

АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ВОПРОСЫ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ НАУКИ

RETHINKING THE CATEGORY OF REVOLUTION

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The subject of the study is the category of revolution. The author tries to understand how revolution as a legitimate government overthrow of a sovereign nation works as a concept in current political situation. In her view, since the Islamic Revolution in Iran it becomes quite impossible to classify the revolution as the bourgeois and socialist, since 1991 — to talk about it in line with the theory of change of social formations. In her article the author analyzes the results of the overthrow of the government during the revolution as a legitimate act, and explains why, in her view, the concept of the revolution is “dead”. The category of revolution is studied by the author through techniques of political Conceptology. As the methods of investigation the author used comparative, historical method, and methods of analytic philosophy. The main conclusion of the study is the exhaustion of modern concept of revolution because of its ambiguity and elevated semantic load, which are stretching the notion of enabling and legitimizing any illegal overthrow of the government, including those which are not in the interests of “sovereign nation”. The concept of revolution in the way in which we are accustomed to perceive it, has exhausted itself, because it consists of continuous fiction, but in today's world radically change the structure of suppression and oppression.

Key words: sovereignty, people, power, elite, legitimacy, freedom, ethnicity, category, value.

Revolution is a fundamental, sense-making concept for many modern states on all continents. Apologetic of revolution pertained so to Russia (Great October!), and was given a renewed momentum in relation to the liberatory anticolonial movements after the World War II. This apologetic, in full accordance with the epigraph, was deftly taken up and used for the legitimation of “velvet revolutions” in 1989—1991, then transformed into the concept of “color revolutions”. Many questions arise after cogitation about “theatrical” mutinies [16. P. 258] of “oranges”, “roses” and “tulips” (The Orange Revolution in Ukraine, 2004, The Rose Revolution in Georgia, 2003, The Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, 2005), I have a lot of doubts over the use of this concept in the course of recent “Arab spring”, referring to the ultra-right take-overs in Europe between the world wars, and to the situation in modern Ukraine... In particular, Mark Neocleous uses the term “revolution”, analyzing the transformations in Germany in the first third

of the XXth century: revolution, revolution I (revolution against revolution), revolution II (revolution against the revolution I) [21].

What then is revolution? Forced change of current social and political system? Fundamental break of political institutions, radical take-over, change of socio-economic formation? Could the revolution be conservative, or it should be called counter-revolution? Is the revolution from the top-down is possible? Etc.

In order to avoid bogging down in the details, nuances and intricacies of different definitions, I will start from the modern general notion of revolution as the «“legitimate” overthrow of current authority by the sovereign citizens» [12. P. 151]. This definition is taken from the article written by Boris Kapustin, as I, like him, doubt the possibility to phrase the general theory of revolution, in spite of huge layer of works which classify those revolutions that we know from history, and emphasize some general stages of them. Quoted article was written as polemical response to the collective monograph, entirely devoted to the selected theme [4], followed by critical response [3]. Those, who want to go deeply into discussion for some details always could turn to these and other works, that also present thorough analytical reviews of different theories of revolution [for examp., 8], which offer critical rethinking of the term [for examp., 16 or 19]. Kapustin himself starts his theoretical reasoning with the definition of revolution as “modern event, defined by coming to existence and (the following) disappearance of political subjectness” [12. P. 121], and thereby admitting the insufficiency and abstractness of this notion, completes it with further commentary on the nature and essence of revolution.

I would like to discuss revolutions in this particular sense (as legitimate overthrows of the authority by sovereign citizens), as then, to my mind, since the Islamic revolution in Iran, it becomes absolutely impossible to classify revolutions as bourgeois and socialistic, since 1991 — reason about them in the line with the theory of social formation change. The approach I have chosen cut at once the whole layer of “cultural revolutions” (in the USSR, China, Iran), coups d’etat like “Glorious Revolution” in the Great Britain, and “top-down revolutions”, especially complicated cases when the reforms of each soviet leader are subsequently interpreted as revolutions, as did Natalia Yeliseeva [24. P. 132]. I have certain doubts left over national-liberation revolutions and wars. I could presume that since the Netherlands revolution they have been like that. Since “velvet”, I suppose, they have not (see below).

Thus wise, in the present work I will try to understand from whence the overthrows of authority become legitimate, and try to explain why, from my perspective, the concept of revolution is “dead” and I consider this article as the requiem for it. Every researcher, reasoning about the concept, yet keeps in mind certain classic examples, and I am no exception. The most “genuine” revolutions to me occurs The French Revolution and The Russian Revolution of 1917. Many magnum opuses of Revolution theory use these examples. The most relevant examples besides the ones listed above are considered The English and the American Revolutions [for examp.: 5]. In order to prove inconsistency of modern revolutions with classical definition, I will introduce the examples from recent history: “Arab spring” and “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet territory.

The legitimacy of overthrows

Revolutions are legitimated “post factum”, and the main thing that provide means for it is public consensus over the unbearable situation on the eve of revolution, which makes the uprising against the existing system justified. Crucial point in this is that the elite fails to fulfill its functions. All societies are hierarchical, social benefits are always distributed irregularly. However, the system that comes to existence is usually somehow conditioned, the benefits — justified.

Even the appearance of so blatantly unfair institute as peasants’ feudal dependence, that caused many popular uprisings, came out of historical conditions. The most vividly it could be demonstrated using the example of typical feudal country — France.

In the territory where afterwards arose the Frankish kingdom, gallo-roman possessors owned their estates on the basis of Roman (slave-owning) right; Francs—originally—on the German (tribal) right of collective property, from which they, within a very short time, came to private property that they called allodium. First few allodiums in the form of incumbency to the royal kinsmen appeared under Clovis, but already Chilperic I (561—584) issued an edict, whereunder all the ploughlands owned by Frankish commoners obtained the status of allodium [13. P. 93].

Formation of feudal dependent peasantry in the Frankish kingdom happened in two stages. The first stage lasted for about 150 years, till the beginning of the VIIIth century, and affected primarily dependant categories of Merovingian peasantry. Mainly the lower classes of gallo-roman population became dependant owners of land: slaves, freedmen and colonuses. The second stage fell at the VIII-IXth centuries, and led to the feudalization of free people, who constituted the backbone of gallo-roman villages and Frankish rural communities’ population. The idea of how it happened could be given by widely spread in the Carolingian period precarium contracts —documents, through which the land were given to the soliciting person. Land itself was called precarium.

For the large part of free population the retaining of lands as the allodial property became a difficult task or a weighty responsibility. Along with the granted precarium (simple transfer of lands from the owner to the peasant) started to appear the returned and the rewarded precariums, when one owner granted his plot to the other owner and instantly got it back as a precarium (in the latter case with the other land plot). Outwardly, the allodium owners voluntarily abandoned the right to property sufficient to manage the household independently.

Conditions of precarium contracts were different. They changed from the responsibility of precarium owner to pay the small zins in the amount of several denariuses to the big rent and bearing the labour services from 3 days to 3 weeks in a year. Precariums were granted for life or with the right of descend, ordinarily till the third generation. It was followed by the lowering of social status. The motivation for the allodium owners to become the precarium owners was the exemption from military service and public duties evasion with the reservation of rights to use the land. Vladimir Kolesnik emphasizes: the unwillingness of the main part of Francs population to fulfill their civil obligations, unrelated to their personal wealth, and their longing to shift responsibility to maintain the order and security onto someone else (to free themselves for solving

vital common problems), led to the social degradation of free peasants (their transformation into the feudal dependents) and to the multiplication of those problems, solving of which demanded their improvidently avoidance of free man duty. The land owner's opportunity to aggravate the precarium contract conditions by the increasing of zins contributed to the situation. Failure to pay zins on the due date led to the final transformation of precarium land into the taxed plot [13. P. 96—98].

The Hungarians and Norman plundering incursions in the Xth century resulted in the process of castle construction, which grasped Western Europe and led to formation of banal (from german "bun" — the right to order) seignior. It was the district within the territory of which the seignior possessed the broad range of politico-military and judicial and administrative rights. The population of district — even if it was not land dependent on the senioir — owed him different duties and homages. It led to the segregation of new military class — knighthood, to the feoffo-vassal hierarchy formalization, and to the unification of social status of the peasantry of the different origin on the base of their common dependence on ban owner. In western medievalism this process is interpreted as the pivotal breaking point in society and called the "feudal revolution" [13. P. 114—115].

In different European kingdoms (the more so in Russia) the process of personal liberty deprivation of peasantry had its peculiarities, but in general was due to the "division of labour" (when one class professionally fights and the other feeds it), and to the inability of kingdoms in the feudal disunity epoch to protect its nationals. This order lost the legitimacy with the development of trade, crafts and generally commodity-money relations. Rent and obligated services had natural exploitation limits, as natural products were perishable. Senioir and his kinsmen in such conditions mostly contrasted with the common people by the amount of consumed food. Change in the life quality of elite led to the commutation of rent — substitution of natural rent by money payments, in consequence of which the burden not only of the agricultural products production, but also the burden of its realization lied heavy on the population. For the elite the more important became the delicacy of food instead of its abundance, clothing and household articles became more and more luxurious. The final delegitimization of feudal dependency happened with the widening of military service evasion in the noble class. This situation has respect both to the European kingdoms and the Russian Empire. Peter III Manifesto on the Freedom of the Nobility originated the vague expectations through the Russian peasantry, which also hoped for freedom. Defeat of these hopes resulted in mass peasant riots.

Those riots fevered Europe, even though the process of manumission was taking place there. In the XVIth century the most part of French peasantry was represented by the censiva owners — personally free peasants, holding a censiva (land plot owned by the inheritance law, which was similar to the proprietary law), and paying the fix rent (census) to their seigniors. Market conditions of price advance and demand growth for the agricultural products favored the situation, but constantly rising (as opposed to the fixed feudal rents) governmental taxes leveled the tendency down [13. P. 182]. In Russia the dependency of formally feudal dependent peasants came down to the money rent only under Nicholas II.

Money rent increase, expansion of common land enclosures on the part of the land owners, growth in taxation tightening grip in progressively centralizing state, wars, poor harvests, and epidemics, — history was always rich in causes for peasant riots. One of the most important of them was personal liberation of peasants on retention of proprietary right to land to the Nobility (copyholders in England, serfs, liberated in 1861 in Russia). In Russia peasants were formally liberated with the land, the cost of which they had to pay to the land owners. Despite the loans, subsidies and the fact that the Treasury undertook to pay the most part of the cost, the result of that reform was that many peasants became the bad debtors, and the most part of the lands was concentrated in the hands of Nobel class. Such liberation, complete with legally secured land (on which peasants worked for generations) by the master, let the owner of land release it from peasants if he would have the opportunity to use it more profitably, and that was perceived as the monstrous injustice by peasants.

The same sort of situation was with the Third Estate. Gradual loss of progressive productive class characteristics and obtaining the characteristics of paratizing class (financial bourgeoisie) by the middle class led irrevocably to the legitimization of the anti-bourgeois revolutions. It is no coincidence that such revolution for the first time took place in Russia, straight after the Bourgeois Revolution, even under the lack of developed capitalistic relations, the paucity of proletariat e.t.c. Russian capitalist was twice parasite due to the merging with the state, because he grew rich not in the “honest” competitive battle, but through the access to the state money, “fattened” on the battlefield supplies e.t.c. October 1917 followed the February for many reasons: both the real, almost insolvable problems, and the impotence of the Russian Provisional Government. The power at that time actually “grew on trees”. However, it was impossible to hold it without the support of the main part of population — without peasantry.

According to Vladimir Babashkin, in the period of forty years after the abolition of serfdom, Russian landowners finally lost the moral right to own the land in the eyes of peasants. It happened because of self-eliminating of “moral economics” from the system, development of commodity — money relationship and the intrusion of market into the land relations (that sharply contradicted the peasant common sense — the land is owned by God and by those, who cultivate it) [2. P. 53].

Here is how the structure of the “moral economics” in the patrimonial Russian state is described by Dmitry Lukshin. [18. P. 183] Peasant “riots” and minor illegal acts (illegal fellings, damage by cattle and so on) he interprets as the system of signals of commoner’s rights violation and the “call for the dialogue”. The “authority” resorted in response the politico-military arguments, but applying of such measures was often of demonstrative nature, and there was a range of concessions in reserve.

Main aspirations of Russian peasants were clearly phrased already in 1905 by the delegates of the All-Russian Peasant Union, and then were continually repeated in the form of instructions to the deputies of the I and the II Duma: «all land should be owned by peasants on the basis of equalitarian common possession; officialdom on all levels should be electoral on the basis of the universal right of suffrage; local authorities should have broad powers in the sphere of land ownership, education and public health on the basis of central financing and self-financing». [2. P. 45—46].

After the February revolution the Provisional government liquidated the Corps of Gendarmes, Police Department and the Institutions of Investigation Police. Illegal acts (including “Black repartition” of lands which was well under way through the whole country) were of no consequences and, as a result, were considered authorized. Peasants shared the land at easy stages, also with the help of local government authorities, and the Bolsheviks only authorized that process by the “Decree on Land”.

In conclusion to this paragraph I would like to pose a question about the legitimation in public consciousness that transformation of Russian Empire in 1991, which is often called “liberal democratic” revolution. (Vitaliy Kurennoy called it “counter-revolution” in the cited source.) Today it may be said positively that acceptance and justification of this process in public consciousness come with the big problems. Economic liberalization took place against the unefficient exposure of planned economy. Other catalysts of discontent were the preferences of Soviet elite. Today these arguments do not seem profound against the merging of business with the state, which started with the distribution of state property for the state funds (loans-for-share auctions) and continues till now in the form of different types of state aid (money, spent for “saving” the banks on the rebound of financial crisis of 2008—2009 did not reach the real sector e.t.c.), mass funds withdrawal abroad by the businessmen or spending the money on the luxury instead of renewal of plant e.t.c. However, at that time (1989—1991) ridiculous — as time goes- privileges of Soviet elite actually outraged the population, since the preferences of party officials were fair only until the latter really “burn out” at work and could forfeit life and prison term at any minute for the undue performance of their duties.

So then the main thing that makes the overthrow of current authority legitimate is that the privileged class ceases to perform its functions in society. Sometimes the following events show that the real situation before revolution was not actually critical, and then the crucial point is not the real state of things, but the common conviction that those who have the privileges are undeservedly elite.

This trend strengthened with the time going from the first modern revolutionary “examples”, and with the “external” participation and wobbling of situation becoming more and more evident. The latter is confirmed by revolution theorists and called the “international pressure” [8. P. 220].

Revolution as value

Boris Kapustin’s remark that it is impossible to analyze the concept of revolution out of the category of freedom seems to me absolutely fair [12. P. 147—148]. However, freedom — which is one of the main values in Western society, not in the least is so in other, non-liberal cultures. The tragedy of values disparity could most prominently be seen as in the case of “Arab spring”, albeit it is noticeable in other situations (comprising long-suffering Russian society). Moreover, the reason for modern revolution often becomes not the lack but the abundance of freedom and the certain level of satiety.

Just before the “Arab spring” in the Middle East and in North Africa there was no economic stagnation, economics of most Arabian countries developed dynamically

(especially versus Western countries). Share of population living in great necessity was extremely small and fairly matched with the relevant shares in such countries as Estonia and Slovenia. Even in the poorest state of the region — in Yemen — level of extreme poverty on the eve of the “Arab spring” was matched with the one in P.R. China and three times lower than in India. There was also no famine: in the norm of standart rate of consumption nearly all Arabian countries (except for Yemen) had long ago come to the level of overnutrition. Social and economic inequality by the Third World’s standards was not outrageous. High level of corruption should not be blamed too. The first victim of the “Arab spring” became Tunis, which just before the revolution was even a little bit less corrupted than Italy. Level of unemployment was not high and had a tendency to decline. It was lower in Egypt than in the USA and the EU. But the medium level of general unemployment combined with catastrophic level of youth unemployment.

Fall in the child death rate in the Arab world in 1970—1990 completed with the late fall in the birth rate led to the share of youth growth in adult population, while the youth is the mainspring of revolutionary movements. Not insignificant role was played by the high educational level of Arabian youth, its concentration in the capitals, its active communication in social networks, its belief in western values and its desire to live up to western standards. This weird combination of western values adoption on one side: freedom, democracy, human rights- with exaggeratedly Arabic and Islamic identity on the other side gave birth to the same weird circumstances. Nevertheless, it is clear that the success of anti-governmental demonstrations in Tunis, Egypt and Libia, and also resignation of Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen were not possible without the obvious conflict inside the ruling elites; as the destruction of prosperous Libyan state and the civil war provocation in Syria were impossible without evident and slightly disguised outside military support from insurgents.

Result of the “Arab spring” was rather the aggravation of situation in the region than solution of pressing problems. Main effects were Islamisation of social-political life of region via quite democratic way, return to the traditional tribal lifestyle (this applies especially to Libya), threat to the territorial integrity of some Arabic states (besides Libya it is also initially Syria), economic stagnation, aggravation of unemployment, armed conflicts. It turned out, that such an engine of Arab economics as tourism could thrive only under the certain “relentlessness” and laicity of Egyptian and Tunisian regimes. The most important breakthrough, removal from power of the most corrupted clans, does not seem very prominent against general background of social and economic problems, sometimes reaching the level of humanitarian disaster. All these should inevitably lead to the radicalization of political life in Arab states, affected by the “Arab spring”. Moderate Islamists in new governments have truly monumental tasks, which they would hardly succeed to solve in short-term period. It will result in polarization of population: some part will demand more consequitive islamisation, some will demand return to the secular state projects. It is most likely that in the current situation the alternative to the radical Islamists are military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. Unlikely the democratization of region could be discussed in the near future, while the conquests of recent decades are lost already [7].

Notably, according to the subsequent events, post-revolutionary radicalization of political life relates not only to the East. Latest revolution in Ukraine resulted in civil war and forced to remember the evident and well-known from history.

First. Revolution is blood.

Practically always. And countless disasters. So far as in the course of revolution the existing politico-governmental institutes are destroyed in order to create a new regime. However, before new structures start to operate, the chaos falls. The settlement of new regime has to be done through the terror, repressions and at the cost of civil war... More over, it is far from certain that it would be settled at all. As fairly notices Vladlen Loginov, “great historical merit” of Bolsheviks is that they managed to “congregate by piecemals already fell to pieces country” [17. P. 225]. I would add for myself that it is huge historical accident, realization of which demanded a lot of inhuman means. In actual fact, the “velvet” revolutions do not exist! Supposedly “peaceful divorce” of soviet republics spilt over into the civil war in Tadjikistan, into the war in Abkhazia (1992—93) and into the Georgian-Ossetian conflict (1991—1992), Nagorno-Karabakh, conflict in Transnistria (1992), the war in Chechnya, and finally into the civil war in Ukraine (2014). Yugoslavia transformed into national European states at the cost of murderous war under the active external bombardments.

Libya on the eve of the “Arab spring” was one of the most successful Arabic projects. The Libyans were on the serious state welfare, could be employed, get education and make their lives. Desire to obtain political liberties (do they exist in the country, that is being teared apart by sheikhs?!) resulted in the state went to pieces, all financial allowances and subsidies vanished together with law and order. Central government does not hold any real power, the war of the cities are on, tribal levies fight against each other for the survived assets [7].

Second. Revolution devours its own children (Danton).

The tragedy of revolutionary-minded Russian intellectuals, which had to perish or to leave the motherland, of the first Bolsheviks, many of whom were repressed, unfortunately was not adopted by Russian remonstrative groups in Bolotnaya square. Essentially — satiated idlers, who do not know what is to work. Wearing out the seats of their trousers and skirts at the offices, prating on the Internet. Those, who get for the worthless activity as PR and some “creativity” absolutely crazy salaries, and have no idea how the rest of population live, and do not understand that in case of the fall of regime they would be the first to drink the cup of people’s wrath as servers of current regime. Apart from the fact that any revolution carries to the surface a lot of misfits, even criminal elements. Sooner or later new government has to impose order by not nearly a liberal means. Often suffer innocent people, who were devoutly seeking the liberty and did not understand that if the real revolution happens, they will have to perish, immigrate, at the best — to put on the wadding and set forth to felling.

Third. Alien values + native background =?

In the non-western world the real problems (and many!) exist, there is also discontent of masses and clans fighting, who recruit these masses. But the key role is already

played not by the undeserved elitism of upper class, but by the external pressure if it is presented only in the form of inculcation of western values in the non-western society.

Eastern politics, who take the western lead, become hostages of situation, as became Iranian shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi during the Islamic revolution in 1979. One of the main causes of population's discontent was the pro-Western politics of shah. But western values (the most important of which is liberty) did not let the developed democracies (first of all, the USA) came to aid to conductor of their policy, when he was wiped out by the people's wrath.

The exaltation of revolution is dangerous, because the liberty, that is without doubt a value, is not an absolute value. Toppling of rather soft social-oriented eastern authoritarianisms goes under the slogan of human rights violation. But certain political bondage against comparative social and economic well-being (in Libya the level of welfare is high) gives place to the anarchy, abuse of power of armed gangs' leaders, other disasters and cruelties of the civil war... Or not only of civil war, but with the addition of outside bombardments, as it was in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Syria... In such situation values as life and state prevail. Not occasionally in Russian history much value was always put upon the state — it was the one way to save life. Against such reasoning becomes more important the role of “failed” revolutions, like “Spring of Nations” of 1848—1849 (when the institutions are not destroyed, and the reforms anticipated in society are implemented in future by the ruling class) [10. P. 15—40].

Fourth. Archaism of post-revolutionary society.

Early revolutions were often related with the reformation of religious consciousness (the Netherlands, the Great Britain). In such cases the Church as the state institute was destroyed and emerged as the institute of civil society. The following revolutions practiced secularization of social life (France, Russia). And vacuum after the “leave” of the Church was filled by mysticism.

As Vladislav Aksyenov notes, under the conditions of censorial regulations' liquidation between the revolutions of 1917, the mystification of public consciousness happened and led to the expansion of demonism, mystic stories and satanic theme. Russian revolution and related to it religious crisis favored the growth of occulted societies. In print appeared a huge amount of advertisements and addresses of chiromomists, fortunetellers, healers and others. [1. P. 32—33] Russian society survived the similar process in 1990s, after revocation of communist ideology, which for some time played a role of secular religion in the country. To pull through the sweeping chiromancy, to set the screen against western and eastern destructive sects became possible only through the consolidation of traditional confessions' position.

Defeat in the World War I, disappointment in Revolution of 1918—19's results lead to the emergence in Intellectual sphere in German such ideological and political movement as “conservative revolution” (A. Moeller van den Bruck, E. Young, H. Freyer, C. Schmitt, E. Junger, O. Spengler and other authors). Ideas of conservative revolution radicalized and applied practically, made a prominent contribution to the settlement of Nazi regime [21. P. 57]. Even though Neocleous called fascism “reactionary modernism”,

in humanitarian context abandoning the Christian values and setback to the barbarism in it are evident.

Attempt of modernization in the course of revolution could in the foreseeable future turn into archaization, at the best — traditionalization of society. It is no wonder that after the “Arab spring” in the Middle East and in North Africa the active islamisation is in progress, with the consolidation of radical sects’ position, as Wahhabism. That is why the appropriate to the term halo of elevated and progressive semantics, contributing to the legitimization of revolutionary results, at the least, is not always justified.

Thus wise, in my opinion, revolution and freedom could not be regarded as absolute values nowadays. Even revolutionary apologetics itself is rather dangerous thing. Particular, Natalia Yeliseeva in her work analyses how the revolutionary rhetoric of M.S. Gorbachev gradually led to the change of social and political regime. The author emphasizes that the big role in it was played by the exaltation of heroic character of the October and the French Revolution. Although the soviet social scientists, understanding that setting the perestroika equal to the revolution happens evidently not upon Karl Marx, tried to give reasons for reforms as “top-down revolutions”, in other words profound transformations, conducted by the government (like the reforms of Peter I, Alexander II, O. Bismarck etc.) [24. P. 129—130]. However, they failed to phrase convincing vision and to put it against the “party line”. The result of “conjunction of revolution” in the USSR in the late 1980s is well known: partition and looting of country, loss of existing military, scientific and agricultural potential, social degradation, immiseration of society, armed conflicts...

Phenomenon of ethnic self-determination

Now we discuss the sovereign people. In that context the special emphasis is put upon the Kyrghiz case, as it concentrates “eastern” (tribalism, clannishness, the Islamic factor) and post-Soviet specifics, i.e. peculiarities of two regions of “color” revolutions localization.

Turkestanian campaigns were launched by the Russian Empire involuntarily, to cease the plundering incursions on certain Russian territories, which had an aim to take hostages, who later were turned to slaves. Kazakh tribes had already come under the protection of Russia to the moment of Central Asia active colonization. Actually, till the second half of the 19th century, when militant Central Asia kingdoms were brought under control, this Protectorate was conventional, while the real borders of the Empire were still the reinforced lines along the rivers Yaik (Ural) and Or.

Separate north Kirghiz tribes were resisting the authority of Kokand khans and were aiming for affiliation with the Russian Empire; they sent their ambassador to Russian authorities in the 18th century already. Since 1850-s, they voluntarily took out Russian citizenship and became Empire expansion conductors in Central Asia, south tribes were merged in the Empire only after the territory of modern Kirghizia was regained from the Khanate of Kokand, later some of them insurrected against the imperial authority.

It is not very clear on which basis the Kirghiz (kara-kirghiz) and Kazaks (Kaysak-kirghiz) tribes were differentiated, which differences were found between them. It is not occasionally that initially the future Kazak ASSR was called the Kirghiz ASSR (1920—1925), later (since 1936) it was called Kazak SSR. The second Kirghiz ASSR (1926) in 1924—1925 was Kara-Kirghiz AO, then (since 1936) it became the Kirghiz SSR. The concept of Kirghiz language and Kirghiz writing system did not exist at the time of nomadic tribes' affiliation with the Russian Empire. As other nations of Turkestan, future Kirghiz lived in mixed sprachraum, within which there was good mutual comprehensibility between them and future Kazaks, Uzbeks and Karakalpaks. In 1910 was created the Kirghiz written system on the basis of Arabic alphabet, in 1911—1914 were published the first authentic Kirghiz books (it is not worthy to even talk about the semi-mythical Orkhon-Yenisey writing system-ancient runic Turkic script). In 1924, when the Kara-Kirghiz AO with the center in Pishpek-city separated from Soviet Turkestan, Arab script was reformed with the aim to convey more precisely particular Kirghiz words. In 1928 the Arabic alphabet was changed to Roman script as non-representing the phonetic peculiarities of Kirghiz language and inconvenient for typesetting; one of the reform's goals was to lessen the Islamic influence onto the mass minds. Particularly in Latin alphabet was conducted the campaign for liquidation of illiteracy, were edited many books and newspapers. In 1940 the Russian alphabet, which is used till nowadays, was taken as a basis for Kirghiz script. Cyrillic alphabet contributed to creation of language homogeneity in the territory of the USSR and disrupted it between soviet Central Asia and Turkey. Written language became the base for the ethnic Kirghiz self-awareness, despite of contradictions between clans, south and north Kirghiz, which existed and exist now.

In the case of Kirghizia we could not talk about preceding nationhood (the Khanates of Kokand, of Khiva (Khwarezm), the Emirate of Bukhara), about some continuity of ancient and high culture. Kirghizia is the garden, created by Russian settlers of pre-soviet time, but mainly-in soviet time in the middle of nowhere and from the scratch. There were built cities, extractive and processing enterprises, there emerged light, food and even knowledge-intensive industries, there were opened the universities, science schools, was found the Academy of Sciences and the high culture was brought up. I suppose every man of culture knows the writer Chyngyz Aitmatov. But there also were the opera singer Bulat Minzhikliev, the ballet-dancer Bubusara Beyshenalieva, the composer, director and music teacher Kalyi Moldobosanov (all of them are people's artists of USSR). The USSR was the only place where the son of sheepherder Isa Ahunbaev could become the prominent surgeon (since 1959 he operated on bare heart, created his own school of cardiosurgery in Frunze). There is both no doubt that Isa Konoevitch was a heaven-born surgeon and that if he stayed in China and did not nomadise back to the USSR, he would tend sheeps and at the best chance become the folk healer.

By the example of Kirghizia it appears that people, also in ethnical sense of this term, is often created at will with the help of state policy. Kirghiz people in the USSR got the most favorable conditions and opportunities for its formation and development,

and, incidentally, in the referendum of 1991 voted for the preservation of the USSR. However, the representatives of all ethnic groups, inhabited Kirghizia, naturally voted.

Following independence the inter-clan contradictions became strained, the tribal identities actualized. All the more that in Kirghiz schools and universities they started to learn the names and characteristics of Kirghiz tribes and that created new reality. Conflicts that till the end of the 1980s were smoothed by the external image, actualized too. Today in the country takes place the struggle, conditioned both by traditional and newly found contradictions, partition and repartition of power and property between regional groupings of south and north Kirghiz, including much unification by congeneric type. Congeneric solidarity propelled not only the leaders, but also the rank members to fight for the victory of their clan, as it promises them the economic dividends. One more pressing question for Kyrghizstan is land question – crucial for many revolutions. Land squatting happens here more and more often.

Struggle for ascendance over the whole territory of modern Kirghizia between different Kyrghiz tribes has historical roots. Indisposing enough armed power at the places of Kirghiz camping ground, the Kokand khans aimed to rule those regions with the help of local noblemen. For that purpose khan's leaders raised the most prominent bais and manaps (rich landowners), decorated them with ranks and gifts, gradually turning them into obedient servants, who rendered substantial aid to Kokands in tax collection from nomadic population. When the Khanate of Kokand in 1830—1840s formally bent to submission the whole territory of Kirghizia, it generated the pretense to rule all Kirghiz tribes among the closest to the Kokands representatives of south-Kirghiz nobility. Among north Kirghiz at that time advanced the tribe Sary-Bagysh. In 1850 the sovereign manap of sary-bagysh Ormon proclaimed himself the khan of all Kirghiz. After the victory of Sary-Bagyshes over the other powerful north-kirghiz tribe — bugu, when only Russian intervention saved the latter from the resounding defeat, the leadership of Sary-Bagyshes was settled through the whole Kirghizia. (In 1961—1985 the first secretary of Republican communist party's Central Committee T. Usubaliev and the first president of Independent Kirghizstan A. Akaev belonged to the tribe Sary-Bagysh) [22].

After 1917 traditional nobility was pushed aside from the power, which did not let advance to the ruling positions in Kirghizia (and Kazakhstan) the representatives of subsidiary tribes. Following the Great Purge, the traditional authority structures returned the ruling position in the guise of Communist leaders.

Ethnic and tribal parity, practiced in Soviet period, did not let concentrate power in the hands of one sub-ethnic clan; however, the regional resistance could be seen even then. Industrially developed North of Republic was shared into 4 districts, and in the South, which specialized on cotton growing in the Fergana Valley, was established one big, united Osh Region. «North» regional elites often united to resist the members of party from Osh regional bureau, as only in this case the powers of competing groupings were more or less equal. Gradually, at the mundane level, those groupings constituted stable essentialist conceptualizations about each other: “northern” Kirghiz thought that “southern” (“oshtuk”) Kirghiz became like the Uzbeks, while “southern” Kirghiz thought that “northern” Kirghiz became russified. Nowadays both groups count themselves

as “pure” Kirghiz and appoint each other predetermined negative characteristics, which influence everyday relations.

“North” and “south” divisions are often explained by the researches and Kirghiz themselves as the result of subcultural differences (wedding and funeral traditions, reception of guests and relatives, allotment of meat etc). It stands to reason that the differences could be found not only among the “north” and “south” regions, but also among the districts of each separate region, meanwhile they do not become the fact of opposition between, for example, “Chuya” and “Issyk-Kul” Kirghiz and are not considered as sub-cultural. At the same time it is absolutely impossible to completely deny the Uzbek ethno-cultural influence in the South of republic. Its population is really more Islamized. Regional identification of Kirghiz becomes active in the periods of intense political competition and race for power. Whereas only such political mobilization lets the “opposition” create competitive groups of its “supporters” under the conditions of actual absence of party system in Kirghizia. Southerners, in particular, argued consistently in 1994 against the two-chamber parliament, fearing the decrease in numbers of its representatives in it, as the South of republic was at that time separated only into two regions: Osh region and Jalal-Abad (in 2000 appeared the third one — Batken region).

Thus wise, during the race for power between elites in the Kirghiz Republic were recruited voluntarily organized groups of ethnic Kirghiz: when the President from the “North” — the “opposition” mobilizes “southern” Kirghiz, when the President from the “South” — it mobilizes “northern” ones. Credit was also divided on the regional principal against the law enforcement forces. At the supreme moment they rely only on “friends”. So, for example, in April 2007 large divisions of MIA were re-deployed from the South of Kirghizia for suppression of mass rallies; they were accommodated at the premises of frontier base in Novopokrovsk in Chuya region, despite that there was enough law enforcement forces in the North of Republic [22].

Such state of things is not new. Young states broke down many times in history on the ethnic (tribal), religious, ideological and others principals. Civil nation, as a rule, is forged by state will, focused policy, sometimes with the application of quite violent measures aimed at the strengthening of national identity against the local, regional, ethnical. Revolutions in history often were national liberation wars. Now such conception is largely put into discredit. “Sovereign peoples” after liberation descend, as a rule, towards the fratricidal strife and break down on the tribal principal. This happened also in the post-Soviet Space. Those, who separated from the Republic, taking the fate into their own hands, did not succeed much in construction of effective nationhood, and their representatives inundated Russia and other countries of the world in search of a piece of bread.

Besides the regional and tribal rivalries, in Kirghizia is also strong the ethnic tension. On the eve of Republic independence the conflict bursted out and spilt over into the armed conflict and massacre. In 1990, despite the growth of anti-Russian sentiments, the bashings in Osh region were focused on the Uzbeks — the third large ethnic group in the Republic population. Young Kirghiz had not enough land for the individual construction, and they forced the authorities to give them the fields of Sovkhoz Lenin,

border on Osh. The Uzbeks, composing about 50% of population, were indignant at the transfer of irrigated plough land where they worked for the residential construction. The Kirghiz's discontent was heated by the abundance of ethnic Uzbeks in chief positions of region, in sphere of trade and services. The Uzbeks demanded the autonomy and the state status to their language. This conflict in early 1990s caused the mass exodus of Russian-speaking population from the Republic.

Approximately since 2000 started the outflow of south Kirghiz from the Fergana valley to the North. The Uzbeks became the one large non-title ethnic group the share of which in the population of country grew consistently through the natural increase and immigration of neighboring Uzbekistan. Fergana Uzbeks massively migrated to the South of Kirghizia due to the lack of economic freedom at their home, where they had no opportunity to sell the agricultural products at the market and had to hand it in to the state by the fixed prices. This increased the demographic pressure in the overpopulated Kirghiz part of Fergana valley. Other reasons that provoked the outflow of Kirghiz to the North were fear of Islamic extremism and consolidation of southerners' positions in power after 2005.

All those factors played the significant role in "revolutions", happened in "sovereign", "democratic" Kirghizstan in 2005 and 2010.

Color revolutions as the sign of time

In whole, I am quite in sympathy with Alexander Fisun that in the post-Soviet space we have to do with the patrimonial bureaucracy, I have even written about it already [11. P. 73—74], but I cannot possibly agree with his statement that phenomenon of color revolutions could be considered as "specific prelude of rational modern state construction and, consequently, transition to the equal game rules for all economic and political subjects" [8. P. 241].

Common to the many color revolutions (not only in the post-Soviet space) is that it is possible to change the voting results through the massive protest, radical aggressive minority takes the liberty to ignore the will of the majority of voters. This sequence of events has, at least, one positive aspect: thanks to the threat of "color" revolution the authority has to understand that there is the limit to the electoral frauds! Main destructive consequence of such overthrows is the threat of permanent unrest, since there is always some side, dissatisfied by the vote results, and it always has temptation to announce the results fabricated.

The Tulip Revolution in Kirghizia in 2005 is in many respects an inspired campaign, demonstrative punishment of Askar Akayev for his attempt to thread his way between the USA, Russia and China. Being the President, Akayev let the USA open American Air Force base near Bishkek for conducting operations in Afghanistan. Later he gave Russia the opportunity to open its air base in 30 km from the deployment of the USA armed forces. After his toppling, Akayev openly accused in press the USA of the overthrow organization in Kirghizia. According to his version, the uprising was organized by nongovernmental organizations (including Freedom House and National Republican Institute), and their efforts were coordinated by American Embassy [20].

This does not mean that there was not popular discontent. Yes, Akayev's clan corrupted the country, occupied all key posts in the state, divided between relatives the property, created in the Soviet period, and the business that appeared later, drew out funds. But why they call "revolution" the demonstrative punishment of the disobedient President of "sheep republic" by the overseas hegemon?

Why should be the palace coup called "revolution", even if it happened with the support of masses?

Palace shuffles took and will take place in the East. Next President of country became "the opposition leader", southerner Kurmanbek Bakiyev, dismissed by Akayev from the position of prime minister after the insurgencies in the South of Republic in spring 2002. The confrontation between South and North was defused by freeing from imprisonment one more ex-premier, northerner Felix Kulov, who held back from the challenge for the presidency in exchange for the prime minister seat. Afterwards Bakiyev did away with Kulov.

In summary, the Kirghiz opposition of 2005 did not have the single political platform and represented itself the group of ex-party workers and ex-politicians, who for one reason or another became unwanted by Askar Akayev and therefore deprived of power and privileges, offered by political offices. It managed to head the mass, discontented by its level of life. Moreover, the Kirghiz revolution, as many others, attracted a lot of destructive and even criminal elements. The rise to power of new clan after the "Tulip Revolution" did not change for the better the life of common Kirghiz. Economic situation was in permanent crisis, the country still was largely dependent on Russia, China and the USA. Unemployment was always on the high level and did not descend lower than 11 %. About a million people had to work in other countries (generally, in Russia), and lives of many common citizens were dependent on the money, sent from abroad. Ruling of Kurmanbek Bakiyev did not make any improvements for Kirghiz people, latterly the contradictions between north and south regions aggravated, and in April 2010 new rebellion begun. This uprising was even more furious than five years earlier. People assaulted the White House and other administrative businesses, despite the sight shooting from roofs. The insurgents seized the weapons, beat law enforcement officers, plundered (somebody considered it as spontaneous expropriation of property by proletariat). The next succession of power happened between regional-tribal clans, south and north, who used the insurgents as food for powder for their own goals. Resting the consistent conspiracy theorists, it is necessary to suppose that positioning of Bakiyev as the politician proved to the strong partnership with Russia and other states of NIS, and his promise to close American air base in return for the Russian credit played its role. In the days of Revolution the surge of debacles, arsons, pillages, assaults on the houses of Russians and Meshkhetian Turks in the north, and on Uzbeks houses in the south swept through the country. In Osh-city, the area of compact Uzbek settling, 70% of houses were destroyed. New President (after the transition period) became the native of Chuya region Almazbek Atanbaev, also the ex-prime-minister. Rental contract between Manas airport and Americans was prolonged for an indefinite term.

External factor did not always play the important role in revolutions. As for English and Netherland Revolutions—they were specifically internal case, even though they surely influenced the minds all over the earth. When The French and American Revolutions accomplished—they at once became the inspiring example for the liberation fight of the oppressed all over the world. During the “Spring of Nations” in 1848—1849 Revolution spreaded over Europe, using the words of Eric Hobsbawm, “like the forest fire” [10. P. 16], and even had an impact on Latin America.

As for the Russian Revolution...It could be said that it was the first involving the external forces. In 1917 in Russia appeared the real threat of substantial strengthening of Russian geopolitical positions. It was possible to cross Russia out of winners in the I World War only by its destruction. Helping to come to power the new players both the enemy (German) and the ally (England and France) got the opportunity to manipulate them.

Of course, the powers ready to the Palace coup existed (the top generalship, the leaders of Octobrists and Cadets, part of the highest bourgeoisie and even the members of the Tsar’s family), they only needed to be supported and directed. However, the participation in the February Revolution in 1917 of English, French and German agents of influence is without doubt.

In the epoch of “Cold War” nobody disguised the external support of the revolutionary movements. The USSR supported “pro-socialistic” national-liberation movements, the USA — “pro-liberal-democratic”. The external participation of the latter in “velvet” revolutions and in breakup of USSR is evident, notably in case of Yugoslavia and the USSR the bet was placed particularly on the ethnic factor. Transformation was not bloodless. Result of others, really velvet revolutions: long term slump in production, aggravation of investment climate, constant rotation of elites, accompanied by the repeated repartition and pillage of resources and assets, loss of trust to the democratic procedures from the side of masses, desovereignisation of country, its falling within total dependence on western grants and credits, settlement of the regime of ruled democracy. In Czeck Republic and Poland, where the population revolted against the installation in the countries’ territories the elements of American ballistic-missile-defense, the governments, however, properly carried out the instructions of overseas patrons.

So, modern “color” revolutions are almost always the inspired campaigns where people’s wrath is used (with the people’s blood). Even though, the scale of event does not guarantee the exact result. However, if the revolution is campaign to settle the external ruling by leading to the power the puppet government — it is a priori directed against people’s interests. In this case, we deal with direct substitution of notion, as people’s sovereignty is provided by national state and national government. Important role in such projects is played by the threat of punishment on the part of international society: fear of lynch homeward and of international criminal court in the Hague puts the Presidents of “sheep republics” off applying “excessive force” for suppression of mutinies. I suppose that Askar Akayev in 2005, Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2010 or Victor Yanukovych in 2014 did not suppress insurgents violently keeping in mind the fate of Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, and Muammar Gaddafi. Not by chance Akayev

and Yanukovich hid after their toppling in Russia, Bakyev — in Belarus. I suppose, there are not other states in the world where they could feel relatively safe.

Curiously enough, that small, but politically aware and active part of Kirghiz people realizes this external participation. After the massacres in Osh on the 11—14 June 2010 Permanent Council of OSCE decided to send the Police Advisory Group to Kirghizia for “easing of ethnic tension”. These plans were received by huge part of population with incredulity and even caused a few demonstrations in Osh and Bishkek. Abbreviation of OSCE, making frequent appearances in Mass Media during the Balkan crises, bought itself strong negative connotations, and agitated concerns in Kirghiz society about the realization of Kosovan scenario in Republic to separate its South. All the more, the ascendance over the South was almost lost at that moment, field commanders ran everything. Kosovo and South Kirghizia have many common characteristics. Both regions occupy very advantage grounds, in both regions the significant role is played by narco mafia. South Kirghizia, situated in the eastern part of Fergana valley, is in close proximity to China, Iran and Afghanistan, which are in the area of interest or under focused attention of the USA. [23]

So, under the pretence of revolution we are presented with any efforts to change the power, up to the sub-ethnic clans’ fights (as in Kirghizia) or the fights between the oligarchic groups (as in Ukraine), even the banal palace coups. Although, nowadays the genuine revolution could be considered only the effort to break the world order headed by the USA together with the effort to destroy the dominance of international bourgeoisie.

Even though for the young philologers the usage of term “revolution” in respect with the “color revolutions” seems quite justified (so, for example, Maria Budina tries to solve the problem by distinguishing the “classic” and “modern” approach to the definition of term [6. P. 26]), I suppose that, from the perspective of political sciences, it is absolutely impossible to call “revolution” the externally planned campaign!

Findings and conclusions

In sum, to my mind, there are minimum two reasons for the term “revolution” exhaustiveness. The first is polysemy, which does not confuse the theorists, however, on the level of political practices it leads to the situation when they start calling “revolution” even the succession of power from some oligarchs to another, as it was during the Ukrainian Orange revolution.

The second is the tail of elevated semantics, following the notion, letting legitimate any illegal toppling of power, including those which do not serve the “sovereign people’s” interests.

As for the perspectives...The concept of revolution as we are used to perceive it—inside the nation state, as the fight between national bourgeoisie or proletariat (international? national? subethnic?) against the existing institutions of domination and submission, ran its course. Due Vitaliy Kurennoy, this happened because modern capitalistic system “embodied revolutionism as the moment of its existence” [16. P. 246, 254]. In my opinion, the case actually is that in modern world the structures of suppression

and depression have radically changed, and today we have to deal with different domination, of global capacity, from whence the notion of revolution (as legitimate toppling of power by the sovereign people) ran its course as it consists of pure inventions.

When we start studying particular cases, we find that, at first, public is not public, both not in the civil and ethnic sense, and even when it has self-identified itself in the latter sense, it continues breaking down into tribal groups. Secondly, it is not sovereign, as it is being seduced, pushed and manipulated. Thirdly, supposedly enough, legitimate overthrow of power (as the elite did not fulfill its functions in the society well) could turn out to be illegitimate post factum, previous “repressive” order could turn to be quite fair, demands of insurgents-exorbitant. Fourthly, there could come a point that the mutiny would be aimed at the right point, as the government does not have the real power, but under the control of international capital, etc. So the revolution is good only as the threat to push the authority towards the reforms and to withhold it from too massive electoral frauds. It seems that in such case the most preferable are the unsuccessful revolutions, as the “spring of nations”. But today the government often fears not the people’s wrath, but the world hegemon’s discontent, for which the “revolution” is only the way to change the “national” elite for more controllable one. That is why, to my mind, the notion of revolution turned into the simulacrum. Using it nowadays, especially in respect with the overthrows, organized and provoked in one or another state by the external forces, we participate in creation of borrowed fictitious conceptual reality. Western human, living in the world of his fictions, feels quite comfortable, non-Western, importing foreign clichés, often destroys his own identity (as it was with Russian “totalitarianism”).

That is why, in the context of revolution, to me is close the original re-thinking the world-system theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, offered by the young author Ilya Kupryashkin, including some romantic statements as “the forthcoming socialistic revolution is the only one possible” [15. P. 132]. The time of “genuine” revolutions, with which we are used to deal, apparently, is now history (which does not exclude the mass people demonstration). It happened also consequent on the seizure of mass media by global media magnates and its turning into the sources of mass disinformation. That is why revolution, connected with it liberation and existing structure of world order oppression’s destruction, would apparently be in very different forms than we are used to know. The odds are that the driving force would be represented by the national states themselves, which saved some sovereignty, and I am not alone in this opinion, to such revolution (surely without calling it so) calls, for example, Sergey Glazyev. It appears to him that this process is actionable through the creation of anti-war coalition of countries with positive program of world financial and economic architecture organization on the basis of mutual benefit, justice and respect of national sovereignty [9]. Maybe, national states would act in league with trans-border structures of civil society, independent from financial structures, affiliated with global hegemon. Glazyev sees perspectives in the fight for future world order in co-operation with religious, anti-facist and humanitarian organizations, world expert and scientific communities. How it would happen shows the time... Only one question rests to be solved: how to make the governments being national avoiding revolutionary upheavals and disruption inside the state?

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ПЕРЕОСМЫСЛЯ КАТЕГОРИЮ РЕВОЛЮЦИИ

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Предметом исследования является категория революции. Автор пытается понять, насколько революция как легитимное ниспровержение власти суверенным народом является рабочим понятием в современной политической ситуации. Поскольку, на его взгляд, начиная с исламской революции в Иране становится совершенно невозможным классифицировать революции на буржуазные и социалистические, начиная с 1991 г. рассуждать о них в русле теории смены общественных формаций. В своей статье автор анализирует, вследствие чего ниспровержение власти во время революции становится легитимным, а также объясняет, почему, с его точки зрения, концепт революции «умер». Категорию революции автор изучает с использованием приемов политической концептологии. В качестве методов исследования применены сравнительный, исторический метод, а также методы аналитической философии. Основным выводом проведенного исследования является исчерпанность на сегодня понятия «революция» по причине его многозначности и возвышенной семантической нагрузки, тянущейся за понятием и позволяющей легитимировать любое незаконное свержение власти, в том числе и отнюдь не в интересах «суверенного народа». Концепт революции в том виде, в котором мы привыкли его воспринимать, исчерпал себя, поскольку состоит из сплошных фикций, а в современном мире радикально изменились структуры подавления и угнетения.

Ключевые слова: суверенитет, народ, власть, элита, легитимность, свобода, этничность, категория, ценность.