; Smith, 2017; Stroope, Baker, 2018).

Между тем в христианской традиции и, прежде всего, в синоптических Евангелиях, ярко прослеживается особое человеколюбие: в частности, «Золотое правило» от Матфея (Матф. 7: 12), «вторая величайшая заповедь» – любовь к ближнему как к самому себе (Матф. 22: 39) и молитва, призывающая верующих к прощению (Матф. 6: 12). Вся последующая история христианства содержит примеры служения больным и немощным, раскрывая тем самым, свою просоциальную природу. Так, есть свидетельства о том,

что во время пандемии чумы в древнем Риме христиане решили остаться в городе и заботиться о больных, а не бежать в сельскую местность для своего спасения, что дало мощный толчок к возрастанию авторитета христианства. Предписания особого, гуманного отношения, терпимости к телесной и духовной болезни в христианстве можно найти в Библии: «Ибо Господь, кого любит, того наказывает...» (Евр. 12: 6–8); «А кто скажет: «безумный», подлечит геенне огненной...» (Матф. 5: 22). Сама душевная болезнь выступает многогранным понятием, выступая или как расплата за греховность, или как благодать для душевного сохранения. Спасение душевное через покаяние и молитвы (Тобалов, 2004), особое «...понятие жалости, милосердия, сострадания к униженным и оскорбленным» (Братусь и др., 1995. С. 45) – важный момент, формирующий терпимое отношение к душевнобольным в христианстве выражен словами епископа Игнатия (Брянчанинова): «...поврежденному рассудком...окажи почтение, как образу Божию». В православии вполне закономерно такое явление, как «юродство», представляющее собой особый подвиг людей, которые «безумны Христа ради» (1 Кор. 4: 10).

Исследования, проведенные отечественными авторами, доказывают существование негативных аттитюдов к психически больным и высокой социальной дистанции по отношению к ним (Бовина, Панов, 2005. С. 116). Аналогичные результаты были получены и при исследовании социальных представлений о психически больных (например, Якушенко, 2015). По результатам наших исследований (Емельянова, 2012), можно говорить о декларируемой толерантности в отношении душевнобольных как норме общественной жизни, которая сочетается с опасениями (например, с глубинным страхом заражения психической болезнью). Эти данные позволяют высказать предположение о существовании явления когнитивной полифазии в репрезентации душевнобольных.

Для более глубокого понимания факторов проявления когнитивной полифазии по отношению к стигматизируемым группам в обществе мы предприняли сравнительное исследование социальных групп с разной ментальностью: православных христиан и неверующих граждан. **Целью исследования** стали проявления когнитивной полифазии в структуре социальных представлений (СП) о душевнобольном в группах православных респондентов и неверующих. Задачи исследования: 1) выявить содержание, структуру СП о душевнобольном в группах респондентов-православных христиан и респондентов-неверующих; 2) сопоставить содержание СП, обнаруженное в ответах на прямые вопросы анкеты с содержанием СП, выявленным с помощью техник проективного исследования; 3) Раскрыть наличие различных модальностей в системе СП внутри каждой из изучаемых групп.

Процедура и методы

Эмпирическое исследование состояло из двух этапов: поискового (были применены индивидуальное анкетирование и полустандартизированное интервью) и основного. На основном этапе исследования применялся авторский опросник. Он разработан на основании результатов поискового этапа и включал в себя 29 утверждений, оцениваемых респондентами по 5-балльной шкале, где: 1 – «абсолютно не согласен»; 2 – «скорее не согласен»; 3 –

«не уверен»; 4 – «скорее согласен»; 5 – «полностью согласен»; шкала самооценки степени религиозности (авторская разработка); модифицированная шкала «Психологической дистанции» Фелдеса (Feldes, 1976). Опросник содержит 11 суждений, выражающих отношение к душевнобольному человеку. Пилотаж проводился на выборке 45 человек. Предлагались суждения, например, «Я мог бы пригласить больного к себе в гости», «Я запретил бы ему иметь детей» и т. п.; модифицированный вариант методики «Незавершенные предложения», включавший незаконченные утверждения, разработанные на материале анализа интервью и дополняемых респондентом самостоятельно. Предлагалось завершить утверждения, например, «Если бы я решал вопросы помощи душевно больным...», «Мои опасения насчет душевнобольных...», «Большинство людей считает, что душевнобольные...» и т. п.; проективная методика Bubbles для выявления глубинных установок и стереотипов относительно душевного нездоровья. Методика представлена схематическим изображением душевнобольного человека и тремя блоками, содержащими вопросы «Что говорит?», «Что думает?», «Что делает?»; блок для получения социально-демографической информации. Обработка полученных данных проведена с помощью программы Statistica 10. Были применены критерий χ^2 Пирсона, t -критерий Стьюдента, тематический контент-анализ.

Выборку составили последователи православного христианства – $N = 114$ (мужчины – 49 чел., женщины – 65 чел.) и неверующие респонденты – $N = 113$ (мужчины – 76 чел., женщины – 37 чел.), в возрастных интервалах 18–23, 40–45, 60–65 лет (представители поколения X, поколения Y и поколения Z), постоянно проживающие в Москве

Результаты исследования

Применение авторского опросника для выявления структуры СП о душевнобольном позволил нам выделить элементы СП: ядерные элементы, зону близкую к ядру, периферические элементы путем подсчета коэффициента позитивных ответов – ТСП (Taux categorique positif), предложенного Ж.-К. Абриком (в адаптации Т.П. Емельяновой (2006)) для каждого из 29-ти утверждений опросника).

$$TSP(i) = \frac{n(4) + n(5)}{N} \cdot 100,$$

где $n(4)$ – число ответов «скорее согласен»; $n(5)$ – число ответов «абсолютно согласен»; N – общее число ответов.

Элементы, имеющие коэффициенты выше среднего более чем на стандартное отклонение были отнесены к ядру (значения выше 65 в двух группах респондентов). Элементы, со значениями коэффициента от 30 до 65 в группе верующих респондентов, от 28 до 65 в группе респондентов-неверующих отнесены к зоне, близкой к ядру; остальные элементы вошли в периферическую зону СП (значения от 1 до 30 в группе верующих респондентов, от 1 до 28 в группе респондентов-неверующих). В табл. 1 представлены значения коэффициентов ТСП в двух группах респондентов.

Таблица 1 / Table 1

Результаты подсчета коэффициента позитивных ответов для каждого элемента СП у православных респондентов (П) и неверующих (Н) / The results of calculating the coefficient of positive answers for each element of social representations among the Orthodox respondents (O) and non-believers (N)

№	Утверждения / Approvals	П / О	Н / N
1	Религия дает человеку лишь ложные надежды / Religion gives people only false hopes	11,5 *	47,8#
2	В современном мире религия не нужна / In the modern world, religion is unneeded	2,8*	31,2#
3	Религия не играет никакой роли, человек сам творит свою судьбу / Religion plays no role, people themselves create their own destinies	34,2#	68,8
4	Религия оказывает положительное влияние на духовность и поведение человека / Religion has a positive effect on human spirituality and behavior	79,6	68,8
5	Религия помогает быть терпимым к другим людям / Religion helps an individual be tolerant of others	73,4	46,2#
6	Религия помогает справляться с жизненными трудностями, в том числе и с болезнью / Religion helps people cope with life's challenges, including disease	77,7	44,3#
7	Психическое заболевание – это милость, посланная избранному человеку / Mental illness is a grace sent to the chosen person	5,8*	1,0*
8	Психическое заболевание такая же болезнь, как и все остальные / Mental illness is just like all others	67,4	74,4
9	Психическое заболевание может коснуться каждого / Mental illness can affect anyone	81,1	96,1
10	Психическое заболевание – наказание за что-либо, «Божья кара» / Mental illness is a punishment for something, 'God's punishment'	21,0*	2,9*
11	Психическое заболевание испытание, данное человеку Создателем / Mental illness is an ordeal given to man by God	26,3*	9,5*
12	Причиной психической болезни может быть наследственность / The cause of mental illness can be hereditary	82,2	91,2
13	Заболевание психики – следствие физической болезни или травмы / Mental illness is a consequence of a physical illness or injury	62,9	78,6
14	Болезни психики – это результат неправильного образа жизни / Mental illness is the result of a wrong lifestyle	33,9#	46,8#
15	Психическое заболевание может передаваться от человека к человеку / Mental illness can be spread from person to person	18,1*	13,7*
16	Результатом жестокого обращения может быть психическое заболевание / Mental illness can be the result of abuse	85,5	81,9
17	Сбой в работе головного мозга может привести к развитию болезни психики / A brain malfunction can lead to the development of mental illness	82,0	92,5
18	Психическое заболевание – это результат неправильного воспитания / Mental illness is the result of poor parenting	30,9#	36,5#
19	Причины возникновения психического заболевания современной науке не известны / The causes of mental illness are not known to modern science	38,5#	26,7*
20	Государство, финансируя лечение и уход за душевнобольными людьми, несет неоправданные убытки / The state, by financing the treatment and care of mentally ill people, incurs unjustified losses	8,6*	23,5*
21	На практике общество, как правило, равнодушно к проблемам душевнобольных людей / In practice, society is usually indifferent to the problems of mentally ill people	67,8	56,7*
22	Общество не должно перекладывать на государство заботу о психически больных людях / Society should not shift the care of mentally ill people to the state	34,9#	38,0#
23	Государство обязано обеспечить достойное качество жизни душевнобольных людей / The state is obliged to ensure a decent quality of life for mentally ill people	90,9	79,1
24	Цивилизованное общество должно поддерживать таких больных / A civilized society should support such patients	93,6	76,8

Окончание табл. 1 / Table 1, ending

№	Утверждения / Approvals	П / О	Н / Н
25	Попечение такого больного – обязанность только его семьи / Such patients should be in the care of their own families	49,4#	56,2#
26	Душевнобольные люди часто не получают должную поддержку от государства / Mentally ill people often do not receive adequate support from the state	84,1	69,8
27	Современное общество делает таких больных маргиналами / Modern society makes such patients marginalized	70,7	55,2#
28	Психически больные люди не приносят пользу для государства и они ему не нужны / Mentally ill people do not benefit the state; therefore, they are not needed	22,9*	27,0*
29	Таких больных нужно изолировать от общества / Such patients should be isolated from society	28,9*	19,2*

Примечание: полужирным курсивом выделены коэффициенты ядерных элементов СП; # – близкая к ядру периферия; * – удаленная от ядра периферия.

Note: in bold italics are the coefficients of the social representations core elements; # – the elements of the periphery close to the core; * – the elements of the periphery far from the core.

Общими ядерными элементами в двух группах респондентов являются утверждения о роли религии, как факторе общественного регулирования (утверждение 4); о признании душевного нездоровья не отличающемся от других заболеваний человека (утверждения 8, 9); о биомедицинской модели заболевания (утверждения 12, 13, 16, 17); об ответственности государства в защите прав больных (утверждения 23, 24, 26). Ядро СП респондентов-неверующих отличается наличием такого элемента, как отрицание роли религии в судьбе человека (утверждение 3).

Отличительными чертами ядра СП верующих респондентов являются утверждения о роли религии в формировании терпимости к другим, в преодолении жизненных трудностей (утверждения 5, 6); о равнодушии общества к проблемам душевнобольных (утверждение 21) и ответственности общества за их маргинализацию (утверждение 27).

Суждения, содержащие негативные эмоциональные переживания по отношению к душевнобольному – возможность заражения психическим заболеванием (утверждение 15) или необходимость изоляции психически больных от общества (утверждение 29) – оказались на периферии СП в обеих группах. Различий по данным шкалы «Психологической дистанции» Фелдеса между группами не обнаружено.

Модифицированная методика «Незаконченные предложения» применялась как проективный метод с использованием формулировок, частично снимающих с респондентов требования «политкорректности» и социальной желательности. Анализ завершений предложения «Большинство людей считает, что душевнобольные...» показал, что положительная оценка присуща в группе неверующих респондентов лишь в 14,3 % высказываниях; отрицательные оценки неверующие респонденты дают в 59,3 % высказываниях, и нейтральные по характеру высказывания демонстрируют в 26,5 %. В свою очередь, верующие респонденты демонстрируют положительные оценки в 35,8% высказываний, отрицательный характер высказываний – в 47,7 % случаев и нейтральное отношение – 16,5 %. Итак, доля респондентов, полагающих, что большинство людей негативно воспринимают психически больных, больше половины (59,3 %) среди неверующих и 47,7 % среди ве-

рующих. По аналогии с закономерностями каузальной атрибуции, эти данные могут говорить о проекции вовне негативного отношения к больным.

Анализ предложений «Общество должно...» показал, что позитивные высказывания встречаются в группе неверующих респондентов в 27,4 % случаев; отрицательные в 35,4 % высказываний и нейтральные по характеру суждения неверующие демонстрируют в 37,2 % высказываний. В свою очередь, верующие респонденты демонстрируют положительные суждения в 33,9 % высказываний, отрицательные в 44 % случаев, нейтральный характер высказываний составил 22 %. Таким образом, доля респондентов, выражающих желание наложить ограничения на больных, изолировать их от здоровых оказывается преобладающей в обеих группах.

Анализ завершений предложения «Мои опасения по поводу душевнобольных...» был проведен для уточнения содержания эмоционального компонента репрезентаций. В качестве единицы анализа были взяты фрагменты, отражающие страхи и опасения респондентов. Так, «агрессивными» душевнобольных считают 15 % неверующих респондентов и 11 % православных христиан, «непредсказуемыми» их называют 10,6 и 19,3 %, способными «причинить вред детям» – 8,9 и 6,4 % соответственно.

Для получения менее опосредованных социальной желательностью результатов была также применена проективная методика Bubbles, данные которой обрабатывались методом тематического контент-анализа. Анализировался характер приписываемой больному речевой активности («Что говорит?»), особенностей его поведения («Что делает?»), и атрибутируемой ментальной активности («Что думает?»). Реплики респондентов делились на три категории: позитивные (например: «желает всем здоровья»), нейтральные (напр.: «то же, что и остальные») и негативные (например: «оскорбляет»). Полученные результаты можно видеть в табл. 2.

Таблица 2 / Table 2

Частота высказываний разной модальности по данным методики Bubbles, % от числа опрошенных / Frequency of statements of different modality according to the Bubbles technique, % of the number of the respondents

Группы респондентов / Groups of respondents	Положительные высказывания / Positive statements			Отрицательные высказывания / Negative statements			Нейтральные высказывания / Neutral statement		
	Что говорит / What he says	Что делает / What he does	Что думает / What he thinks	Что говорит / What he says	Что делает / What he does	Что думает / What he thinks	Что говорит / What he says	Что делает / What he does	Что думает / What he thinks
Неверующие / Non-believers	12,5	13,5	13,5	49	37,5	43,5	38,5	49	43
Православные / Orthodox Christians	17	13,5	20,5	45,5	38	40	37,5	48,5	39,5

Обращает на себя внимание преобладание негативных и нейтральных оценок всех исследованных сфер активности больного как в группе православных, так и неверующих. При этом не обнаружено статистически значимых различий в оценках респондентов разного уровня образования ($p > 0,01$), и половозрастных характеристик ($p > 0,01$).

Обсуждение результатов

Двойственность СП относительно душевнобольного была обнаружена нами при помощи, с одной стороны, анализа утверждений авторского опросника выявления содержания СП и, с другой стороны, проективных методик «Незавершенные предложения» и Bubbles. Способность индивида и группы «использовать различные логические регистры» (Moscovici, 1976. P. 286) при конструировании СП в данном исследовании выразилась в том, что эмоциональный компонент СП о душевнобольных при разных методиках опроса менял свою модальность. При оценивании респондентами утверждений опросника ядро СП обеих групп содержало исключительно сочувственные в отношении больных элементы, а утверждения, раскрывающие негативные эмоции (возможность заражения психическим заболеванием или необходимость изоляции психически больных от общества) оказались на периферии СП (табл. 1).

В то же время данные проективных методик показывают, что негативный фон восприятия душевнобольных значимо преобладает (по сравнению с позитивным) как у верующих, так и у неверующих респондентов. Негативная репрезентация душевнобольного наиболее выражена в группе респондентов-неверующих и достигает самых высоких показателей в группе 60–65-летних респондентов. Подобную амбивалентность мы рассматриваем в русле концепции когнитивной полифазии, проявляющей себя в обеих социальных группах с разной ментальностью (верующие и неверующие). Повидимому, здесь мы сталкиваемся с особой разновидностью когнитивной полифазии – селективным преобладанием. «В этом типе когнитивной полифазии разные системы знания существуют рядом, сохраняя свое содержание, логику и эмоциональную нагрузку» (Jovchelovitch, Priego-Hernández, 2015. С. 174). В случае СП о душевнобольных научная система знаний, предполагающая понимание сути болезни и гуманное отношение к больным, проявилась в прямых оценках утверждений опросника. При этом наибольшая «мягкость» в отношении к душевнобольному присуща возрастной группе 18–23 лет в обеих группах респондентов. Архаичные же, эмоционально насыщенные образы «заражения душевным нездоровьем», «агрессивного поведения больных» и т. п. обнаружались при снижении контроля в результатах проективных методик (возможно, в качестве не вполне рефлексированного защитного механизма).

Необходимо отметить, что, хотя феномен когнитивной полифазии проявляется в группах с разной ментальностью (православные верующие и неверующие), можно видеть некоторые особенности его действия. В группе верующих когнитивная полифазия проявляется в более сглаженной форме. У православных респондентов даже в проективных методиках больше позитивно окрашенных реплик в адрес душевнобольных по данным методики Bubbles (табл. 2). Аналогичные наблюдения отмечаются и по данным методики «Незаконченные предложения».

Стоит признать, что подобная противоречивость и многогранность репрезентационных полей в отношении психического здоровья и болезни характерна для современного общества (Gervais, Jovchelovitch, 1998; Бовина,

Панов, 2005), и актуальной задачей сегодня остается необходимость интеграции душевнобольных в социум и психологическое принятие людей, страдающих этими заболеваниями.

Заключение

Проблема репрезентации душевного нездоровья в современном обществе имеет очевидные моральные и социальные аспекты. Болезнь, как показывают результаты, зачастую рассматривается не столько как физический, но как духовный и социальный недуг, стигматизирующий больных. Однако из статистики правоохранительных органов известно, что, лишь 4% насильственных преступлений совершается душевнобольными. Необходимость терпимого отношения к людям с психическими заболеваниями имеет первостепенное значение для их интеграции в общество. Но подобной интеграции не происходит из-за амбивалентности структуры СП о больных. Эта амбивалентность подпитывается дискурсом СМИ, которыми насаждается страх и недоверие в отношении душевнобольных. Таким образом, в обществе наблюдается противоречие между необходимостью быть терпимым к «иным» своим членам и существующими опасениями в адрес душевнобольных. В связи с этим особое значение приобретает просветительская деятельность и продвижение ценностей гуманизма и терпимости, чему будут способствовать результаты данного исследования, например, при создании реабилитационных программ для душевнобольных и членов их семей, образовательных программ по социально-психологической реабилитации больных.

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Research article

The Phenomenon of Cognitive Polyphasia in Social Representations on the Mentally Ill

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Abstract. The present study is focused on the phenomenon of cognitive polyphasia in the context of representations of mentally ill people by different groups of society. The authors put at the forefront the problem of finding the conditions for the actualization of cognitive polyphasia. The study was aimed at identifying manifestations of cognitive polyphasia in the structure of social representations (SRs) of the mentally ill in the groups of Orthodox respondents and non-believers. The sample consisted of Orthodox Christians: $N = 114$ (49 males and 65 females) and non-believers: $N = 113$ (76 males and 37 females) in the age ranges 18–23, 40–45 and 60–65 years, permanently residing in Moscow. The survey of the respondents at the main stage of the research was carried out using: (1) the authors' questionnaire developed on the basis of the results of the search stage and including 29 statements; (2) a scale of self-assessed degree of religiosity; (3) a modified D. Feldes' Psychological Distance Scale; (4) a modified sentence completion method; (5) the Bubbles technique and (6) a question pool for obtaining socio-demographic information. The results showed that the emotional component of SRs of the mentally ill changed their modality depending on the survey methods used. When the respondents evaluated the statements of the questionnaire, the core of SRs in both groups contained elements that were extremely sympathetic towards the mentally ill, and the statements revealing negative emotions (the possibility of contracting a mental illness or the need to isolate these people from society) were on the periphery of their representations. At the same time, the data of the projective methods showed that the negative representation background (as compared to the positive one) in relation to mentally ill people significantly predominated among both believers and non-believers. The negative representation of the mentally ill is most pronounced in the group of non-believers and reaches the highest rates in the group of 60–65-year-old respondents. We regard such ambivalence as a manifestation of cognitive polyphasia and, in particular, its variety, i.e., selective prevalence.

Key words: social representations, cognitive polyphasia, the mentally ill, large groups of society, Orthodox Christians, non-believers

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Theoretical article

The *Jihadi* Current and the Lay Thinking: A “Re-Anchorage” Process Hypothesis

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Abstract. The *Jihadi-salafist* doctrine which is at the Islamist terrorism origin that affects several countries since the emergence of *Al Qaeda* in the late 80's, gave birth to the “Islamic State of Iraq and Sham/Levant” (ISIS/ISIL)¹ established as a “*Caliphate*” in 2014. Despite the ISIS official military defeat in 2019, the *Jihadi-Salafist* current – whose history goes back a long way, is currently behind a number of attacks whether collective or individual, claimed by known organizations or committed in isolation. In our perspective, we try to apprehend the attraction power of the *Jihadi* narrative issue taking the Theory of Social Representations as a paradigmatic framework. This implies that we don't consider the *Jihadi* current membership as the manifestation of a deviation from normality or optimal rationality, but as the expression of a certain common sense “resonance”. More precisely, and taking the case of the Tunisian context, the success of the *Jihadi* narrative is explained by its effectiveness as an interpretive grid and as a guide for action, making it possible to “re-anchor” a reality lacking in meaning. This hypothesis of a “re-anchoring” implies that anchoring as described by Moscovici as one of the two processes at the origin of the social representations formation (with the objectification process), could be not only as a familiarization of the strange by inserting it in an already known pre-existing frame, but by substituting to the frame itself, a new one, in order to be able to insert familiar objects which would have lost their sense precisely because of the old frame itself. This hypothesis could offer a theoretical and heuristic perspective allowing the anchoring process to be conceived as a circular and non-definitive process.

Key words: social representations theory, *Djihadi-Salafism*, anchoring process, re-anchoring, Tunisia

Introduction

What is named from 2014, as the “Islamic State of Iraq and Sham/Levant” (ISIS/ISIL) or DAESH (an acronym formed from the organization's Arabic designation²) refers to the main face of what is called the organized “global terrorism” af-

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¹ Terrorist organization banned in Russia.

² "داعش"

ter *Al Kaida* had experienced a certain setback. The ISIS proto-State (proclaimed as a “*Caliphate*”) has been characterized by a staged violence and by spectacular attacks as mode of action but also as an argument for its propaganda.

Nowadays, even though ISIS has been militarily defeated, in 2019, the political-islamist current that is at its base, stills manifest through attacks in different regions in the world. According to statistics³, from the beginning of 2021 and if only the actions of organized groups are considered, it was responsible for at least 11591 attacks worldwide and concerns the five most deadly organizations. Many of the attacks are still carried out on behalf organized groups as *Taliban*, *Boko Haram*, ISIS (as an ideological current) or *Al-Shabaab*, but some others are perpetrated “in the name of Islam” by isolated individuals who do not explicitly belong to any organized Islamist network. They generally use rudimentary means, often a bladed weapon and with cries of “*Allah akbar*” (Allah is the greatest). Those attacks aren’t claimed by known organizations. According to Kepel (2021), they are linked to “an atmosphere” of *Jihadism* (“*au djihadisme d’atmosphère*”).

The ISIS as a topical “*Caliphate*” and as a doctrinal current, appears as the material and concrete place of what terrifies, of what creates disorder and of what transgresses all known rules of what makes the modern Nation-States and societies. Concerning the European countries, nor should we forget the role played by a historical background dating back to the Crusades, and even further, in the ISIS problem anchoring in a pre-existing imaginary, opposing “East” and “West”, Islam and Christianity, “civilized” and “barbaric” world, imaginary which characterises the theses of authors as Huntington (1993, 1996) using the notion of clash between the vague concept of opposed “civilizations”. In Muslim-majority countries as Tunisia, *Jihadism* is officially presented as a deviation from a “true” Islam, and the *Jihadi* doctrine as a sham. In short, whether in Europe or in Muslim-majority countries (as Tunisia, Egypt, etc.), the problem of Islamist terrorism is apprehended in the dominant discourses through a same reading grid: that of a break with normality.

Scientific Approaches to the Phenomenon of *Jihadi*

This has led many scholars from different disciplines to focus on either what characterizes *Jihadi* individuals or to examine what it is about Islam itself that generates islamist violence. Thousands of studies have attempted to identify the leading factors to the ISIS membership. There are at micro, meso and macro levels of analysis, ranging from geostrategic to psychological, sociological or political science. At each of these levels, numerous factors interaction and combination contribute to the explanation of what is referred to as “violent extremism” (Ranstorp, Hyllengren, 2013). This shows the phenomenon complexity and the unresolved difficulty of reaching a solution that could prevent violent actions.

With regard to sociological studies, many of them aim explicitly or implicitly to respond to the urgent need to prevent or counter current membership and recruitment by seeking to identify the living conditions or the individual trajectories

³ Statista. (2021). Number of fatalities due to terrorist attacks worldwide in 2019, by responsible terrorist group. Retrieved May 29, 2021, from <https://www.statista.com/statistics/517683/ten-most-violent-terrorist-groups-2015-by-number-of-attacks/>

role leading to violent action. However, identifying unambiguously decisive factors at the general level in the organization membership, seems to be a difficult task. Neither the degree of poverty nor the education or the origin country religiosity level, are determining factors. According to a World Bank report (2016)⁴, only the country's overall male unemployment rate seems to correlate with the recruits number, while at the same time, and according to the same report, the majority say they worked in a trade before joining the organization... According to the report, another important finding is that recruits “are far from being uneducated or illiterate”. 69% of them report at least a secondary education, only 15% left school before high school and less than 2% are illiterate. Concerning recruits from the Middle East, North Africa and South and East Asia, “they are significantly more educated than individuals from their cohort in their region of origin. Most has attended secondary school and a large fraction has gone on to study at university”. But what is even more surprising is their initial relationship to the Islamic religion. With regard to the Muslim religion knowledge, their own assessments of their knowledge of it, show low levels of knowledge: only 4% consider that they have a confirmed religion knowledge. The majority (53%) consider their knowledge “basic” and 20% consider it at the “intermediate” level. In addition, the country religiosity degree is negatively correlated with the ISIS recruits number. In conclusion, the report states that it is the combination of the country's high unemployment rate and a high level of education which has a high probability of leading to “radical” ideas.

From a psychosocial perspective which considers that the lay thinking is a study object in itself, and more particularly in the Social Representations Theory framework (Moscovici, 1961), we consider the *Jihadi* current attraction exerted among certain individuals, taking into account the interactions between what the *jihadi* narrative proposes and what their representations of the context in which they evolve, echoes it.

But first of all, we must specify that the so-called “radical” ideas belong to an Islam minority movement, namely *Jihadi-Salafism* (this should not be confused with *Salafism*⁵, which can be only “activist” or “quietist”...) as it stands today (Rougier, 2008), i.e. in a total social and political rupture logic with the Nation-States model. This is probably the reason why the “Islamist political ideology” as categorized by many social science authors, is generally described in reference to the “radicalism” or “radicalization” concepts (as it was already the case for the anarchist movement in the late 19th – early 20th century or of the far left actions in the 1970s, in Europe) which Khosrokhavar describes as follows (2014. P. 8) “the process by which an individual or group adopts a violent form of action, directly linked to an extremist ideology...” *Jihadi-Salafism* is characterized by, among other things, being selective in the sacred references (i.e. the Koran and

⁴ The World Bank. (2016). *Economic and social inclusion to prevent violent extremism*. Retrieved November 26, 2018, from <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/409591474983005625/economic-and-social-inclusion-to-prevent-violent-extremism>

⁵ The root of the word (“*Salaf*”, “سلف”), means in Arabic “pious ancestors” or “predecessors” (Rougier, 2008).

*hadiths*⁶) and by the violence use as a mean of establishing the only legitimate political and social governance model in the eyes of the doctrine. It should be noted however, that this is a trend whose history is not recent. It dates back to the 8–9th century AD, i.e. *Handbalism* (Laoust, 1959; Charnay, 2008), one of the four leading jurisprudence ("مذهب") schools that form *Sunni* Muslim law, founded by *Ibn-Hanbal*⁷ whose primary concern was to restore strict respect for the Koran and the prophetic tradition (Nader, 1956), in the face of the emergence of new currents of thinking (particularly that of *Mu'tazilites*⁸ inspired by the Greek philosophy), and to disqualify the interpretation of the sacred texts activities designated as "innovation" ("بدعة"), which is a pejorative concept in this context. In the 13th century, *Ibn-Taymiyya*⁹, heir to *Hambalism*, took up the torch and criticized the rationalist philosophers of the time – particularly *Ibn-Rochd (Averroes)* – whom he considered heretics and as the "Aristotle religion" followers whose reference framework is a "polytheistic thinking"; and, secondly, some rites forms that he describes as "deviant", such as *Sufism*¹⁰ (a mystic Islam current existing since the 9th century)¹¹ which, at that time, began to be organized (Guenon, 1973; Houtsma, Arnold, Wensinck, 1913–1936), or the saints cult (Massignon, 1975/2010). Then, *Abdel-Wahhab* (18th century) gave a new lease of life to the *Jihadi-Salafism* as in its current form. He participated in the founding of a *Salafist* governance characterized by a great rigorism, that of Saudi Arabia (Lage, 2006). From the doctrinal point of view in relation to his predecessors, *Abdel-Wahhab*¹² introduced the excommunication principle ("التكفير") and the idea according to which many of those who believe they are Muslim are not true ones due to the "idols" they associate with God ("شرك"). Therefore they are accused by him of polytheism, apostasy or miscreance. They are literally "those who associate" ("مشركون"), punishable by the death penalty. In the 20th century, Qutb¹³ – a member of the early Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood – by promulgating violent struggle as legitimate, even compulsory political action against Arab nationalist and socialist regimes and the "West", in modern *Jihadism* (Carré, Seurat, 1983) was one of those who gave new impetus to the modern *Jihadism*. At the organizational and active level, Azzam at the 80's, then since 2001, Bin Laden, founder of *Al Qaeda*, Al-Zawahiri, and, distinguishing themselves from the latter, Zarkawi and Al-Baghdadi ("Caliph" of the ISIS) among others, are the main representatives of the *Jihadi* current (Bé-

⁶ The Prophet Mohammed Words and facts compiled in reference works (six in number) such as that of *Al-Bukhārī* (9th century) known as "*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*" ("صحيح البخاري") or as that of Muslim (9th century) known as "*Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*" ("صحيح مسلم")...

⁷ Ibn-Hanbal, A. (1895). "*Musnad*". Bulaq.

⁸ Tenants of *Mu'tazilism*, a Sunni Islam current probably founded by *Ibn-Ata* in the 8th century.

⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, A. (2007). "*Al'Aqida Al Wasitiyya*". Dar Al Muslim.

¹⁰ A mystical doctrine of Islam organized in brotherhoods ("طرق").

¹¹ *Al-Hallaj* (9th century) and *Ibn-Arabi* (13th century) were representatives of the movement.

¹² Abdel-Wahhab. *Kitāb ut-tawhīd*. Retrieved October 28, 2018, from http://bayt.al.hikma.free.fr/la_croyance/livre_unicite.html

¹³ Qutb, S. (2002). *In the Shade of the Qur'an* (vol. 30). Retrieved October 20, 2018, from <https://www.kalamullah.com/shade-of-the-quran.html>

nichou, Khosrokhavar, Migaux 2015; Rogozinski, 2017). They have led to the *Jihad* globalization while placing it in an apocalyptic perspective. At the same time, a massive dissemination of *Jihadi* literature both that from the origins and that more recent (in particular that of Al-Maqdissi, Abou Qatada, Abou Moussab...) at the international level, developed through the new communication technologies and the virtual social networks constituting extremely efficient vehicles for the *Jihadi* ideas (Khosrokhavar, 2014).

Since the first work on "*Jihadi terrorism*" that could be traced back to Etienne (1987), the thinking of "political Islamism" in which *Jihadi-Salafism* is classified, has been decoded, often by applying an analysis in terms of ideology, by making use of a predefined conceptual framework that in social psychology refers to general, non-specific mental processes. According to Maher (2017), *Jihadi-Salafism* is a political-religious ideology built around five principles: *jihad*¹⁴ (which literally means "effort" in Arabic and which refers in *Salafist-Jihadist* doctrine to the obligation to armed struggle), the oneness of God¹⁵, the excommunication¹⁶, the covenant and disavowal¹⁷ (broadly referring to the idea that a Muslim would only be a Muslim if he disavows non-Muslims), and absolute divine sovereignty (which refers to what *Salafist* literature more precisely refers to in Arabic, literally, as the "unification of the sovereignty"¹⁸).

In social psychology, the definition of the ideology notion is not without some difficulties. Those given, are often equivocal, non-operational and questionable (Roussiau, Bonardi, 2001). The notion refers to the idea of a particular socio-cognitive system or functioning of "self-explanation" and "self-legitimization" (Deconchy, 1989. P. 242). In Deconchy's terms (2000. P. 118), it is a "specific cognitive posture". According to this author (1989, 1999), it is a coherent system of reality explanations and representations, based on a conviction among its supporters of the veracity of its content considered as "true", without any "rational" verification. It "is as a natural perceiving and explaining framework for events, that is, as realism... Hence the concept of epistemo-ideology" (Camus, 2004). It is characterized by making the product of contingencies, as an historical and logical necessity (Deconchy, 1999. P. 119). Within this conceptual framework, the ideological explanation system is considered as opposed to an optimal thinking system whose prototypical form would be the scientific verification. This conceptual framework – like any theoretical framework – is not exempt from implications: first, the contents of ideologies are studied only as particularisms; and second, the ideology notion refers to an unusual functioning. It is associated with the orthodoxy notion which according to Deconchy (1971. P. 35), characterizes an individual who "accepts, and even asks, that his thinking, language and behaviour being regulated by the ideological group to which he belongs and in particular by the group power apparatuses". Generally, the adherence to *Jihadi-Salafist* doctrine is implicitly interpreted as a sort of "madness", an abnormality, often

¹⁴ "الجهاد"

¹⁵ "التوحيد"

¹⁶ "الكفر"

¹⁷ "البراءة"

¹⁸ "التوحيد الحاكمية"

signified by being “out of the ordinary”. This idea is clearly expressed through certain definitions of Islamist “radicalism”, such as Bernier's (2016), according to which it is an “unusual way” expression, and may eventually lead to the use of “non-ordinary means”. The phenomenon analyzes are generally based on two postulates: that of a clear rupture between an “erroneous” information processing *versus* a valid one, an individual rationality *versus* a collective irrationality, an optimal cognitive functioning *versus* a biased one; and a more specific and implicit one (even among social sciences scholars) of a clear limit between a supposed Muslim “ordinary”, “moderate”, “reasonably religious” common sense, and a “radicalized” way of thinking. The first postulate, an epistemic one, refers to a “preliminary and fixed conception of what thinking should be” as expressed by Moscovici (2013. P. 227), i.e. the idea of a norm, that of a “normality” of thinking *versus* a biased one. These are the presuppositions of a dominant cognitivism in social psychology, undermined by the social thinking paradigm as initiated by Moscovici (1961, 1976). By introducing common sense knowledge as a legitimate scientific object in the social sciences, he reintroduces the reflective and symbolic dimension of human social behavior (Greenwood, 2004, cited by Kalampalikis, 2013. P. 9). The paradigm has also a far-reaching epistemological implication: rationality is no longer the prerogative of the individual or the scientific thinking; and it is no longer defined according to the veracity criteria according to an objective reality. By taking up the legacy of Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl who questioned the dichotomy made between the modern societies rationality and the “primitive” societies irrationality, Moscovici (2013. P. 46) affirms that “all that is rational is social and all that is social is rational”. He refers to “the rationality of popular knowledge”. He stipulates that social thinking would have its own rationality whose logic derives from the social situations and which is generated by the social relations constraints (1961; 1976). It is based on the collective construct of meanings need, in order to act. In this perspective, *Jihadi* way of thinking can be interpreted as a certain “knowledge mode” expression that is contextually determined. It is an “evaluative knowledge” Beauvois (1984) that makes sense in the eyes of its members. But before continuing, we should specify that what is expressed here is a purely epistemological posture which must not be interpreted as a legitimizing attempt of the *Jihadi* actions nor the doctrine. What is proposed here is only to consider this thinking form from its own logic taken in a phenomenological way and in relation to the particular contexts of its diffusion, in the hope of better understanding the dynamics of the actions it claims. Given the difficulty of defining a typical profile¹⁹ of the violent *Jihadi* ready to carry out an attack, it is, in our opinion, towards the *Jihadi* thinking internal elements and their echoe with the context, which we must look to find a way of explanation. It is on the basis of these proposals that we have sought to understand the tremendous attraction and fascination power the *Jihadi* thinking exerts on its supporters. As an illustration of its powerful attraction, a United-Nations experts report²⁰ notes that until August

¹⁹ A report title (*137 nuances of terrorism*, Hecker, 2018) itself, express the impasse by focusing exclusively on what makes individuals and their unique trajectories joining the *Jihadi* movement.

²⁰ Report submitted to the United Nations Security Council on 23 August 2018. Retrieved September 26, 2018, from <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/261/77/pdf>

2018, between 20,000 and 30,000 *Jihadis* were still fighting in the ISIS ranks despite the military setbacks it was undergoing. In addition, there are 3000 to 4000 fighters in Libya, as well as those in Southeast Asia and West Africa. In the Tunisian context which is of particular interest to us, Tunisia has counted between 2011 (year of the fall of the dictatorship of Ben Ali) and 2018, around 3000 jihadist fighters in Iraq, Libya and Syria, which is proportionally important considering the 11 million inhabitants, according to the National Commission for Combating Terrorism (coted by International Crisis Group, 2013²¹, 2021²²). Currently, about 300 Tunisians still fighting. In addition, Tunisian fellows committed four attacks in France and Germany in 2016 and 2021.

The Theory of Social Representations as a paradigmatic framework for the *Jihadi* narrative analysis

We consider that the internal *Jihadi* “rationality” and consistency would have a reality structuring power among those who adhere to it. Thus, in the same way as an idea formulated by Crettiez (2011), the assumption underlying our reflection is that of a “resonance” (Snow, Benford, 1988) of the *Jihadi* narrative as it currently circulates, with a loss of meaning of the key notions that underlie the collective life in a “modern” Nation-State among the lay thinking in Tunisia as formulated by Ben Alaya (2013). This meaning loss would be the result of the dictatorship several decades of Ben Ali’s regime during which the notions of human rights were used to promote an idyllic image of the country, while the authorities practiced a violent repression. Since the fall of the regime in 2011. Succeeded an important social, economic and political crisis and a large part of the Tunisian State authorities have lost much of their credibility and the confidence of the population due to a disappointment of expectations regarding the restoration of the rule of law (Ben Alaya, 2015). This is accompanied by a very strong sense of injustice, humiliation and lack of recognition among young people (Melliti, Moussa, 2018; Ben Alaya, 2015, Ben Alaya, Ben Ismail, Hanine, 2020). More importantly, Ben Alaya's work shows that young Tunisians from different backgrounds, manifest a pragmatic paradox experience in the sense of the Palo Alto systemic theory of (c. f. Bateson, 1995; Winkin, 1981) due to recurring double-bind situations in which they face concrete interactions and experiences that totally invalidate the explicit official narratives about democracy, institutions, justice, equality and human rights. The only issue that remains in a such context is to deny the reality to which the dominant thinking categories refers. This category thinking system is considered by young people as principles that are “imported from Europe”. In other words, there is a meaning loss of the rule of law notions that are disabled by concrete experience. It is, in our opinion, in the context of this loss that the *Jihadi* narrative imposes its own thinking framework or reading grid.

²¹ International Crisis Group. (2013). *Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge*. Retrieved June 7, 2021, from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/tunisia-violence-and-salafi-challenge>

²² International Crisis Group. (2021). *Jihadism in Tunisia: A Receding Threat?* Retrieved June 7, 2021, from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/jihadisme-en-tunisie-eviter-la-recrudescence-des-violences>

To formalize this, we use the description of one of the Social Representations formation processes as described by Moscovici (1961; 1976): the Anchoring. This recourse seems adequate as a social representation is formed facing an “ordinary experience rupture (which) triggers meanings and explanations search of what strikes us as strange and disturbing” (Moscovici, 2013. P. 109). However, it should be noted that in our approach, the anchoring process should concern a “familiar” object that has become “unfamiliar”; Or more precisely, it should concern what we thought being familiar and which surprises us for not being in adequacy with the social interactions reality. It is as if the referents, once anchored in a “modernist” reference framework, had lost their meaning because the framework itself had become a source of ambiguity and strangeness. In contrast to the anchoring process as usually described, there would be the adoption of a new framework for “re-anchoring” the objects that we thought were known and that they have fallen into the strangeness. The anchoring as defined by Moscovici (1961) is the process by which pre-existing frameworks of thought are implemented to apprehend novelty. Except that in our concern, the objects are already known and it is the frame that is new. It would be the substitution of one framework by another to reinterpret in a new way, the already existing objects. The aim of anchoring in this case would not be familiarizing strangeness, but resolving a paradox, re-familiarizing the “known” that is no longer familiar (which would be in concordance with Kruglansky and Webster's theory (1996; 1994) of intolerance towards ambiguity among extremists).

The hypothesis of a re-anchorage process implies that anchoring could be circular, and could lead to a first period of characterization of the object. The stigmatization of once-familiar “non-Muslims” in *Jihadism* could be one of the origins of this demotion into “being to be killed”. To explain the power of this imperative to annihilate this “stranger” who is the “miscreant”, “associator to God” or “heretic”, we can take up the notion of stigmatic anchoring formulated by Moscovici (2002) who notes: “...his presence [the stranger] is felt... as a disorder that one cannot ignore. The deficiency we feel is the deficiency of a common world. More specifically, a loss of familiarity or coherence in the way of being in the group. This is why the awareness of this loss is an existential problem that affects the whole person” (p. 23).

In view of the above, *Jihadi* thinking would find its place in contexts where none of the categorization systems in place among collectives has the power to integrate key objects that govern the “living together”. Alongside the fundamental texts of *Jihadi-Salafist* narrative as it currently circulates, responds in the long term to the need to give a new meaning to the experienced problems, while offering keys to exit, presented as effective and definitive. For the “injustices” and “inequalities” imposed by “a State that favors only the rich” (Ben Alaya, Ben Ismail, Hanine, 2020), it substitutes a divine, supra-human right, the just and equitable nature of which constitutes its very essence concretized by the law of retaliation²³. To the “contempt” shown by “the rich classes” for the “poor classes” (Ben Alaya, Ben Smail, Hanine, 2020), it imposes a hierarchy based on loyalty to God and where each person can, by his own faith and conduct (in other words by his own

²³ "قصاص"

means), reach the highest ranks. To a difficulty in projecting oneself into the future, he offers an infinite perspective of eternity through a very elaborate eschatological vision and apocalyptic narrative. To the feeling of helplessness in the face of difficult events and living conditions, he invites the individual to play an active role not only in his own life, but also in an epic progression of the world and in the inevitable destiny of the divine will. In a few words, *Jihadi* thinking restores in the individual in search of meaning, through his participation in a community of elected representatives (that of the “true” Muslims)²⁴, a self-glorious image and a power, which one believes distorted by the failing law of men.

Conclusion

It is by taking into consideration the meanings conveyed by the *Jihadi* narrative, in correspondence with those existing (or vacant) among the common sense and in a particular context, that the influence of the *Jihadi* thinking can be understood. The implications are multiple. First, an exploration of common sense thinking as a whole, i.e. extended to a non-*Jihadi* population, seems useful, if not essential, to understand the possible relevance of the doctrine to individuals. Secondly, it means that explicit adherence to *Jihadi* thinking would not be in total rupture with the “ordinary” collective social representations, but in a resonance relationship. Another point should be raised. It is to “ordinary” aspirations that *Jihadi* thinking claims to respond. “justice”, “equality”, “equity”, “respect”... are values to which explicit reference is made by the *Jihadi* propaganda. Putting the analyzes made in a radical opposition framework with the “ordinary” referents, could be a dead end. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in *Salafist* doctrine in general, the source of these values and the means to implement them, are considered as external to the social and to the human and are therefore considered as absolutely infallible excluding any dialectic.

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²⁴ The "*Umma*" ("أمة").

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Теоретическая статья

**Джихадизм и обыденное мышление:
гипотеза процесса “повторного якорения”**

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Аннотация. Доктрина джихадистов-салафитов, лежащая в основе исламистского терроризма, поразившего несколько стран с момента появления Аль-Каиды в конце 1980-х годов, дала начало «Исламскому государству Ирака и Леванта» (ИГИЛИИГ²⁵), созданному как «халифат» в 2014 году. Несмотря на официальное военное поражение ИГИЛ в 2019 году, джихадистско-салафитское течение, история которого уходит корнями в далекое прошлое, в настоящее время стоит за рядом атак, ответственность за которые взяли ор-

²⁵ Террористическая организация, запрещенная в России.

ганизации или одиночные исполнители, и развивается в направлении того, что Ж. Кепел называет «атмосферой джихадизма». В исследовании предпринята попытка объяснить, почему джихадистский нарратив находит своих сторонников, взяв за парадигмальную основу теорию социальных представлений С. Московиси. Другими словами, принадлежность к джихадистскому течению рассматривается не как проявление отклонения от нормальности или оптимальной рациональности, но как выражение определенного «резонанса» здравого смысла (в понимании Д. Сноу и Р. Бенфорда). Если обратиться к контексту Туниса, то успех джихадистского нарратива объясняется возможностью его использования в качестве интерпретационной сетки и руководства к действию, что позволяет «повторно заякорить» реальность, лишенную смысла. Предлагаемая гипотеза о «повторном якорении» (*re-anchoring*) подразумевает, что якорение (*anchoring*), описанное Московиси как один из двух процессов, лежащих в основе формирования социальных представлений (наряду с процессом объективации) о чем-то новом, странном, незнакомом, может происходить не только путем введения нового объекта в уже известную, ранее существовавшую «рамку», но и как замена самой «рамки» на новую. В свою очередь, это позволяет поместить знакомые объекты, утратившие свой смысл именно из-за старой «рамки», в новую. Высказанная гипотеза может предложить теоретическую и эвристическую перспективу, позволяющую представить процесс «якорения» как циклический и неопределенный процесс.

Ключевые слова: теория социальных представлений, джихадизм-салафизм, процесс якорения, повторное якорение, Тунис

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Theoretical article

The Mute Zone of Social Representations and the Effects of (Un)Masking: Review and Prospects

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Abstract. Twenty years ago, Guimelli and Deschamps (2000) hypothesised the existence of the mute zone of social representations. According to the authors, certain parts of the social representations of objects, described as “sensitive”, were not expressed under normal survey conditions. This fundamental question was curiously addressed very late in literature on social representations, but has been having significant success within the community of researchers working in this field since then. This seminal work, which offered a methodological perspective capable of highlighting such unspoken facts, paved the way for studies that proposed several theoretical interpretations and new techniques for exploring this ‘mute zone’. The challenge was twofold: to identify the processes involved and to invent the appropriate tools to express the counter-normative contents potentially attached to certain objects of representation. This article proposes to take stock of these 20 years of research and to anticipate new avenues oriented on the one hand on the study of the socio-cognitive processes involved in the mute zone phenomenon, and on the other hand on the proposal of new theoretical and methodological articulations with other concepts dealing with similar issues.

Key words: mute zone, social representations, (un)masking, social comparison, behaviour, power, methodology

Introduction

Would you always tell anyone what you really think about anything? Of course not – that is why this question has been widely debated in the Humanities and Social Sciences, as it questions the validity of the answers collected when human individuals are asked about their opinions on certain objects. It mainly covers three facets: the first relates to the ‘always’ and refers to the effects of the context in which the answers are obtained (for example, the differences between a situation of anonymity and a situation of visibility). The second (the ‘anyone’) concerns the interviewer's influence on the person they are interviewing,

such as status, gender or ethnicity. The third (the ‘anything’) refers to the effect of the object about which opinions are sought, with some objects being more ‘sensitive’ than others regarding the norms and values that are attached to those. In addition to the theoretical issues involved, they also question researchers regarding the need to develop collection techniques that can best approximate the ‘true’ opinions of the respondents.

In social psychology, these questions have been at the heart of the study of stereotypes and prejudices. Several methodological options have been considered in this context in order to get individuals to express attitudes that cannot be expressed in usual conditions of collection: indirect measures (Fazio et al., 1986), the bogus pipeline technique (Jones, Sigall, 1971), the randomised response technique (Warner, 1965; Himmelfarb, Lickteig, 1982), the experimenter effect technique (Anderson, Silver, Abramson, 1988; Campbell, 1981; Davis, 1997; Fazio et al., 1995); Finkel, Guterbock, Borg, 1991; Gilbert, Hixon, 1991; Schuman, Converse, 1971; Stangor et al., 2002; Sudman, Bradburn, 1974) or implicit measures (Fazio, Olson, 2003), the most famous of which is the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, Banaji, 1995). A synthesis about these aspects has been proposed by Albarracin, Johnson and Zanna (2005). It is only recently that research dealing specifically with social representations has found interest in this question through the study of what Guimelli and Deschamps (Deschamps, Guimelli, 2002, 2004) referred to as the ‘mute zone’ of social representations. This term refers to the idea that several elements of the representational field could be ‘masked’ by individuals with regards to certain objects, and thus made mute as they are not expressed in a usual context of collection of opinions. This phenomenon had already been observed by Moscovici (1961) in his seminal research on the representation of psychoanalysis: some of the elements of psychoanalytic theory were not mentioned by individuals. This was notably the case for the notion of ‘libido’. According to the author, this absence was explained by the action of an ambient value system marked by prohibitions concerning sexuality. In the same sense, Jodelet (1989) had noticed that certain dimensions of the representation of mental illness, related to the belief in its contagiousness, were not always verbalised by individuals. According to the author, this was due to their archaic and anxiety-provoking character. These examples suggest that if social representations are globally constructed in conformity with the norms and values of social groups, they can also sometimes integrate beliefs contrary to these norms and values, which then become verbally hidden by individuals.

Therefore, with Guimelli and Deschamps, we can hypothesise that by reducing the normative pressure to which the subjects questioned about psychoanalysis or mental illness were subjected, they could have expressed this type of belief. Several methods were imagined to lift this normative pressure.

Methodological approaches

Three types of procedures have been considered in order to lead individuals to ‘unmask’ some of their opinions regarding ‘sensitive’ objects: manipulation of the public vs. private context of responses, normative decontextualization and substitution technique.

Private and public context

The manipulation of a context of expression that is anonymous and private or, on the contrary, visible and public, has been used for a long time outside the research on social representations (e.g., Klein et al., 2003; Klein, Livingston, Snyder, 2005), but it has also been applied to objects that are closely related to the questions addressed by the work on the mute zone. The aim of manipulating the private versus public context is indeed to cause inhibition or, on the contrary, to facilitate the expression of socially undesirable content (Piermattéo et al., 2014). In this regard, one can highlight the work done on the expression of prejudice against African-Americans (Stangor et al., 2002), or the work done on whether or not to report driving behaviour under the influence of alcohol (Lajunen, Summala, 2003). From this perspective, the differences highlighted between the private and public contexts of expression reveal a strategy for managing self-impression (e.g., Goffman, 1959; Kuran, 1995; Lajunen, Summala, 2003). Thus, following the example of research conducted by Hidalgo (2012), Lajunen and Summala (2003) and Stangor et al. (2002), the work conducted by Piermattéo et al. (2014) confirms the relevance of manipulating such a context in order to reveal counter-normative aspects associated with the objects studied. These aspects are always expressed more in a public context of expression than in a private context. Moreover, the results observed by Piermattéo et al. (2014) prove to be quite consistent with those observed by Guimelli and Deschamps (2000) concerning gypsies using another methodological option: the substitution technique.

The substitution technique

This method of exploration of the mute zone is inspired by the identification paradigm initiated by Jellison and Green (1981). It consists of not soliciting the expression of participants by their own name, but on behalf of someone else to whom the participants are asked to substitute themselves in order to respond. Thus, Guimelli and Deschamps (2000) show that individuals more frequently associate the terms ‘dirty’ and ‘thieves’ with Gypsies when they have to answer ‘as the French would do in general’ than when they express themselves personally. Similarly, the authors (Deschamps, Guimelli, 2004) show that participants are more likely to agree with the idea that ‘insecurity’ is linked to the suburbs, young people and/or foreigners, when they express themselves ‘as the French/Swiss would do in general’ (two populations were interviewed in this study, one French and the other Swiss), than when they are asked to respond on their own behalf. This technique has been the subject of several researches involving very diverse objects such as ‘the North Africans’ (Abric, 2003), ‘the Muslims’ (Flament, Guimelli, Abric, 2006), ‘the working woman’ (Flament, Guimelli, Abric, 2006), or ‘alcohol’ (Lo Monaco et al., 2009). All confirm the patterns of results initially highlighted by Guimelli and Deschamps (2000).

Normative decontextualisation

This method consists of manipulating the interviewer’s presentation (Abric, 2003). Flament et al. (2006) show that when individuals are led to express their representation of ‘Islam’, they express more agreement with the idea that this religion goes against the democratic values of France when faced with an interviewer

introducing herself with a French name ('Céline') than when faced with an interviewer introducing herself with a name of Maghreb origin ('Yamina'). At the same time, individuals express their adherence to socially desirable beliefs when they feel that it is useful, even if they do not necessarily subscribe to them. For example, again in the study conducted by Flament et al. (2006), an individual shows more agreement with the idea that Islam is a religion of tolerance when confronted with an interviewer introduced as 'Yamina' than when confronted with an interviewer introduced as 'Céline'. This type of procedure therefore facilitates the expression of certain socially stigmatised opinions when individuals are faced with the 'right' person, i.e. one who should not or hardly judge negatively the sender for their opinions. This explains why it has been used in several searches involving various objects. Thus, with regards to the representation of alcohol, there are clear differences between a situation where participants think they are responding to the academic solicitation of a student versus an association for the prevention of alcoholism among young people (Lo Monaco et al., 2009; Lo Monaco, Guimelli, 2011). In the same vein, responding to an interviewer belonging to the gypsy community (versus the French community) very strongly attenuates the socio-representational elements expressed with regards to Gypsies (Piermattéo et al., 2014).

The (de)legitimation of counter-normative beliefs

Research conducted by Guimelli, Deschamps and Lo Monaco (2010) has highlighted the relevance of using the legitimisation process (Kelman, 1958, 2001) to study the mute zone of social representations. This research is part of the lawsuit brought against the weekly newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* regarding the publication of Muhammad cartoons, initially published by the Danish daily magazine *Jylland Posten* and taken up by the daily newspaper *France Soir*. The authors predicted that the legitimacy of a judicial decision could make it possible to unmask certain counter-normative beliefs. Students were questioned about the social representation of Muslims in two times: before and after the decision of Justice, which relaxed the satirical weekly newspaper. The media immediately seized the issue and celebrated the victory of freedom of expression. Thus, in France, a wave of information approving such a decision surfaced.

As part of the study and following an inter-subject design, the authors asked participants to complete a questionnaire using the substitution technique. Some of the participants had to answer on their own behalf, under standard survey conditions ('normal' instruction), while others had to answer the questionnaire as the French in general ('substitution' instruction). Some of the participants were interviewed prior to the Justice decision and release of the discharge, while some were interviewed after the decision. During the second phase of data collection, the authors also asked participants if they were aware of the Court's decision.

In accordance with the hypotheses formulated by the authors, before the decision of Justice and therefore at the first stage of the research, we observed the results usually obtained through the manipulation of the instruction of expression. Indeed, when participants are under the 'substitution' instruction, they show more agreement with the counter-normative aspects related to the social representations of Muslims (unmasking) than participants under the 'normal' instruction (masking). However, after the announcement of the Court's decision and *Charlie*

Hebdo's acquittal, the results reveal a cancellation of this difference, and therefore show a convergence of responses towards an agreement with the counter-normative aspects of representation. This result shows that the official position taken by the courts leads to the legitimisation of the counter-normative beliefs of representation and, consequently, their unmasking. It corresponds to the results observed by Kelman in the spring of 1954 when he was pursuing his investigations on social influence in relation to the desegregation of public schools.

Further analysis of the data also showed that these results were even more pronounced when they took into account the participants' awareness of the Court's decision after the trial. In fact, only informed subjects express their agreement with a counter-normative item, thus unmasking their beliefs in 'normal' instructions. These results are in favour of taking into account the institutional legitimisation of beliefs within the framework of the study of the mute zone of social representations.

While all of these studies demonstrate the existence of mute zones about various representational fields, the question of the socio-cognitive processes involved in this phenomenon has given rise to several hypotheses (Flament, Milland, 2010).

Theoretical interpretations

For some authors (Abric, 2003; Guimelli, Deschamps, 2004; Flament, Milland, 2010; Milland, Flament, 2010), the results observed in the paradigmatic framework of the mute zone relate to the effect of normative pressure that represses a socially proscribed discourse or encourages a socially prescribed discourse. Substitution instruction, normative decontextualisation or private context would make it possible to lift this normative pressure. In other words, expressing oneself in the place of others, for example, would make it possible to reduce the level of involvement of the individual who would find themselves somehow freed from the weight of normative pressure. This would lead them to express more counter-normative opinions and less pro-normative ones.

This interpretation is supported by several studies on 'subtle or veiled racism', whose expression is much less brutal than that of blatant racism (Pettigrew, Meertens, 1995). In the same vein, Pérez and Mugny (1993) and several authors around them (see Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2004), have developed a series of studies that explore, within the framework of social influence processes, the action of a 'non-discrimination norm', which leads to self-censorship of xenophobic, racist, homophobic, sexist and other stigmatising discourses. The substitution instruction, the decontextualisation or the private context would thus lift this interdictory norm that weighs on the expression of one's own answers.

However, an alternative explanation has been suggested by Flament and Rouquette (2003) regarding the substitution instruction effect: the possible transparency of a social representation. For the authors, the French participants *know* what most French people think about Gypsies, Islam or the reasons for insecurity. When they are asked to express themselves in the place of the French population, they then try to show clear-sightedness. This is shown in a study well known in the field of racist stereotypes. Devine (1989) used a scale designed to measure prejudice against the African-American population (considered reliable, at least in

the United States and at this time), and divided a group of students (Americans of white ethnicity) according to their level of prejudice (strong or weak). She asked all participants to write down their knowledge of cultural stereotypes about African-Americans and not their personal beliefs: ‘How do you think people see black people?’ The answers show that, no matter how strong their prejudices are, the stereotype is known to all subjects. This closely resembles the results observed by Guimelli and Deschamps (2000) about gypsies: as a standard rule, the 26% of subjects who declare themselves to be ‘thieves’ may be more xenophobic than the others (although this form of questioning is not conceived to study racism). But the substitute instruction, which is the exact equivalent of the one used by Devine, reveals that 64% of respondents are aware of the stereotype that accuses gypsies of being thieves.

The question of this transparency caused by the use of the substitution instruction has been tested experimentally by Guegan, Moliner and Vidal (2013). Based on work on computer-mediated communications, the authors cross-referenced the context of expression (i.e., standard vs. substitution) with the data collection method (i.e., paper/pencil vs. online questionnaire) regarding the social representation of the Roms. If the collection method affects the responses in standard instructions with a greater expression of counter-normative aspects online than in a paper/pencil situation, the authors observe a stability of the counter-normative responses in substitution condition regardless of the modality of the collection method (i.e., paper/pencil vs. online). The results observed in substitution instruction thus show that the valence scores (i.e., positivity/negativity of responses) are statistically equivalent in the on-line and paper/pencil conditions. According to the authors, the stability of the responses produced in substitution instruction reveals the intervention of a process of transparency. In addition, measures of adherence/differentiation to the responses expressed, carried out under both standard and substitution measures, reinforce this interpretation. Indeed, while the online context should make it easier for participants to admit to adhering to the opinions that they supposedly just unmasked, the authors observe, in substitution, that the adherence scores for the reference group's opinion do not differ between the two collection methods (online vs. paper/pencil).

Finally, a third hypothesis has been put forward to account for the effect of the substitution instruction: the intervention of an implicit process of self/others comparison (Chokier, Moliner, 2006; Chokier, Rateau, 2009). By attributing more socially valued opinions to themselves and more socially devalued opinions to others, individuals would seek to maintain a positive self-assessment (Tesser, 1988) and expose themselves to either false consensus bias (Marks, Miller, 1987; Mullen et al., 1985; Ross, Green, House, 1977) or false uniqueness bias (for a review see Chambers, 2008) depending on the desirability or undesirability of the opinions involved. Thus, when participants express themselves about undesirable opinions or behaviours, they would tend to overestimate the frequency of these opinions or behaviours in the population (i.e., false consensus effect). The opposite effect occurs with regards to socially desirable opinions or behaviours: individuals tend to underestimate their frequency in the population (i.e., false uniqueness effect), thus echoing Codol's (1984. P. 317) point of view: ‘the more an item is considered normative by a given subject, the more that subject tends to declare that this

item characterises them more than the others' (see also Hardoin, Codol, 1984). This hypothesis makes it possible to understand why the effect of substitution instructions is observed both for objects involving counter-normative responses (i.e., 'sensitive' objects) and for socially valued objects (e.g., objects related to environmental issues, cf. Chesterman, 2015; Rateau, Chesterman, 2017).

Flament, Guimelli and Abric (2006) will finally summarise the phenomenon by indicating that individuals always select the expressible aspects of representation according to the normative stake they perceive in the situation they find themselves in. In the end, whatever the processes at stake, the context in which the expression takes place leads the individual to summon what is, in relation to the object, socially valued and socially devalued.

Whether it is a question of formulating what is inexpressible in a standard condition, of expressing a certain transparency about undesirable opinions, or a question of expressing what allows the individual to value themselves in relation to others, it is imperative that the individual knows what is valued or not valued and that they convoke this knowledge in order to provide their answer. In other words, if the different techniques used, depending on the case, increase counter-normative responses and reduce pro-normative responses, it is above all because they highlight what is normatively prescribed and proscribed, they activate what is socially desirable and undesirable – in short, they determine a form of recall of what is pro-normative and counter-normative according to the object.

Research perspectives

The issue of behavioural measurement

Few studies have mobilised behavioural measures within the framework of the study of social masking and the mute zone of social representations. To our knowledge, only one study has been carried out (Guimelli et al., 2012; Hidalgo, 2012) in the context of a gambling situation ('prisoner's dilemma'). This study showed that participating students frequently gambled their first move more competitively than cooperatively when they thought they were playing with a gypsy partner rather than when they thought they were interacting with a student partner.

As pointed out by Guimelli and Lo Monaco (2016), this work illustrates the interest that should be taken in behavioural measures when one is interested in the unsaid aspects of social thought. Clearly, behavioural measures avoid many of the inconveniences intrinsic to declarative measurement. We therefore believe that it is necessary to go further within the exploration of these measures in order to overcome the inherent limitations of social desirability effects. Therefore, it seems opportune to come back to the work done on the social representations of the gypsy community by modifying the measures carried out. The work conducted on this representation consisted of asking participants to associate the first words that came to their mind when the term 'gypsies' was evoked. As a reminder, whether by using the substitution technique (Guimelli, Deschamps, 2000) or by varying the anonymity versus the visibility of the participants (Piermattéo et al., 2014), empirical studies have revealed that the term 'thief' did not appear spontaneously. Describing gypsies as 'thieves' supposes to assign them dishonest intent and demonstrate all the distrust they are victim of. Moreover, far from being merely

descriptive, some terms, the word ‘thief’ being probably one of them, have a prescriptive dimension (Flament, 1994). Thus, to say that gypsies are thieves presupposes the activation of a behavioural prescription such as: ‘gypsies are thieves, so it is necessary to beware of them’. If such descriptive cognition of a population is accompanied by a prescriptive dimension of behaviours, it is then possible to glimpse a path conducive to behavioural measurement. It therefore remains to imagine an experimental situation activating this prescription. Distrust refers to vigilance and protective behaviour. Whenever someone we don't trust is standing next to us, we tend, for example, to move our belongings closer to us. This type of behaviour is regularly observed in closed spaces such as public transport. It goes without saying that these attributions of intentions are strongly determined by our system of thought, as shown by the results highlighted by Allport and Postman (1947) within the framework of the relay communication paradigm. The transformations of the message observed in this experiment show the intervention of a body of knowledge relating to the African-American population in the United States. Because of their orientation function (Abric, 1976, 1994; Doise, 1973), social representations can be considered as playing a role in the anticipation of behaviours. Consequently, the adoption of protective behaviours on the part of participants actually confronted with gypsies would potentially show that the latter's behaviours are determined by representational aspects that are not, however, spontaneously declared.

Mute zone, social power and disinhibition

In 2003, Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson (2003) reported on a model that predicts a tendency for ‘high power’ individuals to disinhibition and a tendency for ‘low power’ individuals to inhibition. Disinhibition is part of the social consequences of power and is a modality of approach behaviour. It makes it possible to break free from social norms. Thus, the priming of a high level of power leads to a stronger expression of prejudices and an increase in adherence to legitimising ideologies (De Oliveira, Dambrun, Guimond, 2008; De Oliveira, Guimond, Dambrun, 2012). Other studies show that those who are primed with ‘high power’ use stereotypes to qualify those primed with ‘low power’, while the reverse occurs significantly less (Vescio et al., 2009).

These results are similar to those highlighted by Degraeve (2015) partly devoted to the study of the effects of power (high vs. low) in a situation of anonymity vs. visibility (private vs. public context of expression). The author shows that participants primed with high power report significantly lower social desirability scores than participants primed with low power. Indeed, ‘high power’ primed individuals tend to make more negative judgments about a target in a private context than ‘low power’ primed individuals, but make more positive judgments in a public context. Degraeve (2015) followed the path of social responsibility activated in the public context among the ‘high power’ primed individuals but the results only partially validated his hypotheses. Taken as a whole and in a context of deprivation of expression, the data show a tendency towards disinhibition and are encouraging for further investigation of masking and unmasking effects.

Given these different aspects, it seems possible to use this variable in the study of masking and unmasking. In our opinion, it is from the work carried out by

Swingle (1970) that it is possible to glimpse some interesting ways of operationalisation. Within the framework of paradigms such as ‘experimental games’, Swingle (1970) proposes a manipulation of power by manipulating compensation matrices provided to participants. It consists in manipulating the remuneration which determines a level of power at stake in the relationship between the two players. This power induction pathway would remove the major limitations inherent in power activation methods. However, it may be argued that the experimental gambling situation requires a significant number of trials. Nevertheless, the goal here is not to observe cooperative or competitive behaviours, but to induce a different level of power between players. In addition, just like the ‘role-playing’ type of priming methods (e.g., Anderson, Berdahl, 2002; Dubois, Rucker, Galinsky, 2010; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, Magee, 2003; Maner et al., 2007; Maner, Mead, 2010; Overbeck, Park, 2001; Richeson, Ambady, 2003), quite common in the context of power priming, the advantage lies in the fact that only one handover is necessary in order to place one individual in a situation of high power and the other in a situation of low power, which is not the case for example with autobiographical recall (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, Magee, 2003). While this priming method produces satisfactory results, it is then possible to carry out measurements on a given social group (Degraeve, 2015) and to systematically explore the effects of power on masking and unmasking strategies in relation to positions on counter-normative aspects.

Substitution paradigm and attitudinal and behavioural adjustment

As noted above, one of the major effects of the substitution instruction is that it activates in the participant what is normatively prescribed and proscribed for the object in question. The question then arose as to whether this pro- or counter-normative activation might have an effect on participants’ subsequent behaviour regarding the object. Much work has indeed shown the role that the activation of pro- or counter-normative norms can play on behaviour. This is notably the case with Cialdini’s work on normative focus (Cialdini et al., 1990, 1991; Kallgren et al., 2000; Reno et al., 1993), which shows that when a given situation activates a prescriptive norm, the individual tends to conform to it at a behavioural level. It could therefore be hypothesised that the activation of a prescriptive norm, induced by the substitution instruction, would be able to provoke a phenomenon of ‘behavioural adjustment’. In other words, it was expected that, following a substitutive response, the individual would adjust their behaviour to what is socially desirable. This is shown by a series of studies conducted on environmental objects (Chesterman, Rataeu, 2012a, 2012b; Chesterman, 2015, Rataeu, Chesterman, 2017). For example, participants invited to respond to an environmental attitude scale provide much more negative responses when answering on behalf of the French in general than when answering on their own behalf. Subsequently, these same participants report being more involved in pro-environmental behaviours than others, whether it be declaring a greater desire to adopt eco-responsible behaviours, installing dry toilets in their homes, respecting seismic standards in the construction of their homes, or investing in a shared garden project. This effect goes beyond behavioural intent alone to guide actual behaviour. For example, individuals who have responded to an environmental attitude scale with a substitution instruction are subsequently more likely than others to sign petitions in favour of pro-

environmental actions and to effectively participate in a clean-up event. In other words, denigrating others on an environmental dimension seems to activate a prescriptive pro-environmental norm to which participants subsequently adjust their behaviour. Other work is currently underway on this issue, which opens up promising paths for research and application.

In the same vein and more recently, a series of research studies using the substitution paradigm has been conducted on moral judgment (Trémolière, Rateau, submitted). The results show that individuals faced with a series of moral dilemmas under substitution instruction provide more utilitarian answers (i.e., it is moral to sacrifice the life of an innocent person if this sacrifice saves other lives) than those faced with standard instructions who are more deontic (i.e., it is not moral to sacrifice an innocent person, regardless of the positive consequences). These results, particularly robust as indicated by a meta-analysis applied to a set of six replications, indicate the existence of a deontic social norm to which individuals subscribe while they believe others do not conform to that norm. However, the subsequent effects on the judgment of others, whether assessing another participant who allegedly provided deontic vs. utilitarian responses or choosing between two political candidates, one deontic and one utilitarian, are not apparent. Again, research must continue in order to refine our understanding of the processes and effects of substitution.

Conclusion

Taken as a whole, the elements relating to the assessment and research perspectives demonstrate the value of intensifying studies devoted to the expression of socially desirable and undesirable aspects of social representations. Clearly, at a time when opinions are expressed more and more rapidly and when digital social communications are at the heart of concerns, it is more than ever necessary to understand the mechanisms at play in the expression of these opinions whose determinants are of an ideological and socio-representational nature. However, understanding these mechanisms, and therefore the processes, presupposes mastering the reliability of the responses produced or understanding the ways in which they are expressed. As such, whether at a theoretical or methodological level, research on the mute zone of social representations has an important political and social significance: research makes it possible to grasp the subtleties of the expression of common sense and reveal the social conditions of this expression.

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Теоретическая статья

Скрытая зона социальных представлений и эффекты (де)маскировки: обзор и перспективы


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Аннотация. Двадцать лет назад Гимелли и Дешам (2000) выдвинули гипотезу о существовании скрытой зоны социальных представлений. По мнению этих ученых, некоторые части социальных представлений об объектах, описанных как «чувствитель-

ные», не выявляются в обычных условиях исследования без дополнительных приемов. Этот фундаментальный вопрос на удивление поздно был поднят в литературе по социальным представлениям, но с тех пор он привлекает все больше внимания исследователей, работающих в данной области. В своей основополагающей работе Гимелли и Дешам предложили методологическую перспективу, позволяющую выявлять такие «невывказанные факты» и проложившую путь для дальнейших исследований, в которых были выдвинуты несколько теоретических интерпретаций и новых методов изучения «скрытой зоны» социальных представлений. При этом исследователям было важно как определить лежащие в основе «маскировки» процессы, так и разработать соответствующие инструменты для выявления контрнормативного содержания, потенциально связанного с определенными объектами представления. В настоящей работе предлагается подвести итоги этих двадцатилетних изысканий и наметить новые направления исследований, ориентированных, с одной стороны, на изучение социально-когнитивных процессов, связанных с феноменом скрытой зоны, а с другой – на поиск новых теоретических и методологических связей с другими концепциями, исследующими аналогичные вопросы.

Ключевые слова: скрытая зона, социальные представления, (де)маскировка, социальное сравнение, поведение, власть, методология

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Theoretical article

From Prototypical Stimuli to Iconographic Stimuli: The Power of Images in the Study of Social Representations

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Abstract. When we are interested in the image of a social object, we are interested in what individuals have perceived about that object, the ways in which they have interpreted those perceptions, and what they think about that object. Fully agreeing with the idea that the use of iconographic stimuli can enhance the traditional methods and techniques that are used to study any social representation, in this article, two techniques will be presented. The first, the prototypical stimuli technique, was proposed in the second half of the 1980s by Galli and Nigro. The second technique, iconographic stimuli, creatively integrate images and words in a single tool, was designed more recently to study the social representation of culture by Galli, Fasanelli, and Schember. Researches here reviewed clearly shows that the image has the great power to attract to itself the very objects depicted, a power that the word often does not possess. It is images that make people reflect, help them to think about issues concerning the fundamental aspects of everyday life. The work here presented, carried out in first person by the writer, as well as by all the other authors who are concentrating their efforts in this direction, only represents a starting point of reflection. New and more articulated studies will be able to support with heuristic evidence what so far seems to be configured as a suggestive hypothesis, which in any case will require a wider and shared interdisciplinary effort.

Key words: social representations, prototypical stimuli, iconographic stimuli, multi-methods approach

Introduction

As Barale (2009) reminds us, the famous iconologist Aby Warburg was convinced that the distancing allowed by an image is a prerequisite for the capacity of reflection. In Warburg's opinion, thought needs a space – a space between the self and the object. The creation of distance between the self and the external world can be described as “the fundamental act of human civilization”, that is, a kind of interval between the stimulus and the action or a pause between the impulse and the consequent behavior. For Warburg, the loss of this distance between signified and signifier, between observer and object, identifies the central problem

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of science or, rather, of the link between art and science, where the latter is always considered to be at a higher level than the former. As the author himself points out in the fragments of *Symbolismus al Umfangsbestimmung*, “The work of art is the result of the repeated effort, on the part of the subject, to establish a distance between himself and the object” (Warburg, 1896–1901. P. 23).

Science has always tried to establish a distance between itself and what ordinary people do on a daily basis, such as using a pictorial image to identify a deity or, more recently, looking for a known image to anchor an unknown and disturbing concept.

Serge Moscovici has devoted his scholarly career to understanding this complex interplay between science and common sense. Through the Social Representations Theory (SRT), he has offered an explanation for this constant and continuous work, carried out by social groups, aimed at finding the best way to prefigure, or rather refigure, any attempt to deal with a problem, a cataclysm or, contrarily, a joyful event for the community. This is what usually happens within the processes of the naturalization of cognitions, which help make new and unusual notions seem similar to other notions and other scientific names, giving them a “palpable” existence. Naturalization tends to provide an autonomous figurative model and a status of evidence for the complex reality of “common sense” (Moscovici, 1961. Pp. 316–317).

We often employ vivid images, aware as we are of their explanatory power: we look for them inside our minds to explain concepts or ideas that, because of their abstract nature, cannot be easily understood. We are also aware that the use of an image does not merely ensure the simplification of information, but it familiarizes us with a concept, correlating it with the knowledge that we have learned through listening in everyday life. Everyday language and common knowledge are particularly rich in their representational ability, precisely because they assimilate and complete the transformation from concept to image. The study of images, as pointed out by Abric (1987), has a long history in the psychological literature, although it mostly appears as a perceptual model, within which the image is seen as a reflection of the surrounding world, with a clear separation between subject and object. The interpretation of the image that we present here derives from the concept of representation and assumes, on the contrary, a constitutive relationship between subject and object. In these terms, the image is not a mere reflection of an object but the product of a complex relationship – whether real or imaginary, objective or symbolic – that the subject projects onto a specific object (Molinari, Emiliani, 1990).

In reflecting on the relationship between images and collective beliefs, Moliner (2008), inspired by Moscovici (1961), studied the role of icons as identifying tools of social representation, stating that iconography must be considered the source, medium, and product of representation. According to Moliner, when we are interested in the image of a social object, we are interested in how individuals perceive that object, the ways in which they have interpreted those perceptions, and what they think about that object. This is why “the notion of image as a phenomenon of collective opinion cannot be unrelated to the notions of visual image, mental image, and symbolic image” (Moliner, 1996. P. 111). Therefore, as it is, images must necessarily be part of that small nucleus (central core) of elements that gives rise to any social representation, as shown by scholars of Aix-en-Provence University.

According to de Rosa and Farr (2001), although images can be an important source of communication, scientific thought has often underestimated them, considering them a harbinger of errors and falsehoods. In the literature, in fact, the prejudice towards images is demonstrated by the scarce attention given to them by sociologists and social psychologists – this is a paradox for these disciplines in a society where visual information dominates written and spoken information in terms of impact. Only in developmental or clinical psychology, and of course in the psychology of the arts, does attention to figurative language, as well as to perception, testify to the existence of an interest in alternative forms of language to verbalcentrism.

In his comparative study of figurative and visual thinking, for example, Darras (1998 as cited in Moliner, 2016) proposes a useful taxonomy for classifying images, focusing on four main types: *similis*, which have a stronger relationship of analogy with their object; *schémas*, are images which take one or more figurative characters of the object, without it being necessary to include all the details that characterize it; *iconotypes*, which result in the repeated and recognized use of a given pattern; *pictogrammes*, coinciding with an iconotype validated by a community of users (Darras, 1998. P. 92). These consistently represent the figurative characteristics of each object, thus identifying the sociological or cultural specificity of individuals. It is important to note that objects represented through diagrams, iconotypes, and pictograms do not necessarily belong to the visibly perceptible physical world. This is true, for example, in the graphic representation of a process (the evolutionary stages of man), a system of relationships (the Catholic hierarchy), or a phenomenon (the seismogram). In any case, the diagram remains the only possible way to reproduce an image of the object, since it would be difficult to produce an analog image, a simile according to the previous terminology (Moliner, 2016). Reflecting on the relationship between images and collective beliefs, Moliner (2008) investigated the role of icons as tools for identifying a social representation, stating that iconography must be considered a source, means and product of a representation.

Starting from a reflection on the role that the image can play in overcoming the bottlenecks of “verbal exclusivity”, we could begin to assert that the same word “image” contains within itself a wide variety of phenomena. Mitchell (2005) suggests a distinction between two English words: picture and image. In particular, he points out that picture is an iconographic representation, a particular form of form. Furthermore, as Moliner (2016) argues, image relates to the concrete objects that offer themselves to our perception. These objects exist independent of our perceptual identity. As stated by de Rosa and Farr (2001), within the human species, speech is a privileged channel for defining, objectifying, and constructing reality; however, reality cannot be defined exclusively through speech: images, sounds, and behaviors are other ways of generating and communicating 'multiform' (not necessarily complementary and, in some cases, antagonistic) aspects of social representations. For these reasons, it seems appropriate to explore social representation using methodologies and techniques that involve the use of iconographic, as well as verbal, stimuli. This is also in line with the constant exposure that complex images have undergone in recent years, transforming the myriad of icons on our devices, which identify and summarize objects, processes and emotions.

From prototypical stimuli to iconographic stimuli

Fully agreeing with the idea that the use of iconographic stimuli can enhance the traditional methods and techniques that are used to study any social representation, two techniques will be presented below: the prototypical stimuli and iconographic stimuli used in a series of studies that have taken as their focus “power” and “culture”.

The first, called the prototypical stimuli technique, was proposed in the second half of the 1980s by Galli and Nigro (Galli, Nigro, 1989).

At that time, the authors intended to study the social representation of “power”, but they soon realized that a simple interview would not be enough to make the interviewees overcome the taboo inherent in the very idea of power. What was needed was a strategy that could overcome this impasse. This gave rise to the idea of enriching the interview with the presentation of 6 black and white photographs (Figure 1), created ad hoc, as prototypical stimuli; three of the photographs were related to dyadic power relationships (mother/son, husband/wife, doctor/patient), and three were related to one-to-many power relationships (Pope/believers, university teacher/students, officer/troop). Each image represented an asymmetrical power situation about which respondents were asked to make judgments.



Figure 1. Prototypical stimuli (Galli, Nigro, 1989)

The descriptions and judgments made about the photographs allowed for a better understanding of how people represent themselves as either holding power or being subjected to it, as well as the relationships defined by the power situation more generally. At the end of the task, the respondents were asked to place the 6 photographs in hierarchical order from the one that most clearly expressed power to the one that expressed it the least. The main function of prototypical stimuli is to make “visible” certain manifestations that help define the object of representation so that the subjects’ discourse moves from the abstract to the concrete: prototypical stimuli, in fact, induce subjects to confront specific situations. This technique can be advantageously used for the collection of both qualitative and quantitative information. In fact, prototypical stimuli can be used in

the course of a qualitative interview, as well as within data collection tools that involve the use of scalar items. In the first case, the use of prototypical stimuli is particularly useful, first, because it helps reduce the incidence of those responses in terms of social desirability, which pollutes even the most sophisticated and well-structured questionnaires and interviews (Fasanelli et al., 2020; Galli et al., 2019). Second, by having subjects express their evaluation on any interval scale, it is possible to reconstruct in a very precise way the “attitude” component of the social representation one intends to study. Prototypical stimuli undoubtedly offer the advantage of allowing the transposition of the object of social representation from the abstract to the concrete. By making the object of representation visible, it is, in fact, possible to “force” the subject to confront it directly and to be, in the end, less evasive in expressing him or herself.

The research on power SRs, carried out using prototypical stimuli, was replicated in the first decade of the 2000s in an intercultural project financed by LEPS and directed by Moscovici, who oversaw the involvement of French, Indonesian, Mexican and Romanian colleagues. In this case, too, the technique showed its value. However, to avoid Eurocentric bias, the necessity of constructing ad hoc visual stimuli was highlighted, anchoring those stimuli to the stylistic features related to phenotypes, settings and ornaments characteristic of the cultures of reference in the data-construction context. The results of these reflections, impossible to adequately summarize here, are contained in the text edited by Ida Galli (2008): “Del potere e di altri dèmoni”.

The second technique that creatively integrated images and words into a single tool was designed by Galli, Fasanelli, and Schember (2018) to study the social representation of culture. Inspired by prototypical stimuli, this data construction strategy was named iconographic stimuli.

The iconographic stimuli technique consists of asking a group of independent judges to provide a number of icons (functional to the objectives of the research being conducted) that represent, from their perspective, the object of study. The resulting icons (from physical or telematic archives or from ad hoc creations, both manual and computerized) are categorized into semantic areas and related categories using content analysis of the graphic materials. The result of this classification is then submitted to a group of judges. The judges have the preliminary task of eliminating all polysemic, duplicate or strongly similar images and, finally, of choosing the icon that best represents each of the identified semantic areas. The icons selected to be used as stimuli are those on which at least 70% of the judges agree. The set of icons thus selected is randomized and integrated into a questionnaire constructed in line with those used for the analysis of prototypicality and similarity. Basically, the instrument comprises the following: a section dedicated to the presentation of all the icons, each identified with a letter of the alphabet (Figure 2); a section dedicated to the explanation, by the participants, of the motivation that led them to the choice of each specific icon; and a section dedicated to the classification of the icons in hierarchical order of attributed importance (Fasanelli, Galli, Piscitelli, 2020; Galli, Fasanelli, 2020).

The goal of the iconographic stimuli technique is to explore an object of social representation using images situated in a communication process. The images

do not necessarily have the same relationship to the object because they may be symbolic images, representing one thing and signifying something else. In contrast to pictograms, whose relationship to the object merges with the consensual recognition of certain figurative forms, the symbolic image derives its meaning from a system of correspondences, which goes far beyond the realm of mere representation: “In other words, images are translated and selected by individuals other than those for whom they are intended” (Moliner, 2016. P. 14).



Figure 2. Iconographic stimuli (Galli, Fasanelli, Schember, 2018)

The methodological strategy described above shows the possibility of identifying the iconographic dimension of each central element, which cannot necessarily be evoked by the participants. Moreover, the use of the subjective choice motivation within the questionnaire offers the researcher the possibility of clearly understanding the meaning of each icon associated with the stimulus in a wide number of cases: when the icon might suggest other meanings, when cases the icon seems to be completely unrelated to the inducing term, when an icon is used with a double meaning to understand the articulation of the reasoning underlying its selection, or when the subjective meaning attributed to the icon itself is the focus.

Concluding remarks

There is a widespread belief that the language of images is more natural and spontaneous than the language of words and that words are learned, and figures recognized naturally, but this belief is completely unfounded. Languages, all languages, are cultural media that allow the senses, affections and intellect to collaborate in the exercising of one’s intelligence. Verbal language and the language of images are both legitimately definable as media insofar as they do not merely transcribe the products of thought but are themselves a thought and the work of thought.

An image, according to Cacciari (2017), has the great power to attract to itself the very objects depicted, a power that a word often does not possess. Civilization has needed, since the beginning of time, physical and, more importantly, mental representations. Even the most abstract thoughts of humankind need representation along a sensitive and aesthetic dimension. It is images that should make people reflect and help them think about issues concerning the fundamental aspects of everyday life.

Jean François Lyotard (2008), in the book *Discourse, Figure*, argues the need to integrate words and images to reveal and overcome the deception of a model of thought and knowledge based only on a language of words. Having at one's disposal a wealth of quality images capable of interacting and collaborating with words serves mainly to help one look and think about oneself and the world with greater clarity and lucidity.

Neuroscience studies, as Dallari (2018) points out, have shown the partial distinguishability of areas of the brain devoted to image processing from those involved in linguistic processes. However, this does not justify a cultural and epistemological separation of the two categories since, from the point of view of the construction of knowledge, representation, thought and intersubjective relations, these different areas are interconnected. However, it is precisely scholars and researchers from the cognitive area who support the superiority of the universe of images over that of words in the creation of knowledge and representation in the contemporary world. Gottfried Boehm (2009) uses the term *iconic turn* to indicate what he believes is a real change in characterizing the contemporary world through images.

Psychosocial reflection on these issues includes the work of Moliner (2008), who argues that the social image of an object is the result of a process of activation of multiple mental images obtained through sensitive experiences related to the object through communication with different social groups with which the individual interacts through different media. The latter, today, are much more numerous than the sources of diffusion evoked by Serge Moscovici in the second half of the last century. Today, the individual is “captured” by a society governed by the screen. These screens come in many forms: televisions, computers, tablets and even smartphones. These new forms of communication, whose “medium is the message”, are likely to have a major impact on the process of objectification, giving a collective character to the mental images of social groups. It now seems difficult to study social phenomena without iconographic techniques. One could, in fact, reproach the methodologies generally employed that distance themselves from the object of study. We agree with Moliner when he states that it seems difficult to avoid using iconographic techniques for studying social phenomena. Iconographic stimuli, on the other hand, have shown their capacity to unveil the mental images of social groups, showing new and more fruitful relationships not only between subject and object but also, above all, between object and concept. Referring to the seminal work of Moscovici (1961. P. 315), we can say that the “concept is an intellectual instrument that allows to order a series of phenomena and to perceive their relations in an approximate and essential way. The relationship of the concept with reality is neither immediate nor univocal. The leap into the imaginary prepares a fundamental change of status and function. The concept is no longer

a pure idea or even an image, but an entity. Naturalization draws all its meaning from this insofar as it gives a full reality to what was an abstraction.”

It seems evident that what has been described so far is nothing more than a greater and more precise operationalization not only of that generative process of every social representation, called objectification, but, above all, of the original intuition of the existence of a figurative nucleus. The process of objectification, as described by the author of the Social Representations Theory, “seems to break down into two distinct phases or cover two converging movements: one goes from theory to its image, the other goes from this to the construction of social reality. The first phase is that in which the scientific conception, compared to other value systems and other representations, sees a choice being made between its elements; their movement to a concrete level is concomitant. The result is certainly not an aggregation of separate data, but an ordered, coherent and relatively correct whole. At the end of this stage, the theory is found schematized in a twofold sense of a complete selection and stylization of its terms. In this way the imaginative nucleus of a social representation, or figurative model, is constituted... From the scientific theory to the figurative model, the content is schematized and allows some concrete elements to be isolated. In turn, these elements are generalized in a double direction: social, as categories that orient reality, and psychological, as general forms that reflect reality. These two directions are inseparable” (Moscovici, 1961. P. 336).

Italo Calvino (as cited in Dallari, 2018), reflecting on his own work as a story inventor, writes, “We can distinguish two types of imaginative processes: the one that starts from the word and arrives at the visual image and the one that starts from the visual image and arrives at verbal expression”. Calvino also points out that “in the conception of a story, the first thing that comes to my mind is an image and for some reason it presents itself to me as full of meaning, even if I do not know how to formulate this meaning in discursive or conceptual terms... it is the images themselves that develop their implicit potential, the story they carry within themselves” (Calvino, 1988. P. 93). For Italo Calvino, thinking words (to say them, to write them) is a process that constantly dialogues with the visual image even when it is not visible in the text: a story is often conceived starting from an image or a series of images born in the author's mind and then generates images in the mind of the reader or the listener.

The work presented in this article, carried out in first person by the writer, as well as by other authors focusing their efforts on this direction, show that this process, admirably described by Calvino, can be completely superimposed upon the one that common sense, the so-called collective mind, carries out whenever it has to deal with an unknown and, for this reason, disturbing phenomenon. New and more articulated studies will be able to support heuristic evidence that thus far seems to be configured as a suggestive hypothesis, which, in any case, will require wider and shared interdisciplinary effort.

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Теоретическая статья

От прототипических к иконографическим стимулам: потенциал образов в изучении социальных представлений

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Аннотация. Когда психологов интересует образ социального объекта, они изучают, что люди думают об этом объекте, как восприняли его, как проинтерпретировали это восприятие. Полностью соглашаясь с идеей о том, что применение иконографических стимулов может усилить традиционные методы, приемы и техники, которые используются для изучения социального представления, в настоящем исследовании авторы представили две техники: 1) прототипических стимулов, предложенную во второй половине 1980-х годов Галли и Нигро; 2) иконографических стимулов, творчески интегрирующую образы и слова в единый инструмент, недавно разработанную Галли, Фазанелли и Шембером для изучения социального представления о культуре. Исследования, обзор которых представлен в статье, ясно демонстрируют, что образ обладает огромной притягательной силой, силой, которую часто не имеет слово. Именно образы заставляют людей задуматься, помогают им размышлять над вопросами, касающимися фундаментальных аспектов повседневной жизни. Предложенная в статье разработка мульти-методического подхода к исследованию социальных представлений является лишь от-

правной точкой для размышлений, новые и более четко организованные исследования смогут подкрепить эвристическими доказательствами то, что пока выглядит как гипотеза, которая в любом случае потребует более широких и совместных междисциплинарных усилий.

Ключевые слова: социальные представления, прототипические стимулы, иконографические стимулы, мультиметодический подход

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Исследовательская статья

Исследование образа ученого в контексте концепции социальных представлений Сержа Московиси

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Аннотация. Анализируются научно-социальный аспект функционирования научной школы, созданной С. Московиси, различные формы этого объединения: исследовательский коллектив, направление в науке, «незримый» колледж. Раскрывается возможность исследования социальных представлений через включение в диагностический арсенал новых методов анализа, в частности, иконографических документов, изображений социального объекта, что свидетельствует о современном этапе функционирования научной школы С. Московиси. В качестве примера исследования социальных представлений не только через вербальные ассоциации, но и через рисунки, обсуждаются результаты изучения социальных представлений об ученом у подростков. Цель исследования – выделение особенностей категориального аппарата образа ученого у современных российских подростков на основе иконографического материала. Гипотеза исследования состоит в предположении о том, что система социальных представлений об ученом у российских подростков содержит как устойчивые показатели принадлежности человека к профессиональному научному сообществу, так и вариативные контекстные элементы образа ученого, а степень выраженности и соотношение устойчивых и контекстных элементов отражают характеристики имиджа ученого у отечественных респондентов. В качестве основного диагностического инструмента была использована рисуночная методика The Draw-A-Scientist Test (DAST), направленная на выявление представлений об ученом на основе иконографических ассоциаций. Полученные рисунки анализировались посредством экспертной оценки, для статистической обработки использовались процедуры корреляционного и факторного анализа. Установлено, что для российских подростков характерно в целом стереотипное представление об ученом, связанное с использованием общих индикаторов внешнего облика, определяющих профессиональную принадлежность изображаемого персонажа. Обнаружены различия в частоте использования устойчивых и контекстных иконографических элементов рисунков. Показана возможность применения рисуночной методики в качестве диагностического инструмента выявления социальных представлений об ученом на основе анализа смысла объекта через его иконографическую фиксацию.

Ключевые слова: социальные представления, научная школа, имидж ученого, социальная психология науки, отношение к науке, иконографические документы

Введение

Предложенный Сержем Московиси социально-психологический подход к анализу социальных феноменов в рамках концепции социальных представлений можно со всем правом отнести к исследовательской программе самостоятельной научной школы, которая стала отличительной особенностью не только французского, но и мирового интеллектуального капитала. Говоря о Серже Московиси как об ученом – Учителе, хотелось бы обратиться к короткому анализу динамики созданной им научной школы в рамках французской социальной психологии с опорой на историческую реконструкцию исследовательской программы и социальной организации сообщества ученых, исходя из предложенного в истории психологии и науковедении подхода (Умрихин, 2007). За 60 лет концепция социальных представлений вышла за пределы и французской психологии, и за рамки, собственно, психологической науки. Умение заинтересовать, вдохновить идеей, передать «личностное знание» даже в опосредованном общении, безусловно, отражает масштаб личности С. Московиси (Гаврилова, Ушаков, 2016; Полани, 1985). В задачи данной статьи не входит описание концептуальных положений теории социальных представлений. Они хорошо известны в отечественной психологии (Донцов, Емельянова, 1985; Донцов, Белокрылова, 1999; Емельянова, 2016; Зинина, 2017; Moliner, Bovina, 2020; Сачкова, Есина, 2019; Тимошина, 2017; Farr, 1994; Jodelet, 2015; Monaco, Delouee, Rateau, 2016; Moliner, Guimelli, 2015; Moliner, Bovina, Juventin, 2019). Нам бы хотелось, прежде всего, остановиться на социально-организационной логике развития данной научной школы, которая прошла стадии исследовательского коллектива, направления в науке и «незримого» колледжа.

Первоначально парадигма анализа социально-психологической феноменологии с опорой на систему социальных представлений, выдвинутой Сержем Московиси и его последователями, замыкалась рамками организационных контуров лаборатории социальной психологии Высшей школы социальных наук (Moscovici, 2001), что соответствовало характеристикам школы – исследовательского коллектива, члены которого работали над разработкой предложенной руководителем новой идеи.

Со временем научная школа – коллектив стала расширять свои формальные границы. Это было обусловлено как разнообразием предлагаемых Сержем Московиси и его учениками исследовательских подпрограмм в рамках общей линии изучения социальных представлений, так и значительным усилением прикладного характера накапливаемого теоретического знания. Происходит вовлечение все большего числа ученых разных стран, использующих общую методологию исследовательского поиска при огромной вариативности проблемных областей, что позволило научной школе – исследовательскому коллективу выйти за рамки французской социальной психологии, объединить различные исследовательские лаборатории в отдельных университетах не только Франции, но и всей Европы (Kalampalikis, Jodelet, Wiewiorka, 2019). Превращение научной школы С. Московиси в направление в науке подтверждается ее активным продвижением через систему многочисленных научных форумов, приобретших значение важных дискуссионных площадок для обмена актуальными результатами теоретико-методологического

и практико-ориентированного характера в области социальных представлений. Это и Международная конференция по социальным представлениям (International Conferences on Social Representations (ICSR)), и Международные конгрессы по социальной психологии, организуемые Ассоциацией по распространению социально-психологических знаний (Association pour la Diffusion de la Recherche en Psychologie Sociale (ADRIPS)), и летняя школа по теме социальных представлений для молодых ученых в рамках европейской системы подготовки в аспирантуре (ERASMUS), в ходе которой ежегодно происходит увлечение новых поколений социальных психологов идеями социальных представлений, трансляция им накопленного опыта, а также ряд других научных мероприятий, свидетельствующие об организационной институционализации идей С. Московиси. Существует отдельная образовательная программа подготовки в аспирантуре (European Ph.D.) в рамках Европейского сообщества «Социальные представления и коммуникация (Social Representations and Communication)». Безусловно, происходит сохранение традиции и преемственности как в плане предметного содержания базовых идей, так и в плане формирования профессиональной идентичности юных ученых в качестве членов научного объединения и продолжателей предложенных С. Московиси направлений анализа, что подтверждает выполнение когнитивной и педагогической функций данной научной школой.

И, наконец, третий вид научной школы, который стал более характерен для современного этапа развития идей Сержа Московиси: школа – «незримый» колледж, отличительным признаком которой стало ощущение включенности в некоторый общий круг единомышленников – продолжателей идей С. Московиси в рамках антропологии, культурологии, политологии, экологии и ряда других дисциплин.

Современный этап развития научной школы С. Московиси связан с развитием новых методов и областей анализа, с рассмотрением социальных представлений с опорой на изучение различных изобразительных источников, отражающих систему восприятия социальной реальности. Раскрытие содержания представлений о реальности через понимания смысла, заложенного автором в картине, рисунке и других иконографических документах, открывает новые возможности для изучения психологической феноменологии. Иконографические документы – это рабочие инструменты для исследователей. Изображение – это не только иллюстрация наблюдений, но и способ исследования и анализа, «отражение», наблюдение реальности. Это не просто пассивная фиксация реальности, это конструирование реальности, создание объекта из системы представлений о ней (Moliner, Guimelli, 2015).

Иконографические документы стали материалом для психологического анализа в связи с тем, что они позволяют выявить нормы, ценности, убеждения людей соответствующего времени, так как отражают видение определенного социального объекта, развитое в соответствующем контексте межличностного взаимодействия внутри определенной социальной группы (Moliner, 2016). Можно говорить о коммуникации, которая происходит в процессе исследования образа, его интерпретации, понимания сюжета. Художник в качестве коммуникатора вовлекает зрителя в коммуникативную ситуацию, передавая тому свое видение, понимание, отношение к сюжету.

Для продуктивного общения художника со зрителем предполагается наличие соответствующего уровня подготовки реципиента (зрителя), его умение раскрывать смысл, декодировать информацию, транслируемую автором.

Художественное общение позволяет автору-коммуникатору делиться своими мыслями, а человеку, воспринимающему иконографический документ, приобщиться к опыту, который далек от него исторически и географически. Общения художника со своей аудиторией позволяет понять особенности восприятия самого художника, его систему представлений и эмоционально-оценочного отношения к транслируемой изобразительными средствами информации, личностные характеристики автора. Поэтому иконографические документы открывают разнообразие элементов обыденного знания относительно описываемого социально-исторического явления.

Характерной актуальной чертой научной школы социальных представлений стала ее межпредметность и полидисциплинарность. Можно более подробно остановиться на взаимодействии этой концепции с науковедением, одним из элементов которого является социальная психология науки, направленная, в частности, на исследование имиджа ученого у различных социальных групп, и на опыте применения для этой цели иконографических документов. Имидж ученого имеет в своей структуре знаковую составляющую, на основании которых человек воспринимается как принадлежащий к профессиональному научному сообществу, «распознается» как ученый. Выделены следующие отличительные знаковые системы персонального имиджа ученого: во-первых, особенности используемого учеными в межличностном общении научного языка, чья лексическая структура отличается от обыденного языка, составляющие показатели вербального имиджа; во-вторых, визуальная система, характеризующая отличительные особенности внешности ученого и отражающая содержание его габитарного имиджа; в-третьих, знаки решения исследовательских задач, описывающие средовой имидж ученого (Володарская, 2019).

Искусство как средство художественного общения автора со зрителем, его семиотическое содержание в качестве системы знаков подчеркивалось в культурологии, эстетике (Потебня, 2007). Иконографические документы, например изображения ученого на рисунках, портретах, выступают опосредованной имиджформирующей информацией для понимания системы социальных представлений об исследователе, сформированном в общественном сознании, а изучение иконографических источников, посвященных науке, поможет выявить общий код культурного восприятия этого социального института. Такой взгляд на объект формирует научный образ, соответствующий системе представлений своего времени. Поэтому его можно использовать как след эпохи (Илизаров, 2016). Живопись и фотография повышают достоверность информации, на основе которой формируются социальные представления и отношения людей (Фандо, 2016; Юркин, 2016).

Связь психологии и истории науки, искусства, тяготение этих дисциплин между собой, взаимопроникновение системы категорий и объяснительных принципов неоднократно подчеркивалось представителями данных дисциплин (Выготский, 1998). Концепция социальных представлений ставит

перед исследователем вопросы анализа механизмов распространения (une propagation) идей, мнений о науке, научном сообществе, ученых.

Общественное сознание отражает определенную динамику системы представлений об этих социальных явлениях. Изменение имиджа науки обусловлено трансформацией социальной роли ученого и организации самого института науки, например, в современном аспекте коммерциализации научного знания, активном развитии так называемого, «академического капитализма» и превращения исследователя в «когнитивного предпринимателя» (Душина, Куприянов. *Идея и реальность..*, 2020a). Коммерциализация академической и вузовской науки влечет за собой изменение ценностных установок исследователя, для которого наиболее значимым мотивом осуществления научного поиска становится не получение нового научного знания, а капитализация своих интеллектуальных усилий, продажа результатов. Ученый начинает выступать в несвойственных ему до этого и отсутствующих в ролевом ансамбле научного коллектива социальных ролях маркетолога, продавца, что с неизбежностью меняет мотивацию исследовательского труда (Душина, Куприянов. *Наука..*, 2020b; Куприянов, 2020).

Наука является не только профессиональной сферой, но и важным направлением общественной жизни, оцениваемым в массовом сознании с позиции важности, престижности исследовательского труда, социальной роли ученого, в частности, для молодых поколений, перед которыми только встают вопросы профессионального самоопределения. Вероятно, для юных граждан наука может рассматриваться как новый социальный объект, знания о котором только формируются.

Понятийные рамки теоретико-методологического подхода к интерпретации объективной реальности, заданные концепцией социальных представлений, позволяют обратить внимание на отдельные закономерности формирования коллективного знания относительно новых социальных явлений на основе механизма якорения (l'ancrage). Данный феномен проявляется во включении социального объекта в хорошо известную систему координат, способствующую пониманию и интерпретации новой информации (Farr, 1994; Moliner, Bovina, Juventin, 2019).

Это позволяет, с одной стороны, найти сходство, ассимилировать новую информацию в имеющуюся систему социальных представлений, а с другой стороны, выделить отличия, дифференцировать знание о социальном явлении и создать иную систему социальных представлений о нем (Jodelet, 2015; Monaco, Delouee, Rateau, 2016). Очень важно выявлять то, каким образом происходит классификация, категоризация ранее неизвестного и его включение в разделяемое группой знание. Напомним три этапа процесса якорения, описанные в социальной психологии (Moliner, Guimelli, 2015). Во-первых, фаза приписывания значения изображаемому объекту и социальным представлениям о нем для закрепления в ранее существующем поле восприятия. Во-вторых, фаза интеграции в когнитивную систему ценностей, мнений, отношений. И, в-третьих, фаза инструментализации, на которой новое понятие становится инструментом понимания и управления окружающей реальностью.

Выделение социальных представлений на основе иконографических материалов может быть осуществлено двумя способами: во-первых, через вы-

бор визуальных элементов из перечня предлагаемых, изображающих изучаемый социальный объект, и, во-вторых, самостоятельное изображение этого объекта (Le Moël, Moliner et Ramadier, 2015).

Описание образа ученого у современных подростков важно для определения содержания предметной деятельности исследователя, отличия данного типа труда от других сфер при знакомстве с миром профессий. Большое прикладное значение понимания системы представлений об ученом подтверждается рядом исследованиями образа ученых у подростков из разных стран мира на основе анализа рисунков респондентов по методике Draw-A-Scientist Test (DAST) (Bodzin, Gehringer, 2011; Chambers, 1983).

Этот метод был использован при изучении представлений об ученом, сложившихся у более чем 4000 школьников различного возраста в разных странах мира (Боливия, Греция, Канада, Колумбия, США, Турция, Швеция и т. д.) (Losh, Wilke, Pop, 2008). Рисунки участников были посвящены изображению физических характеристик ученых, описанию рабочих условий осуществления научного поиска, материалов, используемых при проведении экспериментов (Anastassios, 2018). Ученого часто изображали в лабораторном халате со странными волосами и в очках, читающего книги или работающего в лаборатории (Paweł, Dudek, 2017). Исследователи делают вывод о наличии достаточной типичности индикаторов отнесения изображаемого персонажа к профессиональному научному сообществу независимо от национальной специфики респондентов (Banchefsky et al., 2016; Meyer, Guenther, Joubert, 2019).

Были выделены 7 основных стереотипных индикаторов образа ученого независимо от социокультурного контекста, в частности, лабораторный халат; очки; усы или борода; символы исследований (приборы и оборудование); символы знаний (книги, картотеки); технологии (научные продукты); соответствующие подписи (формулы, комментарии типа «эврика», «я нашел» и т. п.) (Karthigeyan, Harrell, Wojnowski, 2013). Но выраженность данных индикаторов по-разному характеризуют имидж ученого в отдельных этнокультурных группах. Так, изображение лабораторного халата отражено на 46,7 % рисунков турецких детей, 50,7 % рисунков подростков из Боливии и 60,9 % рисунков принявших участие в исследовании респондентов из Колумбии (Jerez, Middleton, Rabaza, 2011; Türkmen, 2008). Рисование волос на лице ученого в рисунках участников распределено по странам соответственно: лабораторный халат – 17,4, 25,1 и 24,9 %; очки – 30,7, 36,6 и 51,1 % рисунков; приборы и оборудование – 86,1, 75,3 и 77,1 % изображений; символы знаний – 51,2, 15,6 и 21,1 %; научные результаты – 45,1, 21,9 и 20,3 % рисунков. Подписи, например, «Эврика!» изображены на рисунках 45,1 % респондентов из Турции, 21,9 % рисунков участников из Боливии и 20,3 % рисунков подростков из Колумбии.

Помимо типичных индикаторов имиджа ученого, сходных в разных исследованиях, с помощью методики DAST выделены так называемые контекстные элементы, характерные для разных исследуемых групп. Среди таких показателей упоминаются, например, пространство работы ученого вне лаборатории (предприятие, лекционная аудитория, лес) (Karthigeyan, Harrell,

Wojnowski, 2013), космос как символ науки и гендерный показатель (женщина-ученый) (Anastassios, Koutsianou, 2018).

Таким образом, проведенный теоретический анализ показал наличие устойчивых, повторяющихся, имеющих характер стереотипа, категорий представлений об ученом у подростков и разнообразие альтернативных, контекстных единиц оценки визуального образа ученого, что также нашло свое подтверждение в осуществленных ранее исследованиях на российской выборке с применением методики DAST, выполненных в других контекстах (Володарская, Разина, Фролова, 2017; Volodarskaya, Razina, 2018).

Вышеизложенные положения определили *цель данного исследования*, которая заключается в выявлении категориального аппарата образа ученого у современных российских подростков, выделяемого с помощью рисуночной методики DAST.

Гипотеза исследования состояла в предположении о том, что система социальных представлений об ученом у российских подростков содержит как устойчивые индикаторы принадлежности человека к профессиональному научному сообществу, так и изменчивые контекстные элементы образа ученого, а мера выраженности и соотношение устойчивых и контекстных элементов отражает особенности образа ученого для отечественных респондентов.

Методы и процедура исследования

Выборка включала в себя 171 подросток в возрасте от 9 до 12 лет, средний возраст – 10,5 лет. Среди испытуемых 88 девочек (51,7 %) и 83 мальчика (48,3 %). Включение в исследование подростков связано с тем, что профессиональное самоопределение, с одной стороны, еще не стало для них приоритетной задачей, а с другой стороны, технологичность современного мира включает человека с ранних лет в научную среду через разнообразные информационные ресурсы, новые виды транспорта (например, электробусы), бытовые приборы по типу «умный» дом и т. д., что делает результаты работы ученых повседневной реальностью (Perronnet, 2018).

Для достижения поставленной цели в качестве основного диагностического средства была использована рисуночная *методика* The Draw-A-Scientist Test (DAST). Использованный рисуночный тест является проективным, результаты которого отражают проявление представления подростков об изначально не четко конструированном в инструкции объекте – ученом. Данный метод применялся не в целях клинического обследования, как это в большей степени свойственно проективным методам (Венгер, 2003). Методика The Draw-A-Scientist Test не была направлена на диагностику уровня интеллектуального развития принявших участие в исследовании подростков по сравнению, в частности, с проективной методикой «Рисунок человека» (Маховер, 2000).

Процедура исследования. Участникам было предложено создавать спонтанные изображения, связанные с названным исследователем объектом, респонденты должны были нарисовать ученого. В инструкции не давалась конкретизация области науки или темы исследования. Респонденты должны были дать иконографические ассоциации.

Полученные рисунки были проанализированы с помощью метода экспертной оценки (Гуцыкова, 2011) с целью выделения единиц визуального контента по предложенной категориальной схеме и последующим подсчетом согласованности мнения экспертов об адекватности выделения содержательных категорий на рисунках. В качестве экспертов выступили 5 сотрудников факультета психологии Московского института психоанализа, кандидаты психологических наук.

Эксперт должен был определить степень выраженности элемента рисунка по шкале от 1 до 5, где 1 – минимальная степень, а 5 – максимальная степень. После чего была произведена оценка согласованности мнений экспертов путем расчета коэффициента конкордации Кендалла.

В качестве содержательных показателей, подвергавшихся дальнейшему анализу, были выбраны выделенные в исследованиях с применением данной рисуночной методики семь устойчивых индикаторов описания ученого, а именно: лабораторный халат, очки, волосы на лице (борода, усы, баки), символы исследований (приборы и оборудование), символы знаний (книги, картотеки), подписи, символы достижений.

Элементы рисунков, не включенные в данные основные показатели, но опоминавшиеся в различных исследованиях с использованием данной методики, были распределены по дополнительным контекстным категориям, свидетельствующим об изменчивости компонентов образа ученого. Этот блок контекстных категорий составили следующие индикаторы: компьютеры, гендерный признак, пожилой возраст, элементы фантастика, расовый признак, источник опасности, повседневная одежда, улыбка, работа вне лаборатории.

Статистический анализ полученных результатов проводился с применением процедур корреляционного и факторного анализа на основе статистической программы SPSS.

Результаты исследования и их обсуждение

Основной вопрос метода DAST как проективной методики заключается в стандартизации элементов анализа, а значительная трудность состоит в адекватной интерпретации данных (Габидулина, 1986).

В целях анализа связи между инвариантными и контекстными показателями визуального контента образа ученых был проведен корреляционный анализ полученных в ходе экспертной оценки показателей отнесенности. Для этого был рассчитан коэффициент корреляции Пирсона между всеми визуальными категориями анализа. Показано отсутствие связей между устойчивыми и контекстными категориями, что свидетельствует о принципиально различных конструктах, измеряемых данными показателями.

Соответственно, можно говорить о наличии в системе социальных представлений об ученом на русскоязычной выборке подростков набора обособленных непересекающихся категорий восприятия ученого.

Далее был проведен эксплораторный факторный анализ с Varimax-вращением всех имеющихся в анализе категориальных элементов. В результате выделено 2 фактора (КМО = 0,500), которые по своему содержанию совпадают с устойчивыми и контекстными содержательными элементами образа ученого (табл. 1).

Таблица 1 / Table 1

Результаты факторного анализа / Factor analysis results

Критерии восприятия / Perception criteria	Факторная нагрузка / Factor load
<i>Фактор 2 (20,9 % дисперсии) «Устойчивые» / Factor 2 (20.9% variance) "Sustainable"</i>	
Лабораторный халат / Lab coat	,479
Очки / Glasses	,438
Волосы на лице / Facial hair	,516
Символы исследований / Research symbols	,387
Символы знаний / Knowledge symbols	,365
Надписи / Inscriptions	,474
Символы достижений / Achievement symbols	,568
<i>Фактор 1 (25,4 % дисперсии) «Контекстные» / Factor 1 (25.4% variance) "Contextual"</i>	
Компьютер / A computer	,669
Пол / Sex	,484
Пожилкой возраст / Elderly age	,572
Фантастика / Fiction	,556
Расовый признак / Race	,541
Опасность / Danger	,538
Повседневная одежда / Casual wear	,520
Улыбка / Smile	,659
Работа вне лаборатории / Working outside the lab	,442

Результаты факторного анализа позволили подтвердить наличие в поле представлений об ученом двух больших категорий образа: инвариантных и контекстных.

Полученные результаты хорошо согласуются с данными других авторов, применявших методику DAST для изучения образа ученого у подростков и выделивших те же устойчивые элементы имиджа (Anastassios, Koutsia-nou, 2018; Türkmen, 2008). Таким образом, возможно констатировать, что выделенные категории представлений об ученом не всегда связаны с этнокультурными особенностями респондентов и могут рассматриваться как сходные, общие категории социальных представлений об ученом, складывающиеся к подростковому возрасту.

Далее был проведен анализ частоты проявления категорий образа ученого на основе подсчета процентного распределения по выборке испытуемых. Результаты появления традиционных устойчивых характеристик образа ученого на рисунках подростков представлены в табл. 2.

Таблица 2 / Table 2

Частота появления устойчивых категорий на рисунках респондентов, % / Frequency of occurrence of stable categories in the drawings of the respondents, %

Критерии восприятия / Perception criteria	Частота появления / Frequency of occurrence
Символы исследований / Research symbols	67
Очки / Glasses	44
Лабораторный халат / Lab coat	36
Символы знаний / Knowledge symbols	32
Надписи / Inscriptions	28
Волосы на лице / Facial hair	23
Символы достижений / Achievement symbols	8

Большинство респондентов нарисовали символы исследования в качестве наиболее значимых индикаторов принадлежности человека к миру науки.

Включение в рисунок приборов, разнообразного оборудования, пробирок и т. д. отражает содержание предметной деятельности ученых в восприятии подростков. Остальные типичные индикаторы отражают представление об ученом у менее 50 % респондентов, что может указывать на низкую стабильность признака. Очки изображены на 44 % рисунков российских подростков, в то время как на рисунках респондентов из Колумбии эта категория представлена у 51 % участников исследования (Jerez, Middleton, Rabaza, 2011). Лабораторный халат входит в систему представлений 36 % россиян, хотя эта категория изображена на 61 % рисунков колумбийских подростков.

Символы научных знаний (книги, чертежи, библиотека) входят в систему представлений только 32 % российских подростков, а турецкие участники выделили эту категорию на 51 % изображений (Türkmen, 2008). Усы, борода включаются в образ ученого только у 23 % респондентов. Это можно объяснить тем, вероятно, что ученый не воспринимается как умудренный опытом старец, признаками внешнего облика которого как раз и является растительность на лице.

Подписи на рисунках (например, «Эврика») есть у 28 % российских респондентов. Сравнение с данными других исследований показывает, что отечественные подростки меньше, чем их сверстники из Боливии (50 %) отражают на рисунках процесс мышления изображаемого персонажа при исследовательском поиске (Jerez, Middleton, Rabaza, 2011).

При оценке частоты распределения контекстных категорий представлений об ученом обнаружено, что для большинства респондентов ученый, судя по рисункам, принадлежит к европеоидной расе (94 %) (табл. 3). Представление об ученом как о человеке европейской внешности характерно, например, и для турецких подростков (Türkmen, 2008).

Таблица 3 / Table 3

**Частота появления контекстных категорий на рисунках респондентов, % /
Frequency of occurrence of contextual categories in the drawings of the respondents, %**

Критерии восприятия / Perception criteria	Частота появления / Frequency of occurrence
Расовый признак / Race	94
Пол / Sex	72
Улыбка / Smile	44
Пожилой возраст / Elderly age	35
Повседневная одежда / Casual clothes	27
Работа вне лаборатории / Working outside the lab	11
Опасность / Danger	8
Фантастика / Fiction	7
Компьютер / Computer	6

Также для значительного числа подростков важным признаком представления об ученом является отражение его пола. Причем из 72 % рисунков на более чем половине из них был изображен ученый-мужчина. В исследованиях, проведенных ранее на подростках в Боливии и Колумбии, ученый также ассоциируется с мужчиной у 89 и 79 % респондентов соответственно (Jerez, Middleton, Rabaza, 2011). Интересно, что две трети респондентов не считают ученого пожилым человеком, в то время как для турецких подрост-

ков приоритетным является изображение ученого как пожилого человека (69 % рисунков) (Türkmen, 2008). Российские подростки редко включают в изображение ученого символы опасности (например, взрыв, пожар). Можно предположить, что деятельность ученого не связывается у подростков с негативными последствиями использования научных открытий, техногенными катастрофами и т. д. Хотя вопросы социальной ответственности ученых за применение своих научных знаний стоит достаточно остро в современном мире. Работа вне лаборатории (например, лекционная аудитория) отражена только на 11 % рисунков респондентов, что указывает на представление о научной деятельности, замкнутой рамками специального лабораторного помещения.

Всего на 6 % рисунков были нарисованы компьютеры. Иными словами, современные информационные технологии не связываются в восприятии участников исследования с научной деятельностью. В то же время 41 % турецких подростков рисовали компьютеры при изображении ученого.

Таким образом, анализ рисунков респондентов, рассматриваемых в качестве иконографического документа, позволил говорить о наличии в образе ученого устойчивых, типичных элементов «распознавания» профессиональной принадлежности субъекта. Ученый в восприятии подростков – это, прежде всего, мужчина европейской наружности, окруженный приборами и другим оборудованием, символизирующим лабораторные исследования и в большей степени характерным для естественных наук. Эти категории восприятия можно отнести в центральную зону представлений об ученом. Остальные характеристики, выделяемые в раннее проведенных исследованиях зарубежных авторов, также зафиксированы на рисунках и российских респондентов, что указывает на вхождение данных категорий в образ ученого для отечественных младших подростков. Это такие индикаторы, как «очки», «лабораторный халат», «символы знаний (книги)», «надписи на рисунках, свидетельствующие о научном открытии», составляющие элементы группы устойчивых индикаторов образа ученого, выделяемых с помощью методикой DAST на разных группах респондентов.

К низкочастотным в изображении российских младших подростков отнесены индикаторы исследовательских достижений – научные открытия, изобретения, что может указывать на слабое знакомство подростков с конкретными результатами работы ученого.

В целом, полученные результаты использования рисуночной методики DAST на российской выборке подростков, свидетельствуют о схожести содержательных категорий системы представлений об ученом с данными результатов применения рисуночной методики среди подростков других стран. Действительно, в имидже ученого выделяются две группы индикаторов, но мера выраженности каждого компонента в восприятии российских младших подростков указывает на своеобразие образа ученого.

Итак, анализ изображений показывает наличие двух самостоятельных подмножеств иконографических ассоциаций, отражающих представление об ученом, как, главным образом, осуществляющего деятельность с лабораторным оборудованием. Во втором графическом множестве ученый – это мужчина европейской внешности. То есть первое подмножество иконографиче-

ского материала раскрывают в представлении респондентов содержание предметной деятельности, а второе подмножество индикаторов описывает внешность ученого. Как было показано выше с опорой на статистические процедуры анализа, две системы индикаторов имиджа учёного (устойчивые и контекстные) отражают различные системы восприятия человека науки. Каждая из выделяемых категорий восприятия отдельно графически ассоциируется с ученым, но отсутствует целостный устойчивый образ внутренних связанных между собой элементов.

Иными словами, в представлениях младших подростков выделились признаки, являющиеся индикаторами принадлежности человека к науке. Но нет устойчивого набора обязательных графически отображаемых элементов конструкта «образ ученого». Например, если у изображаемого персонажа есть очки, то, вероятно, он может быть ученым. Но, если убрать очки, то образ ученого в представлении респондентов не разрушится.

Можно утверждать, что в представлениях об ученом у подростков нет однозначного набора обязательных признаков распознавания человека как ученого. Выделяемые категории в большей степени характеризуют стереотипное восприятие ученого, причем из области естественных наук. Исследователи, работающие, например, в социогуманитарных областях, слабо представлены на рисунках респондентов. Это может быть связано с низкой информированностью респондентов о современных деятелях науки и недостаточности наглядных иллюстративных примеров образа сегодня работающего ученого. Безусловно, выделенные в исследовании особенности коллективных ментальных образов социальной группы подростков объективируются во многом под влиянием СМИ, становящихся основным источниками информации о науке и ученых при низкой индивидуальной вовлеченности школьника в самостоятельную исследовательскую деятельность.

Заключение

По результатам осуществленного исследования можно сформулировать следующие обещающие выводы.

Исследование системы социальных представлений с использованием рисуночной методики The Draw-A-Scientist Test позволило проверить систему категорий изображения ученого на российской выборке подростков и выделить особенности образа ученого у отечественных респондентов.

Можно отметить, что исследование, направленное на выделение индикативных компонентов имиджа ученого в рисунках детей, показало, что представленные ранее с использованием теста DAST выделение устойчивых и контекстных показателей принадлежности человека к миру науки также присутствуют в рисунках российских подростков. При этом частота встречаемости индикаторов имиджа ученого в рисунках российских детей указывает на уменьшение роли устойчивых элементов в иконографической фиксации образа исследователя, требующих дополнительного изучения.

Результаты выявления особенностей образа ученого у современных российских школьников подросткового возраста указывают на высокую стереотипность восприятия и интерпретации этой профессиональной сферы, которая отражается в выделении двух самостоятельных подмножеств иконо-

графических ассоциаций. Первое подмножество отражает индикаторы среднего имиджа (символы исследования), а второе подмножество индикаторов связано с габитарным имиджем ученого, в котором фиксируется представление о внешнем облике. Подобная графическая трансляция концепции «человека знания» определяет в некоторой степени мифологизированный образ ученого, складывающегося у подростков.

В образе ученого отсутствуют характеристики современного периода исследовательской деятельности, использования высокотехнологического оборудования, представления о содержании решаемых научных задач, специфики работы в разных научных областях.

Выводы об особенностях социальных представлений об ученом у современных российских подростков требуют более широкого и всестороннего анализа. Хотя ограничение выборки только младшими подростками не дает оснований переносить выделяемые закономерности на старших школьников или студентов, для которых вопрос поиска работы становится субъективно значимым и более актуальным.

Специфика полученных результатов может быть связана с отсутствием однозначного перевода названия методики *The Draw-A-Scientist Test* на русский язык, а инструкция DAST содержала слово «ученый», которое употребляется на русском языке в мужском роде, и могла нацелить респондентов на изображение персонажа мужского пола. Также инструкция, предполагающая необходимость нарисовать ученого, могла предопределить количество людей на рисунке. Помимо этого, слово «ученый» не отражает в полной мере широкий диапазон новых возможностей построения исследовательской карьеры, основанной, а частности, на информационных технологиях, инженерии, смежных профессиях (например, биоинженер, IT-медик, специалист по биоэтике и т. д.).

Важным направлениями дальнейшего анализа может стать сравнение социальных представлений об ученом у подростков в зависимости от того, являются ли их родители учеными, а также выделение образа ученого с использованием рисуночной методики DAST в других возрастных и профессиональных группах. В методическом плане необходимо сочетать рисуночную методику с прототипическим анализом вербальных ассоциаций, даваемых респондентами на слово-стимул «ученый».

Выделенные закономерности образа ученого у школьников младшего подросткового возраста могут быть учтены в дальнейшей профориентационной работе для понимания тенденций выбора науки как возможной сферы труда. Система социальных представлений об ученом у молодых людей определяет выбор профессии, связанной с наукой, что, несомненно, ставит новые задачи перед образовательным пространством и профессиональной научной средой.

Разнообразные иконографические документы (портреты, фильмы, комиксы, мультфильмы, карикатуры и т. д.), транслирующие информацию об ученом, научной деятельности, состоянии и положении науки в обществе, влияют на молодое поколение, формируя и отражая его коллективное знание о данной сфере. Ведь, помимо индивидуальной склонности к аналитической деятельности подростка, его высокого интеллектуального потенциала и

желания постичь новое, на решение в пользу выбора исследовательской карьеры оказывает влияние система представлений молодого человека об ученом, содержательная наполненность и оценочная определенность имиджа исследователя.

Результаты осуществленного анализа социальных представлений об ученом у российских подростков показывают значительные возможности применения иконографических документов для изучения социальных представлений о разнообразных социальных объектах. Это свидетельствует о продолжающемся развитии научной школы социальных представлений Сержа Московиси, включении в диагностический арсенал новых методических инструментов, расширении исследовательских областей.

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A Study of the Scientist's Image in the Context of S. Moscovici's Theory of Social Representations

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Abstract. The article describes the scientific and social aspects of the functioning of the scientific school created by S. Moscovici, revealing various forms of this association: a research team, a scientific direction, an 'invisible' college. The authors focus on the possibility of studying social representations through the inclusion of new analytical methods in the diagnostic toolkit, in particular, iconographic documents and images of a social object, which indicates the current stage of the functioning of S. Moscovici's scientific school. The formation of social representations not only through verbal associations but also through drawings is explored by the authors through the example of how adolescents develop their social representations of a scientist. The purpose of this study is to highlight the categorical features of the image of a scientist in modern Russian adolescents, identified using the DAST drawing technique. The hypothesis of the research is the assumption that the system of social representations of a scientist among Russian adolescents contains both stable indicators of a person's belonging to the professional scientific community and variable contextual elements of the scientist's image, whereas the degree of expression and the ratio of stable and contextual elements reflect the characteristics of the scientist's image in domestic respondents. The Draw-A-Scientist Test (DAST) technique was used as the main diagnostic tool aimed at identifying adolescent representations of a scientist based on iconographic associations. The obtained drawings were analyzed by the expert evaluation method, involving the procedures of correlation and factor analysis. The results of the study show that Russian adolescents generally have a stereotypical representation of a scientist associated with the use of general indicators of external appearance, which determine the professional affiliation of the character depicted. Differences were found in the frequency of using stable and contextual iconographic elements of drawings. It has been shown that it is possible to use the drawing technique as a diagnostic tool for identifying social representations of a scientist based on an analysis of the meaning of an object through its iconographic fixation.

Key words: social representations, scientific school, image of a scientist, social psychology of science, attitude to science, iconographic documents

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Исследовательская статья

Социальные представления о коронавирусе в начале пандемии в России

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Аннотация. Вспышка коронавируса – глобальное событие, которое вышло за пределы национальных границ и охватило весь мир. Изучение социальных представлений о пандемии позволяет выявить проблемы, которые структурируют опыт людей в конкретном социальном контексте. Для выявления социальных представлений о коронавирусе проведено исследование на территории Свердловской области. Опрос респондентов проходил в период с 11 марта по 11 мая 2020 г. Сбор данных охватил два этапа: 1) когда в России в целом был подтвержден 31 случай заражения COVID-19, на территории Свердловской области таких случаев еще не было зафиксировано; 2) число заболевших в Свердловской области составляло 1952 чел., в стране – 221 344 чел. Для сбора эмпирического материала использовались методы свободных словесных ассоциаций и семантического дифференциала (В.Ф. Петренко), методика оценки психической активации Л.А. Курганского и Т.А. Немчина, анкетный опрос. Выявлено, что значимость проблемы коронавируса в разные периоды времени для респондентов различна. Ядро представления является устойчивым, согласованным и отражает результат информационного воздействия СМИ – «смерть», «паника», остается стабильным вне зависимости от времени и вовлеченности в пандемию респондентов. Потенциальная зона изменений выступает «приручением» знаний о коронавирусе, операционализацией содержания представления о коронавирусе на язык изменений в своей обыденной жизни – пандемия коронавируса понимается как «эпидемия гриппа», а введение необходимости самоизоляции – как «каникулы», возможность побыть «дома». Определение непосредственной аффективной реакции респондентов на слово-стимул «коронавирус» показало наличие эмоциональной напряженности и преобладание негативных переживаний респондентов при предъявлении данного стимула. Проведенное исследование показало, что в условиях пандемии, выступая основным источником информации и средством коммуникации, СМИ задают направление формирования представлений.

Ключевые слова: социальные представления, состояние безопасности, изоляция, пандемия, COVID-19, эмоциональные состояния

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Введение

Сегодня мир меняется, и трансформируются многие понятия. Особо изменения касаются понимания нами безопасности. Теперь люди знают, что прикосновение к вещам, пребывание с другими людьми и вдыхание воздуха в замкнутом пространстве может быть опасным. Степень осознания будет отличаться у разных людей, но оно никогда не исчезнет полностью ни у кого из тех, кто пережил 2020 г. Станет нормальным – уклониться от рукопожатия или прикосновения, как и постоянная дезинфекция рук. Парадокс онлайн-общения будет усилен: это создает больше дистанции, но и больше связей, так как люди будут чаще общаться с теми, кто находится все дальше физически и которые чувствуют себя в безопасности из-за этой дистанции. Бельгийский психолог Р. Хогенрад сказал, что «это как если бы мы без компаса входили в неотмеченные территории нового исторического периода, для которого у нас все еще нет слова, чтобы назвать его» (Hogenraad, 2017. Р. 2), но нельзя отрицать, что ключевой проблемой является обеспечение безопасности. Сегодня, как и раньше, люди не знают, где они, кто они и где им место: «Нам не хватает концепций, чтобы усвоить то, что мы испытали» (Musil, 1990. Р. 117).

По мере того как число смертей от этой болезни растет во всем мире, становится все более важным понимание восприятия коронавируса обществом. Текущие правительственные меры варьируются от социальной дистанции и рекомендаций по гигиене (например, Швеция) до полной изоляции населения (например, Италия, Израиль). Тем не менее из прошлых пандемий мы знаем, что успех политики, направленной на замедление быстрой передачи высокоинфекционных заболеваний, зависит, в том числе и от того, насколько точные представления люди имеют о личностных и общественных факторах риска. Фактически, поведение людей может существенно влиять на распространение пандемии (Reluga, 2010; Van Bavel et. al., 2020). Оценка самого факта пандемии является важным условием, определяющим готовность общественности сотрудничать и принимать защитные меры для здоровой модели поведения (Bish, Michie, 2010; Poletti et al., 2011; Rudisill, 2013). Другими словами, социальные представления в период пандемии имеют решающее значение для эффективного управления обществом.

Пандемия меняет мир, новый вирус уже изменил наши отношения с правительством, с внешним миром и даже друг с другом. «Люди теряются в водовороте событий, чувствуют давление со стороны окружающего мира и не уверены в своем будущем и безопасности своей жизни» (Zinchenko, Zotova, 2014. Р. 51). Население в большинстве стран, затронутых пандемией, изменило свою активность и образ жизни. Коллективные представления о настоящем уже изменились. Если сохранится опасность, которую коронавирус представляет для здоровья как отдельных людей, так и для общественного здравоохранения, люди будут вынуждены пересмотреть саму концепцию своей жизни.

Но, с другой стороны, кризисные моменты также открывают новые возможности: более гибкое использование технологий, меньшая поляризация, переоценка простых удовольствий в жизни. На самом деле чрезвычай-

ный шок, вызванный пандемией коронавируса, может привести к ряду позитивных последствий. В частности, сценарий «общего врага», когда общество сталкивается с общей внешней угрозой. COVID-19 представляет нам грозного врага, который не различает цвет кожи, уровень дохода и семейное положение. Также, хотелось бы верить в то, что социальные потрясения будут способствовать более конструктивным моделям взаимодействия в нашем обществе.

По мнению П. Словича «риск не существует независимо от нашего ума и культуры» (Slovic, 1992. P. 121). Действительно, большой объем исследований, проведенных за последние десятилетия, показал, что восприятие эпидемий является субъективной психологической конструкцией, на которую влияют когнитивные, эмоциональные, социальные, культурные и индивидуальные различия как между людьми, так и между разными странами (Leiserowitz, 2006; Slovic, 2010; Linden, 2015, 2017).

По сравнению с другими областями науки, например, такими как экология, сегодня гораздо меньше известно о том, как люди воспринимают риски, связанные с возникающими инфекционными заболеваниями (Zwart et al., 2009). Большинство доказательств восприятия пандемий были получены в ходе исследований, проведенных во время пандемии свиного гриппа H1N1 в 2009 году (Prati et al., 2011; Rudisill, 2013; Fischhoff et al., 2018) и вспышки лихорадки Эболы (Prati, Pietrantonio, 2016; Yang, Chu, 2018). Хотя эти исследования внесли большой вклад в изучение особенностей восприятия пандемий, однако они основаны на единичных измерениях, не затрагивая изменений в восприятии пандемии во времени.

Социальные представления чаще всего фокусируются на явлениях, которые становятся предметом споров, конфликтов, чрезвычайных ситуаций и меняют коллективное мышление в обществе. Социальные представления – это сети понятий, образов и чувств, которые разделяются между членами общества (Moscovici, 1988). Также, социальные представления выполняют стабилизирующую функцию эмоциональных состояний людей в условиях социальной нестабильности современного общества (Емельянова, 2001).

Представления во многом опираются на социокультурные, исторические и групповые нормы. В контексте путаницы, порожденной пандемией, люди ориентированы на выработку взаимопонимания, которое устанавливает прочные ориентиры, с помощью которых они могут приспособиться к ситуации. Исследования показывают, что поиск объяснений, объясняющих причину произошедшего, чаще стимулируется негативными и неожиданными событиями (Försterling, 2001), когда нарушается состояние безопасности. Объяснение социальных событий является одним из центральных механизмов, с помощью которых мы ориентируемся в мире. Люди призваны – неявно как социальные субъекты и явно как граждане – объяснить проблемы, с которыми сталкивается общество (Hewstone, 1989). Представленные объяснения имеют весомые последствия, определяя, кто несет ответственность за решение проблем и какие меры считаются необходимыми для этого. Поэтому раскрытие непростой эпистемологии социальных проблем является важнейшей задачей в понимании современной действительности.

Проблемы, типичные для периода, затрагивающего пандемию коронавируса, определяется рядом отличительных черт.

Во-первых, это глобальное событие, которое вышло за пределы национальных границ и охватило весь мир. Сегодня инфекционные болезни распространяются по планете намного быстрее, чем когда-либо прежде. Вспышка или эпидемия заболевания в одной части света всего лишь через несколько часов становится неминуемой угрозой где-то еще (Прентис, Рейндерс, 2007).

Во-вторых, пандемия как процесс, невидима и недоступна для непосредственного восприятия. «...пандемия непредсказуема. И совершенно невидима. В отличие от войны она не порождает инфраструктуру, не разрушает здания. Она атакует только живое... Она сметает все на своем пути» (Тилье, 2016. С. 189).

В-третьих, понимание происхождения и развития пандемии требует специальных знаний. Люди полагаются на экспертов, правительство, СМИ для понимания и характеристики события. Поскольку человек не может непосредственно воспринимать масштабы и угрозы пандемии, единственный способ «узнать» проблему – это посредничество с другими людьми, включая экспертов и СМИ. Однако, необходимо учитывать то, что экспертные высказывания пересматриваются, перерабатываются, а иногда встречают активное сопротивление (Jovchelovitch, 2008), и этот процесс обусловлен как значимыми социальными интересами, так и индивидуальными когнитивными искажениями. Исследование Э. Йоффе и ее коллег, посвященное изучению общественного восприятия метициллинрезистентного золотистого стафилококка (MR3C), устойчивого к больничной инфекции выявило, что общепринятое медицинское объяснение MR3C – чрезмерное использование антибиотиков – как правило, игнорировалось в пользу объяснений, основанных на идеях грязных больниц, персонала и структурных проблем в Национальной службе здравоохранения (Joffe et al., 2011). Таким образом, люди обращаются к новой проблеме не «с чистого листа», а через призму существующих наборов мировоззрений и репрезентаций, что приводит к объяснениям, которые включают более широкий круг вопросов, чем обычно встречаются в экспертных оценках.

Как писал историк Джон Бэрри в своей книге «Великий грипп: история самой смертоносной пандемии в истории» – хроника пандемии гриппа 1918 г., в которой погибло около 50 млн человек во всем мире, – главный урок этой катастрофы заключается в том, что «те, кто у власти, должны сохранять доверие общества, и способ сделать это – ничего не искажать, ничто не изображать с лучшей стороны, никем не пытаться манипулировать» (Barry, 2004. Р. 461).

В связи с вышесказанным изучение социальных представлений о пандемии позволяет выявить проблемы, которые структурируют опыт людей в конкретном социальном контексте. Мало того, социальные представления не являются «статичной» структурой знаний, а подкрепляются социальными и эмоциональными мотивами. Центральной мотивационной основой социального репрезентативного процесса является защита личности (Howarth, 2002). Социальные представления «являются результатом социально-когнитивных процессов, которые люди используют для понимания своей социальной сре-

ды и придания ей значения» (Moliner, Bovina, 2019). Функции идентичности социальных репрезентаций становятся особенно очевидными, когда сообщество сталкивается с угрожающим явлением. Исследования показывают, что в таком случае нарушение состояния безопасности часто проецируется на «другого» или внешнюю группу, тем самым защищая себя от вины или символического загрязнения. Э. Йоффе показала, как в разгар эпидемии ВИЧ/СПИДа символизация болезни как «чумы геев» служила для того, чтобы отдалить большинство от самой угрозы и от ее социального осуждения (Joffe, 1999).

По мнению С. Драйхерст и ее коллег, люди, которые имели непосредственный личный опыт общения с вирусом, ощущают больший страх и беспокойство по сравнению с теми, кто не имел непосредственного опыта (Dryhurst et al., 2020). Люди, которые получили информацию о вирусе от семьи и друзей, воспринимают большую опасность по сравнению с теми, кто этого не делал. А опыт работы с вирусом помогает интерпретировать ситуацию как более конкретную и более близкую к себе и, таким образом, повышает вероятность конструктивного поведения (Торе, Liberman, 2010).

Существующие исследования эпидемий показывают, что, хотя восприятие опасности, связанной с азиатским гриппом, было выше в Азии, чем в Европе, воспринимаемый риск не был высоким. Авторы предполагают, что это связано с прошлым опытом знакомства с эпидемией атипичной пневмонии, что повысило убежденность в том, что новые пандемии можно контролировать (Zwart et al., 2007). Поэтому информация о существующей опасности для здоровья становится наиболее эффективной, когда она включает в себя меры, разработанные для защиты людей от заболевания (Witte et al., 2001; Bish, Michie, 2010). А вера в эффективность рекомендуемого поведения для защиты от заболевания является важным предиктором конструктивного поведения во время эпидемий (Bish, Michie, 2010).

Лонгитюдное исследование Н. Брюэра и его коллег показало, что участники с более высоким начальным восприятием опасности заболевания имели гораздо больше шансов получить прививку от болезни Лайма, чем участники с более низким восприятием риска. А вакцинация привела к тому, что люди, вакцинированные правильно, считали, что их риск будущей инфекции был ниже, чем у людей, не вакцинированных (Brewer et al., 2004).

По мнению Б. Фишхоффа и его коллег, изучавших последствия лихорадки Эбола, суждения об опасности заболеть были слабо связаны с полом, возрастом, образованием, доходом или политической идеологией. Более образованные и более состоятельные респонденты считали, что риски для населения ниже; женщины воспринимали их как более высокими. Более политически консервативные респонденты считают Эболу более передаваемой и выражают меньшую поддержку политике общественного здравоохранения. В целом респонденты поддержали предоставление честной и точной информации, даже если эта информация беспокоит людей (Fischhoff et al., 2018).

За последний год в мире пандемия COVID-19 изучается всеми научными направлениями, в стороне не осталась и психологическая наука. Однако в рамках теории социальных представлений исследований проводилось не так и много. Х. Писарро и его коллеги анализируют распространенность социальных представлений о пандемии COVID-19 в 17 странах Америки,

Европы и Азии, а также их связь с воспринимаемым риском и его привязкой к социально-политическим убеждениям (Pizarro et al., 2020). Психологи из Франции и Бразилии изучают процессы социальных коммуникаций вокруг COVID-19 в своих странах (Apostolidis et al., 2020; Justo et al., 2020). К. Ситто и Э. Любинга проанализировали сообщения южноафриканских онлайн-СМИ о социальных репрезентациях COVID-19 (Sitto, Lubinga, 2020). Ученые из Италии провели исследования, которые были направлены на анализ структуры и содержания социальных представлений о коронавирусе SARS-CoV-2, уделяя особое внимание социально сконструированным значениям, чтобы понять, каким образом пандемия COVID-19 будет формировать коллективное сознание в мире (Coli et al., 2020; Fasanelli et al., 2020; Emiliani et al., 2020).

Впервые случаи инфекции COVID-19 были зарегистрированы на территории России 31 января 2020 года, и вирус очень быстро распространился по всей стране (Калюков, 2020). В Свердловской области на конец февраля 2021 года было выявлено более 77 000 случаев заражения коронавирусной инфекцией (Информационный бюллетень..., 2021).

В мае 2020 г. фонд «Социум» провел опрос среди жителей Екатеринбурга, чтобы выяснить, как они переживают пандемию и боятся ли уже выходить на работу. По результатам исследования, 38 % работающих горожан боялись заразиться коронавирусом на работе. При этом треть из них уже находились на своих рабочих местах, а остальные или работали на удаленке, или вынужденно не работали. Испытывали стресс из-за перспективы выхода на работу 47 % тех, кто работал из дома, так как видели в этом опасность заражения.

Не испытывали опасений примерно столько же – 39 % работающих горожан. Из них 24 % считали, что шансы заразиться невелики, а 9 % и вовсе не верили в реальность COVID-19. «Интересно, что таких ковид-диссидентов вдвое больше среди людей среднего возраста (34–54 лет – 12 % не верят в коронавирус), чем среди более молодых и более пожилых горожан (5–6 % в этих группах). Мужчины почти вдвое чаще, чем женщины, бравировуют неверием в коронавирус, чаще об этом заявляют также жители города с низким уровнем образования, рабочие (Отношение населения..., 2020).

Целью проведенного эмпирического исследования выступило изучение социальных представлений о коронавирусе в начале пандемии на территории Свердловской области. Исследование носило поисковый характер.

Для реализации цели были поставлены следующие **задачи**: 1) выявить степень актуальности переживаний исследуемых респондентов по поводу коронавируса; 2) выявить структуру представления о коронавирусе; 3) определить факторы, лежащие в основе восприятия респондентами нового коронавируса; 4) определить предикторы чувства безопасности у респондентов в начале пандемии.

Процедура и методы исследования

Процедура. Для выявления социальных представлений о новом коронавирусе было проведено исследование на территории Свердловской области. Опрос респондентов проводился в период с 11 марта по 11 мая 2020 г. Таким образом, сбор данных проходил в **два этапа**:

1) с 11 по 25 марта 2020 г. 11 марта 2020 Всемирная организация здравоохранения объявила о пандемии коронавируса (WHO Director-General's opening remarks., 2020). На тот момент в России в целом был подтвержден 31 случай заражения COVID-19, на территории Свердловской области таких случаев еще не было зафиксировано. Конец данного этапа отмечен 25 марта 2020 г., когда президент РФ В.В. Путин объявил нерабочие дни с 30 марта 2020 г. и призвал жителей страны к самоизоляции. На тот момент времени в стране было зафиксировано 658 заболевших, в Свердловской области – 20 чел.;

2) с 25 марта по 11 мая 2020 г. На момент завершения сбора данных от респондентов на территории Свердловской области еще сохранялись ограничительные меры (отмена массовых мероприятий, приостановление работы предприятий, создание условий для социального дистанцирования, обязательная самоизоляция для людей старше 65 лет, масочный режим, соблюдение санитарных правил). Число заболевших в Свердловской области составляло на тот момент 1952 человека, в стране – 221 344 чел.

На первом этапе исследования сбор данных осуществлялся в очной форме, путем опроса и предъявления респондентам бланковых форм. На втором этапе организация сбора данных была изменена в связи с введением ограничительных мер. Для сбора данных была создана электронная форма, которая была размещена в свободном для заполнения доступе на ресурсах Гуманитарного университета. Кроме того, ссылка на заполнение данной формы была разослана по электронной почте респондентам, ранее принимавшим участие в исследовательских проектах университета. Таким образом, выборка исследования формировалась стихийно (опрашивались доступные респонденты, выразившие согласие на участие в исследовании).

Методики. Методами сбора эмпирического материала выступил метод словесных ассоциаций, метод семантического дифференциала (В.Ф. Петренко), «Методика оценки психической активации» Л.А. Курганского и Т.А. Немчина, метод анкетного опроса.

Для выявления *ассоциативных элементов*, респондентам была предложена инструкция: «Запишите все ассоциации, которые возникают у вас, когда вы слышите «коронавирус»». После завершения перечисления всех возникших ассоциаций респондентам была дана дополнительная инструкция: «Отметьте плюсом те ассоциации, которые сопровождаются положительными эмоциями, а минусом – те ассоциации, которые сопровождаются отрицательными эмоциями». Данная инструкция была необходима для последующей оценки эмоциональной нейтральности и полярности исследуемого представления в сознании респондентов. Ассоциативная методика предъявлялась респондентам в первую очередь, после нее предъявлялся семантический дифференциал.

Семантический дифференциал В. Ф. Петренко включает в себя 41 переменную, выраженность каждой применительно к объектам нужно оценить по 7-балльной шкале. В качестве объектов оценивания выступили крупные неблагоприятные события и явления экологического, экономического, социального, техногенного и пр. характера, имеющие влияние на макрорегиональном уровне. Семантический дифференциал содержал следующие объекты оценивания: «Финансовый кризис»; «Терроризм», «Глобальное потепле-

ние», «Вирус иммунного дефицита человека (ВИЧ)», «Коронавирус», «Авария на АЭС «Фукусима-1».

Полученные результаты были обработаны с использованием прототипического анализа по П. Вержесу (Vergès, 1992), эмоционального индексирования ассоциаций по Е.Е. Прониной (Пронина, 2002) для оценки непосредственной аффективной реакции респондентов на слово-стимул – «коронавирус». То есть была проведена оценка уровня напряженности психики при предъявлении данного стимула посредством определения индекса нейтральности и индекса полярности на основе анализа позитивных, негативных и нейтральных эмоций, приписываемых респондентами своим ассоциациям. *Индекс нейтральности* (ИН) оценивался по формуле

$$\text{ИН} = \frac{\text{нейтральные асс.} - (\text{позитивные асс.} + \text{негативные асс.})}{\text{общее число ассоциаций}}$$

Индекс полярности (ИП) определялся по формуле

$$\text{ИП} = \frac{\text{позитивные ассоциации} - \text{негативные ассоциации}}{(\text{позитивные ассоциации} + \text{негативные ассоциации})}$$

Кроме того, для анализа ассоциаций был использован частотный и контент-анализ, количественные данные были обработаны посредством множественного регрессионного анализа (метод шагового отбора), факторного анализа с использованием SPSS 20.0.

Выборка. Общее число респондентов, принявших участие в исследовании – 168 чел. На первом этапе сбора данных (группа 1) были получены результаты 46 респондентов, на втором (группа 2) – 122 респондентов (табл. 1). Группы сравнения по составу респондентов не пересекались. Отсутствие заболевших в своем окружении отметили 55,8 % респондентов, 28,8 % – не знают о таких случаях и 15,4 % – имеют заболевших в своем окружении.

Таблица 1 / Table 1

Характеристики исследуемой выборки / Characteristics of the sample

Характеристика / Characteristic	Группа 1 / Group 1	Группа 2 / Group 2
Возраст / Age	M = 44,5; SD = 10,56	M = 38,2; SD = 13,12
Мужчины / Males	30,43 %	31,96 %
Женщины / Females	69,57 %	68,03 %

Необходимо отметить, что респонденты старше 65 лет составляют 5 % от общего числа выборки.

Результаты

Для того чтобы выявить степень актуальности переживаний респондентов по поводу коронавируса респондентам, участвующим в исследовании, в первую очередь был задан вопрос «Что Вас сейчас волнует больше всего?». При помощи контент-анализа представленных ответов удалось выявить факторы, вызывающие наибольшее беспокойство у респондентов на момент проведения исследования (рисунок).




Рис. Выраженность факторов, вызывающих наибольшее беспокойство у респондентов на момент проведения исследования, % /
Figure. The Intensity of the factors causing the greatest concern among the respondents at the time of the survey

Обращает на себя внимание, что для респондентов первой и второй группы общими факторами являются «коронавирус», «здоровье», «здоровье близких», «нестабильность», и «индивидуальное материальное положение». Однако выраженность данных факторов в группах различна: по мере развития пандемии большее беспокойство у респондентов начинает вызывать ситуация нестабильности, неясности и экономическая ситуация в стране. В ситуации же фактического отсутствия проявлений пандемии (менее 20 заболевших во всей области) респонденты в большей степени беспокоятся о здоровье своем и близких людей, своем материальном положении («маленькая зарплата», «растут цены» и пр.) и актуальным является вопрос – введение поправок в Конституцию РФ. При этом беспокойство по поводу коронавируса выражается только в самом его наличии: респонденты о данном факторе заявляют односложно – «коронавирус». В то время, как по мере развития ситуации респонденты содержательно расширяют данный фактор: появляются «люди, гуляющие на улице с детьми без масок», «распространение вируса», «отсутствие средств защиты». Кроме того, со временем совершенно выпадает из поля внимания респондентов введение поправок в Конституцию РФ, но появляется беспокойство по поводу экономической ситуации в стране («как страна выйдет из этой ситуации», «действия правительства по стабилизации экономики и поддержке здравоохранения», «экономическая ситуация в стране после пандемии» и т. д.).

С помощью метода словесных ассоциаций респондентов всей выборочной совокупности (168 чел.) в ходе эмпирического исследования было получено 537 ассоциаций на понятие «коронавирус», что в среднем составляет 3,2 ассоциации на респондента. Словарь понятий составил 125 различных слов и словосочетаний. В зону ядра и периферии представления о коро-

навирине вошли 274 ассоциации (51 % от общего числа ассоциаций, высказанных респондентами).

Анализ содержания ядра представления о коронавирусе свидетельствует о том, что ключевыми характеристиками данного явления в сознании респондентов являются «болезнь», «смерть» и «изоляция» (табл. 2).

Таблица 2 / Table 2

Структура представления о коронавирусе / The representation structure of the coronavirus

Элементы структуры представления / Elements of the representation structure	Понятия-ассоциации (в скобках рядом с каждым понятием указаны их частота встречаемости и средний ранг) / Notions-associations (the numbers in parentheses next to each notion indicate the frequency of occurrence and average rank)
Зона ядра социального представления / Core zone of social representation	Болезнь / Disease (39; 1,77) Смерть / Death (33; 2,27) Изоляция / Isolation (45; 2,40) Опасность / Danger (29; 1,11) Паника / Panic (27; 2,11)
Потенциальная зона изменений представления / Potential alteration zone of representation	Эпидемия / Pandemic (9; 2,0) Грипп / Flu (9; 1,07) Ложь / Lie (9; 1,54) Тревога / Anxiety (10; 2,11) Страх / Fear (21; 3,29) Беспомощность / Helplessness (12; 1,20) Каникулы / Vacation (30; 3,22) Дома / At home (18; 3,33) Кризис / Crisis (18; 3,67)
Собственно периферическая система представления / The actual peripheral system of the representation	Карантин / Quarantine (12; 2,50) Безработица / Unemployment (12; 3,50) Маска / Face-cloth cover (9; 4,05) Риск / Risk (9; 3,67) Китай / China (12; 3,75) Безответственность / Irresponsibility (9; 4,12) Ограничение / Restrictions (12; 4,50)

Зону ядра образуют те элементы, которые имеют высокую частоту встречаемости (больше медианы частоты всех включенных в анализ ассоциаций) и низкий ранг (меньше среднего ранга всех включенных в анализ ассоциаций). В зоне ядра располагаются стереотипы и прототипы, ассоциирующиеся с объектом. Содержание ядра социальных представлений обусловлено историческими, социальными и идеологическими условиями существования группы.

Потенциальную зону изменения представляют элементы, важные по частоте упоминания или по рангу. Эта часть является источником потенциального изменения и трансформации представления. В эту часть входят элементы, высказанные меньшинством, но в первую очередь, а также высказанные значительным числом респондентов, но не в первую очередь. В периферическую систему входят наименее важные ассоциации, разделяемые наибольшим числом респондентов, т. е. ассоциации с высоким рангом и низкой частотой.

Необходимо отметить, что содержание ядра представления оказалось постоянным для первой и второй групп респондентов. То есть вне зависимости от срока пандемии, элементы ядра представления остаются стабильными. Обнаружены следующие различия в двух группах респондентов: элемент периферической системы представления «Китай» в большей степени

характерен для первой группы, а для второй – «безработица», «ложь» и элемент, не вошедший в структуру представления – «надоело».

Кроме того, на основе анкетного опроса респонденты были поделены на группы по наличию заболевших коронавирусом в их окружении (место работы/непосредственное место проживания). Ответили, что не имеют заболевших в своем окружении, 55,8 % респондентов, 28,8% – не знают о таких случаях и 15,4% имеют заболевших в своем окружении. Дальнейший анализ позволил установить, что элементы представления «риск», «безответственность» и «ложь» характерны в большей степени для респондентов, имеющих в своем окружении заболевших.

Для оценки непосредственной аффективной реакции респондентов на слово-стимул – «коронавирус» было проведено эмоциональное индексирование ассоциаций (по Е.Е. Прониной). То есть была проведена оценка уровня напряженности психики при предъявлении данного стимула посредством определения индекса нейтральности и индекса полярности.

Определение индекса нейтральности дало следующие результаты: для стимула «коронавирус» ИН = $-0,824$. Полученное значение индекса можно интерпретировать как повышенную силу эмоций и тенденцию к аффекту у респондентов в отношении восприятия ими изучаемого явления. Установлено, что подобное эмоционально напряженное восприятие приводит к снижению адекватности осмысления получаемой информации (Пронина, 2002). При этом для респондентов группы 1 характерно более напряженное восприятие (ИН = $-0,862$), чем для респондентов группы 2 (ИН = $-0,786$). Для определения направления данной эмоциональной реакции был определен индекс полярности эмоций. Для стимула «коронавирус» ИП = $-0,59$, то есть в отношении данного явления у респондентов преобладают негативные чувства. Здесь обнаружена та же тенденция: у респондентов группы 1 в отношении коронавируса возникают более сильные негативные чувства (ИП = $-0,72$), нежели у респондентов группы 2 (ИП = $-0,46$). Исходя из схемы анализа и интерпретации результатов, предложенной автором методики Е.Е. Прониной, полученные данные свидетельствуют о наличии у респондентов эмоциональной напряженности и преобладании негативных переживаний, что, по мнению автора методики, составляет серьезное препятствие в адекватном осмыслении респондентами информации, получаемой в отношении изучаемого объекта, в данном случае – коронавируса.

На следующем этапе анализа была проведена факторизация массива данных, полученных при помощи семантического дифференциала. Был применен эксплораторный факторный анализ методом главных компонент с варимакс-вращением и нормализацией Кайзера. В результате факторного анализа данных совокупной выборки было выделено 5 факторов с общей объясненной дисперсией – 99,800 %. То есть при оценке крупных неблагоприятных событий и явлений, имеющих влияние на макрорегиональном уровне, респонденты опираются, прежде всего, на 5 факторов. Все пять выделенных факторов являются биполярными. Для обеспечения наглядности представляемых результатов в табл. 3 приведены переменные, имеющие наибольшую факторную нагрузку в каждом из факторов. При этом в результате дан-

ного анализа отсутствуют переменные, имеющие незначительную (менее 0,3) факторную нагрузку по всем пяти факторам.

Таблица 3 / Table 3

Факторы оценки крупных неблагоприятных событий и явлений, имеющих влияние на макрорегиональном уровне / Factors for assessing major adverse events and phenomena having an impact at the macro-regional level

Переменные с высокими факторными нагрузками, входящие в фактор / Variables with high factor loadings included in the factor		Координаты дескрипторов в пространстве фактора / Coordinates of descriptors in factor space	
<i>Фактор 1 (29,416%) «Единичность» / Factor 1 (29.416%) "Singularity"</i>			
Редкое / Rare	0,965	Авария на АЭС «Фукусима-1» / Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster	1,404
Единичное / Single	0,913	Глобальное потепление / Global warming	0,823
Единое / Shared	0,893	Вирус иммунодефицита человека (ВИЧ) / Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)	0,330
		Коронавирус / COVID-19	-0,672
		Терроризм / Terrorism	-0,869
Упорядоченное / Ordered	-0,891	Финансовый кризис / Financial crisis	-1,017
<i>Фактор 2 (26,453 %) «Опасность» / Factor 2 (26.453%) "Danger"</i>			
Опасное / Dangerous	0,911	Авария на АЭС «Фукусима-1» / Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster	1,397
Грубое / Rude	0,726	Терроризм / Terrorism	0,787
Жестокое / Tough	0,698	Финансовый кризис / Financial crisis	0,283
		Коронавирус / COVID-19	-0,361
		Вирус иммунодефицита человека (ВИЧ) / Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)	-1,016
Приятное / Pleasant	-0,886	Глобальное потепление / Global warming	-1,089
<i>Фактор 3 (21,331 %) «Устойчивость» / Factor 3 (21.331%) "Sustainability"</i>			
Неограниченное / Unlimited	0,968	Коронавирус / COVID-19	1,556
Устойчивое / Sustainable	0,634	Терроризм / Terrorism	0,358
		Авария на АЭС «Фукусима-1» / Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster	0,113
		Вирус иммунодефицита человека (ВИЧ) / Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)	-0,170
		Глобальное потепление / Global warming	-0,345
Кратковременное / Short-term	-0,722	Финансовый кризис / Financial crisis	-1,513
<i>Фактор 4 (13,314 %) «Естественность» / Factor 4 (13.314%) "Naturality"</i>			
Здоровое / Healthy	0,959	Вирус иммунодефицита человека (ВИЧ) / Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)	1,688
Чистое / Clean	0,748	Терроризм / Terrorism	0,537
		Авария на АЭС «Фукусима-1» / Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster	-0,026
		Финансовый кризис / Financial crisis	-0,448
		Коронавирус / COVID-19	-0,623
Большое / Big	-0,797	Глобальное потепление / Global warming	-1,129
<i>Фактор 5 (9,486%) «Открытость» / Factor 5 (9.486%) "Openness"</i>			
Страстное / Passionate	0,896	Терроризм / Terrorism	1,541
Жестокое / Cruel	0,647	Глобальное потепление / Global warming	0,954
		Вирус иммунодефицита человека (ВИЧ) / Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)	-0,384
		Коронавирус / COVID-19	-0,480
		Финансовый кризис / Financial crisis	-0,751
		Авария на АЭС «Фукусима-1» / Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster	-0,880

Поскольку ключевым переживанием в связи с коронавирусом у респондентов выступило переживание опасности («опасность» является элементом ядра представления о коронавирусе), необходимо рассмотреть особенности данного переживания в период пандемии. Для выявления предикторов, обуславливающих состояние безопасности у респондентов в период пандемии, был проведен множественный регрессионный анализ (метод – шаговый отбор), результаты которого представлены в табл. 4. В качестве независимых переменных выступили следующие переменные: пол респондентов, возраст респондентов, образование респондентов, период пандемии, наличие/отсутствие в непосредственном окружении заболевших коронавирусом, а также параметры состояния респондентов (психическая активация, интерес, эмоциональный тонус, напряжение и комфортность – показатели методики Л.А. Курганского и Т.А. Немчина). В качестве зависимой переменной «Чувство безопасности» были использованы оценки респондентами степени своей безопасности по 7-балльной шкале.

Таблица 4 / Table 4

Регрессионная модель зависимой переменной «Чувство безопасности» /
Regression model of the dependent variable 'Sense of Security'

R^2	Скорректированный R^2 / Adjusted R^2	F	Предикторы / Predictors	β	t	p -value
0,324	0,202	8,972	Психическая активация / Mental activation	0,309	3,818	0,000
			Период пандемии / Pandemic period	0,243	2,993	0,003

Примечание: R^2 – коэффициент детерминации, равный доле дисперсии переменной «Чувство безопасности», обусловленной влиянием независимых переменных; F – F статистика Фишера, оценивающая значимость уравнения регрессии; β – стандартные коэффициенты регрессии, отражающие относительную степень влияния каждого из предикторов; t – отношение нестандартизованного коэффициента к своей стандартной ошибке; p -value – величина p -уровня значимости, вероятность случайности полученного результата.

Note: R^2 – the determination coefficient equal to the portion of the variance of the variable 'Sense of security' due to the influence of the independent variables; F – Fisher statistics evaluating the significance of the regression equation; β – the standard regression coefficient reflecting the relative degree of the impact of each of the predictors; t – the ratio of the non-standardized coefficient to its standard error; p -value – the value of the p -level of significance, the probability of the result randomness.

Полученная модель свидетельствует, что 20,2 % дисперсии переменной «Чувство безопасности» обусловлены влиянием только двух выделенных предикторов: психическая активация и период пандемии. Причем обе переменные связаны с чувством безопасности прямой, не обратной связью.

Обсуждение результатов

Развитие пандемии изменяет фокус внимания респондентов: актуальными становятся ранее не рассматриваемые проблемы («экономическая ситуация в стране»), а иные, наоборот утрачивают свою актуальность. Увеличение значимости для населения экономических вопросов в ходе пандемии отмечено и в ежегодном опросе Stress in America, проводимом Американской психологической ассоциацией (Stress in America, 2020). Кроме того, значимость и самой проблемы коронавируса в разные периоды времени для респондентов различна.

Представление о коронавирусе у исследуемой выборки главным образом сформировано в результате воздействия средств массовой информации, поскольку к моменту начала исследования на территории всей Свердловской области не было зафиксировано случаев заражения, а к моменту завершения сбора данных – 1952 чел. при общей численности населения Свердловской области 4 310 681 чел.

Анализируя структуру представления о коронавирусе, можно отметить, что ядро представления является устойчивым, согласованным и как раз отражает результат информационного воздействия СМИ – «смерть», «паника». Данные элементы не представлены в непосредственном опыте респондентов в виду отмеченной выше статистики заболеваний в области. Потенциальная зона изменений выступает, «приручением» знаний о коронавирусе, операционализацией содержания представления о коронавирусе на язык изменений в своей обыденной жизни. Так, пандемия коронавируса понимается как «эпидемия» «гриппа», введение необходимости самоизоляции – как «каникулы», возможность побыть «дома». При этом, в данной же зоне описываются эмоциональные переживания, вызванные текущей ситуацией – «тревога», «страх», «беспомощность». Данные переживания могут быть обусловлены состоянием неизвестности/неопределенности, которое респонденты в опросе отмечали в качестве фактора, вызывающего их беспокойство в данный момент. Периферическая зона представления конкретизирует, дополняет зону потенциальных изменений.

Необходимо отметить, что если ядро представления остается стабильным вне зависимости от времени и вовлеченности в пандемию респондентов, т. е. вне зависимости от наличия или отсутствия в ближайшем окружении респондента заболевших, то именно в зоне потенциальных изменений и периферической можно отметить эти вариации.

Невозможность сенсорного восприятия риска заболевания и эмоционально отрицательное освещение средствами массовой информации нового коронавируса сформировало у респондентов состояние эмоциональной напряженности. Определение непосредственной аффективной реакции респондентов на слово-стимул – «коронавирус» показало наличие эмоциональной напряженности и преобладание негативных переживаний респондентов при предъявлении данного стимула. Однако по мере развития ситуации данная эмоциональная реакция смягчается, и респонденты, участвующие во втором этапе опроса, демонстрируют менее напряженное и негативное переживание. Этот результат находит свое подтверждение в том, что одним из предикторов чувства безопасности респондентов во время пандемии является период пандемии: с течением времени чувство опасности ослабляется и усиливается чувство безопасности.

В целом коронавирус воспринимается респондентами как повторяющийся (подобный свиному гриппу, птичьему гриппу и пр.), не очень опасный (радиация, терроризм и финансовый кризис опаснее), устойчивый, не кратковременный, не вполне естественный и имеющий скрытое воздействие (как при финансовом кризисе и воздействии радиации).

Согласно результатам исследования, основой чувства безопасности в период пандемии выступает возможность респондентов совершать активные действия, оставаться активным. В связи с этим ограничение активности, введение жестких ограничительных мер может усиливать ощущение небезопасности. Возможно, в этом заключается причина нарушений режима самоизоляции населением. В данном поведении проявляется попытка сломить чувство опасности, возникающее в результате бездействия, ограничений и невозможности влиять на ситуацию, и обрести чувство безопасности.

Проведенное исследование сочетало в себе количественный и качественный подход к изучению представлений. И хотя используемые в исследовании процедуры и выборка не были рассчитаны на получение данных, репрезентативных для России и мира в целом, но они позволяют проследить некоторые важные тенденции в структуре представлений и эмоциональных состояниях личности в период пандемии.

Полученные в ходе исследования результаты и сформированные идеи и выводы полезны для понимания того, как люди переживают такие экстремальные события как данная пандемия. Результаты могут быть полезны руководителям системы здравоохранения и политикам для лучшего согласования их рекомендаций и ресурсов в целях удовлетворения меняющихся потребностей населения в области психологического здоровья.

Заключение

Проведенное исследование показало, что в условиях пандемии, выступая основным источником информации и средством коммуникации, массмедиа задают направление формирования представлений. Из потока сообщений массмедиа человек выбирает то, что его больше всего волнует, вкладывая полученную информацию в формирование своего представления о каком-либо феномене и о конкретной ситуации. В связи с этим нужно отметить, что именно СМИ имеют возможность создания у населения образа «правильного» поведения в ситуации пандемии. При этом необходимо помнить о таком психологическом феномене, как «эффект бумеранга» или «обратный эффект»: когда человека в чем-то убеждают слишком активно, он нередко начинает верить в обратное. Все это создает условия, в которых абсолютно правильные предупреждения врачей и представителей системы здравоохранения не дают эффекта или дают прямо противоположный эффект.

Перспективы исследования данной темы могут быть рассмотрены в нескольких направлениях: 1) обнаружение особенностей представлений о коронавирусе и переживаний личности в период пандемии у лиц, имеющих и не имеющих детей (поскольку в опросе Американской психологической ассоциации были выявлены специфические особенности у данных групп) (Stress in America, 2020); 2) изучение особенностей представлений о коронавирусе у лиц, имеющих профессиональные знания в области медицины и вирусологии в частности; 3) анализ связи представлений личности о коронавирусе и стратегий ее совладания с трудными ситуациями, защитными психологическими механизмами.

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Research article

Social Representations of the Coronavirus at the Beginning of the Pandemic in Russia

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Abstract. The coronavirus outbreak is a global event that has bypassed national borders and affected the entire world. Therefore, examining social representations of can reveal the problems that structure people’s experiences in a particular social context. To identify social representations of the coronavirus, the authors conducted a survey within the territory of the Sverdlovsk region. The survey covered the period from March 11 to May 11, 2020. The data were collected in two stages: at the first stage, there were 31 confirmed cases of COVID-19 infection in Russia, but no cases had yet been recorded in the Sverdlovsk region; at the second stage, the number of cases reached 1952 in the Sverdlovsk region and 221 344 throughout the country. The study used the word association tests, The Semantic Differential Scale (V.F. Petrenko), The Psychic Activation Assessment Methodology (L.A. Kurgan and

T.A. Nemchin) and the questionnaire survey techniques. The findings showed that the significance of the coronavirus problem for the respondents varied in different periods of the pandemic. The core of the social representation is sustainable and coherent. It reflects the results of the media impact: death, panic. It also remains stable regardless of the time and involvement of the respondents in the pandemic. The potential alteration zone serves as a kind of ‘taming’ of knowledge about the coronavirus, the operationalization of the coronavirus perception content into the language of changes in a person’s everyday life – the coronavirus pandemic is understood as a ‘flu epidemic’ and the need for self-isolation is a ‘vacation’, an opportunity ‘to stay at home’. Observation of the immediate affective reaction of the respondents to the trigger ‘coronavirus’ uncovered the presence of emotional tension and the prevalence of negative experiences in them. The survey also showed that in the pandemic, being the main source of information and a means of communication, the media set trends for developing perceptions.

Key words: social representations, state of security, isolation, the pandemic, COVID-19, emotional state

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Scientific report

United Nations Psychology Day 2021 Focused on Post-Pandemic Rebuilding

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Abstract. In the wake of the unprecedented global COVID-19 lockdowns in 2020, the Psychology Coalition at the United Nations (PCUN) managed to continue to pursue its mission, to apply psychological science to global issues at the UN. This two-part report offers a concise overview of (a) recent PCUN activities in 2020–2021, and (b) the PCUN’s 14th annual Psychology Day at the UN on April 15, 2021, which focused on “Psychological Contributions to Building Back Better in a Post-Pandemic World.”

Key words: United Nations, Psychology Day, international, COVID-19, NGOs, PCUN

Introduction

In 2020, the United Nations was poised to celebrate “UN75,” the joyous 75th anniversary of its formation on June 26, 1945 (www.un.org/en/75). But tragedy soon intervened. On March 11, 2020, after weeks of hesitation, the UN’s World Health Organization (WHO) declared the novel COVID-19 virus outbreak in Wuhan, China, as a “global pandemic” (McNeil, 2020). Like the UN itself, most institutions world-wide quickly “locked down” and cancelled in-person activities, to try to cope with this mysterious and deadly new menace.

Early in 2020, New York City became the epicenter of this deadly virus in the USA, with hospitals overwhelmed by thousands of patients, and refrigerated trucks nearby to hold the bodies of the deceased. Given this grim backdrop, and the impossibility of in-person meetings, the City’s countless institutions and organizations each had to decide whether or not to continue operations by shifting to virtual activities.

Psychology Coalition at the United Nations (PCUN)

Over a dozen psychology organizations have been working with the United Nations during the past 20 years (Takooshian, 2020). Since 2014, about 25–50 members of the Psychology Coalition at the UN were meeting (usually one Thursday



each month) at various New York City locations at or near the UN headquarters in Manhattan – at City University of New York, Fordham University, or the Salvation Army. In March of 2020, PCUN officers and members voted to shift to a virtual meeting each month and, if feasible, to take this opportunity to expand this meeting to participants in regions outside New York.

As a result, PCUN had a productive year in 2020–2021, in several ways:

- the virtual PCUN monthly meetings expanded, to include visitors from other cities and even nations;
- PCUN strived to continue its normal activities, such as advocacy statements for diverse UN committees;
- on May 27, 2020, PCUN hosted its first virtual Psychology Day at the UN – an historic webinar with 1,271 participants from 104 nations;
- also in May of 2020, a new volume appeared on “Psychology in the global arena,” with 16 chapters featuring the work of many PCUN representatives and interns (Congress et al., 2020);
- in December of 2020, PCUN voted to sign an agreement with publisher George Johnson of Information Age Publishing (IAP), to launch a unique new series of books on behavioral science applied to global issues;
- in spring of 2021, after months of planning, many PCUN members participated in a new series of seven global webinars. These webinars brought together experts from many nations (like Philip G. Zimbardo in the USA, Isabelle Kamariza in Rwanda, Anjhula Mya Singh Bais in Malaysia, Irina A. Novikova in Moscow, Allyn Enderlyn in Geneva) to share new information on diverse and timely topics. These topics included the role of NGOs at the UN, the UN International Day of Happiness, food insecurity in Africa, “everyday heroes,” human rights and genocide;
- in February of 2021, PCUN adopted a new logo, to include its new and more precise title, as provided by UN officials: “The Psychology Coalition of NGOs having Consultative Status with the UN Economic and Social Council;”
- not least of all, PCUN hosted its 14th Psychology Day at the United Nations on April 15, 2021.

Psychology Day at the UN

The first Psychology Day at the UN was in 2007 – focused on the theme of psychological responses to disasters. Since 2007, this has become an annual tradition in New York City, with a timely new theme each year (see Table).

These forums have increased in size over the years, drawing over 500 colleagues and students to the UN in April of 2019. Though there is no systematic publication of these lively forums, many are now available on video or in written summaries. This includes the forums on “Reducing health inequities” (Marcotte, 2015), “Global migration crisis” (Marcotte, 2016), “Promoting well-being” (Feher, 2017), “Climate change” (Richa, Idahosa-Erere, 2018),¹ “Gender equ[al]ity,”² and “Multilateralism” (Sandanapitchai, Takooshian, 2020).³

¹ UNPD 2018. <http://webtv.un.org/search/11th-annual-psychology-day-at-the-united-nations/5769788009001/?term=psychology%20day&sort=date>

² UNPD 2019. <http://webtv.un.org/search/the-time-is-now-psychological-contributions-to-global-gender%20equality-12th-annual-psychology-day-at-the-united-nations/6030064139001/?term=psychology%20day&sort=date>

³ UNPD 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AwZrUpbnZ8c>

Themes of Psychology Day at the United Nations, 2007–2021

Year	Theme
2021	Psychological Contributions to Building Back Better in a Post-Pandemic World
2020	The Multilateralism We Want: Psychological Contributions to Building Bridges Among and Within Nations
2019	The Time is Now: Psychological Contributions to Global Gender Equ[al]ity
2018	From Vulnerability to Resilience: Using Psychology to Address the Global Migration Crisis
2017	Promoting Well-Being in the 21 st Century: Psychological Contributions for Social, Economic and Environmental Challenges
2016	From Vulnerability to Resilience: Using Psychology to Address the Global Migration Crisis
2015	Reducing Health Inequalities Within and Among Countries: Psychology’s Contributions to the United Nation’s Post-2015 Global Agenda
2014	Psychology’s Contributions to Sustainable Development: Challenges and Solutions for the Global Agenda
2013	Psychology and Violence in a Global Context: Antecedents, Consequences and Prevention
2012	Human Rights for Vulnerable People
2011	The Role of Psychology in Achieving Universal Access to Education
2010	Psychology and Diplomacy: Negotiating for Peace and Human Rights
2009	No Psychology Day
2008	Psychology and Social Justice Related to the UN Global
2007	Psychology and Disaster Response

On April 15, 2021, the fourteenth annual Psychology Day at the United Nations drew 1,941 registrants from 97 nations, and over 750 of these participated, on the theme of “Psychological contributions to building back better in a post-pandemic world.” In the wake of a year of COVID-19 traumata, this forum engaged five experts in four nations to address five specialties in psychology that can aid in recovery.⁴

This 130-minute webinar was in three parts: (a) it began with introductions by several experts: PCUN President Leslie Popoff, Comfort Asanbe, Janet A. Sigal, Walter Reichman, and Minister Sully Saneaux of the Dominican Republic; (b) five experts spoke on their work for 15 minutes each; (c) this was followed by 25 minutes of question-and-answer with the speakers.

This series of five experts were introduced by H.E. Ambassador Richard Arbeiter of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations (Figure).



Figure. Moderator Richard Arbeiter with the five experts, Drs. Molly Byrne (Ireland), Marina Umaschi Bers (USA), Michael Frese (Malaysia), Charlene Y. Senn (Canada), Thema Bryant-Davis (USA) (photo from personal archive of authors)

⁴ UNPD 2021. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z9xR-99IvEs&t=1329s>

1. Educational psychology. *Marina Umaschi Bers, PhD*, is Professor and Chair of the Eliot-Pearson Department of Child Study and Human Development at Tufts University. She spoke about “*Playground and Playpens: The Role of New Technologies in Learning.*” The COVID-19 pandemic has made a huge impact on the learning experience of children due to the sudden shift towards virtual platforms causing difficulties for children, teachers and parents to navigate these platforms. However, Dr. Bers’ work at DevTech research group is more timely than ever as it aims to explore how technologies can enhance the learning experience and influence positive child development based on pedagogical approaches. By teaching programming languages at an early age, children are engaged in Positive Technological Development (PTD) that promotes communication, collaboration, community building, content creation, creativity and choice of conduct. The Coding as Another Language (CAL) approach, developed by Professor Bers, seeks to examine how learning programming languages can replicate the educational process for teaching literacy. She further clarified that the ultimate goal of learning coding/computer science is not to make every child to become a program developer, but to support young children to develop critical thinking, problem-solving strategies and collaborative skills to become better global citizens.

2. Social psychology. *Charlene Y. Senn, PhD*, is Professor of Psychology and Gender Studies at the University of Windsor. Dr. Senn addressed “*Empowering young women to resist: An evidence-based intervention to reduce sexual violence.*” Sexual assault is a distinctly gendered crime because the majority of victims are women regardless of age and sexual identity and most perpetrators are men. Although many interventions have been implemented in addressing sexual violence in the past decade, statistics of sexual violence cases have not reduced significantly. Therefore, she emphasized the need of a comprehensive plan for sexual violence prevention and the critical role of psychological science to analyze the effectiveness of such interventions. From a social psychological perspective, she discussed the consequences of cultural messages about the risk of sexual violence around public environment and stranger risk, and how this perpetuates more harm. The EAAA (Enhanced Access, Acknowledge, Act) sexual assault resistance program, founded by Dr. Senn, is a 12 hour, small-group evidence-based intervention. Its goal is to reduce the likelihood that young women experience sexual attack, by decreasing the time to identify the risk cues, reducing the emotional obstacles to take action, and maximizing the chance to use verbal and physical self-defense tactics. She pointed out that the program has shown promising outcome in reducing the risk of victimization that ensure its future adoption for different languages and cultural settings.

3. Industrial-organizational psychology. *Michael Frese, PhD*, is Professor of Management at Asia School of Business (Malaysia). He focused on “*How work and organizational psychology can contribute to reduce poverty in developing countries.*” COVID-19 has exacerbated existing inequities and poverty, especially in developing countries. Poverty should not only be viewed from an economic perspective, but also a psychological perspective, to understand the causes and maintenance of poverty. He also acknowledged the role of societal, political, historical and environmental factors on poverty reduction. He identified three areas where psychology is connected to economic development: (a) working hard

(effort, persistence, achievement motivation); (b) enterprising and innovating (risk taking, autonomy, long term orientation); (c) efficient organizing (trust, leadership, ethical behaviors, team player). Numerous studies have shown that improvement in these three areas is positively associated with higher entrepreneurial success and employee performance. He specifically highlighted the impact of personal initiative – self-starting, future-oriented and proactive mindset – on business performance. His study conducted in Togo, has shown that compared to a traditional business training model, psychological training based on personal initiative had positive effects on micro-entrepreneurs from boosting profits and increasing invention of new products, to motivating them to expand their investments. This is mainly because personal initiative provides tools to tackle challenges, be innovative and unique, and foster better long-term planning for continuous business growth.

4. Clinical psychology. Thema Bryant-Davis, PhD, is a licensed psychologist, ordained minister, artist, and Professor of Psychology at Pepperdine University, where she heads Pepperdine’s Culture and Trauma Research Laboratory. She presented on “*Thriving in a post-pandemic world: Clinical implications.*” She started her presentation by acknowledging her identity as an African-descendent woman, since she believes that our identity influences our research, shapes the questions we ask, and the ways we interpret data. The COVID-19 pandemic has caused severe acute and chronic mental health problems. Thus, she stressed the importance of psychological components of recovery and resilience to build back better. Moreover, the pandemic has disproportionately affected specific population like children, individuals with preexisting health conditions, health care workers, immigrants, and racially marginalized groups. Since race-based stress and trauma from police brutality, and racially motivated hate crimes have escalated during the pandemic, it is crucial to address the inequities and injustice as part of treatment considerations. She further explained that treatments should be sensitive to various cultural and spiritual components beside being evidence-based. From a holistic approach, treatments should accommodate various techniques such as mindfulness, self-compassion, healing groups, family and group processing, expressive arts and resistance strategies. Dr. Davis called for “liberation psychology” that not only provides coping tools to deal with trauma and oppression, but also teaches us to resist and dismantle such acts. She concluded by providing key takeaways for thriving in a post-pandemic world: address trauma and loss, rebuild community, engage holistic therapies, integrate expressive arts, and dismantle inequities and injustice.

5. Health psychology. Molly Byrne, PhD, is Professor of Health Psychology in the School of Psychology at National University of Ireland (NUI) in Galway, and Director of its Health Behaviour Change Research Group. She focused on “*Contribution from health psychology to building back better in a post-pandemic world.*” Understanding and predicting behaviors have become the center of health psychological research because many of the leading causes of morbidity and mortality are behaviorally determined. In general, health psychologists use psychological science to promote health, prevent illness and improve health care systems. She mentioned, however, health psychology has evolved during this pandemic, since there is now more focus on translating psychological evidence for

policy and practice. She provided examples of how health psychologists work closely with policymakers to inform global pandemic responses, by providing recommendations and best practices to COVID-19. For example, an international team of health psychologists released a guideline on addressing pandemic fatigue, suggesting four key strategies for government to maintain and reinvigorate public support for protective behaviors: (a) understand people; (b) engage people as part of the solution; (c) allow people to live their lives but reduce risk; (d) acknowledge and address hardship experienced by the people. She indicated that psychologists have an immense role in pandemic preparedness based on numerous evidence-based psychological interventions to deal with global health challenges. She concluded by saying that more funding is needed for psychological and social research relative to biomedical research and international collaboration is the key for an effective pandemic response.

This 2021 Psychology Day program was organized by the sedulous PCUN Program Committee.⁵ It was co-sponsored by 11 psychology organizations, and supported by three diplomatic missions to the UN – Palau, Mexico, and Dominican Republic. A 10-page program for this webinar appears at the UN Psychology Day website: <https://www.unpsychologyday.com/>. Those interested in past or current PCUN activities can check its website, at <http://psychologycoalitionun.org/>

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⁵ PCUN Program Committee: Walter Reichman, Janet Sigal, Comfort Asanbe (the three co-chairs), and Michelle Bell, Adam Calderone, Roseanne Flores, Ayorkor Gaba, Cynthia Grguric, Rashmi Jaipal, Josephine Juanamarga, Elizabeth Kloner, Judy Kuriansky, Efrat Neter, Nelida Quintero, Odetta Saul, Anna Stauber, and Carmen Vazquez.

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Научное сообщение

**День психологии – 2021 в ООН,
посвященный постпандемическому восстановлению**

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Аннотация. После начала беспрецедентного глобального локдауна, связанного с пандемией COVID-19 в 2020 году, Коалиция психологов в Организации Объединенных Наций (Psychology Coalition at the United Nations, PCUN) смогла продолжить выполнять свою миссию – использовать достижения психологической науки в решении глобальных проблем, обсуждаемых в ООН. В данном научном репортаже, состоящем из двух частей, представлен краткий обзор: 1) недавних мероприятий PCUN в 2020–2021 гг.; 2) 14-го Ежегодного Дня психологии в ООН, организованного 15 апреля 2021 г. при поддержке PCUN и посвященного теме «Вклад психологии в улучшение восстановления в постпандемическом мире».

Ключевые слова: Организация Объединенных Наций, День психологии, международный, COVID-19, неправительственные организации, Коалиция психологов ООН

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