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Instruments of State Identity Policy in the Contemporary World

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Abstract. The article is devoted to studying the development and specifics of using instruments of state identity policy in modern conditions of geopolitical challenges. The study contributes to clarifying scientific knowledge about the means by which state authorities strive to achieve their goals in identity construction. The differentiation of approaches among particular states in the conditions of modern geopolitical confrontation has been established. The study is based on the application of a comprehensive approach to determining the content of state identity policy. The empirical source of the study is the results of an expert survey of leading domestic researchers in the field of identity politics conducted in the fall of 2023 with the participation of the authors. Discourse analysis was used as a method for processing primary data. The main trends in the development of instruments of state identity policy in the conditions of the 2020s have been identified. The study allows for the clarification of knowledge about the limitations and limits of the effectiveness of the state in the field of identity construction.

Keywords: identity, identity politics, state identity policy, public policy, symbolic politics, identity construction, public policy instruments

Инструменты государственной политики идентичности в современном мире

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Аннотация. Изучено развитие и выявлена специфика использования инструментов государственной политики идентичности в современных условиях геополитических вызовов. Исследование вносит вклад в уточнение научных знаний о средствах решения органами государственной власти задач по конструированию идентичности. Практическая значимость исследования связана с необходимостью уточнения знаний об эффективности применения конкретных инструментов государственного управления в сфере конструирования идентичности. Выявлена дифференциация подходов отдельных государств в условиях современного геополитического противостояния. Исследование основано на применении комплексного подхода к определению содержания государственной политики идентичности. Эмпирическим источником исследования являются результаты проведенного осенью 2023 г. с участием авторов экспертного опроса ведущих отечественных исследователей в области изучения политики идентичности. В качестве метода обработки первичных данных использован дискурс-анализ. Выявлены основные тенденции развития инструментов государственной политики идентичности в условиях 2020-х гг. Наибольшая сложность в оценке инструментов государственной политики идентичности связана с проблемой измеримости поставленных задач и целей в этой сфере публичного регулирования. Для государственной политики идентичности характерны специфические комбинации традиционных типов инструментов государственной политики. Инструменты прямого регулирования применяются только в сдерживающих целях. Наибольшая роль принадлежит стимулирующим инструментам, которые, как правило, одновременно являются косвенными. Исследование позволяет уточнить знания об ограничениях и пределах эффективности деятельности государства в области конструирования государственной идентичности.

Ключевые слова: идентичность, политика идентичности, государственная политика идентичности, государственная политика, символическая политика, конструирование идентичности, инструменты государственной политики

Introduction

The study of public policy in the field of identity construction is one of the most dynamically developing research fields in domestic science (Popova, 2020; Titov, 2022). The rapid growth of attention among Russian scientists to issues of state identity policy has been occurring since the late 2010s (Mitroshenkov, 2016; Malinova, 2017; Lubsky, 2018). Currently, scientific knowledge in this area is acquiring practical significance and influencing the content of public policy (Baranov, 2019; Grishin, 2020).

One of the "research gaps" in the scientific study of state identity policy is the question of the tools used in this area of state regulation. In some areas of public administration, policy implementation tools have been studied in great detail; approaches to the classification and assessment of individual public policy instruments have been formed (Lascoumes, Patrick, 2007). At present, it is not clear to what extent these scientific ideas are applicable to measures of managerial influence in the sphere of constructing the identity of citizens with their own state. It is necessary to answer the question of whether general theoretical ideas about the instruments of state policy are applicable in relation to state identity policy. Then, it is equally important to find out whether the practice of state activity in the field of constructing identity provides grounds for clarifying scientific knowledge about the instruments of state policy in general.

This article solves the problems of clarifying scientific and theoretical knowledge about the specifics of using public policy instruments in a certain local area of public regulation—identity construction and identifying the peculiarities of the use of these instruments by modern states. The most valuable source of the article was the results of an expert survey conducted by the authors of the article as part of the scientific project "State identity policy in the context of modern geopolitical challenges" in October–November 2023. Among the experts, there were leading domestic researchers in the field of identity politics; also, there were 20 participants. The method of collecting information when conducting an expert survey is a non-standardized interview, and the method of processing the obtained primary data is discourse analysis. The respondents were leading Russian researchers of identity politics, which allowed the authors to use the results of this empirical study directly to clarify theoretical issues in the chosen area of research.

Theoretical Framework of the Study

In the scientific literature, public policy instruments are usually considered in the broader context of systemic measures but are sometimes associated with a specific instrumental approach (Hood & Margetts, 2007). The instruments of state policy are

traditionally understood as a wide range of means of influence by the state on the desired object to achieve the set goals and objectives and obtain the required result (Welfens, 2002: 45).

State policy instruments are always considered inseparable from the goals and objectives set by the state (Gutsalov, 2023). When considering public policy instruments, the principle of proportionality is almost always taken into account, which assumes that the measures taken by the state must be adequate to the objectives set. This is one of the main difficulties, since in modern science the tasks of state policy in the field of identity construction are interpreted in a very wide range, from tasks in the field of historical education and patriotic education (Lagutin, 2019; Baranov, 2023) to maintaining the common values, symbols, and meanings necessary to ensure integration in society (Gorshkov, 2016; Gorlova & Zorin, 2023).

Among existing scientific approaches to classifying public policy instruments, some can be applied to policies in the field of identity construction.

The most universal and widespread approach to classifying public policy instruments, regardless of the spheres of managerial influence, is the division into direct and indirect. Direct instruments are targeted and aimed at a certain range of objects, and the condition for their use is the direct participation of government authorities, while indirect instruments are not targeted and are used in relation to the entire possible range of objects of activity, forming the basic rules and environment for activity. In relation to various areas of public administration, the thesis is widespread that indirect tools are more effective than direct ones (Salamon, 2002: 57). Obviously, this thesis can be extended to state policy in the sphere of constructing the identity of citizens, since the applicability of administrative measures in this direction seems doubtful.

Depending on the stage of development and implementation of state identity policy, tools are divided into stimulating and restraining ones. This classification can also be used in relation to state identity policy, with a certain adjustment of definitions. In the field of state identity policy, tools aimed at developing and strengthening the population's awareness of unity and maintaining values, images, and meanings that promote integration should be recognized as stimulating. Tools designed to protect historical memory and the values, images, and meanings that are most important for maintaining the unity of society from destructive influence can be considered deterrents (Avksentyev, 2018). It is believed that within the framework of state identity policy, it is advisable to use both stimulating and restraining tools. In particular, V.Yu. Zorin and A.V. Rudakov note that "the policy of protecting… one's own identity in modern conditions can hardly be of a defensive nature. On the contrary, the effectiveness of this policy may be due to its offensive nature" (Zorin & Rudakov, 2018: 63).

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Depending on the specific area of public regulation, researchers usually identify a wide range of specific public policy instruments. Analytical work on their systematization almost always lags behind the research of individual specific instruments, which results in an unjustifiably broad use of this term in applied research.

Experts' Assessment of the Features
of State Identity Policy Instruments

Speaking about the tools for identity formation, experts draw attention to the fact that some types of social identity are formed by society itself, by traditions, and, accordingly, do not require special government intervention in this process. "*These tools are associated with the historical traditions of interaction in society. They are both institutionalized and informal practices. These are traditions, some norms, some customs, etc. And every nation and every social group will have their own. They persist even despite the fact that we are in the 21st century*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

It is clearly visible how differently various communities live and act within the same state. For example, in France, there are communities that cultivate identity models of the countries from which they came. They live in an unconditionally secular state, but they not only preserve but also emphasize their religious identity. The difficulty lies in the fact that when discussing tools for identity formation, "*we are talking about both historical communities and emigrants of other ethnic origins who arrive and also organize fraternities, preserve their identity due to the fact that they also maintain ties with their homeland, with their relatives, move their relatives and friends [there], and organize their own centers of mutual assistance and mutual support. This allows us to preserve and reproduce norms and formal and informal practices*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

According to experts, when the state tries to integrate everyone into one community, it usually initially introduces a whole range of prohibitive measures. For example, in France, "*there was a struggle with so-called regional particularisms, with regional identities, until the 70s and 80s of the 20th century, and then, when, it would seem, there were no longer any regional features left, emigrants arrived and a policy of cultural pluralism arose. This was also used by regional historical communities as a basis for fighting for their rights. As one of the French authors wrote, you can be French and Arab, but you cannot be Norman and Arab. It turned out that regional identity began to have some special weight when a dispute arose with some other newcomers and emigrant identities. A new round of disputes arose in the struggle for this historical identity. Accordingly, the Normans then remembered that after all they were Normans, that they were Bretons, when,*

it would seem, there were no longer any peculiarities and they were forgotten" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

At this stage, a surge of serious struggle arises "*precisely for the rights of these identities that live in these regions. In the 90s, almost everywhere in Europe, there has been an increase in self-knowledge and self-identification, an increase in demands on the center and on the central government to ensure the rights of these identities*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor). Experts believe that the policy of cultural pluralism has not justified itself in relation to the emigrant community but has made a great contribution to the self-knowledge, self-orientation, and self-identification of regional communities. A large volume of practices is being created related to the formation of institutions of power in the regions, with the support of regional languages. This is due to educational processes, programs, and the publication of textbooks and teaching aids. "*There are entire international projects that support this process. The European Union has a Charter for the Support of Regional Languages, an Office of Less Commonly Used Languages, and the so-called "Euromosaic" program, which supports rare languages of the European Union and finances the publication of books and textbooks in these languages. In general, identity-related policies are now linked to government decentralization policies. Hence the support for projects when competencies are transferred specifically to historical regions, and they are more active... within the framework of various integration projects, when they can practically attract investments, form their own alliances and connections with regions of other states, not only neighboring ones; they even receive delegations from other states at cultural events, so they are often included in some projects at the level of the state itself*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

Experts believe that these processes deserve careful analysis since various regional movements can become increasingly significant players in the country's public administration practices. As a rule, one model of interaction between the center and these national regions has been historically reproduced. If previously they were perceived as opportunities for separatist protest in the regions, now the central government addresses them, which greatly influences the result: "*Some regions may be more fortunate in the sense that they quickly get the opportunity to institutionalize their characteristics, for example, to have their own parliament. Someone may receive national cultural autonomy but will not be satisfied with this and will continue to demand some changes in the constitutional status. But the central government, of course, approaches these issues quite carefully*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

Experts are unanimous that there is a huge number of instruments of state identity policy that the authorities and other actors they attract actively use. "*They are very diverse. This is the politics of memory, symbolic politics; this is some kind*

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of propaganda activity of the state; this is the creation of an image of the enemy or images of friends; this is the use of ideologies, myths, and myth-making. The experience of foreign countries in the field of identity formation is very diverse; it significantly depends on the context, on the conditions in which this state exists, and on how this identity is formed. It can be formed in two ways. Firstly, of course, no one sets out the task of forming some kind of identity. Values can be formed; this happens naturally. Secondly, the state is interested in the formation of certain models of identity" (M., Doctor of Law, Professor).

When the state, in the process of implementing identity politics, delegated part of its functions, financial resources, and symbolic resources to civil society organizations, it solved two problems. On the one hand, it really transfers part of its responsibility to those civil organizations that work more targeted, succinctly, specifically, and effectively. This is "*a classic addition to the institutions of civil society, filling those gaps that the state is unable to fulfill due to its enormity and cumbersomeness*". But, on the other hand, "*the state has the task of additionally demonstrating and legitimizing itself: "Society supports us; we have other actors, not only state actors, in this environment"*" (F., Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor).

In the experts' answers about priority tools, the most often voiced idea was that in any society, the main tools for forming a common identity are the education system, the media, and institutions for the development and reproduction of culture. Each of these areas takes responsibility for its own part of identity politics. Educational institutions are primarily involved in educating citizens. For example, in France, there is a special civics course in high school. There were attempts to abandon it, but then the subject was restored in the education system. Subjects of history and social studies should be focused on the formation of civil identity and demonstrating the historical conditionality of unity.

Diversity and Innovation of State Identity Policy Instruments in Experts' Assessments

The interviewed experts noted the wide variety of tools used in the field of identity construction and the uniqueness of some of them. Although it is declared that the object of influence of the state identity policy is the entire population of the country—all citizens—in reality, most often the focus is on certain age groups, primarily schoolchildren and youth.

Some experts highlighted large programs in various areas of state policy regarding youth, emphasizing the special importance of projects in the field of education. "*This is by far the most important channel that the state implements; it is concerned about the common identity of the younger generation*" (F.,

Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor). Experts note that the state is not interested in the generation aged 40+. "*It is believed that people who have managed to be among the pioneers are already correct in themselves. There are people who were socialized later; this is the "lost generation"; nothing can be done with them. And there are young people with whom it is urgently necessary to carry out activities so as not to lose them. I think this is a too simplistic approach. This conclusion is not based on any research*" (F., Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor). The secondary education system is responsible for education, from physical to moral and intellectual development. Basically, schools, and partly universities, are the channels through which the state works with children and youth. The state strives for fairly transparent decisions, relying mainly on the education and cultural systems (the obvious direction is cinema). Significant investments and a more complex branched system are created for working with historical memory.

An expert specializing in the study of the PRC notes that this country has formed "*an optimal, to some extent authoritarian, but successful system for the formation of civic identity. The PRC is a multinational country with many nationalities. And, probably, in these matters, it is impossible to do without authoritarianism at the level of government decisions*" (F., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor). State identity policy permeates all spheres of social life, starting with education, youth policy, and family as an institution for the formation of values. This system is well built. The discussion of the role of religion in civic identity deserves special attention. Formally, in a multi-religious country, the role of the religious factor, from the point of view of the formation of civic identity, is very unclear. But "*if in China Confucianism still strongly influences the value sphere of a person, then in Russia such a significant and massive influence of religion on a person's personality and value system cannot be traced. Well, this is precisely from the point of view of systematicity; this topic is very poorly spelled out*" (F., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor). In China, there is a strong respect for the country's history and historical memory. "*And, in fact, the history of the country is complex, and there were many difficult events, but these events are taken at face value, it is what happened, this is part of our history*" (F., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

In Russia, as soon as an event or historical era becomes a thing of the past, it becomes an object of criticism. "*Criticism of the country's historical experience and historical memory also influences the formation of the civic identity of our young generation*" (F., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor). The expert considers the introduction of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 809, "On approval of the Fundamentals of State Policy for the preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values,"

on November 9, 2022, to be an absolutely non-standard, unexpected, but very effective means. "*Now that these things are starting to become more active, they really build the state's position regarding politics, including the civil identity of a person*" (F., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

Experts note systematic, deep work with young people to form a system of values, develop respect for historical memory, symbols of the state, and important elements of the state political course: "*We can see, for example, the emergence of conversations about what is important, the tradition of raising the flag and the anthem on Monday morning in every school and every university in our country. But how is this conveyed, how is it organized, and how is the perception of young people built? This is a separate point that needs to be formed, which needs to be paid attention to... This requires serious work*" (F., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

The difference in expert approaches to the set of tools for implementing state identity policy affects the relationship of government institutions with other political and non-political actors, to whom government authorities delegate some of the tasks of forming models of political identity and politicized options for social identity with characteristics desirable for a particular political regime. Experts talk about the role of military service as an instrument of state identity politics. Religious organizations and NGOs associated with certain ethnic groups or denominations are assessed as extremely important institutions. The role of public and social mediation institutions is specifically stipulated. "*This, undoubtedly, is military service; these are confessions, instruments of public policy. Well, for example, the interaction of government authorities with public chambers or with ethnic and religious NGOs. Various kinds of advisory councils, advisory structures, intermediary institutions, mediating institutions—the more democracy, the more complex the system of these instruments. And they are not so much of a state nature as of a social one*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

Among the tools seemingly traditional institutions stand out, which, as follows from the classical theory of political socialization, work to form the norms, values, ideas, and political preferences of people. However, experts emphasize that the education system must function at all levels and for all age categories, including civic education practices. "*Starting with what are the institutions and instruments of state identity policy, this is, of course, the education system at all its levels, from preschool to adult education, the so-called civil*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor) .

With a diverse arsenal of tools for implementing state identity policy, it is currently "*carried out at the expense of the information block that every national state has, that the territories that claim the name of at least an unrecognized state have. Including all the failed states, they are also trying to use this, because if you are outside the media and information agenda today, you simply do not show your point of view, you do not prove it, and one can even say radically—it does not exist*" (M., Doctor of Political

Sciences, Professor). Experts are convinced that the perception of the media—from traditional to online services—in this case turns out to be upside down; a much greater influence on the formation of state and civil identity or their deformation is exerted by "*social networks, instant messengers, then websites, news portals of some kind, and last of all, traditional media in the form of newspapers, television, and radio channels*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

Experts place symbolic politics in second place of importance, after education or information policy. Interesting cases arise in connection with the change in the self-name of the state. Experts are drawing attention to the attempt to rename, or rather, change the self-name of India to Bharat. "*Will there be understanding in the world? I think that sooner or later we will come to it, but for this, we need to actively rework school textbooks and maps in various languages, including Russian. This will be unusual for us, but the point of view of the Indian government and the Indian elite is legitimate. Let's be called differently, and thereby we will close a certain page of our history. Symbolism is a very important thing*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

In language policy, practices of multilingualism are welcomed, i.e., securing the equality of different languages (the status of several state languages or ensuring fair equality of the status of regional and local languages) on the basis of relevant international law, including the norms of the Constitution enshrined in this regard, which play an important role in the cultural integration of various ethnic groups. This function is mainly carried out through a system of representation in non-governmental organizations. The positive experience of Finland is that, despite a fairly monotonous ethnic Finnish composition of the population, a Swedish minority lives in the city of Turku and its environs, in the area of Helsinki and the Aland Islands. The status of the Aland Islands is enshrined in law, including in international law as the status of a demilitarized zone and as an area where both Swedish and Finnish are used equally, although Swedes make up a very modest percentage of the population. There is a positive practice in Finland, Norway, and Sweden regarding the Sami (the old name is Laplanders). Denmark's positive experience is based on the broad autonomy of the Faroe Islands and Greenland; the current policy is opposed only by a narrow group of ethnic activists. "*Yes, there are also non-governmental organizations there; there is representation, advisory, and consultation in parliaments and in land representative structures*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor). Experts note that in a number of Eastern European countries, for example, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the policy of integrating ethnic minorities while preserving their identity is carried out quite effectively. However, in those states that have little experience of independent existence, "*less tradition of the national state, where it was not completed or created under coercion, with large*

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authoritarian practices, or where there are compactly living minorities, there are, of course, much more problems. These are Bulgaria, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and North Macedonia, not to mention Albania” (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

According to experts, “*the secular strategy of identity politics… is more preferable in modern conditions. If a country integrates its population on a confessional basis, then one must be prepared for the fact that some kind of alternative project will arise or that it will become politicized. This is how the situation is in Turkey; the appeal to the norms and values of Islam, perhaps in itself, is a positive phenomenon, but it instantly caused an “allergic reaction” on the part of secular, social democratic, liberal parties. And there this conflict is clearly expressed*” (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

Experts note that the effects of using identity politics tools in different countries are contrasting. The frequently applied policy of positive discrimination, the policy of providing quotas for migrants and representatives of autochthonous, indigenous minorities, especially if this is associated with territorial fencing, the allocation of an area where these communities have some special rights, can be dangerous and have a negative impact in those countries where, it would seem, minorities are not very significant in numbers and have few economic resources. “*In New Zealand and Canada, voices are heard that the ethnic majority should repent for colonialism, for centuries of oppression, but I do not consider this productive*” (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

In many states, the discourse of the political-administrative and public political elite declares the integration of state identity politics into other areas of politics, for example, into development policy. “*Small countries and rich countries of the West, such as New Zealand and Scotland, which is also a country, formulate development policies that include the formation of identity. Many people do not call identity politics purely politics, but it is still present*” (F., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

Objectively, the goals of state identity policy for government bodies and society differ. For a person, the manifestation of the state as social and the implementation of social programs are of the utmost importance. “*Now, if a person feels themselves standing with both feet and looking into the future, this is the criterion*” (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor); “*and the well-being of the person themselves… It does not exist. Because it is about self-awareness. The criterion is a citizen’s sense of self in society*” (F., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor). At the same time, for the political elite, the main goal is to ensure political and social stability. “*Stability, continuity. Sustainable order*” (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor); “*sustainability for the elite is important as an indicator of its effectiveness*” (F., Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor); “*a constellation of interests of groups… They [the political and administrative elite] want stability*” (M., Doctor

of Political Sciences, Professor). It was in connection with this idea that experts spoke about the need for accelerated economic and social development in the country as a synchronization of efforts to obtain a synergistic effect. "*Economy and education—these are the things we need to rely on now; we need to unite—well, in general, unite the state through education and through some economic things*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

Sport on the international stage as a representation of a strong country is a very strong argument for creating a sense of respect for "one's" state. "*Well, perhaps we could talk about sports, for example. But you know what the current situation is with sports*" (F., Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor).

Symbolic politics, as the strongest instrument of state identity politics, has many directions. The priorities, according to experts, are toponymy, the policy of installation or demolition of monuments, and museum policy: "*Museums... The question is, how do you bring people there? The museums are wonderful, the buildings are magnificent, the exhibits are rare, and the people who work there are professionals with higher education and extensive work experience. Well, everything is fine. Where are the people? Not all the residents of the republic and the city were at the National Museum*" (F., Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor). Then, the patriotic and documentary films: "*Cinema and, in general, television. The hero of our time—who is he? We open some television channels; what do we see? The heroes, of course, around whom all these talk shows are formed... the main thing is that people are interested in this; that's where the audience is*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor); "*Cinema is a very powerful tool... people still continue to go to the cinema; they want cinema*" (F., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

An extremely important tool is domestic tourism as an opportunity to get to know and love your country: "*If you follow any route in Adygea, in the mountains... the routes are made in such a way that you are proud of the country*" (F., Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor); "*An interest appears in studying the region <...> you come... and say, "Well, it's like home"...*" (F., Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor).

Experts note that the set of instruments for state identity policy depends largely on the direction of the model being constructed. Like all ideal types, when trying to classify, the negative model and the positive model on the platform of the development of social programs do not exhaust all options for possible cases, but they provide certain guidelines for understanding the political situation. The negative model appeals to cancel culture, memory wars, and culture wars. "*These are negative categories that meet the objectives of some states for negative mobilization but do not meet the public demand for development. I see serious contradictions here*" (F., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

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The use of a positive model based on the development of social programs allows citizens to feel a sense of gratitude to their states for the quality of life. "*Rich countries... had such an attitude towards creating a model of society and especially a well-being economy. Not "welfare" but "well-being"*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor) and the possibility of continuous development ("*We will talk not only about social support but about creating a favorable environment for development and identity formation. There is such a platform for five rich countries, which include Finland, Iceland, Wales, Scotland, New Zealand, etc. These are small economies. But they want to be leaders in the discussion. This happened before the turning point events*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor)), a chance to live in good environmental conditions, since the state takes care of this and part of the profit is directed through social programs to eliminate environmental risks ("*The social agenda is integrated into the climate agenda*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor)), preservation of national and cultural traditions of ethnic groups ("*Multiculturalism was very popular. Now it is unpopular, but the ideas of integration and the need to build interaction in new cultural societies remain. Interculturalism is also not entirely new; it is about 10 years old... They are trying to find "other paths and models"*" (F., Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor)).

In addition, experts mention the influence of discourse, building a specific communication strategy between public politicians and the population on issues of the image of the future state. "*This is what in modern discourse is called "discursive power". The use of discursive power is the most important characteristic of identity politics today*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

The results of the expert survey allow us to identify some significant aspects of domestic scientists' understanding of the instruments of state identity policy.

1. Experts emphasize the dominance of reference to events of the past, which is typical for states of the "semi-periphery" and "periphery", the lack of a clear positive or constructive image of the future state, and the obligatory focus on confronting the "other". "*The same applies... to the Baltic countries. Using their example, it is very easy to say that identity is formed in confrontation because they are on the European periphery. And the formation of a positive agenda is the next stage*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

2. The experts pay attention to the appeal to obvious simple indicators associated with overcoming the poverty level by a significant part of the population. "*If we talk about the lack of a positive image, then this is typical for a large part of the world. The Chinese have developed (or, at least, say that they have developed) such a positive image. But, for the most part, it is present due to the fact that they have made a very clear statement about overcoming poverty. And this stage, overcoming poverty, is the bar against which we count, let's say, not*

even the formation of a positive identity, as it used to be, but the unification of society around this agenda" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor); "*... especially the level of development of the territory. A positive vector towards reducing the level of inequality. Not overcoming inequality. Nobody thinks that it will ever be overcome. Everyone knows that this is the engine of development. There will be no complete overcoming of inequality, but moving towards reducing the level of inequality or, at least, bringing it to a socially acceptable level is another matter. This is the most important component—a positive movement towards the greatest possible overcoming of inequality*" (F., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

3. Humanitarian values seem to be significant in modern conditions: "*There are general guidelines; they are associated with enlightenment and education, with the introduction of humanitarian values*" (F., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

4. Declaration of the involvement of the population in the formation of "territories of social well-being" at the local level: "*There is a model of the economy of well-being, a society of well-being, in which the state does not play a decisive role. The meaning there is that the population is involved at all levels. The Finns tested this model at the local level with the help of consultations of all kinds*" (F., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

5. The possibility of using the "rapprochement agenda" for a certain period of time: "*There are positive dynamics regarding the rapprochement of regions; this is a very important component of a positively oriented identity policy*" (M., Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor).

Conclusion

Strengthening state management influence on the sphere of identity construction corresponds to modern fundamental trends towards expanding the functions and spheres of public administration (Grishin, 2019: 69). As part of this general trend, states are mastering new management tools, which leads to innovation but is also a non-linear process. The use of separate tools for identity construction tasks may turn out to be ineffective and lead to the revision and improvement of management practices (Popova, 2019). Obviously, the greatest difficulty in assessing the instruments of state identity policy is associated with the problem of the measurability of the set tasks and goals in this area of public regulation.

State identity politics is characterized by specific combinations of traditional types of state policy instruments. Direct regulation instruments are used only for deterrent purposes. The greatest role is played by stimulating tools, which, as a rule, are also indirect.

State identity policy is defined by an extremely complex combination of tools. Experts emphasize that almost every state uses a specific and very wide arsenal of tools in the field of identity construction. For researchers, this circumstance makes it difficult to correctly assess the effectiveness of each specific instrument of government influence.

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