RUDN Journal of Political ScienceRUDN Journal of Political ScienceВестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Политология2313-14382313-1446Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia named after Patrice Lumumba (RUDN University)4962710.22363/2313-1438-2026-28-1-59-79NVWQWOPUBLIC POLICY AND MANAGEMENTГОСУДАРСТВЕННАЯ ПОЛИТИКА И УПРАВЛЕНИЕResearch ArticleModeling Government-Parliament Interaction: A Post-Soviet Legislative FrameworkКонцептуальная модель взаимодействия правительства и парламента в законотворческом процессе: пример постсоветских странhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-3068-5664PomiguevIlya A.ПомигуевИлья Александрович

PhD in Political SciencesAssociate Professor of the Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Mass Communications, Head of the Laboratory of Parliamentary and Legislative Studies

кандидат политических наук, доцент кафедры политологии факультета социальных наук и массовых коммуникаций, заведующий лабораторией парламентских и законотворческих исследований

pomilya@mail.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-0576-0899AlekseevDmitry V.АлексеевДмитрий Владимирович

PhD in Political Science Associate Researcher, Laboratory of Parliamentary and Legislative Studies

кандидат политических наук, ассоциированный исследователь лаборатории парламентских и законотворческих исследований

mityaalexeev@yandex.ruFinancial University under the Government of the Russian FederationФинансовый университет при Правительстве РФ08042026281Public Policy and Public AdministrationПубличная политика и государственное управление597908042026Copyright ©; 2026, Pomiguev I.A., Alekseev D.V.Copyright ©; 2026, Помигуев И.А., Алексеев Д.В.2026Pomiguev I.A., Alekseev D.V.Помигуев И.А., Алексеев Д.В.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0https://journals.rudn.ru/political-science/article/view/49627

The interaction of the government and parliament is one of the common topics in the framework of research on the configuration of political power, forms of government, political decision-making processes, etc. In order to effectively implement and adjust laws, and especially the budget, the executive branch is often forced to assume the functions of a legislator and directly participate in legislative decision-making, albeit in a limited format - It will not be possible to pass a law without its adoption in parliament. This situation forces the Government to look for all possible tools to influence the course and outcome of consideration of legislative initiatives, which ultimately determines its role in the legislative process. The study presents an attempt to determine the specifics of the interaction of the branches of government in the legislative process. For this purpose, a conceptual model is proposed based on the ideas of the three main traditions of neo-institutionalism: historical, sociological and rational choice theory. The conceptual framework of the model includes three main elements: institutional (context, resources, rules of the game), actor (parties, experts, bureaucratic structures) and applied (processes, technologies, communications). The analytical potential of the proposed model is confirmed by examples of interaction between branches of government in post-Soviet countries.

Взаимодействие правительства и парламента является одной из распространенных тем в рамках исследований конфигурации политической власти, форм правления, процессов принятия политических решений и т.д. Для эффективного исполнения и корректировки законов, а тем более бюджета, исполнительная власть часто вынуждена брать на себя функции законодателя и непосредственно участвовать в принятии законодательных решений, хотя и в ограниченном формате, - издать закон без принятия его в парламенте не получится. Такая ситуация вынуждает правительство искать все возможные инструменты для влияния на ход и результат рассмотрения законодательных инициатив, что в конечном итоге и определяет его роль в законотворческом процессе. В исследовании сделана попытка определить особенности взаимодействия ветвей власти в законотворческом процессе. Для этого предложена концептуальная модель, основанная на идеях трех основных традиций неоинституционализма: исторического, социологического, и теории рационального выбора. Концептуальный каркас модели включает в себя три основных элемента: институциональный (контекст, ресурсы, правила игры), акторный (партии, эксперты, бюрократические структуры) и прикладной (процессы, технологии, коммуникации). Аналитический потенциал предлагаемой модели подтверждается на примерах взаимодействия ветвей власти в постсоветских странах.

legislative processparliamentgovernmentlegislative agendapolitical institutionslegislative technologiespost-Soviet countriesзаконодательный процесспарламентправительствозаконодательная повестка дняполитические институтызаконодательные технологиипостсоветские страныИсследование выполнено за счет гранта Российского научного фонда № 24-78-10163 «Трансформация роли исполнительной власти в законотворческом процессе: сравнительное исследование постсоветских государств» (URL: https://rscf.ru/project/24-78-10163/) в Финансовом университете при Правительстве РФ.The research was carried out at the expense of the grant of the Russian Science Foundation No. 24-78-10163 “Transformation of the executive’s role in the legislative process of post-Soviet countries: a comparative study” (URL: https://rscf.ru/project/24-78-10163/) at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian FederationAlekseev, D.V. (2023). 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