RUDN Journal of Psychology and PedagogicsRUDN Journal of Psychology and PedagogicsВестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Психология и педагогика2313-16832313-1705Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia named after Patrice Lumumba (RUDN University)4784510.22363/2313-1683-2025-22-2-268-288VLBPOOCURRENT TRENDS IN PERSONALITY RESEARCHСОВРЕМЕННЫЕ ТЕНДЕНЦИИ РАЗВИТИЯ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ ЛИЧНОСТИResearch ArticleRussian versions of measures for assessing core knowledge confusions and bullshit receptivity: Adaptation and validationРусскоязычные версии методик для оценки путаницы в базовых знаниях и восприимчивости к чуши: адаптация и валидизацияhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-8841-1722HII-5216-20224854-0374KomyaginskayaElizaveta ShamilevnaКомягинскаяЕлизавета Шамилевна

Research Intern, Center for Sociocultural Research

стажер-исследователь, Центр социокультурных исследований

ekomyaginskaya@hse.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-8775-728958182813400GLV-6876-20226639-2529GallyamovaAlbina AlikovnaГаллямоваАльбина Аликовна

Junior Research Fellow, Center for Sociocultural Research

младший научный сотрудник, Центр социокультурных исследований

aagallyamova@hse.ruhttps://orcid.org/0009-0000-6540-5322JPL-1952-2023OcheretAnna Yur'evnaОчеретАнна Юрьевна

Student, Faculty of Social Sciences

студент, факультет социальных наук

ayuocheret@edu.hse.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-4511-794257191706675K-3338-20151807-9739GrigoryevDmitry SergeevichГригорьевДмитрий Сергеевич

PhD, Research Fellow, Center for Sociocultural Research

PhD, научный сотрудник, Центр социокультурных исследований

dgrigoryev@hse.ruHSE UniversityНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»30122025222VOL 22, NO2 (2025)ТОМ 22, №2 (2025)26828830122025Copyright ©; 2025, Komyaginskaya E.S., Gallyamova A.A., Ocheret A.Y., Grigoryev D.S.Copyright ©; 2025, Комягинская Е.Ш., Галлямова А.А., Очерет А.Ю., Григорьев Д.С.2025Komyaginskaya E.S., Gallyamova A.A., Ocheret A.Y., Grigoryev D.S.Комягинская Е.Ш., Галлямова А.А., Очерет А.Ю., Григорьев Д.С.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0https://journals.rudn.ru/psychology-pedagogics/article/view/47845

In the context of information overload and the spread of disinformation, the ability to discern truth and meaning becomes especially important. This study focuses on two reasoning errors — ontological confusion and receptivity to bullshit — that influence the formation of beliefs. The aim of the study was to adapt and validate Russian-language versions of two measurement instruments: Core Knowledge Confusions Scale developed by M. Lindeman and K. Aarnio, which assesses the ability to correctly distinguish between different ontological categories (such as physical objects, mental phenomena, and biological entities), and Bullshit Receptivity Scale created by A. Erlandsson and colleagues, which measures receptivity to pseudo-profound statements lacking real content. Their associations with cognitive abilities, motivational factors, and personality traits were examined. To ensure cultural appropriateness of the items, cognitive interviews were conducted. The study involved 1,268 respondents. Data analysis using Item Response Theory models and multiple regression demonstrated the reliability and validity of both instruments in the Russian context. The results revealed that core knowledge confusions were positively associated with receptivity to bullshit, as well as with belief in the paranormal and pseudoscientific claims. Verbal intelligence negatively predicted both reasoning errors, whereas extraversion was a positive predictor. Need for structure was positively related to core knowledge confusions, while need for meaning was positively related to receptivity to bullshit. Among sociodemographic factors, educational level was negatively associated with core knowledge confusions, whereas older age and male gender were negatively associated with receptivity to bullshit. These findings highlight the significant role of cognitive and motivational factors in information processing and belief formation, and may have practical implications for developing educational strategies aimed at enhancing critical thinking and information literacy.

В условиях информационной перегрузки и распространения дезинформации особую важность приобретает способность определять истину и смысл. В данном исследовании рассматриваются две ошибки мышления — онтологическая путаница и восприимчивость к чуши, влияющие на формирование убеждений. Цель  исследования — адаптация и валидизация русскоязычных версий методик для оценки этих феноменов: разработанная М. Линдеман и К. Аарнио шкала путаницы в базовых знаниях (Core Knowledge Confusions Scale), которая измеряет способность корректно разграничивать различные онтологические категории (физические объекты, ментальные явления, биологические сущности), и созданная А. Эрландссоном и соавторами шкала восприимчивости к чуши (Bullshit Receptivity Scale), предназначенная для оценки восприимчивости к псевдоглубоким высказываниям, лишенным реального содержания. Была исследована их взаимосвязь с когнитивными способностями, мотивационными факторами и чертами личности. Для обеспечения культурной адекватности формулировок были проведены когнитивные интервью. В исследовании приняли участие 1268 респондентов. Анализ данных с использованием моделей теории ответа на задание (Item Response Theory) и множественного регрессионного анализа продемонстрировал надежность и валидность обеих методик в российском контексте. Было выявлено, что онтологическая путаница положительно связана с восприимчивостью к чуши, а также с верой в паранормальные и псевдонаучные убеждения. Вербальный интеллект отрицательно предсказывал обе ошибки мышления, в то время как экстраверсия — положительно. Потребность в структуре способствовала онтологической путанице, а потребность в смысле — восприимчивости к чуши. Среди социодемографических факторов уровень образования был отрицательно связан с выраженностью онтологической путаницы, тогда как более старший возраст и мужской пол — с восприимчивостью к чуши. Результаты подчеркивают значимую роль когнитивных и мотивационных факторов в обработке информации и формировании убеждений, а также могут иметь прикладное значение для разработки образовательных стратегий, направленных на повышение критического мышления и информационной грамотности.

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